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ABSTRACT   
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between board attributes and 
risk management (committee structure, practice, and disclosure) and firm performance 
(return on asset [ROA], return on equity [ROE], and market-to-book ratio [MTB]) of 
listed financial service firms in Nigeria from the year 2012 to 2016. Data were collected 
from the annual accounts and reports of 45 sampled firms (225 firm-year observations). 
To test the hypotheses developed in this study, the Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSEs) regression was used. The result from the multivariate analysis shows that board 
size and risk management committee meeting have a significant positive effect on firm 
performance (ROA, ROE, and MTB), while chief executive officer’s tenure has a 
significant positive effect on ROA and ROE. However, board composition, board 
expertise, risk management committee size, and risk management practice and 
disclosure have a significant negative impact on all the three performance variables in 
this study. While board meeting has an insignificant positive effect on ROA and MTB 
and has an insignificant negative influence on ROE. Risk management committee 
composition shows an insignificant positive association with firm performance. 
Consequently, the result of this study portrays the influence of Corporate Governance 
(CG) mechanisms (board attributes and risk management) in the Nigerian financial 
institutions. In addition, the findings of this study offer an immense insight to the 
regulators of CG reforms in Nigeria to review and strengthen the existing CG code 
where necessary. Besides, this study has also provided an important intuition to the 
shareholders, corporate managers, financial analysts, and the academic communities to 
further understand the impact of CG mechanisms on firm performance.  
 
 
Keywords: corporate governance, firm performance, board attributes, risk management 























Tujuan kajian ini adalah untuk menyelidik hubungan antara atribut lembaga dan 
pengurusan risiko (struktur jawatankuasa, amalan, dan pendedahan) dengan prestasi 
firma (pulangan atas aset [ROA], pulangan atas ekuiti [ROE], dan nisbah pasaran-
kepada-buku [MTB]) firma perkhidmatan kewangan tersenarai di Nigeria dari tahun 
2012 hingga 2016. Data dikumpulkan daripada sampel akaun dan laporan tahunan 45 
buah firma (225 pemerhatian ke atas pencapaian tahunan firma). Untuk menguji 
hipotesis yang dibangunkan dalam kajian ini, regresi Panel Piawaian Pembetulan Ralat 
(Panel Corrected Standard Errors) (PCSEs) digunakan. Hasil analisis multivariat 
menunjukkan bahawa saiz lembaga dan mesyuarat jawatankuasa pengurusan risiko 
mempunyai kesan positif yang signifikan terhadap prestasi firma (ROA, ROE, dan 
MTB), sementara pelantikan ketua pegawai eksekutif mempunyai kesan positif yang 
signifikan terhadap ROA dan ROE. Walau bagaimanapun, komposisi lembaga, 
kepakaran lembaga, saiz jawatankuasa pengurusan risiko, dan amalan pengurusan risiko 
serta pendedahan mempunyai kesan negatif yang signifikan terhadap ketiga-tiga 
pemboleh ubah prestasi. Sementara itu, mesyuarat lembaga mempunyai kesan positif 
yang tidak signifikan terhadap ROA dan MTB, tetapi mempunyai pengaruh negatif    
yang tidak signifikan terhadap ROE. Komposisi jawatankuasa pengurusan risiko 
menunjukkan perkaitan positif yang tidak signifikan dengan prestasi firma. Hasilnya, 
dapatan kajian ini menggambarkan pengaruh mekanisme Tadbir Urus Korporat (CG) 
(lembaga pengarah dan pengurusan risiko) dalam institusi kewangan di Nigeria. Di 
samping itu, penemuan kajian ini menawarkan wawasan yang besar kepada pengawal 
selia pembaharuan CG di Nigeria untuk mengkaji semula dan mengukuhkan kod CG 
sedia ada apabila perlu. Selain itu, kajian ini juga memberikan intuisi penting kepada 
para pemegang saham, pengurus korporat, penganalisis kewangan dan komuniti 
akademik untuk lebih memahami impak mekanisme CG ke atas prestasi firma. 
 
 
Kata kunci: tadbir urus korporat, prestasi firma, atribut lembaga, struktur jawatankuasa 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
 
Today's business environment has been highly competitive and often volatile in nature 
due to frequent changes and rapid advancement in technology. However, this has 
reshaped the decision-making process of various businesses in meeting growth and 
development objectives via; profit making, maximizing shareholders' value, growth in 
market share by attracting investors, and in strive to suit in the current and ever changing 
global business trends. Besides, in the quest to ensure growth and development, 
businesses engage in investments accession with investors. 
 
Coherently, investors often ensure that a business is financially reliable and stable, and 
that long-term profit generation is guaranteed before investing in a given venture 
(Millan, 2007). The investors are after a better performance of a company because it is 
the essential requirement for an organizational survival and growth (Kakanda, Salim, & 
Chandren, 2016a). Similarly, Kakanda, Bello, and Abba (2016b) stressed that 
"performance is a key to determine the perpetuity of a business set up. It is regarded as 
the foremost objective of profit-oriented organizations. A well-performing business is 
often one that is effective and efficient in securing its long-term success. Managers of 
corporate entities are much concerned about high performance, as it has a long-term 
effect on their corporations ranging from an adequate utilization of resources and 





Performance as an essential requirement for survival and growth of a company is 
considered as the process by which the limited amount of resources available to an 
organization are effectively and efficiently managed in achieving its predetermined 
objectives for both short and long-term periods. It is the increase in wealth of a 
shareholder from the beginning of one accounting period to the end of another period 
(Berger & Patti, 2002; Marn & Romuald, 2012). In this regard, the primary objective of 
shareholders investing in a venture is to ameliorate their wealth from one level to a better 
level, and this could only be achieved when the business is doing well. Thus, the 
performance of a company will depict how better of a shareholder has become on the 
investment in an entity over a given period of time.  
 
Subsequently, the financial reliability and stability, and profitability of a business solely 
depend on the process and practice of its corporate governance, and with effective 
corporate governance in operation, it is assumed that the long-term value of stakeholders 
will be enhanced (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2002). Similarly, a crucial and 
valuable stair in constructing and encouraging market confidence, alongside more stable 
and long-term investment flows, depends mainly on good established corporate 
governance (Barbu & Bocean, 2007).    
 
Historically, the earlier seminal work of Berle and Means (1932) set the pace for most 
of the works in the field of corporate governance. The work titled ‘separation of 
ownership and control' was published immediately after the stock market crash of the 
United States in 1929. The separation has been assumed to generate an agency 
relationship between owners (the principals) and managers (the agents). It is expected 




maximizing returns to shareholders. This assumption doesn't hold in the real world 
because it is on fantasy conclusion (Tosuni, 2013). 
 
Remarkably, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(hereinafter, OECD) which is a unique forum where governments of over thirty (30) 
different economies work in common to tackle economic, social and governance 
challenges of globalization as well to achieve their objectives, has been the fore-runner 
in defining corporate governance. OECD (2004) refers to corporate governance as the 
procedures used by organizations in pursuing their set objectives in the circumstances 
of social, regulatory and market surroundings, and the practices of corporate governance 
are being affected by an effort to align shareholders’ interests (wealth maximization) 
(Adrian, 2009). 
 
However, the theme of corporate governance has over the years received greater 
attention from governments, non-governmental organizations, managers, academicians, 
investors, and other stakeholders (Claessens & Fan, 2002). In essence, it is particularly 
due to the Asian financial crisis in 1997, which has slightly resulted from the long 
economic crisis in Japan in the early 1990s (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008; Sachs, 1998). 
This has negatively affected the performance of many East-Asian corporations, hence, 
an impetus for researchers to posit that the economic crisis in East Asia has to a great 
extent emanated from malfunction corporate governance that leads to poor performance 
(Marn & Romuald, 2012).    
 
In the same way, the high-profile of financial scandals that leads to the downfall of giant 




Brothers, Commerce Bank, and Parmalat in Italy among others, have recaptured the 
attention and interest of academic researchers, policy makers, regulatory bodies, 
investors and other stakeholders about corporate governance alongside its influence on 
the performance of firms (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008; Benjamin, 2009; Gill & Mathur, 
2011; Fallatah & Dickson, 2012;  Shahwan, 2015). In this effect, Brown and Caylor 
(2006), Jackling and Johl (2009), and Bohren and Strom (2010) opined that the financial 
scandals in the aforementioned corporations was due to the manipulations of their 
financial statements to inflate performance figures which crumbled investors believe in 
capital markets and existing corporate governance effectiveness in elevating 
transparency and accountability as unraveling by investigations (Gill & Mathur, 2011). 
 
Similarly, Oyebode (2009) opined that the loss of confidence by investors in the 
companies quoted in the Nigerian capital market resulted from poor corporate 
governance practice that leads to poor performance that has led to the crash in the share 
price of companies most especially banks that are operating in the financial service 
sector. In a twin dimension, Rogers (2008) reports that poor corporate governance 
practice had also led to the collapse of some banks in Uganda, such as Uganda 
Corporative bank, Greenland Bank, and International Credit bank. Equally important, 
the 2008 global financial crisis, has predominantly affected every sector and country, 
because the excessive and failures were at the core of the financial system (especially 
banking sector) which transmitted the ramifications rapidly on the global economy 
(International Monetary Report [IMF], 2009). However, IMF linked this to poor 






Accordingly, failure in the financial sector may be contagious to other sectors of the 
economy, as it serves as a financial intermediary, and as an auxiliary in enhancing the 
growth of an economy (IMF, 2009). Therefore, financial institutions are considered as 
the key economic players in every nation. This is in corroboration with the view of 
Sutton and Beth (2007) that financial services sector is the largest in the world in terms 
of returns maximization. Besides, it consists of wide range of businesses involving 
merchant banks, credit card companies, to mention but a few. Moreover, the authors 
state that financial services enable the commencement of new businesses, increase 
business growth potential and efficiency, and as well assist companies to compete at 
both national and international markets.  
 
At the same time, the financial sector of every economy is the most important oil that 
lubricates its growth and development, and it is the key player that mobilizes funds from 
the surplus sector to the deficit sector of the economy (Adekunle, Salami & Adedipe, 
2013). Aderibigbe (2004) reveals that financial sector has over the years immensely 
assists in easing and promoting business transactions and economic growth in Nigeria.  
 
To Wong (2012), financial institutions are considered the main pillars of the economy 
of every nation and involve in a business with potential risks. The author assumed that 
since risk management is very vital to the financial institutions toward obtaining their 
predetermined goals and objectives, they are therefore required to publish in their annual 
reports, all matters regarding risk management policies. This is because “various 
stakeholders to financial institutions, especially investors, rely on these risk 
management disclosures to assess the adequacy and appropriateness of the risk 




Recently, risk management committee structure has turned into a critical issue with a 
ton of attentions, and activities on risk management are viewed as part of the momentous 
audit committee functions (Ng, Chong, & Ismail, 2012). Still, numerous corporate 
catastrophes like Enron and WorldCom have become a challenge to the trust that 
shareholders placed on auditor's report, and this has cast doubt on the integrity of audit 
committees in monitoring and implementing programs on risk management (Bates & 
Leclerc, 2009). Consequently, this prompts the need for risk management committee 
structure (RMC) to oversee and implement risk management programs. In essence, 
RMC structure has some features that encompass RMC size, RMC composition 
(Independence), and RMC meetings (Ng et al., 2012).   
 
Generally, assessment and determination of effective corporate governance can be on 
the basis of different principles. These principles include principles of disclosure and 
transparency, relationship with investors and other stakeholders, policies and 
compliance, and members of a board of directors' attributes (Shahwan, 2015). Boards 
of both private and public firms are responsible to ensure that the interests of companies’ 
stockholders are met, and also to guarantee the financial steadiness and performance of 
such companies (Ethics Resource Center, 2002). 
 
Topal and Dogan (2014), opined that the main duty of the board of directors is to direct 
the overall activities of the corporation in a more cautious and proactive way because 
they are the apex authority in the decision-making process, and their directive to the 
corporation enables a continuous profit to the shareholders in the long-run. Board of 
directors is considered as the most important mechanism of organizational governance 




Hindawi, Al-Dahiyat, & Sartawi, 2012). Therefore, this study attempts to assess the 
relationship between corporate governance represented by board attributes (board size, 
board composition, board meetings, CEO tenure, board expertise), risk management 
committee (RMC) structure, (RMC size, RMC composition, RMC meetings), risk 
management practices and disclosure and performance of listed financial service firms 
in Nigeria.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement  
 
Corporate governance has for long become an issue of global concern due to excessive 
corporate failures that resulted from poor corporate governance practice. Among the 
cases are Enron, World Com and Lehman Brothers in the United States, Parmalat in 
Italy, and Malaysian Airlines System (MAS) in Malaysia, Spring Bank Plc and Fin Bank 
Plc in Nigeria (Benjamin, 2009; Fallatah & Dickson, 2012; Gill & Mathur, 2011; 
Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008; Marn & Romuald, 2012; Rogers, 2008; Shahwan, 2015). 
The central theme of the issue being debated is the failure of the board of directors in 
playing their role of monitoring and counselling, and reporting the activities of the 
company for the interest of shareholders, whose expectations are having a better return 
on their investments (Uadiale, 2010). 
 
In 2008, the issue of corporate failures resulting from the global financial crisis has 
become severe because it is related to financial institutions which are the main pillars of 
capital market stability (IMF, 2009). This is because, financial institutions serve as 
financial intermediaries for a mortgage, government securities, corporate debt, equity 




stock exchanges, currency exchanges, providing liquidity in the market and managing 
of risks in price changes that are very important for the economy (CBN, 2015). 
Therefore, failure in the effective operation of these institutions may be detrimental to 
other sectors in an economy. 
 
To address the fundamental deficiencies in financial institutions (specifically banks) 
corporate governance that became apparent during the 2008 and 2009 global financial 
crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has revised its erstwhile 
recommendations for adoption of sound corporate governance by banks in 2010 (Bank 
for International Settlement, 2010). Following BCBS’s recommendation, emerging 
economies in the world have designed policies to implement best practice bank 
management in which Nigeria is also not left out.  
 
In the same vein, Karatzias (2011) maintains that “several large financial institutions 
worldwide no longer exist or have been taken over precisely because they neglected the 
basic rules of risk management and control” (p. 146). Moreover, OECD (2009) reports 
that there are some common problems relating to risk management and corporate 
governance that are present in numerous financial institutions prior to, and during the 
2008 global financial crisis. The problems include: (1) Risks are not frequently linked 
to business strategy which is a major subject in ensuring that the management of risk is 
the central focus on the operations of the business; and (2) Corporate board of directors 
do not take into consideration stakeholders and custodians in reporting responses to risks 





Similarly, global economic crisis and the collapse of large corporations over a decade 
have caused great concern on the inadequacy of corporate governance practices and risk 
management disclosures in the financial markets (Buckby, Gallery, & Ma, 2015). As a 
result, the inadequate corporate disclosures on its activities, corporate governance 
practices, and risk management practices, have a significant effect on the investor's 
ability in evaluating public companies and its associated risks (Abraham & Shrives, 
2014). 
 
In an attempt to mitigate the problem of risk in organizations, several standards are 
developed. For instance, regarding financial institutions, the Bank for International 
Settlement (2011) states that in 2006 it published a document ‘Principles of the Sound 
Management of Operational Risk and the Role of Supervision’ which substitutes the 
2003 ‘Sound Practices’. The new principles are contained in the document that is 
referred in paragraph 651 of Basel II, and it has principles of sound risk management 
involving: (1) corporate governance, (2) risk management environment, and (3) role of 
disclosure.  
 
The Basel II contains principles for the management of operational risk in banks, and 
these fundamental principles are; 
 
Principle 1: “The board of directors should take the lead in establishing a strong 
risk management culture. The board of directors and senior management should 
establish a corporate culture that is guided by strong risk management and that 
supports and provides appropriate standards and incentives for professional and 
responsible behaviour. In this regard, it is the responsibility of the board of 
directors to ensure that a strong operational risk management culture exists 






Principle 2: “banks should develop, implement and maintain a Framework that 
is fully integrated into the bank’s overall risk management processes. The 
Framework for operational risk management chosen by an individual bank will 
depend on a range of factors, including its nature, size, complexity, and risk 
profile” (Bank for International Settlement, 2011, p. 7). 
 
Principle 3: “The board of directors should establish, approve and periodically 
review the Framework. The board of directors should oversee senior 
management to ensure that policies, processes and systems are implemented 
effectively at all decision levels” (Bank for International Settlement, 2011, p. 8). 
 
Principle 11: “A bank’s public disclosures should allow stakeholders to assess 
its approach to operational risk management. Because a bank’s public disclosure 
of relevant operational risk management information can lead to transparency 
and the development of better industry practice through market discipline. The 
amount and type of disclosure should be commensurate with the size, risk profile 
and complexity of bank’s operations, and evolving industry practice” (Bank for 
International Settlement, 2011, p. 18). 
 
 
Nevertheless, the issue of corporate failure and its associations with weak governance 
that leads to poor performance is also experienced by Nigeria. In this regard, the 
Nigerian capital market has been shocked from the global financial crisis which leads 
to loss of jobs and investor confidence in the capital market, alongside, doubt in the 
effectiveness of existing corporate governance practice (Mmadu, 2013; Ironkwe & 
Adee, 2014). Moreover, from 2008 to 2010, investors in the Nigerian capital market 
have suffered a drop-down of $61.64 billion (N9 turn.) or 70% of their investments due 
to lack of effective compliance to the code in practice, which leads to the issue of a 
revised Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance (NCCG) in 2011 (Securities and 
Exchange Commission [SEC], 2012).  
 
Moreover, Bello (2013) reveals that there is widespread of financial misconduct that led 
to the declaration of many banks as failed and distressed in the Nigerian financial service 




stream to the shortfall sector within the economy. Likewise, some banks have poor 
performance and liquidity problem due to ineffective corporate governance practice 
because only less than 50% of the listed firms in Nigeria observe effective corporate 
governance practice (Mmadu, 2013), and non-adherence to banks’ risk management 
practices (Sanusi, 2010).  
 
Pertinent to mention, the failure and weak corporate governance in Nigerian financial 
sector (majorly banks) is undoubtedly the major factor that significantly contributes to 
the financial crisis in the economy (Sanusi, 2010). The author further states that 
corporate governance in many banks and non-banks financial institutions failed because 
their board of directors ignored its practices due to misleading behaviour by executive 
management, lack of required expertise by board members to enforce good governance 
on management, CEO/chairman often had domineering control on the boards, and the 
board committees are also often ineffective or even dormant. In the same vein, failure 
of some companies in the Nigerian financial sector results from inadequate risk 
management framework for identifying and measuring of risk, and lack of adequate and 
a transparent disclosure of such risks and other activities (CBN, 2010).  
 
Notably, bank consolidation exercises took place in Nigeria in 2005 and 2009 which 
arose from the erosion of shareholders’ funds largely due to unethical managerial 
practices in banking sector (Onakoya, Fasanya & Ofoegbu, 2014), and declining quality 
of their risk associated assets resulting from fall in equity market prices, world oil prices, 
and naira value compared to other nations’ currencies (BGL Banking Report, 2010) 





Over the years, the Nigerian financial institution has suffered from deteriorating 
movements in both capitalization and profitability (Dugguh & Diggi, 2015), because 
out of twenty-four (24) banks, only 3 are said to be profitable while 8 are on the brink 
of distress and failure due to inadequacy of capital and risk asset diminution (CBN, 
2010). Moreover, other factors like a significant failure in corporate governance at 
banks, macroeconomic instability, enforcement and irregular supervision were 
responsible for ensuring delicate financial system and which has set risk in the system 
(CBN, 2010).  
 
Report from CBN (2010) shows that the failure of some companies (especially banks) 
in the Nigerian financial institution in 2005 and beyond was due to some factors like 
failures in corporate governance (weak and poor), neglect by board members in 
discharging their role (inadequate knowledge of the board), inadequate disclosure and 
transparency in reporting, inadequate risk management frameworks for identifying, 
measuring and controlling the risks associated with the activities of deposit money 
banks (DMBs) and other financial institutions among others which placed them 
(financial service firms) to be operating at the risk of failure.  
 
In a nutshell, capital risk and market risk may be the major risks that evolve around the 
operations of financial service firms in Nigeria that puts them on the verge of failure. 
Concurrently, Dugguh and Diggi (2015) maintained that the problem of risk 
management that leads to failure in the Nigerian financial institution is subject to 
recurrence. The authors added that the Nigerian industry has witnessed widespread of 




1958, 7 in 1989, 63 in 2006, and 3 in 2011 (being acquired by Asset Management 
Corporation of Nigeria, AMCON). 
 
More recently, the Central Bank of Nigeria has dissolved the board and retrenched the 
CEO of a particular company (Skye Bank) on July 4, 2016, due persistent loss and fall 
in value of investment which causes loss of confidence in minds of investors, depositors, 
and other stakeholders (in press, channelstv.com). However, to mitigate the problem, 
CBN instituted its staff as the new CEO of the bank and appoints its other staff to form 
a new board of directors. Surprisingly, with newly appointed CEO and board members 
by CBN, the share value of Skye Bank increases by $166,666.67 (N50m) as evidenced 
in the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Therefore, this indicates that both CEO and board of 
directors of companies have a significant relationship with performance and value of 
firms. 
 
However, in the quest to mitigate the risk of failure in the Nigerian financial sector, the 
CBN has in 2005 requires all commercial banks to have a minimum capitalization base 
of $193.8m (N25b) in order to continue operating. Other measures taken by CBN from 
2005 to date include; establishment of the financial stability committee, establishment 
of the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON), review of supervisory 
procedures and methodology, renewed collaboration with other regulators, adoption of 
a common year-end for banks, and revision of corporate governance that include risk 
management framework and its reporting among others (CBN, 2010). 
  
The Society for Corporate Governance in Nigeria, SCGN (2011) reports that corporate 




because of inadequacies in the Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance (hereinafter, 
NCCG) issued by SEC in 2003, alongside ignorance of the board in discharging their 
functions. SCGN recommends that the selection of board members should be based on 
skill and experience, and a risk management committee should be established separately 
from audit committee in corporate organizations. 
 
Consequently, the Nigerian SEC revised it erstwhile Code of CG in 2011 which 
emphasizes on the establishment of a risk management committee and its framework by 
the board of publicly trading companies in the country. The NCCG 2011 states that the 
board is responsible for the oversight function and effective implementation of risk 
management framework, and its annual review to ensure full compliance. It also added 
that the risk management committee should be of adequate size, compose of non-
executive directors, and should hold meetings to strengthen the performance of firms, 
and practice of such risk management be disclosed in the annual reports of the 
companies which are of high interest to investors.  
 
Equally important, Yatim (2010) opines that “boards that establish a stand-alone 
committee that focuses solely on the risk management function demonstrate their 
commitment to improving the overall corporate governance structures of their firms” 
(p. 18). In addition, financial and non-financial companies that have complex or huge 
risks are to provide a familiar reporting system involving direct reporting of risk 
management to board of directors who are acting on behalf of shareholders (OECD, 
2015), and reports on the risk management practices of firms are normally disclosed in 





Typically, it has become prevalent that the issue of corporate governance and firm 
performance has become a global interest particularly following the global financial 
crisis and financial scandals in different economies. Thus, regulators, managers, 
academicians, investors and other stakeholders are increasing their efforts to infuse 
suitable controls through effective corporate governance in various economies 
(Benjamin, 2009; Ibrahim, Rehman & Raoof, 2010; Fallatah & Dickson, 2012). As a 
result, several empirical studies are conducted to assess the relationship between various 
corporate governance mechanisms and performance of firms. However, most of these 
studies are extensively conducted in developed nations, albeit there are lots of the said 
studies in developing nations but seldom in financial service sector especially in an 
emerging economy like Nigeria that has a different economic setting and financial 
market. Again, the results of these studies are found to be inconclusive and disputing in 
the literature regarding corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance.   
 
To be more specific, one stream of studies found that positive relationship exists 
between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance (e.g., Abdul-Qadir & 
Kwanbo, 2012; Afrifa & Tauringana, 2015; Al-Matari et al., 2014a; Chechet Jnr., & 
Akanet, 2013; Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Gill, Biger, Mand & 
Shah, 2012; Joe Duke & Kankpang, 2011; Liang, Xu, & Jiraporn, 2013; Ngerebo-A & 
Yellowe, 2012; Ogege & Boloupremo, 2014; Pamburai, Chamisa, Abdulla, & Smith, 
2015; Peter & David, 2014; Velnampy & Pratheepkanth, 2013). 
 
Conversely, other studies show a negative association between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance (e.g., Arouri, Hossain, & Badrul Muttakin, 2014; 




Mang’unyi, 2011; Marn & Romuald, 2012; Narwal & Jindal, 2015; Nwonyuku, 2016; 
O’Connel & Cramer, 2010; Vafeas, 1999), whereby some studies found no relation 
between corporate governance mechanisms and performance of firms (e.g., Ezugwu & 
Itodo, 2014; Mukolu & Blessing, 2014; Ndiwalana, Ssekakubo, & Lwanga, 2014; 
Onakoya et al., 2014). 
 
However, despite the significant move by the aforementioned empirical findings on 
investigating the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance, studies on the relationship between risk management committee structure 
(risk management committee size, risk management committee composition, risk 
management committee meetings) and firm performance is still scant in literature. In 
addition, studies on risk management reporting (e.g., Abdullah, Abdul Shukor, 
Mohammed, & Ahmad, 2015; Abraham & Shrive, 2014; Amran, Manaf Rosli, Che Haat 
Mohd Hassan, 2008; Buckby et al., 2015; Dabari & Saidin, 2015; Wong, 2012) ignore 
to link the relationship between risk management practices and reporting with firm 
performance.  
 
Theoretically, agency theory has been the dominating theory in research on corporate 
governance (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; McKnight & Weir, 2009; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986), because the theory focused commonly on agency relationship, where 
shareholders (the principal) delegates work to managers (the agents) who carries out the 
work, and agency theory tries to define this relationship by means of a symbol of 
contract (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Moreover, without effective and efficient control 
procedures, corporate managers may likely take actions or make decisions that diverge 




result, Eisenhardt (1989) argues that corporate board of directors will serve as a means 
to monitor the activities of corporate managers so as to reduce agency costs and improve 
performance. 
 
Nevertheless, utilization of agency theory on corporate governance study is not enough 
because it’s not the only theory that concentrates on board function. This accord with 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003), that resource dependence theorists and agency theorists 
focused on a single board function (monitoring/resource provision) at the expense of 
one another, paying to a partial understanding of board function and how it affects firm 
performance. In this effect, Hillman and Dalziel recommend that the integration of 
agency and resource dependence theories is significant because it can assist in 
overcoming the contemporary myopic issues surrounding both streams of research, 
because resource dependence theory is based on how board provides resources 
(expertise, experience, and reputation) to the firm in order to reduce dependence on 
external environment (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer, 1972).      
 
Therefore, as a result of inconclusive and mixed findings in previous studies, excessive 
failure of some companies in the Nigerian financial institutions resulting from poor 
corporate governance practice, poor performance, and inadequate disclosure of risk 
management practices by the companies, this study becomes worth to be conducted. As 
such, this study will examine the relationship between corporate governance represented 
by board attributes (board size, board composition, board meetings, CEO tenure, board 
expertise), risk management committee structure (risk management committee size, risk 
management committee composition, risk management committee meetings) and firm 




management practices and disclosure and firm performance specifically in the financial 
service sector in Nigeria. 
 
1.3 Research Questions    
 
This study tries to examine the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance of listed financial service firms in Nigeria. Particularly, the study attempts 
to address the following research questions: 
 
1. What is the extent of disclosure of risk management practice by the listed 
financial service firms in Nigeria? 
2. What is the relationship between board attributes (board size, board 
composition, board meetings, CEO tenure, and board expertise) and 
performance of the listed financial service firms in Nigeria? 
3.   What is the relationship between risk management committee structure (risk 
management committee size, risk management committee composition, and risk 
management committee meetings) and performance of the listed financial 
service firms in Nigeria? 
4. What is the relationship between risk management practices and disclosure and 
performance of the listed financial service firms in Nigeria?  
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
 
The primary purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between corporate 




from 2012 to 2016. Therefore, in order to answer the research questions in the preceding 
section, this study comes up with the following specific objectives: 
 
1. To determine the extent of disclosure of risk management practice by the listed 
financial service firms in Nigerian. 
2. To ascertain the relationship between board attributes (board size, board 
composition, board meetings, CEO tenure, and board expertise) and 
performance of the listed financial service firms in Nigeria. 
3. To assess the relationship between risk management committee structure (risk 
management committee size, risk management committee composition, and risk 
management committee meetings) and performance of the listed financial 
service firms in Nigeria. 
4. To examine the relationship between risk management practices and disclosure 
and performance of the listed financial service firms in Nigeria.  
 
1.5 Motivation for the Study 
 
This study is motivated on the premise that the performance of firms is a vital element 
in ensuring their long-term survival and growth (Kakanda et al., 2016a). It is understood 
that an effective Corporate Governance (CG) practice enhances shareholders’ value and 
firm’s performance (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2002). Even though past studies 
have used various mechanisms of corporate governance in establishing a relationship 
with corporate performance, yet, studies on risk management committee are limited and 
remain inconclusive (Ng et al., 2012), and empirical evidence on risk management 




& Zhang, 2009) which may have influence on firm performance. Understanding this 
may result in reducing the risk associated with the operations of a firm that may lead to 
costs reduction and ultimately enhances performance. 
 
Over the years, weak corporate governance system has resulted in poor performance 
that causes several corporate failures especially in Nigerian, especially companies in the 
financial sector (Sanusi, 2010). As a consequence, the Nigerian Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has in 2011 revised the erstwhile corporate governance code of 
2009, in order to strengthen its effectiveness in the publicly traded companies in Nigeria. 
Owing to this, there is a requirement for companies to establish a risk management 
committee structure in addition to their existing board committees, alongside to disclose 
information on their risk management practices through annual reports, for the reason 
to strengthen the effectiveness of the CG code and mitigate the risk of corporate failure 
by enhancing performance.   
 
An inquiry into CG mechanisms and firm performance reveals that there is an absence 
of empirical evidence on the relationship between board attributes, risk management 
committee structure, and risk management practice and disclosure in Nigeria. There is, 
therefore, the need to investigate such relationship in Nigeria, a country which has 
different socioeconomic background, common law, company law, capital market, and 
compliance level of CG code from those of developed economies like the UK and US. 
Thus, this study extends prior studies on CG and firm performance by incorporating 
additional variables that include: risk management committee structure (risk 
management committee size, risk management committee composition, and risk 




examine their relationship with the performance of listed financial service firms in 
Nigeria. 
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
 
It is expected that after the successful completion of this study, it will significantly 
contribute to both literature (empirical, theoretical, and methodological) and practice 
(management, relevant authorities, and the general public). The explanation to these are 
provided as the following: 
 
1.6.1 Significance to Literature 
 
The significance of this study to literature comprises of empirical, theoretical, and 
methodological contributions. Empirically, various studies have been conducted to 
assess the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate 
performance in both developed and emerging economies, but end up in mixed and 
conflicting findings, and the like of such studies are inadequate in Nigerian economy 
especially in the financial service industry. The said studies are but not limited to Abdul-
Qadir and Kwanbo (2012), Afrifa and Tauringana (2015), Al-Matari et al. (2014a), 
Arouri et al. (2014), Chechet Jnr. and Akanet (2013), Elyasiani and Zhang (2015), Erah 
et al. (2012), Ezugwu and Itodo (2014), Fauzi and Locke (2012), Gill et al. (2012), Gill 
and Obradovich (2012), Guest (2009), Hauser (2013), Joe Duke and Kankpang (2011), 
Liang et al. (2013), Marn and Romuald (2012), Mukolu and Blessing (2014), O’Connel 




study will provide important findings which will help to boost the extent of corporate 
governance agenda, especially in developing economy like Nigeria.  
 
Moreover, prior studies have concentrated on the relationship between board attributes 
and firm performance as previously exemplified. This study will contribute empirically 
by including additional variables like risk management committee structure (risk 
management committee size, risk management committee composition, risk 
management committee meetings) that may boost firm performance. Similarly, another 
important area that previous studies ignored is linking the relationship between risk 
management practices and disclosure and firm performance, as such, this will be another 
important contribution that this study will render to literature. 
 
Additionally, the finding of this study is expected to be an added value to existing body 
of knowledge and will serve as a reference and a basis where further research on 
corporate governance mechanisms (board attribute, risk management structure, and risk 
management practices and disclosure) and company performance will be carried out 
especially on listed companies in Nigeria.  
 
However, in terms of contribution to theory, this study links agency theory and resource 
dependence theory to corporate governance mechanisms represented by board 
attributes, risk management committee structure, and risk management practices and 
disclosure and firm performance. In determining the board monitoring function, some 
studies utilize agency theory and others use resource dependence theory at the expense 
of the other (Hill & Dalziel, 2003). This study will use agency theory and resource 




contemporary myopic issues surrounding both streams of research. Therefore, this will 
serve as a significant contribution to the application of multiple theories in corporate 
governance research agenda. 
 
Equally, the study is significant in a methodological sense because it adapts methods 
used by previous studies in examining the like of the study in question, and an 
improvement is made to the previous methods by collecting an important data on risk 
management practice and disclosure via analysis of contents. Collection of data through 
this means has a great importance because both the provider of the data and one 
collecting the data does not have control or influence on such data, hence improving the 
richness of the expected results (Stemler, 2001).  
 
1.6.2 Significance to Practice  
 
The expected significance of this study to practice encompasses policy makers, relevant 
authorities, and the general public. To policy makers, the study will in a long way 
provides the treasured information needed by the management of corporate entities to 
make appropriate decisions regarding the practice of corporate governance in their 
companies. Specifically, the management will know the relationship between each of 
the selected board attributes' (board size, board composition, board meetings, CEO 
tenure, board expertise) and performance of their firms. Moreover, the association 
between risk management committee structure (size, composition, meetings) with 
performance will be adequately known by the management of listed financial service 
firms in Nigeria. In the same line, the relationship between risk management practices 




management to make decisions regarding the effect of adequate disclosure of their 
activities.  
 
Equally important, relevant authorities (for instance, SEC and CBN) to the operations 
of financial service firms in Nigeria will be provided with important information about 
the effectiveness of board attributes, risk management committee structure, and risk 
management practices and disclosure in the Nigerian financial service sector. By this, 
the relevant authorities will know the extent of application of the NCCG 2011 by the 
financial service firms, which may be used as a basis of assessment. 
 
Furthermore, the findings of this study will be a contribution to the general public, 
specifically investors and financial analysts. To financial analysts, they will use the 
findings of this study to assess the level of performance and level of corporate 
governance effectiveness of financial institutions in Nigeria. In addition, they will also 
be provided with information on the intensity of disclosure on risk management 
practices in the Nigerian financial service sector and how it is related to performance. 
This will serve as a basis for measuring the performance of a company in the financial 
sector and will serve as a yardstick for investment decisions by investors.       
 
1.7 Scope of the Study 
 
This study concentrates on the relationship between corporate governance represented 
by board attributes (board size, board composition, board meetings, CEO tenure, and 
board expertise), risk management committee structure (size, composition, and 




on assets, return on equity, and market-to-book-value ratio) of fifty-five (55) quoted 
financial service firms actively operating in the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). The 
study covers a 5-years period spanning from year 2012-to-2016 because the previous 
period’s financial report is usually submitted to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in Nigeria in the first quarter of the immediately subsequent period. 
Selection of firms in the financial industry is based on their role as financial 
intermediaries by supplying resources from the available stream to the shortfall sector 
within the economy. While the selection of the time period (2012 to 2016) is based on 
the fact that the NCCG for publicly traded companies in Nigeria was revised by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in 2011, and its full implementation takes effect 




Scope of the study out of quoted firms in NSE 




























Figure 1.0 is showing the various sectors operating in the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
which amassed to eleven. The sectors range from healthcare having 11% from the total 
eleven sectors, information and communication technology (ICT) with 5%, industrial 
goods 11%, natural resources 14%, and oil and gas sector with 12%. While others are 
agricultural sector having 3%, conglomerates 3%, construction and real estate 5%, 
consumer goods 15%, and the largest is the financial service sector having 30%. Here, 
it can be seen that the scope of the study (that is financial service sector) dominates other 
sectors in the Nigerian Stock Exchange and it majorly contributes to the nation’s 
economy.  
 
1.8 Organization of the Thesis 
 
Chapter one encompasses the introduction of the study including, comprehensive 
explanation on the background of the study, statement of the research problem, research 
questions, research objectives, significance of the study, the scope of the study, and 
organization (structure) of the study. Whereas, the next chapter (chapter two) elaborates 
on the overview of Nigerian economy comprising of political and economic 
background, the structure of Nigerian financial system, regulatory agencies in the 
Nigerian financial system, institutional development in the Nigerian financial system, 
development of corporate governance, and regulations governing financial institutions 
in Nigeria. In addition, the chapter elaborates on the underpinning theories of the study, 
the concept of corporate performance, concept of corporate governance, and review of 





Chapter three discusses the research framework and methodology. The chapter 
specifically concentrates on framework direction and hypotheses development 
portraying the relationship between corporate governance represented by board 
attributes (board size, board composition, board meetings, CEO tenure, board expertise), 
risk management committee structure (risk management committee size, risk 
management committee composition, risk management committee meetings), risk 
management practices and disclosure and firm performance (return assets, return on 
equity, and market-to-book-value ratio). Moreover, the chapter provides the 
methodology in terms of research design, panel data, the population of the study, sample 
size, the method of data collection, operational definition and measurement of variables, 
and techniques of data analysis. 
 
Chapter four presents the results of analysis and discussion thereupon. The results 
presented include descriptive statistics, correlational analysis, diagnostic tests, and 
multivariate regression analysis using Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) with 
additional robustness test. Discussion of the results as well as the decision on the study 
hypothesis is also presented. Chapter five, which is the last chapter in this study, presents 
the summary of the study, implications of the study findings, limitations of the study, 
suggestions for further research, and conclusion.      
 
1.9 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed the introduction of the study specifically on the background 
of the research, statement of the research problem, research questions, research 




and organization (structure) of the research. The next chapter presents an overview of 































This chapter highlights information regarding Nigeria including the background of 
Nigeria, Nigerian political and economic overview, structure of the Nigerian financial 
system, the performance of financial institutions in Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), 
regulatory reforms in Nigerian financial sector, development of corporate governance 
in Nigeria, and regulations governing the practice of financial institutions. Moreover, 
the chapter review related underpinning theories, review literatures related to the 
concept of firm performance, types of firm performance and their measurements, 
concept of corporate governance, corporate governance mechanisms (board attributes 
including; board size, board composition, board meetings, CEO tenure, and board 
expertise), risk management committee (RMC) structures (RMC size, RMC 
composition, and RMC meetings), and risk management practices and disclosure. A 
summary of the chapter is also provided in the final section. 
 
2.2 Background of Nigeria 
 
Nigeria, a country located in West Africa-north of the Gulf of Guinea, it is bordered on 
the north by Niger, northeast by Chad, west by the Republic of Benin, and on the east 
by Cameroon. Nigeria has a total land mass of 356,669 square miles (equivalent to 
923,773 square kilometres). Features of land dramatically change in Nigeria, from rain 
forests, which are along the coast to savanna hills. This is about or more than 200 miles 




the Niger and Benue coastlines. Mountains form the border between Nigerian from the 
northeast and Cameroon whiles the North West and Central part of Nigeria is composed 
of the Sahel-known as flat/semi-desert land (Douglas, 2004).  
 
Nigeria is being ranked the 10th and largest nation in the world and largest nation in 
Africa has an estimated population of 177.5 million (World Bank, 2014). The country 
is being divided into six geopolitical zones namely; North West, North East, North 
Central, South East, South West and South-South. Four major ethnic groups out of 400 
different ethnic groups and 450 languages dominate these geopolitical zones. The four 
major ethnic groups make up about 65 to 70% of the entire population. The group with 
the highest population is called Hausa/Fulani majorly Muslims, a combination of two 
ethnic groups located in northern Nigeria. The second is Yoruba located in western 
Nigeria and a minority among the four major ethnic groups is the Igbos from eastern 
Nigeria. There are 36 states in Nigeria with Abuja as the Federal Capital Territory 






Six Geo-Political Zones in Nigeria 
 
Prior to her independence on the 1st day of October 1960, Nigeria has passed through 
dramatic shifts in governance. In 1914, the Governor's advisory council noticed a 
change after six black Africans were introduced into its operation. A legislative council 
consisting of thirty-six Europeans and ten Africans (four of them elected) were 
empowered in 1922 to legislate for the south. However, in 1947, the scope of activities 
of the council's authority, was widened to the whole country (The Commonwealth 
Yearbook, 2015). From three zones of the country, north, west and east regional houses 






After 1951 constitution has given balance and equal power to Nigerians, Nigeria became 
a federation in 1954, and Eastern and Western regions possess internal self-government 
in 1957 and Northern region in 1959. In December 1959, elections for the Federal House 
of Representatives brought in a fresh government. The new House of Representatives at 
its first meeting beseeched full sovereignty. From there, Nigerian independence was a 
birth on October 1, 1960 (The Commonwealth Yearbook, 2015).     
 
2.2.1 The Political Overview of Nigeria 
 
After the British colonial rule of over half of a century, Nigeria gained her independence 
on 1 October 1960 led by the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) in connection with the 
National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) (mostly Igbos) and became a federal 
republic in 1963. Late Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa became the first Prime Minister 
and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe as the first President (non-executive) (The Commonwealth 
Yearbook, 2015; national encyclopedia, 2003). In 1966, the First Republic was nowhere 
to be found because it ended up with a military coup. In May 1967, Nigeria went in 
chaos due to the civil war that emanated from the declaration made by the Eastern 
Region that they seceded from Nigeria. The Eastern Region (the Igbos) declared self-
independence and named it ‘The Republic of Biafra'. Nevertheless, the federal 
government of Nigeria fiercely battled with the Biafrans that later surrendered in 1970. 
 
In 1970 when the civil war ended, Major General Yakubu Gowon created a federal 
system, which consists of twelve states that replaced the four regions, and national 
reconciliation was emphasized. However, in July 1975, Brigadier Murtala Ramat 




in early 1976. General Olusegun Obasanjo succeeded as the next head of state. Obasanjo 
after developing a draft of a new constitution through the national Assembly paved the 
way for democracy to stay where elections were conducted in 1979 and second republic 
inaugurated under Alhaji Shehu Shagari (national encyclopedia, 2003). 
 
Due to economic mismanagement and increased in corruption, Shagari was displaced 
on 31 December 1983 led by Major General Ibrahim Badomosi Babangida. A five-year 
plan to return to civil rule was been announced by Babangida in September 1987.  Later 
elections were held on June 12, 1993, and Mashood Abiola, successful Yoruba business 
person was widely seen as the winner of the 1993 general elections, but Babangida led 
government annulled the election and named Chief Earnest Shonekan as interim head 
of state. General Sani Abacha who assumed power as the new military head of state 
overthrew Shonekan. A new dawn of democratic transition was created after the death 
of General Sani Abacha on 8 June 1998. Major General Abdulsalami Abubakar 
succeeded Abacha on 9 June 1998 after selected by the Provisional Ruling Council in a 
closed-door meeting. Abubakar reinstated democracy in Nigeria after Obasanjo- a 
former military head of state was elected president on February 27, 1999. 
 
After a successful four years in democracy, Obasanjo was re-elected in 2003 under the 
platform of People’s Democratic Party (PDP) with 61.9% of the total votes, against his 
opposition candidate, Major General Muhammadu Buhari of the All Nigeria People’s 
Party (ANPP) with 32.2%. Moreover, the April 2007 presidential election was won by 
the ruling PDP’s candidate, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’Adua with 70% of total votes cast 
against General Muhammadu Buhari of the ANPP with 18% and former vice president 




President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, who was later sworn in as the president on May 6, 
2010 (The Commonwealth Yearbook, 2015), succeeded Yar’Adua. In April 2011, 
Jonathan, PDP’s ruling party candidate, won the presidential election with 59% of the 
total votes cast and having above 25% of total votes in at least 24 states. The main 
opposition runner, General Muhammadu Buhari (now of CPC – Congress for 
Progressive Change), secured 32% of the total votes cast.  
 
A new dawn and a turnaround in the Nigeria political transition occurred in the 2015 
presidential elections. On March 28, 2015, General Muhammadu Buhari (now of All 
Progressive Congress – APC) secured 54% of the total votes cast, defeating the 
incumbent President, Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP having 45%. It was the first time 
in Nigeria’s history to vote out an incumbent President.  President Buhari was sworn in 
on 29th May 2015 with vice president Professor Yemi Osinbajo. President Buhari is to 
hold office for four years, that is subject to re-election for another four years. The 
maximum term of office of Nigeria’s president is two terms of four years each.  
 
2.2.2 The Economic Overview of Nigeria 
 
Colonialism has been a major feature of Nigerian economic history (Ekpo & Umoh, 
2010). Britain initially gained control and management of Nigerian resources. The 
Nigerian economy after independence became more promising. They (authors) further 
state that before the oil boom era, agriculture has been the promising and major source 
of Nigeria's revenue. Nigeria has been the major exporter of agricultural products like 
groundnuts, cotton, cocoa and millet that contributes to about 63% to the nation's Gross 




era around 1970 to 1978, the nation's economy witnessed a tremendous growth when 
the GDP grew positively by 6.2% annually. 
 
Ekpo and Umoh (2010) added that the contribution of agriculture to the Nigerian GDP 
was unsatisfactory as it dropped down from 63% in 1960 to 34% in 1988 due to 
carelessness and neglect of agricultural sector.  As a result, Nigeria became the major 
importer of basic food items in 1975. In addition, the period of structural adjustments 
and economic freedom from 1988 to 1997 was a remarkable one because the GDP 
positively responded to the economic adjustment policies. The GDP grew at an annual 
growth rate of 4%.   
 
The National Bureau of Statistics (2013) reported that series of unfortunate economic 
and political events hinder economic growth in Nigerian. Nevertheless, the nation still 
plays a pivotal economic role in the globe, especially as a producer and exporter of crude 
oil.  The economy faced a lot of challenges which affect the overall economic activity 
in the year 2012 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013). The report further stresses that 
the downturn in economic activity's real growth rates has affected both the oil and non-
oil sectors. In the oil sector, production was below expectation due to security challenges 
and floods. In the non-oil sector (majorly Wholesale and Retail Trade, and agriculture) 
was mostly affected by weaker consumer demands, floods and land degradation. 
 
Based on 2012 economic data, real GDP indicates growth by 6.34 and 6.39% in the first 
and second quarter respectively. In addition, there was a slight difference in the rate of 
economic activity and the initial estimates of 6.17 and 6.28%. However, the revised 




7.5% respectively. In this effect, the economy declined by 0.62 and 1.11% in the first 
two-quarters of the year when compared to 2011corresponding quarters (National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2013). 
 
The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) (2012) reports that oil 
production was projected at 2.37 million barrels per day at the first half of 2012 as 
against 2.48 million barrels per day in first half of 2011, but en-up producing 2.27 
million barrels per day. The decline in crude oil production was due to recorded cases 
of oil theft and vandalization of oil pipelines in the oil producing areas.  On the contrary, 
the non-oil sector was affected by flooding alongside declined in consumer demand 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2013). Table 2.1 shows the sectoral growth summary for 
2011 and 2012 economic year.  
 
Table 2.1:  
Sectoral Growth Summary for 2011 and 2012 
 




However, Nigerian economy has enjoyed better economic growth in 2015 where the 
annual GDP increases by about 7% compared to 6.3% in 2014.  The main driver of the 
economic growth is non-oil sector, with agriculture and manufacturing contributing 
about 21% and 9% respectively, services contribute about 57%. Thus, the economy is 
diversifying and transforming to more of services oriented through wholesale trade and 
retail, information communication and real estate. In the same vein, the 2014 real GDP 
growth which is recorded to be 6.3% is an increased from 5.4% of 2013. A major driver 
for growth is the non-oil sector, specifically manufacturing, services, agriculture, and 
trade. Growth in non-oil sector positioned at 7% in 2014 in contrast to 8.4% in 2013 
while growth in oil sector turns down by 1.2%.  The real growth rate in agriculture 
increased from 2.9% in 2013 to 4.6% in 2014 (Barungi, Ogunyele & Zamba, 2015). 
 
Recently, World Bank (2014) reported that Nigeria's GDP at market price stood at 
$568.5 billion. Just like other oil exporting countries, Nigeria is facing a dwindling 
movement in oil revenues resulting from a heavy fall in global oil prices. In this case, 
the price of Bonny Light is seen to have declined in June 2014 from $118 per barrel (pb) 
to about $50 pb in 1st Quarter of 2015, while price falls below $45 pb in April 2016 
(Watts, 2016; Barungi et al., 2015). This decline in oil prices is negatively hindering the 
economic growth possibilities of Nigeria. 
 
Considering inflation, Table 2.2 shows that inflation rate depicts a downward trend 
during the year 2011, despite various economic challenges witnessed by the country like 
insecurity, floods, and removal of fuel subsidy (Barungi et al., 2015). From 12.1% 
recorded in January (year-on-year), the headline inflation rate stretches to 12.8% in 




rose to 10.3% in September and increases to 10.5% in October and November before 
slightly falling to 10.3% in December. As a result, average headline inflation rate for 
2011 stood at 10.85%.  As at January 2012, the inflation rate skyrocketed to 12.6% and 
declined 11.9% in February. The inflation rate reaches its highest in April and June by 
recording 12.9% respectively. It later drops down to 11.7% for August and October. The 
year ended with 12% inflation rate in December, with an average rate of 12.24%.  
 
Table 2.2:  
Inflation Rates Summary from 2011 to 2017 (7 Months)  
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
January 12.10 12.60 9.00 8.00 8.20 9.62 18.72 
February 11.10 11.90 9.50 7.70 8.40 11.38 17.78 
March 12.80 12.10 8.60 7.80 8.50 12.77 17.26 
April 11.30 12.90 9.10 7.90 8.70 13.72 17.24 
May 12.40 12.70 9.00 8.00 9.00 15.58 16.25 
June 10.20 12.90 8.40 8.20 9.20 16.48 16.10 
July 9.40 12.80 8.70 8.30 9.20 17.13 16.05 
August 9.30 11.70 8.20 8.50 9.30 17.61 N/A 
September 10.30 11.30 8.00 8.30 9.40 17.85 N/A 
October 10.50 11.70 7.80 8.10 9.30 18.33 N/A 
November 10.50 12.30 7.90 7.90 9.37 18.48 N/A 
December 10.30 12.00 8.00 8.00 9.55 18.55 N/A 
Average 10.850 12.242 8.517 8.058 9.010 15.625 17.057 
 Note: NA=Not Available   





However, the year 2013 has been a favorable economic period for Nigeria because, in 
January, the inflation rate declines to 9% compared to December 2012 (12%). The rate 
drops to its lowest in October by recording 7.8% (year-on-year). The rate continues to 
fluctuate in that year between 7% and 8% while the year ends with 8% in December and 
the average inflation rate for the year is 8.5%. In 2014, the inflation rate in January is 
8% and drops down to its minimum in February to 7.7%. Like 2013, the rate fluctuates 
between 7% and 8% throughout the year, while December has 8% and the average for 
the year is 8.05%. On the other hand, starts with 8.2% and end at its highest with 9.55%, 
while the overall inflation rate average for the year is 9.01%. The last year, which is 
2016, has inflation records for two months only because as at the reporting period, only 
January and February inflation rates records are available. In January 2016, the rate is 
9.62% and significantly increases to 11.38% in February showing an increase of 1.76% 
(month-on-month). However, the highest inflation rate is in the year 2016 is in the month 
of December with 18.55%. There was also a persistent increase from December 2016 to 
January 2017, where the inflation rate stood at 18.74%, and later on, moves at a 
decreasing rate to 16.05% in July 2017 due to various agricultural outputs by the nation's 
populace.    
 
Furthermore, the currency used by Nigeria is denominated in notes and coins called 
Naira (N) and Kobo (K). The highest denomination of the Nigerian currency is N1000 
followed by N 500, N 200, N100, N50, N20, N10 and N5. Moreover, Naira notes and 
coins are printed/minted by the Nigerian Security Printing and Minting Plc (NSPM) 
with other overseas printing and minting companies and issued by the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN). At the currency printing works of the NSPM Plc, quality is being 




every note issued meet the required standard. The CBN maintains an office called ‘Mint 
Inspectorate’ in the premises of the NSPM Plc to maintain security and quality of Naira 
notes and coins.  
 
The CBN issued currency to Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) through its branches, and 
old notes retrieved through the same medium. Currency deposited by the banks are 
processed and sorted to fit and unfit notes in line with the clean note policy. The clean 
notes are re-issued while the dirty notes are usually destroyed (CBN, 2015). 
  
2.3 Structure of Nigerian Financial System 
 
Central Bank of Nigeria (1993) cited in Maduka and Onwuka (2013) defines the 
financial system as the set of rules and regulations and the summation of institutions, 
financial arrangements, agents that intermingle with one another to promote economic 
growth and development of a country. Furthermore, International Monetary Fund, IMF 
(2006) asserts that financial system comprises of institutional units and markets that 
interrelate in a broad manner, for the intention of mobilizing resources for investments 
and providing services together with payment systems, primarily to finance commercial 
activities.  
 
The financial system is a key player in the mobilization as well as the distribution of 
savings for productive reasons (Maduka & Onwuka, 2013). It also helps in lessening the 
risks distracting firms and businesses in their manufacturing and service processes, 
enhancement of collective diversification and protecting the economy from external 




between different sectors of the economy and promotes a significance level of speciality 
and economies of scale. 
 
The Nigerian Financial System consists of several institutions, instruments, and 
regulations (Maduka & Onwuka, 2013). The Nigerian financial system consists of both 
formal and informal sub-sectors. The formal sub-sector encompasses the regulatory 
authorities, money markets, capital markets, foreign exchange markets, brokerage firms, 
insurance companies deposit money banks (DMBs), development finance as well as 
other financial institutions (OFIs).  While the informal sub-sector involves community-
based organizations like micro finance institutions (MFIs), financial cooperatives, rotary 
savings and credit associations, self-help groups and related institutions (CBN, 2010). 





Figure 2.2  
Structure of the Nigerian Financial System 
Source: CBN, (2010) 
 
The acronyms in Figure 2.2 are explained as thus:  
NASS  - National Assembly 
DFIs  - Development Financial Institutions 
NDIC  - Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation 
ACSE  - Abuja Commodity and Security Exchange 
NSE  - Nigerian Stock Exchange 
SEC  - Securities and Exchange Commission 
NAICOM - National Insurance Commission 




NACRDB - Nigeria Agricultural Cooperative and Rural Development Bank 
NEXIM - Nigeria Export-Import Bank 
UDB  - Urban Development Bank 
FMBN  - Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria 
 
2.4 Regulatory Agencies in the Nigerian Financial Service Industry (NFSI) 
 
In an effort to facilitate a framework for the co-ordination of regulatory and supervisory 
activities in the Nigerian financial sector, the CBN in April 2014 establishes a committee 
called ‘The Financial Services Coordinating Committee (FSCC). The establishment of 
the committee is to address more effectively, via consultations and regular inter-agency 
meetings, issues of common concern to regulatory and supervisory bodies (CBN, 
2016b). Moreover, on May 27, 1994, the name of the committee later transformed to 
Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee (FSRCC). The legal status of 
the committee granted by the 1998 amendment to section 39 of the CBN Act of 1991 
and formally inaugurated by the CBN Governor in May 1999. 
 
Additionally, the committee (FSRCC) was reconstituted to achieve objectives that 
include (1) coordinated and ensure the supervision of financial institutions, (2) ensure 
the reduction of opportunities in arbitrage usually created by different existing 
supervisory and regulatory standards between supervisory authorities in the Nigerian 
financial services sector (FSRCC, 2016). Other objectives of the committee (FSRCC) 
are to discuss on problems encountered by a member in the course of relating with 
another financial institution and to remove any gap of information faced by some 




The agency members of Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee 
(FSRCC) are the Central Bank of Nigeria, Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), 
Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF), National Insurance Commission (NAICOM). 
Among the agencies also are the National Pension Commission, Nigerian Deposit 
Insurance Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Abuja Securities 
and Commodity Exchange (ASCE) Plc, Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) and Federal 
Inland Revenue Service (FIRS).  
 
2.4.1 The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
 
The Central Bank of Nigeria is the apex authority in regulating the financial system. It 
was established by the CBN Act of 1958. The CBN Act of 1958 (as amended) and the 
Banking Decree of 1969 (as amended) forms the legal framework in which the Central 
Bank functions and control banks. In 1991, the Banks and Other Financial Institutions 
Decree (BOFID) 24 and 25 repealed the Banking Decree of 1969 which extends the 
power of the CBN to manage and control other financial institutions. the bank primary 
role is to promote monetary stability and ensure strong financial system and to act as 
financial adviser to the Federal Government. The regulatory focus of CBN is on deposit 
money banks (DMBs) alongside other financial institutions, with bureaux-de-change, 
primary mortgage institutions, microfinance institutions, discount houses, development 
finance institutions, and finance companies (CBN, 2010).  
 
Ordinarily, the supervisory role of the CBN is structured into four (4) different 
departments namely; Financial Policy and Regulation Department, Banking 




Consumer Protection Department (CBN, 2016). The Financial Policy and Regulation 
department is saddled with the responsibility of establishing and implementing policies 
and regulations that will enhance financial system stability.  The department also 
provides license and give approvals for banks and other financial institutions. However, 
the Banking Supervision Department supervises Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) and 
Discount Houses, whereas, Other Financial Institutions Supervision Department carries 
out the supervision of other financial institutions. The Consumer Protection Department 
establishes and implements an effective consumer protection framework that promotes 
consumer confidence in the Nigerian financial system. 
 
2.4.2 The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) 
 
The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) was initiated by the Nigerian Company law 
known as the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990.  Before the 
establishment of CAMA in 1990, the Companies Act of 1968 was the law that regulates 
formation and operation of companies in Nigeria (CAMA, 1990). Due to the various 
challenges related to registration, instruction, and supervision of companies operating 
in Nigeria, the Nigerian Law Reform Commission promulgates CAMA in 1990 in a way 
to strengthen the rules on registration and operation of companies.     
 
Companies and Allied Matters Act, CAMA (1990) reports that the commission (CAC) 
is responsible for the registration of companies, Business names registration, 
incorporation of associations, bodies, Trustee of committees, and other regulations that 
may arise from time to time. The commission is also responsible for management, 




records and offices in every state of Nigeria. The commission has the power to conduct 
or organize an investigation at the request of shareholders or public into the dealings of 
any company operating in Nigeria and can perform several functions specified by any 
enactment or Act. 
 
2.4.3 The Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF) 
 
The Federal Ministry of Finance offers advice to the Federal Government on fiscal 
matters and cooperates with the Central Bank of Nigeria on monetary affairs (Maduka 
& Onwuka, 2013: CBN, 2010). All budgets of ministries, departments and agencies in 
Nigeria are passed through the Federal Ministry of Finance before going to the 
presidency as budget appropriation bill. The mission of Federal Ministry of Finance is: 
‘To manage the Nation’s finances in an open, transparent, accountable and efficient 
manner that delivers on the country’s development priorities’. 
 
The ministry's (FMF) objectives are to ensure a stable and vibrant economy and a better 
standard of living, long-term treasury equilibrium, cost-effective and proficient tax 
environment, accountable and performance oriented administration of state finances 
(FMF, 2016). The ministry's other objectives are to enable translucent government 
operations and successful and well-arranged organizational structure, employment of 
high-quality staff to function in a conducive working environment and to deliver a 
reliable service by heavily emphasizing on professionalism. 
 
In order to achieve its objectives, the ministry (FMF) establish the following 




General Services, Graduate Internship Scheme, Home Finance, Human Resource 
Management, International Economic Relations, Reforms Coordination and Services 
Improvement, and Technical Services.   
 
2.4.4 The National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) 
 
The National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) is an agency of the Federal 
Government of Nigeria by statute to control and oversee the Nigerian insurance 
industry. The powers of the commission are derived from the NAICOM Act of 1997 
and the insurance Act of 2003. The Commission (NAICOM) is responsible for effectual 
administration, regulation, supervision and control of insurance businesses in Nigeria. 
Its main function is the established principles of the operation of the insurance business 
and safeguarding insurance policyholders (CBN, 2010). Accordingly, organizations that 
fall under the regulatory supervision of National Insurance Commission in Nigeria are 
Insurance Brokers, Insurance/Reinsurance firms, and Loss Adjusters and Agents. 
 
2.4.5 The National Pension Commission (PENCOM) 
 
The National Pension Commission (PENCOM) is the regulatory agency responsible for 
the oversight of fund custodians, alongside pension administrators in Nigeria (CBN, 
2010).  The Pension Reform Act No.2, of 2004, governed the activities of National 
Pension Commission. The objective of the 2004 pension scheme is to ensure that all 
individuals that work in either private or public service sector (federal government 
workers) receive their retirement entitlements as and when due as stated by PENCOM 




save in order to provide for ‘rainy days’ (that is during their old ages). As another 
objective of the commission, it is to develop a standard set of rules and regulations for 
the management and payments of retirement benefits for workers in the private sector, 
Federal Capital Territory (FCT), and Public Service of the Federation.   
 
In July 2014, the Nigerian President signed a Pension Reform Bill which becomes an 
Act (Pension Reform Act, 2014) that repeals the Pension Reform Act No.2 of 2004. The 
Pension Reform Act, 2014 continues to govern and regulate the administration of the 
uniform contributory pension scheme for both the public and private sectors in Nigeria, 
unlike the erstwhile scheme that has unequal contribution among the contributors.  
 
2.4.6 The Nigerian Deposit Insurance Commission (NDIC) 
 
The Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) harmonizes the supervisory and 
regulatory function of the Central Bank of Nigeria as opining by CBN (2010). The 
NDIC is independent of the CBN and reports to the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF). 
NDIC's primary role is the insurance of depositors' money in Deposit Money Banks 
(DMBs) and additional insured financial institutions. It is saddled with the responsibility 
to liquidate distressed banks and supervises Deposit Money Banks and other insured 
institutions in concurrence with CBN. 
 
Board of the Central Bank of Nigeria through it committee's report established the 
commission (NDIC) in 1983 to examine the operations of the Nigerian banking system 
(NDIC, 2016).  The report of the Committee suggests the instituting of a Deposit 




the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Commission was created to replace Deposit Protection 
Fund.  Hence, the extraordinary increase of banks operating in Nigeria from 40 to 120 
(the period from 1986 to 1992) that leads to competition increase among banks, 
inadequate work force, and people of doubtful integrity been owners and managers of 
banks (NDIC, 2016). The mission of the National Deposit Insurance Commission 
(NDIC) is, To protect depositors and contribute to the stability of the financial system 
through effective supervision of insured institutions, provision of financial/technical 
assistance to eligible insured institutions, prompt payment of guaranteed sums and 
orderly resolution of failed insured financial institutions. 
 
2.4.7 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the highest authority that regulates 
operations in the Nigerian Capital Market (CBN, 2010). The powers, regulations, and 
supervision by the Securities and Exchange Commission are been controlled and 
monitored by the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF). The commission (SEC) was 
established by the SEC Act of 1979 which was later strengthened by Securities and 
Exchange Decrees of 1988. The commission (SEC) endorses and controls mergers and 
acquisitions and approves the institution of unit trusts.  The commission (SEC) also 
upholds surveillance over the financial market to improve efficiency.  The SEC Act of 
1979 has empowered the commission to regulate the capital market with the aim to 
protect investors and develop the capital market to promote the efficiency of its 





2.4.8 The Abuja Securities and Commodity Exchange (ASCE) Plc. 
 
Apart from the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), the Abuja Securities and Commodity 
Exchange (ASCE) is the other between the two existing stock exchanges in Nigeria. It 
was established in 1998 and located in Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) 
(ASCE, 2016). The Exchange (ASCE) engages in trading of commodities like Millet, 
Sorghum, Maize (Corn), and Cocoa, Coffee, Soybean, Melon, Cowpea and other 
agricultural products. The Exchange (ASCE) does not engage in trading of securities 
like equity, debts and derivatives, as it is the function of the Nigerian Stock Exchange.  
 
The establishment of Abuja Securities and Commodity Exchange may give farmers or 
operators in the agricultural sector the opportunity sell their products in a standard 
market that attracts the interest of various investors. This may also help to enhance 
agricultural production that will boost government revenue and redirect Nigerian 
economy from oil-based to agricultural based since agriculture has been the major 
source of government revenues before the oil boom era in the 1970s. 
 
2.4.9 The Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) 
 
Olusegun, Oluwatoyin, and Fagbeminiyi (2011) report that the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE) was established in 1960, and licensed under ISA- Investment and 
Securities Act that is regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (NSE, 
2016). Oulsegun et al., (2011) further stressed that the NSE was before called the Lagos 
Stock Exchange (LSE) and later transformed to Nigerian Stock Exchange in 1977. 




located in big cities and Abuja inclusive. The Exchange (NSE) started operations with 
19 listed securities. Currently, there are about 200 listed equities and the All Share Index 
(ASI) and Market Capitalization stood at 24, 850.11 basis points and N8.548 trillion 
USD equivalent ($4.34b) as at April 22, 2016 (NSE, 2016). 
 
Moreover, the Exchange (NSE) offers various services involving listing and trading, 
market data solution, licensing and additional information technology (IT) among 
others. The Exchange belongs to several international and regional organizations in 
order to adopt a high level of international standards and to promote the establishment 
and incorporation of global best practices in all its activities (NSE, 2016). The 
membership of the Exchange is in the following: (1) International Organization of 
Securities Commission (IOSCO), (2) Sustainable Stock Exchanges (SSE) Initiatives, 
(3) the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE), (4) Inter-market Surveillance Group 
(ISG), and the SIIA's Financial Information Services Division (FISD). 
 
2.4.10 Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) 
 
The Federal Inland Revenue Service begins as an arm of colonial tax administration 
with the name ‘Inland Revenue Department of Anglophone West-Africa (Ghana, 
Gambia and Sierra Leone)’ (FIRS, 2016). The Board of Inland Revenue was created in 
1958 under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1958. Following several transformations 
between 1961 and 1993, the Federal Inland Revenue Service got its self-sufficiency 
through the surfacing of FIRS Act 13 of 2007. The FIRS is an operating segment of the 
Federal Board of Inland Revenue (FBIR). The Act serves as a collection of powers, 




the operation and management of the FIRS. The Service (FIRS) is responsible for 
assessing, collection and accounting for different tax incomes to the federal government 
(FIRS, 2016). 
 
2.5 Institutional Developments in the Nigerian Financial Sector 
 
The growth of the Nigerian banking system after consolidation period (the post year 
2004) and the failure of the supervisors and regulators to initiate appropriate capabilities 
to supervise the system generate risk to the system, which caused a significant setback 
to both supervisors and other stakeholders. Furthermore, other factors like a significant 
failure in corporate governance at banks, macroeconomic instability, enforcement and 
irregular supervision were responsible for ensuring delicate financial system (CBN, 
2010). Due to the factors that make the Nigerian financial system susceptible, the CBN 
in 2009 intervenes by implementing some initiatives to strengthen stability in the 
financial system. These initiatives are but not limited to the following:   
  
(1) Establishment of the Financial Stability Committee (FSC) 
(2) Establishment of the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) 
(3) Review of supervisory procedures and methodology 
(4) Restructuring of the Financial Sector Surveillance Directorate (FSSD) 
(5) Adoption of a common year-end for Banks 
(6)  Renewed collaboration with other regulators 
(7) Review of Code of Corporate Governance (CCG) for Banks 
(8) Establishment of an N300 billion ($2.044 billion) Power Development Fund in 




(9) Establishment of an N200 billion ($1.363 billion) Commercial Agriculture 
Credit Scheme (CACS) by the CBN, collaboration with the Federal Ministry of 
Agriculture and Water Resources (FMA & WR) 
(10) Establishment of an N200 billion ($1.363 billion) refinancing and restructuring 
of the manufacturing sector loan portfolio 
 
Whereas other supportive mechanisms of financial stability initiated by the Federal 
Government (FG) are:  
 
(1) Enactment of Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010 
(the “Local Content Act”) 
(2) Federal Government’s amnesty program in the Niger Delta region (a region 
affected by militancy engaged in oil pipelines vandalisation and kidnapping of 
foreign company’s oil workers for ransom); and 
(3) Creation of a Ministry for the development of the Niger Delta  
 
2.5.1 Key Challenges in the Nigerian Financial System  
 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (2010) reports that there exist some factors which 
collectively threatened the Nigerian financial system and hamper growth in 2008 and 
2009. However, slight recovery was witnessed in the first half of the year 2010 as doubts 
about the feasibility of the global economy, which had been wrecked by the force of the 
global financial crisis, eased. Furthermore, the effect of several policy procedures 




The major challenges in Nigerian financial system as states by CBN include the 
following: 
 
Volatile and reversible capital inflows that characterized bank consolidation exercise of 
2005;  
 
(1) Failures in corporate governance in banks and other financial institutions 
(2) Major weaknesses in the business environment. 
(3) Inadequate disclosure and transparency in financial reporting. 
(4) Uneven supervision and enforcement. 
(5) Engagement in multiple financial activities that increased the complexity of 
operations; and 
(6) Inadequate risk management frameworks for identifying, measuring and 
controlling the risks associated with the activities of deposit money banks 
(DMBs) and other financial institutions. 
 
2.5.2 Financial Institutions’ Performance in the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) 
 
Financial institutions in the Nigerian Stock Exchange has witnessed dramatic shift over 
the period. Figure 2.3 depicts that performance of listed financial institutions in Nigeria 
has dwindled through hard times. Albeit, they have a favourable start in 2010, but 
performance declines in 2011. Subsequently, performance continues to stumble in 2011 
and drastically declines in 2012 till early 2013. From 2013 through 2014, there has been 
a favourable increase in performance, but this achievement fails to reinstate at the end 




fails severely amid 2015 till early 2016. This assessment is diagrammatically depicted 





Performance of Listed Financial Service Firms in NSE Market 
Source: NSE, (2017). 
 
2.6 Development of Corporate Governance (CG) in Nigeria  
 
The concept of Corporate Governance (CG) existed from medieval days. Because 
during the ancient times, the tribal commune supervises activities of communal tribes 
and the supervision extends to other individual members to guarantee the conformity of 
tribal norms by individual members (Lai & Bello, 2012). This later transformed into 
farmers' community that gave rise to global trading institutions in the post crises era. 
This leads to the formation of different regulatory bodies and regulations by the British 






of England (BOE) and Joint Stock Companies (JSC), which are to oversee trading 
activities based on effectiveness, efficiency, stakeholders' contentment, and 
accountability (Kukure, 2006). 
 
Crawford (2007) and Afolabi (2015) reported that issues evolving corporate governance 
have been the theme of significant global debate since the 1970s. There have been 
reforms of corporate governance in both developing and developed nations. This is due 
to: (1) the significant increase in demand by corporate owners (Shareholders) to 
maximize their wealth and exercise their ownership right, and (2) signal of retrenching 
corporations Chief Executive Officers that include Kodak, Honeywell, and IBM by their 
board of directors. In addition to this, the neglect and purposeful unethical action of the 
corporate board of directors and top executives has led to the collapse of giant 
companies like Enron and WorldCom, which attracts the attention of various corporate 
stakeholders and necessitate their interests in Code of Corporate Governance. For this 
reason, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is developed (Benjamin, 2009; Fallatah & Dickson, 
2012). 
 
Additionally, the Asian financial crisis in 1997 has affected many companies in East 
Asia like Thailand and Malaysia (for instance, Renong, Perwaja Steel, and Malaysian 
Airline System). Due to the 1997 Asian economic crisis, the Malaysian government has 
embarked on intensifying corporate governance best practices and ensures its 
implementation and reporting in all listed companies in 2000. The supervisory 
authorities concerned in regulating and controlling the Malaysian capital market include 




Exchange), and Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank) (Abdul Rahman & Mohamed, 
2006; Yatim, 2010).  
 
In Nigeria, because of persistent distress in the banking industry, inadequate supervision 
by authorities, carelessness amongst the directors and managers, and poor performance 
led to the issue of first Code of CG for banks and non-banks financial institutions in the 
4th quarter of 2003 by the Bankers' Committee (Demaki, 2013; Mmadu, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the NCCG is surrounded by less impact and weaknesses, as the group of 
Banks' Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) issued it. To have improved corporate 
governance in Nigeria, the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) through the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued the Code of Best Practices (CBP) on CG in 
2003 for listed or incorporated firms (Adelegan, 2009; Afolabi, 2015). 
 
Furthermore, at the end of 2003, Nigerian-banking industry was in distress because of 
poor corporate governance practice that results from weak internal control systems, 
overrule of internal control measures, poor performance, excessive risk taking, an 
absence of risk management processes, and override of authority limit among others. 
This is in consensus with the report by SEC in 2004, which states that the Nigerian 
corporate governance ineffectively practices because only less than 50% of the listed 
firms in Nigeria observe corporate governance practice (Mmadu, 2013). This led to the 
banks' consolidation exercise in 2005 that require banks to have minimum capitalization 
base of N25b ($187.5m), which slashed Nigerian Banks from 89 to 24. In regards to 
this, the Central Bank of Nigeria issued a new Code of Corporate Governance for banks 




It is commonly believing that poor corporate governance has led to corporate failures in 
Nigeria as earlier noted. In order to have enhanced corporate governance, SEC in 
September 2008, launched a National Committee headed by Mr. Mahmoud, M. B. to 
review the 2003 Code of Corporate Governance for listed companies. The Committee 
was permitted to identify flaws and constraints in the 2003 code and to identify ways of 
enhancing it, boost greater compliance, and for linking the code with international best 
practice. This gives birth to the SEC 2009 code of CG. Therefore, the board of SEC 
believes that the new Code of CG will guarantee the highest standards of accountability, 
transparency and good governance in firms without negative effect to their operations 
and innovation. 
 
Moreover, SEC reviews the 2009 Code of CG for public quoted companies in 2011 due 
to the 2008 global financial crisis that affects both developed and emerging economies 
and noncompliance with standard corporate governance practice in the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE) (SEC, 2012). In this effect, the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2014 issued 
a new Code of Best Practice on Code of CG for Banks and Non-Banks Financial 
Institutions. The new code has provided a clear guideline on every aspect of corporate 
governance and is expected to strengthen corporate governance for financial institutions, 
most especially in the areas of board structure (nonexecutive directors’ compensation, 
directors’ remuneration policy, names of chairmen and members of each committee etc.) 
and risk management practice, compliance and reporting (same as the NCCG, 2011) 
(CBN, 2006 & 2014).   Nonetheless, the CBN Code of CG and the SEC Code of CG are 
in no any circumstance conflicting each other because they are designed based on the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act of 1990 (The Nigerian Company Law) and their 




2.7 Regulations Governing Financial Institutions Practice in Nigeria 
 
There are available regulations governing the activities of financial institutions in 
Nigeria that involve the company law and the code of CG. Even though the regulations 
are for general companies, but they significantly assist in regulating the activities of 
Nigerian financial institutions since they are also incorporated companies operating in 
the capital market (NSE).      
 
2.7.1 The Company Law 
 
Afolabi (2015) states that in Nigeria, there exists a legal framework regulating the 
registration and operation of companies known as Companies and Allied Matters Act 
(CAMA) of 1990 (formerly, Companies and Allied Matters Decree, 1989) derived from 
English (British) Companies Act of 1862, later U.K Companies Act 1948, which is the 
genesis of modern company law. Olakanmi (2008) report that in 1922, the Companies 
Ordinance of 1912 and 1917 were consolidated and re-enacted with some amendments 
as the Companies Ordinance 1922. This became Cap.38 of the laws of Nigeria 1948 
edition and Cap.37 of the laws of Nigeria 1958 edition. In 1963, it was re-designated 
Companies Act and continued to be the law applicable to the whole country until its 
repeal in 1968.  
 
Olakanmi (2008) further stressed that the Companies Decree of 1968 came into being 
because Cap.37 of the laws of Nigeria 1958 was inadequate and could no longer cope 
with the growth of Nigerian economic activities. Subsequently, it was felt that a 




business and give greater protection to investors and creditors. In this effect, the 
Companies Act of 1968 is remarkable because it made provisions for accounts and 
encouraged greater accountability and enhances effective participation of shareholders 
in the affairs of the company. 
 
Due to the significant growth witnessed by the Nigerian Economy further exhibits the 
need for more vibrant, systematic and comprehensive laws not rooted in the antiquated 
U.K. Companies Act 1948. The Attorney-General directed the Nigerian Law Reform 
Commission in 1987. This Report was considered by the Ministry of Justice and 
promulgated the draft Decrees into law as the Companies and Allied Matters Decree 
1990 (Olakanmi, 2008). Nigerian company law has made provisions regarding directors' 
duties, appointment, removal remuneration, and proceedings (meetings and resolutions) 
under sections 244-287. 
 
Nonetheless, Section 246 of the law (CAMA) requires that registered companies in 
Nigeria must have at least two (2) directors and that a company may appoint a director 
of any age. The Act provides that a person who is been appointed by a public company 
when He/She is 70 years old or more must be disclosed to members in the general 
meeting. More so, the Act states that certain persons (a person under 18 years of age, 
lunatic or person of unsound mind, and insolvent, bankrupt or fraudulent persons) from 
appointment as a director. 
 
The company law (CAMA) in Nigeria governs the registration of companies through 
the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), by providing guidelines on incorporation 




membership of a company, promoters and their duties, generating meetings, shares, 
prospectus, directors, financial statement reporting and auditing, dividends, and 
company winding up. Therefore, one can be saying that these provisions are also 
affecting the activities of Nigerian financial institutions since they are incorporated 
under the company law (CAMA).   
 
2.7.2 The Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance (NCCG) 
 
Code of corporate governance is another important provision that regulates the 
operations of financial institutions in Nigeria. This is because there is Code of Corporate 
governance for the listing requirement in the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), and for 
operations in specific institutions as earlier identified.  The issued by Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) for listing requirements (which is obligatory) on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) for corporate best 
practices in financial institutions which is mandatory, are in accordance with the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act of 1999 (Now, 2004 as amended) (Demaki, 2013). 
 
2.7.2.1 Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance (NCCG) on Board of Directors 
2.7.2.1.1 Responsibilities of the Board 
 
The NCCG 2011 stipulated matters relating to corporate board members in Nigeria by 
providing their responsibilities as the following: 
 
1. The Board is accountable and responsible for the performance and affairs of the 




human and financial resources are been deployed effectively towards attaining 
those goals. 
2. The principal objective of the Board is to ensure that the company is properly 
managed. It is the responsibility of the Board to oversee the effective 
performance of the management in order to protect and enhance shareholder 
value and to meet the company’s obligations to its employees and other 
stakeholders. 
3. The primary responsibility for ensuring good corporate governance in the 
company lies with the board. Accordingly, the board should ensure that the 
company carries on its business in accordance with its Articles and 
Memorandum of Association and in conformity with the laws of the country, 
observing the highest ethical standards and on an environmentally sustainable 
basis.  
4. The board shall define a framework for the delegation of its authority or duties 
to management specifying matters that may be delegated and those reserved for 
the board. The delegation of any duty or authority to the management does not 
diminish in any way the overall responsibility of the board and its directors as 










2.7.2.1.2 Duties of the Board  
 
Based on the NCCG 2011, the board should perform the following duties: 
 
1. Formulation of policies, overseeing the management, and conduct of the 
business. 
2. Formulation and management of risk management framework. 
3.  Succession planning and the appointment, training, remuneration and 
replacement of board members and senior management. 
4. Overseeing the effectiveness and adequacy of internal control systems. 
5. Overseeing the maintenance of the company’s communication and information 
dissemination policy. 
6. Performance appraisal and compensation of board members and senior 
executives. 
7. Ensuring effective communication with shareholders. 
8.  Ensuring the integrity of financial reports. 
9. Ensuring that ethical standards are maintained; and 
10.  Ensuring compliance with the laws of Nigeria.   
 
2.7.2.1.3 Composition and Structure of the Board 
 
The NCCG 2011 requires that the board of directors of publicly traded companies 





1. The board should be of a sufficient size relative to the scale and complexity of 
the company’s operations and be composed in such a way as to ensure diversity 
of experience without compromising independence, compatibility, integrity and 
availability of members to attend meetings. 
2. Membership of the board should not be less than five (5), and should not exceed 
twenty (20). 
3. The board should comprise a mix of executive and non-executive directors, 
headed by a Chairman. The majority of board members should be non-executive 
directors, at least one should be an independent director. 
4. The members of the board should be individuals with upright personal 
characteristics, relevant core competence and entrepreneurial spirit. They should 
have a record of tangible achievement and should be knowledgeable in board 
matters.  Members should possess a sense of accountability and integrity and be 
committed to the task of good corporate governance. 
5. The board should be independent of management to enable it to carry out its 
oversight function in an objective and effective manner. 
 
2.7.2.2 Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance (NCCG) on Risk Management  
 
The NCCG 2011 states that the board may establish a Risk Management Committee 
(RMC) to assist it in its oversight of the risk profile, risk management framework and 
the risk reward strategy determined by the board. A written Terms of Reference or a 





1. Review and approval of the company’s risk management policy including risk 
appetite and risk strategy. 
2. Review the adequacy and effectiveness of risk management and controls. 
3. Oversight of management’s process for the identification of significant risks 
across the company and the adequacy of prevention, detection and reporting 
mechanisms. 
4. Review of the company’s compliance level with applicable laws and regulatory 
requirements which may impact the company’s risk profile and performance. 
5. Periodic review of changes in the economic and business environment, including 
emerging trends and other factors relevant to the company’s risk profile and 
performance. 
6.  Review and recommend for approval of the board risk management procedures 
and controls for new products and services. 
 
In order to enhance the risk management function, the NCCG 2011 requires that a 
member of senior management should be detailed to perform the function and attend the 
meetings of the Risk Management Committee (RMC). More so, the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), executive directors, and the head of internal audit unit should attend the 
meetings of the Risk Management Committee (RMC). Specifically, the CBN Code of 
Corporate Governance for best practices in the financial institution requires that the 
Board Risk Management Committee (BRMC) should compose of at least two (2) non-
executive directors and the executive director overseeing risk management. A non-





2.8 Underpinning Theory  
 
A theory in an empirical study is like a brick that makes a building stand. Consequently, 
Mann (1985) cited in Adams, Khan, Raeside, and White (2007) define a theory as ‘a 
building which is made from the hard-won bricks of research studies’. In social science 
research, a theory is “a rational edifice built by scientists to explain human behaviour” 
(Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007, p. 10). Whereas, Adams et al. (2007) defined a 
theory as ‘a set of systematically interrelated concepts, definitions, and propositions that 
are advanced to explain and predict phenomena (facts)' (p. 28). Moreover, in 
quantitative research, a theory is an interconnected collection of constructs (or variables) 
modelled into hypotheses or propositions that stipulate the association among the 
variables (in terms of extent or direction) (Creswell, 2013).  
 
Collectively, a theory may be referring to a set of ideas, coherent statement, or 
underlying principles, which explains an observed fact or process. That is, a theory 
explains a relationship that exists between variables (specifically in terms of direction, 
manner, and extent). For instance, a theory describes how variable ‘X' relates to or 
influences variable ‘Y', or how a collection of variables ‘X1, X2, X3……Xn’ relate to or 
influence variable(s) ‘Y’, Y1, Y2, …. Yn’.  
 
Therefore, agency theory and resource dependence theory will be used to explain the 
relationship between the variables in this study. This is because, in practice, Korn Ferry 
(1999) reports that board of directors as representatives of the shareholders, monitor and 
also provide resources to firms, and are both related to corporate performance. In this 




dependence theories is significant because it can assist in overcoming the contemporary 
myopic issues surrounding both streams of research. In addition, Hillman and Dalziel 
argue that "both agency theorists and resource dependence theorists have examined one 
board function (monitoring/the provision of resources) at the expense of the other, 
contributing to an incomplete understanding of what boards do and how they affect firm 
performance" (p. 383). In regards to this, agency theory which dominates studies on 
boards will be used as the major theory, while resource dependence theory will 
complement agency theory on some board variables. 
 
2.8.1 Agency Theory 
 
Agency relationship ascends between two or more parties when one known as the agent 
acts on behalf of another known as the principal in making decisions concerning a 
particular problem (Ross, 1973). Agency theory is universally embraced by scholars in 
Economics, accounting and finance, organizational behavior, marketing, and political 
science (e.g.,   Basu, Lal, Srinivasan, & Staelin, 1985; Demski & Feltham, 1978; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Eccles, 1985; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Kosnik, 1987; Mitnick, 1986; Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971). Agency theory can 
be said to originate from the work of Adam Smith (1776) who wrote on the behaviour 
of managers in joint stock companies in his text ‘The Wealth of Nations’, where he states 
that: 
 
"The directors of such (joint-stock) companies, however, being the managers 
rather of other people's money than their own, it cannot well be expected that 
they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the 
stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not 




having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less 
in the management of the affairs of such company" (p. 990). 
 
Based on Smith's (1776) assertion, it can be deduced that conflict of interest arises 
between owners of resources (principals) and their stewards/managers (agents) because, 
in the event of managing the principal's resources, they (agents) have their personal 
interest to achieve. Consequently, Berle and Means (1932) became the pioneers of 
agency theory by describing the separation between ownership and control in 
companies.  Berle and Means contend that conflict of interest and separation can be the 
cause of agency problem in an organization which may result from inadequate checking 
of management functions by shareholders. Moreover, shareholders' interests may be 
impaired when managers want to maximize their self-interests at the expense of the firm 
success and efficiency. However, the most extensively-cited studies on agency theory 
spring from Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that agency theory is focused universally on agency 
relationship, where shareholders (the principal) delegates work to managers (the agents) 
who carries out the work and agency theory tries to define this relationship by means of 
a symbol of contract. Eisenhardt (1989) stress that agency theory concentrates on 
solving two problems which may arise in agency relationships. Eisenhardt state that “the 
first is the agency problem that ascends when (a) the desires or goals of the principal 
and agent conflict, and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the 
agent is actually doing” (p. 58). Here, the problem is, the principal will find it difficult 
to verify whether the agent has actively behaved in a good manner. In addition, another 




(managers) have diverse attitudes on risk. As such, the principal and agent may desire 
to act differently due to their differences in risk preferences.  
 
Moreover, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency costs ascend in any condition 
that involves cooperative effort (that is when two or more parties are engaged in 
accomplishing a particular task or objective). Agency problems come up for the reason 
that contracts that are not costlessly recorded and imposed (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The 
authors further claimed that agency costs are such costs that involve monitoring, 
structuring, and bringing together the collection of contracts amongst agents having 
conflicting interests. In the same vein, agency costs also involve the ‘value of output 
lost' because the costs to fully implement the contracts outweigh the benefits. 
 
Meanwhile, the association between the shareholders and management of a company fit 
the meaning of a real agency relationship, then it should be clearly understood that the 
issues related to the "separation of ownership and control" in the contemporary diffuse 
ownership company are significantly associated with the problem of agency generally 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Nevertheless, controlling agency problems become 
necessary in the decision-making process in a company because when managers who 
formulate and enforce essential decisions are not the main residual claimants, hence do 
not bear a significant share of the wealth-effects of their decisions (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). 
 
Moreover, without effective and efficient control procedures, corporate managers may 
likely take actions or make decisions that diverge from the residual claimants’ 




“an effective system for decision control implies, almost by definition, that the 
control (ratification and monitoring) of decisions is to some extent separate from 
management (initiation and implementation) of decisions. Individual decision 
agents can be involved in the management of some decisions and the control of 
others, but separation means that an individual agent does not exercise exclusive 
management and control rights over the same decisions” (p. 304).  
 
Consistently, Fama and Jensen (1983) affirm that in order to reduce agency costs that 
result from separating ownership and control, there is need of a system that can be used 
differentiate between decision control and decision management of firms. This will in a 
long way reduce agency costs through control of management power and assuring an 
appropriate attention to stockholders' interests. As such, corporate governance can be 
seen as that system which will safeguard and enhance the rights of stockholders and 
other stakeholders. Besides, the unscrupulous behaviour of agents can be curtailed, and 
agency costs can be reduced by internal and external mechanisms of corporate 
governance (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; McKnight & Weir, 2009; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986; Williamson, 1984). 
 
More importantly, the highest systems of organizations' (large and small) decisions and 
control, where decision agents do not participate in the significant share of wealth 
maximization upon their decisions are regarded as "some form of the board of directors" 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). The authors added that such board of directors usually 
possessed the power to employ, retrench, and compensate top executives and to confirm 
and oversee important decisions. The control of top executives’ decisions by the board 
helps in separating decision management and control. 
 
Furthermore, Eisenhardt (1989) contends that a specific appropriate information system 




board of directors provide adequate and relevant information, high-level decision 
managers (top executives) are more expected to behave in the best interests of 
shareholders. Moreover, Eisenhardt adds that the usefulness and greatness of board of 
directors' information can be measured based on characteristics like board size, board 
composition, board meetings frequency, proportion of board members that have long 
tenure, number of board sub-committees, board members with experience, and 
proportion of board members being representatives of a particular ownership groups. 
 
Apparently, there is a stream of studies which empirically support the notion that 
effective board will ensure that the oversight functions of the board is improved and will 
overcome the problem of information asymmetry, which in turn enhances the market 
value of firm and performance. The studies use boards efficiency regarding its attributes 
like size (e.g., Afrifa & Tauringana, 2015; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Fidanoski et al., 2013; 
Guest, 2009; Joe Duke & Kankpang, 2011), composition (e.g., Marn & Romuald, 2012; 
Narwal & Jindal, 2015; Uadiale, 2010), meetings (e.g., Al-Matari et al., 2014a; Harvey 
Pamburai, Chamisa, Abdulla, & Smith, 2015; Vafeas, 1999), CEO tenure (e.g., Afrifa 
& Tauringana, 2015; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008), expertise 
(e.g., Andreou et al., 2014; Dass et al., 2014; Yatim, 2010), risk management committee 
structure (size, composition, meetings) (e.g., Ng et al., 2012; Pathan, 2009; Tao & 
Hutchinson, 2013). 
 
Therefore, this study will utilize agency theory and resource dependence theory because 
they concentrate on provision of advice, counselling, and monitoring functions which 
help in solving the problem of principal-agent relationship that is dominated by agency 




mechanisms can be used in reducing the agency cost (Fama 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). The corporate governance mechanisms like board 
characteristics and its subcommittees can ensure the effectiveness of the board, which 
will, in turn, enhance firms' value and performance (Denis & McConnell, 2003; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). Moreover, agency theory will be used to explain risk management 
practices and disclosure because the theory postulates that disclosure of information on 
corporate risk reduces monitoring costs (Hemrit & Arab, 2011), which ensures that 
information is provided in the annual reports of companies (Depoers, 2000). 
 
2.8.2 Resource Dependence Theory  
 
Albeit, agency theory has been the leading theory in research on boards (Zahra & Pearce, 
1989), while this is the area of resource dependence theory’s significant research 
influence (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). Resource dependence theorists assessed 
how board capital (expertise, experience, reputation) facilitates or provides resources to 
the firm (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). As such, the board of directors enable firms to gain 
resources or minimize dependence (Pfeffer, 1972). Corporate boards do not only 
provide an important linkage to other companies but also guaranteed favourable 
transactions among these companies (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Bazerman and Schoorman 
(1983) reported that the residual effects of the board of directors in this situation is 
ensuring an increase in coordination among firms, enhance access to important 
information and resources, and assist in reducing transaction costs. 
 
In consistent with the work on theoretical underpinning of resource dependence theory 




resources to the organization (Hillman et al., 2009), which (the function) refers to the 
ability of the board to convey resources to the firm. Resources, as explained by 
Wernerfelt (1984), is "anything that could be thought of as a strength or weakness of a 
given firm" (p. 172). When an individual is appointed by the organization to its board, 
it expects that the individual appointed will give adequate support to the organization, 
pay more attention to its problems and discuss it with others, and will try to assist in 
solving the problem (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The authors proclaim that there are four 
basic benefits that can be ensured by corporate boards which include: "(1) advice and 
counsel, (2) legitimacy, (3) channels for communicating information between external 
organizations and the firm, and (4) preferential access to commitments or support from 
important elements outside the firm" (p. 145, 161). 
 
In the same way, empirical evidence from resource dependence theory has shown that 
there is a significant relationship between board capital and performance of firms (e.g., 
Boyd, 1990; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Pfeffer, 1972). Proponents of resource 
dependence theory suggest that the provision of resources by board of directors is linked 
directly to firm performance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), assist to reduce dependency of 
organization on external contingencies, reduces uncertainties for the firm, minimized 
transaction costs, and assist in ensuring the survival of a firm (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Sing, House, & Tucker, 1986; Williamson, 1984).  
 
Since resource dependence theory is on the conception that board of directors provide 
resources (advice and counsel, legitimacy, information access, and supports) to the firm 
to ensure its success, it is therefore expected that it will have an influence on company 




complement agency theory in showing the relationship between the variables in this 
study. 
 
2.9 Concept of Corporate Performance and its Measurement 
2.9.1 Concept of Performance 
 
The concept of firm performance has been a central idea of a debate in both literature 
and practice. This is because it is an essential requirement for an organization's survival 
and growth. However, Kakanda et al. (2016b), Marn and Romuald, (2012), and Yasser, 
Entebang, and Mansor, (2011) view firm performance as the process by which the 
limited amount of resources available to an organization, are effectively and efficiently 
managed in achieving its predetermined objectives for both short and long-term periods. 
In addition, firm performance is the increase in wealth of a shareholder from the 
beginning of a given period to the end of another period (Berger & Patti, 2002).  
 
Neely, Gregory, and Platts (1995) report that performance is measured based on 
assessing and quantifying the efficiency and effectiveness of management in 
discharging their defined responsibilities. To Berger and Patti (2002), the financial 
performance of a firm can be determined using ratios derived from financial reports, 
which are mainly a statement of financial position and statement of comprehensive 
income, or the use of stock prices data on the capital market. From the foregoing 
definitions which are based on agency theory and resource dependence perspectives, 
firm performance and its measurement is most required by organizations to assess the 
effectiveness and efficiency of management, and it helps in providing vital information 




In essence, profitability and market value of the firm are measures of it passed and future 
ability to maximize returns, while an increase in its size determines it growth (Whetten, 
1987; Glick, Ishburn & Miller 2005). However, Teeratansirikool, Siengthai, Badir and 
Charoenngam (2013) opine that measurement of performance plays a significant role in 
developing, applying, and overseeing a strategic plan. It assists corporate managers to 
assess the extent to which organizations predetermine objectives are achieved which is 
used as a basis of compensating managers. Performance measurement helps corporate 
executives to know whether the firm is moving in the planned direction, which is also 
the expectation of shareholders, and other parties that have a stake in the company. 
 
2.9.2 Performance Measurement  
 
There are different ways of measuring performance, either base on accounting 
measurement or market-based measurement. Previous studies have utilized both 
accounting and market-based measurement of performance, while some studies use 
organizational based performance measurement. For the purpose of this study, both 
accounting and market-based performance measurements will be used. 
 
2.9.2.1 Accounting-based Performance Measurement        
 
The indices of measurement based on accounting data are but not limited to Return on 
Assets (ROA); Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Sales (ROS), Net Profit Margin 
(NPM), and Gross Profit Margin (GPM), Return on Capital Employed (ROCE), Return 
on Sales (ROS), Expenses to Sales (ETS), Return on Revenue (ROR) among others. 




firm performance that use accounting based performance measures like return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), net profit margin (NPM), dividend per share (DPS), 
and earnings per share (EPS) include (Amba, 2013; Marn & Romuald, 2012; Yasser et 
al., 2011; Vance, 1978).  
 
2.9.2.2 Market-based Performance Measurement  
 
The market-based performance measures include Market-to-book-value, Price-earnings 
(P/E) ratio, Tobin's Q, Earnings Yield (EY) and Dividend Yield (DY), Market-to-Book 
Value (MBV) ratio, Logarithm of Market Capitalization (LMC), Annual Stock Return 
(ASR) to mention but a few. Prior studies on the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance that utilize market-based performance 
measures include (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Vafeas, 1999). 
 
Based on the extant literature concerning the choice of performance measurement, some 
scholars (for instance, Bozec, 2005; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008; Khan, Nemati & 
Iftikhar, 2011) have recommended the use of market-based performance measure, for 
example, Tobin's-Q. While some studies (for instance, Marn & Romuald, 2012; Amba, 
2013) recommend the use of profitability measures like ROA, ROE, EPS, and NPM and 
so on. 
 
Therefore, this study will utilize both accounting-based performance measures (ROA 
and ROE) following scholars like (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Khan, 2012; Onaolopo & 
Kajola, 2010; Saibaba & Ansari, 2013; Yermack, 1996) and market-based performance 




the book value of total assets') is consistent with Best (2004), and Gentry and Shen 
(2010). This is because accounting-based performance measures can be influenced by 
corporate managers to show their effectiveness and efficiency of operations to 
shareholders and other stakeholders. This is consistent with the opinion of Hitt (1988) 
who states that accounting measures have various deficiencies because they are 
subjected to alteration of accurate company performance at any point in time, subjective 
methods of depreciation, and abnormal charges may alter performance. In addition, 
accounting measures are rarely adjusted for risk. 
 
However, market performance can only be influenced by the forces of demand and 
supply in the market, thereby showing a more specific performance of a company for a 
long-term business period (Hitt, 1988). Therefore, blending of accounting-based and 
market-based performance measures may ensure a better result in determining financial 
performance (Rowe & Morrow, 1999; Schwab,1999) of listed financial institutions in 
Nigeria. 
 
2.10 Corporate Governance  
2.10.1 Concept of Corporate Governance  
 
The concept of corporate governance is first utilised by Eells (1960), who state that 
corporate governance means the organization and effectiveness of a corporate policy. 
From then, the concept has been defined differently by various researchers. For instance, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as the process by which 
providers of financial resources to corporations carry out effective operations of their 




The Central Bank of Nigeria, CBN (2014) refers to corporate governance as the rules, 
processes, or laws by which institutions are operated, regulated and governed.  
 
Moreover, CBN added that effective corporate governance practices provide and 
enhance a structure that works for the benefit of various stakeholders by ensuring that 
the enterprise adheres to accepted ethical standards and best practices as well as formal 
laws. Additionally, the Organization for Economic Development and Co-operation, 
OECD (2004) defined corporate governance as the procedures used by organizations in 
pursuing their set objectives in the circumstances of social, regulatory and market 
surroundings. Moreover, governance mechanisms include not only the monitoring of 
actions but with policies, practices and decisions of corporations, their agents as well as 
concerned and affected stakeholders. 
 
The Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation, (OECD, 2015) stressed 
that “the corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient 
markets, be consistent with rule of law and clearly state the division of responsibilities 
among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities" (p.13). In relation 
to this, OECD further states that the principles (Code of Corporate Governance) identify 
the interests of other stakeholders and organization's employees alongside their 
significant role in ensuring the successful existence and performance of the firm. This 
indicates that an effective utilization or application of corporate governance principles 
established by various institutions (government and non-governmental regulators of 





Accordingly, Al-Matari et al. (2014a) asserted that with effective corporate governance 
principles in practice, financial disputes can be prevented. They further argued that apart 
from preventing financial disputes, corruption can be lessening, thereby improving the 
level of firm growth which finally amounts to the overall economic growth and 
development of a nation, and also improve the financial performance of a company. 
Equally, effective corporate governance has a significant function as a factor that 
guarantees growth and development potentials of an economy (Spanos, 2005). 
  
Larker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) viewed corporate governance as the collection of 
mechanisms that persuade corporate managers' decisions when ownership is separated 
from control. They argued that among the monitoring means are institutional 
shareholders, the board of directors, and market functions for control of the firm. While 
Akbar (2015) defines corporate governance as the mechanism that corporations used to 
protect shareholders' right. The author further stresses that the requirement for corporate 
governance emanates from agency problem. Because in organizational systems, 
corporate managers have extra control and information than the providers of resources 
(shareholders). In regards, as providers of resources (shareholders) are interested in the 
maximization of their investments, corporate managers may be busy after their job 
security and promotion. 
 
Yilmaz and Buyuklu (2016) viewed corporate governance as an established relationship 
between the management of a company, its shareholders, other stakeholders, and its 
board of directors. corporate governance spells out the dissemination of rights and duties 
amid various participants (for instance, shareholders, managers, and other stakeholders) 




making of a company (Gavrea & Stegerean, 2012). In this effect, therefore, corporate 
governance offers the structure via which predetermined objectives of a company are 
set, and the process of achieving the set objectives and enhancement of performance. 
 
Based on the above discussions, corporate governance can be referring to as the set of 
rules, procedures, and mechanisms utilized by corporations for effective control and 
management of organizational resources (man, material, money, and machines) towards 
achieving their set objectives that have impact on the interests of shareholders, 
management, employees and other stakeholders.   
 
2.10.2 Corporate Governance (CG) Mechanisms  
 
Effective utilization of shareholders’ resources depends on the corporate managers who 
have significant control and monitoring of the resources and may discharge their 
responsibilities according to their self-interests rather than shareholders’ interests 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). From the perspective of the agency theory, the 
shareholders have little confidence that the managers will take an action on behalf of 
their own interests. The shareholder is in believing that the corporate managers will act 
for their personal interests and not for investors' interest. This conflict is getting worse 
due to the information asymmetry among the two parties. Therefore, this calls for the 
need of governance mechanism like the board of directors as proxies of the shareholders 
to oversee the activities of management in a company. In order to utilize corporate 
governance mechanisms to tackle the problem of principal-agent relationship, various 




Vishny, 1997; Villiers, Naiker & Staden, 2011) have used mechanisms like board 
structure, ownership structure alongside other characteristics of a company. 
 
Fan, Lau, and Wu (2002) reported that “corporate governance mechanisms of modern 
corporations are of the interest to investors, business practitioners, regulators, and 
scholars. These mechanisms can be broadly classified as internal and external. Internal 
governance mechanisms in developed market economies focus on the role and functions 
of ownership structure, boards of directors, CEO duality, and directors and executive 
compensation. External governance mechanisms concern the effectiveness of the 
managerial labour market, the market for corporate control, and government 
regulations” (p. 211). Therefore, this study use the Nigerian CG code 2011 for the 
internal mechanisms of corporate governance represented by board attributes (board 
size, board composition, board meetings, CEO tenure, board expertise), risk 
management committee structure (risk management committee size, risk management 
committee composition, risk management committee meetings), and risk management 
practices and disclosure. 
 
2.10.2.1 Board of Directors’ Attributes  
 
Companies' boards are charged with the responsibility of overseeing the activities of 
corporate managers on shareholders' behalf (Uadiale, 2010). Finkelstein and Mooney 
(2003) argue that board of directors play a various and significant role in effective 
operations of corporations that include advice, oversight, counsel, and monitoring of the 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), and if necessary, to offer disciplinary actions on them. 




freedom to manage and control shareholders' resources. Masson (1971) opines that the 
agents (corporate managers) have some goals that may be in conflict with that of the 
principals (shareholders), therefore disregarding wealth maximisation goals of the 
shareholders. Following this, the board of directors are to undertake effective 
management functions like observing and recompensing of top executives in order to 
guarantee shareholders' returns maximization objectives (Uadiale, 2010; Zahra & 
Pearce II, 1989). 
 
Consequently, for the board of directors to perform their functions effectively, some 
attributes like board size, board composition, board meetings, board expertise and so on 
must be in place (Kakanda et al., 2016a). Whereas Brennan (2006) concludes that the 
effectiveness of the board of directors' oversight function is influenced by some factors 
like board size, board composition, CEO duality, board culture, information 
asymmetries, and board diversity. Thus, this study will concentrate on board size, board 
composition, board meetings, CEO tenure, and board expertise. While on board 
subcommittee, the study will focus on risk management committee size, risk 
management committee composition, and risk management committee meetings. 
 
2.10.2.1.1 Board Size 
 
Kakanda et al. (2016a) view board size as the degree of the board of directors of a 
company. It is the total number of directors serving on a company's board (Ogege & 
Boloupremo, 2014; Vafeas, 1999). Nevertheless, board size is regarded as the most 
fundamental dimension of board features because of fragmented views in the literature 




board with smaller size is satisfactory and effective because monitoring duties will be 
minimized, hence boost the efficiency of operations, communication, and management. 
While a significant increase in board size leads to interruption and delay in decision 
making process, management, communication, crafts additional conflicting interests 
between shareholders and executives, and diminishes the moral of majority members, 
which finally affects firm performance (Abdurrouf, 2011; Jensen, 1993; Kakanda et al., 
2016a; Nanka-Bruce, 2011; Yermack, 1996).   
 
Furthermore, Dahya and McConnell (2005), Goodstein, Gautum, and Boeker (1994), 
Kent and Stewart (2008), Pearce and Zahra (1992), Pfeffer (1987), and Villiers, Naiker 
and Staden (2011) contend that larger boards lead to diversity that would assist 
corporations to safeguard their resources and lessen uncertainties in environments, 
enhance directors' oversight function, and guarantee effective decisions by 
management.  Moreover, Eulerich, Velte, and Van Uum (2014) suggest that a diversity 
of extra resources is made by an increase in board size because of different individual 
interactions within and outside the company by the board members. 
  
According to Lipton and Lorsch (1992), the number of the company board of directors 
should be between seven and eight. This contention is consistent with the view of Jensen 
(1993). Consequently, Firsteberg and Malkiel (1994) contend that board of a company 
that have up-to eight or fewer members stand a significant chance to preserve better 
focus, meaningful debate, better participation, and good interaction. However, a 
requisite board size of a company relies on industry type, age, and company size (Adams 
& Mehran, 2003). They exemplified that board size in the banking industry is found to 




requires publicly traded companies to have a minimum size of 5 members on board but 
did not specify the maximum number required because this depends on organizational 
complexity and requirement. This reflects that board size should be optimal, rather than 
smaller in size to function effectively. 
 
In line with agency theory, a larger board size ensures an effective and efficient 
monitoring of management which reduces the power of the CEO on corporate board of 
directors and therefore enhances firm performance (Singh & Harianto, 1989). Moreover, 
since agency theory is primarily to solve the problem of principal-agent relationship 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) which reduces agency costs from separating of ownership and 
control (Fama & Jensen, 1983), larger board size will hinder CEO’s domination of the 
board because directors will be in a better position to exercise their powers and right in 
governing the firm, and thereby improve performance of the company (Zahra & Pearce, 
1989).  
 
Based on resource dependence theory which aims at provision of intangible resources 
by the board of directors to the firm (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), so as to enhance firms' 
performance (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003), the size of boards is expected to contribute to 
better operations and performance of companies. This presumption is supported by 
Pfeffer (1972) who finds that size of the board of directors is directly related to firm's 
environmental needs, and firms that have larger interdependence need a significant ratio 
of outside directors. 
 
It is worthy to mention that there is a stream of studies on corporate governance and 




One particular study by Fidanoski, Mateska and Simeonovski (2013) which aimed at 
investigating the relevance of board size, board composition and CEO qualities in the 
banks and their performance in Macedonia found that the size of both the Supervisory 
and the Managing board is positively related to return on asset (ROA) as one of 
performance variables. While a significant and positive relationship is also found to 
exist between the size of the Managing board and the Cost-Income Ratio. The study 
utilizes annual reports of fifteen (15) sampled banks in Macedonia for the periods 2008-
2011, while regression (OLS) is used in analyzing the data collected. Variables like; 
Bank's age, Credits/Deposit Ratio and Dummy for Bank's nature are controlled for. The 
result of the study can still be biased because of limitations like; manipulation of 
financial statements by the managers, undervaluation of assets to have a higher return, 
use of manipulative policies to record depreciation, adoption of different methods to 
consolidate accounts and others (see Chakravarthy, 1986). 
 
Suhail, Rasul, and Fatima (2017) studied the relationship between internal and external 
mechanisms of corporate governance and firm performance in Pakistan banks. The 
study utilizes a sample of 30 banks quoted on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE) for 
the period of 2008 to 2014. ROA, ROE, Earnings Per Share (EPS), and Dividend Payout 
(DP) served as the proxies of performance. For analysis purpose, the authors make use 
of correlation and fixed and random effect models. The result shows that board size has 
a significant positive effect on ROA at the 0.01 level. Despite the contribution of the 
study to literature, yet, the sample size is small (30 banks only), and it concentrates only 
on banks without including nonbanks financial companies. Moreover, the study covers 




characteristics (for instance, board meeting frequency, board expertise, board tenure 
etc.) which are believed to have a significant influence on firm performance.  
 
Hidayat and Utama (2017) found that board size has a significant U-shape (positive and 
negative) relationship with firm performance in Indonesia. The study makes use of 293 
companies quoted on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (ISE) from 2008 to 2012. 
Accounting based performance measure (ROA) and market-based performance measure 
(Tobin's Q) were used as proxies of performance. Descriptive statistics and multivariate 
regression analysis are used in analyzing the data. However, the end of the study period 
is 2012, which is 5 years difference from 2017, hence making a generalization of the 
result obtained difficult since various socioeconomic or financial policies of the 
government (2012-2017) might have influenced the activities (including performance) 
of the sampled firms used. Further, the study did not carry out correlation analysis to 
show the extent and direction of a relationship between the variables of the study. 
 
In Nigeria, Ogege and Boloupremo (2014) found that board size has a significant and 
positive relationship with the performance of banks. Return on assets (ROA) and return 
on equity (ROE) are used as proxies for financial performance variables. The authors 
collected data from 15 listed banks in Nigeria for 2012 accounting period. Descriptive 
statistics, correlation, and linear regression are utilized for analysis purpose. One of the 
set back of the study is a sample size of 15 out of 21 DMBs are used, and it pays less 
attention to consider other non-banks financial firms. The study also dwells on only 
financial performance measures, and the use of a single operational period (that is 2012 
only) will make a generalization of result difficult because the trends of the business 




Additionally, board size has been found to have a significant positive relationship with 
the performance of listed small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the UK. This is the 
result of a study by Afrifa and Tauringana (2015) whose study aimed at examining the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of listed SMEs in the 
UK. The study uses data from AMADEUS commercial data base of 234 listed SMEs 
on the UK Alternative Investment Market (AIM) for 10 years (2004-2013). Descriptive 
statistics, correlation, and multiple regression are used in the analysis of the data. Tobin's 
Q is utilized as a proxy for performance which is the dependent variable of the study. 
However, the study has concentrated only on SMEs which may have different capital 
requirements, operational mode, listing requirements, and nature of transactions with 
general products and service firms, this will make a generalization of findings difficult. 
Moreover, the study uses only market performance measures (Tobin's Q) as the 
dependent variable while ignoring financial performance measures. Here, the blending 
of both (financial and market) performance measures is needed in future research to 
determine the association between board size and performance.  
 
Fauzi and Locke (2012) examine board structure role and the impact of ownership 
structure on the performance of New Zealand firms. The study uses a balanced panel 
data from the annual financial reports of 79 from the total of 147 listed firms in New 
Zealand (New Zealand Stock Exchange, NZX) covering periods of 2007 to 2011. The 
79 firms are selected from service, primary, goods, energy, property, and investment 
sectors. Return on assets and Tobin's Q are used as performance variables, and the study 
uses Generalized Linear Model (GLM) for analysis in order to achieve robustness. The 
study finds that board size has significant positive effect on the performance of firms in 




average is 6 as appears in the firms, indicating a sufficient board size. The coefficient 
of board size shows significant positive association with both returns on asset and 
Tobin's Q. The study covers the time from 2007-2011 involving a sample size of 79 
listed firms in New Zealand, therefore the validity of interpreting the findings is limited 
to data scope and circumstances of economics for the data periods. 
 
In another study by Joe Duke and Kankpang (2011), board size has significant relation 
with performance measured by return on assets (ROA) and profit margin (PM) because 
a larger board size enables more commitment and better decision making in companies. 
Data is obtained from the annual reports of 40 randomly selected firms quoted on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange over a period of 5 years. Descriptive statistics, Pearson's 
Product Momentum coefficients of correlation, and OLS regression is used in analyzing 
the data collected. Their study has not stated specifically the years (in periods) covered, 
but only provide the number of years (5). This will have a consequence on the 
interpretation of the effect of board size on performance since the NCCG has several 
reforms in 2003, 2009, and 2011. More to this, there is no justification for the sample 
selection because out of the 40 sample firms used in the study, 20 are selected from 
publicly quoted firms while the remaining 20 are selected using judgmental sampling 
from unquoted firms. This may create bias in the selection process and may have an 
effect on the outcome of the study. In addition, the study dwells only on financial 
performance measures (ROA and PM) without considering market performance like 
Tobin' Q or Price/Earnings ratio so as to have a better result on the association between 





Conversely, O'Connel and Cramer (2010) assess the association between board 
characteristics and performance of firms' in Ireland. Their study considers listed firms 
on Irish Stock Market (ISM), and data is collected from the annual reports of the 77 
companies for the period ended December 2001. Their study excludes eight financial 
firms from the sample because of the uniqueness in their financial reports. The 
performance variable is proxied by return on asset, stock market returns (raw) and 
financial Q. The study uses OLS estimates for analysis purpose, and the results indicate 
that board size has a significant negative relationship with performance. The following 
may likely be the flaws in the study: (1) the result is limited to one accounting period, 
therefore their findings lack generalization over several years; (2) absence of 
information available to public and the sample size is limited due to a minimal number 
of listed companies on Irish stock market (Brennan & McDermott, 2004); (3) the study 
has less chance for important sector or industry analysis due to small sample size; and 
(4) the accuracy of prediction of their findings for comparison purposes is limited, as 
quoted firms in Ireland are commonly few and have smaller boards as reported by the 
authors. 
 
Relatively, Guest (2009) studied the effect of board size on the performance of UK listed 
firms. The study utilizes 2746 listed firms in the UK over the period of 1981-2002. The 
main dependent variable (DV) in the study is profitability, proxied by return on asset 
(ROA). In addition to ROA, share returns (yearly share return for 12 months preceding 
previous financial year-end) and Tobin's Q (book value of total assets + market value of 
equity – book value of equity/book value of total assets) are also used as performance 
measures for robustness of results. Board size in the study is measured by the log of the 




indicates that board size has significant negative effect on profitability, share returns, 
and Tobin's Q. Furthermore, the study finds that the negative association between board 
size and performance is significant in larger firms who have large boards. This is 
because boards in the UK have a weak monitoring role, therefore less effective in 
monitoring function. One of the major challenges of the study despite its large sample 
is the exclusion of companies in property and financial sectors in the UK, and having 
an unbalanced panel data from 2746 companies over the periods of 1981 to 2002. 
 
Therefore, due to the conflicting findings by previous studies that assessed the 
relationship between board size and corporate performance, this study will re-examine 
the relationship in regards to financial services firms in Nigeria because most of the 
studies conducted in the context neglect board characteristics and performance of 
financial institutions in Nigeria, rather concentrating only on banks. 
 
2.10.2.1.2 Board Composition 
 
Board composition is the number of non-executive directors on board of a company 
(Kakanda et al., 2016a). It is the ratio of non-executive directors to total directors (Marn 
& Romuald, 2012; Yasser et al., 2011). While Uadiale (2010) refers to board 
composition as the proportion of independent non-executive directors to the summation 
of directors on the board. Board composition is also referring to as the percentage of the 
executive (inside) and non-executive (outside) directors on a company's board (Akbar, 
2015). Clifford and Evans (1997) assert that independent non-executive director is that 





It has been presumed that boards with significant outside directors will effectively 
perform their duty and have better decisions than a board that is dominated by inside 
directors. Fama and Jensen (1983), Jones and Goldberg (1982), and Spencer (1983) 
argued that non-executive directors' representation on the board increases board 
independence, directors' objectivity and enhances directors' expertise. On the contrary, 
other studies suggested that non-executive directors do not have the required time, 
knowledge, skill and expertise to carry out their work effectively (Geneen, 1984; Vance, 
1983). 
 
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) contend that due to the formal evidence of power 
setting of the board, it might be valuable to assess how this materialistic change in the 
composition of the board may affect the relationships between corporate managers and 
shareholders, the tactical decision-making process and strategic results in companies. 
This means that the composition of board matters as it may have an influence on the 
performance of companies. 
 
Based on the NCCG 2011, publicly traded companies should have a board comprising 
of both executive (inside) and non-executive (outside) directors so as to be independent 
of the management and carry out oversight function effectively. This means that a 
company that has a board of directors dominated by non-executive directors may 
become independent of the management and functions more effectively. 
 
Agency theory attributes an important role to boards in governance and organizational 
structures of a particular large corporation (Bathala & Rao, 1995). Relatively, 




executive) directors in board composition (Zahra & Pearce, 1989), because it leads to 
an increase in board independence for better management, enhance expertise of the 
boards, increases board’s objectivity, and improve corporate activities to suit 
contemporary economic environment (Jones & Goldberg, 1982). In addition, agency 
theory supports the involvement of non-executive directors in controlling and 
overseeing any abnormal activities by the management which reduces agency costs and 
finally enhances firm performance (Le, Walters, & Kroll, 2006). On the basis of agency 
theory, a board that is dominated by a large number of nonexecutive directors are in a 
better position to operate in the best interest of shareholders and improve firm 
performance via effective oversight functions on the management (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1988). 
 
The composition of a board with a higher proportion of outside directors is also 
supported by resource dependence theory. This is consistent with the opinion of Pfeffer 
(1972) that organizations that largely depend on external contingencies require a higher 
proportion of outside directors. Moreover, companies that invite and appoints powerful 
community members into their boards acquired vital resources from the external 
environment (Provan, 1980). In the same vein, companies that operate in regulated 
industries are more likely to require the service of the larger ratio of outside directors, 
especially those having relevant experience (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).     
 
To justifiably know the relationship between board composition and firm performance, 
various studies are empirically undertaken. For instance, Ali, Liu, and Niazi (2017) 
examine the relationship between CG and performance (ROA and ROE) of peer firms 




nonfinancial companies listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) from 2006 to 2011. 
The Partial Least Square-Structural Equation Model (PLS-SEM) was applied in 
analyzing the data. The result shows that board composition has a significant positive 
effect on firm performance. The setback in this study include; elapsed time period (2006 
to 2013), use of nonfinancial companies in the sample, and excluding other important 
board structure variables like expertise, board meeting, board tenure and so on.      
 
Harvey Pamburai et al., (2015) investigate the association between CG mechanisms and 
performance of firms in South Africa. The authors use 158 listed companies in South 
Africa as a sample from the population of 374 listed firms in South Africa for accounting 
period 2012. Their study ignores property, insurance and banking sector from the 
sample due to their peculiar governance rule and companies Act. Return on assets, 
economic value added (EVA), and Tobin's Q are employed as proxies of performance. 
For analysis purpose, descriptive statistics, correlation, and multiple regression analyses 
are engaged. The results indicate that board composition (represented by the proportion 
of non-executive directors) has significant positive effect on the performance of listed 
firms in South Africa. 
 
Board composition has significant relation with performance of Micro-finance banks in 
Nigeria (Paul, Ebelechukwu, & Yakubu, 2015). The study collected data from the 
annual reports of 23 sampled Micro-finance banks from North central region of Nigeria 
covering the year 2011 to 2013. Return on assets (ROA) and earnings per share (EPS) 
have proxied financial performance measure. The study employed Pearson correlation 
and OLS regression for analysis purpose. The study considers only one geographical 




finance banks in Nigeria. Moreover, some Micro-finance banks are listed on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) called Alternative Security Market (ASM) while others 
are not, and in the study, there is no explanation about the status of the selected sample 
used. It should be noted that listed firms are more adhering to Code of Corporate 
Governance than non-listed firms because of the listing requirements in the capital 
market. The period of the study also needs to be extended. 
 
From the study by Chechet, Jnr., and Akanet (2013), board composition has been found 
to have a significant positive effect on the performance of Nigerian Deposit Money 
Banks (DMBs) because the significant number of non-executive directors have made 
the board independent of the management, and can act effectively. The study collected 
data from the annual financial reports of 14 DMBs for the periods of 2005-2011. Return 
on assets (ROA) is used as the performance variable. Descriptive statistics, correlation, 
and multiple regression are employed as analysis tools in the study. Variables like size, 
leverage, sales growth, and firm age are not controlled for in the study, and they may 
influence firm performance (Afrifa & Tauringana, 2015) which may influence the 
outcome of the study. Moreover, the study concentrates on one variable of financial 
performance (ROA) while there are other variables like ROE, EPS, Tobin's Q, Earnings 
Yield (EY), P/E ratio, to mention but a few, which can also be used as dependent 
variables. 
 
Consistently, Yasser et al. (2011) found that board composition has significant and 
positive relation with performance of listed firms in Pakistan. The performance measure 
as the dependent variable is proxied by return on equity (ROE) and profit margin (PM). 




2009. In order to carry out the analysis for their study, descriptive statistics, correlation, 
and ANOVA are utilized. Nevertheless, the sample size of the study is relatively small, 
and the period covered by the study is only two years (2008 and 2009). This will make 
the generalization of the result difficult because the firms' operational trends which will 
affect performance over time is not captured. In addition, the study only utilizes 
financial performance measures (ROA and PM) without considering market 
performance measures.  
 
On the other hand, Farhan, Obaid, and Azlan (2017) document that board independence 
(composition of nonexecutive directors on the board) has significant negative effect on 
the performance of quoted firms in the United Arab Emirate (UAE). The study collected 
data from the annual financial reports of 72 sampled companies listed on the UAE stock 
market for the period of 2010 to 2013. Return on asset (ROA) and Tobin's Q are used 
as the proxies of firm performance. For analysis purpose, descriptive statistics, 
correlation analysis, and multiple regression analysis were utilized. The study flawed in 
terms of the period covered (2010 to 2013) which needs to be extended. More so, other 
corporate governance variables like; busy directors, board meetings, risk management 
committee characteristics, to mention but a few are being ignored by the study.  
  
Marn and Romuald (2012) examined the effect of corporate governance and firm 
performance in Malaysia. Data is collected from 20 listed firms in Malaysia from the 
year 2006 to 2010. Firm performance is proxied by Earnings Per Share (EPS), and 
descriptive statistics, correlation, and regression analysis are used in the analysis of the 
data. The result indicates that board composition has no significant impact on the 




share in determining the performance of listed lead in Malaysia, while there are other 
performance measures like return on assets, return on equity, net profit margin, Tobin's 
Q, dividend per share among others. The study also uses small sample size (20 firms) 
out of about 800 has listed on the Bursa Malaysia, the sample selected doesn't represent 
the population, and there are no specific criteria used in selecting the said sample. This 
may lead to non-generalization of the result and renders comparison with results of other 
studies difficult. 
 
Moreover, board composition (represented by the proportion of Non-executive 
directors) is not significantly related to profitability (performance) of the textile industry 
in India, as indicates in an empirical study by Narwal and Jindal (2015). The study 
collected data from the annual financial reports of 40 companies from textile industry 
listed on National Stock Exchange and Bombay Stock Exchange in India, for 5 years 
starting from 2009 to 2014. Correlation and OLS regression are employed in analyzing 
the data, and the overall results show a negative relation between board composition 
(Non-executive directors) and profitability (profit after tax, PAT). The study uses only 
PAT as a performance variable while there are other available performance variables 
measuring both profitability and market performances that need to be explored. 
 
Latif, Shahid, Haq, Waqas, and Arshad (2013) investigate the effect of CG mechanisms 
on the performance of Sugar Mills in Pakistan. Data is collected from annual published 
accounts of 12 sampled firms out of 84 Sugar Mills for the periods of 2005 to 2010. 
Arithmetic means, t-test, and analysis of variance (ANOVA) are employed in analyzing 
the data. The result from the study indicates that board composition has no significant 




limitations of this study is ‘small sample', and it uses only ROA in measuring 
performance. Moreover, the study didn't utilize regression so as to determine the 
coefficient of board composition to performance. 
 
2.10.2.1.3 Board Meeting Frequency 
 
Board meeting refers to the gathering of directors on the board to discuss significant 
issues regarding the company (Kakanda et al., 2016a). It is measured as the number of 
meetings during a year by a company board of directors (Al-Matari et al., 2014a; 
Chechet, Jnr., & Akanet, 2013; Vafeas, 1999).   meetings play a significant role in the 
success of a company, and it serves as an important avenue for effective decision making 
of a company. Board of directors hold meetings on behalf of the company to discuss 
issues of the past, present, and future that is related to the company, and resolutions are 
passed during board meetings (Kakanda et al., 2016a). Therefore, the more the number 
of board meetings, the better for a company, because the boards will have more and 
better chances of making various decisions (Khan & Javid, 2011; Pearce & Zahra, 
1992). 
 
Moreover, Conger, Finegold, and Lawler (1998) suggest that board meeting is a 
significant resource for enhancing board of directors' effectiveness. Relatively, Lipton 
and Lorsch (1992) proclaimed that the more regularity of board meetings, the more 
likely of an organization to obtain high performance. Board meetings attendance is the 
basic medium via which board of directors obtained vital information needed to carry 
out their functions (Das & Dey, 2016). They added that default in attending board 




decisions of the company, alongside resulting to ineffective monitoring and oversight 
function of the board.  
 
Based on the requirements of the NCCG 2011, boards of publicly traded companies are 
to meet at least once every quarter (that is four times in a year) in order to effectively 
perform their oversight function and monitor the performance of management. 
However, agency theory highlights that corporate board of directors displays significant 
abilities in terms of counselling, penalizing, and overseeing management actions, hence 
enhancing the performance of firms where there is a higher frequency of board meetings 
(Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Vafeas, 1999). Therefore, the expectation is that 
frequency of board meetings may ensure that objectives of companies are achieved 
especially regarding their performance. 
 
Consequently, results from empirical studies that attempt to investigate the effect and 
relationship between board meetings and firm performance are still inconclusive 
because of mixed results. Arora and Sharma (2016) investigate the impact of corporate 
governance on the performance of large quoted firms in India. Data for a sample of 1922 
large companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange was collected from PROWESS 
[3] database for the period of 2001 to 2010. ROA, ROE, Net Profit Margin (NPM), and 
Tobin's Q are used as proxies of performance, and multivariate regression was used in 
analyzing the data. The study finds that board meeting frequency has a significant 
positive impact on firm performance. The result of the study is not up-to-date as many 
economic activities might have occurred between the year 2010 to 2017 (8 years 
difference). Moreover, the study fails to incorporate any of the board committees (like 




concentrates only on manufacturing, chemicals, and machinery sectors without paying 
attention to the financial service sector. As such, there is the need for further study to 
overcome the flaws identified in this study.   
 
Liang et al. (2013) examined the impact of board characteristics on performance and 
asset quality of banks in China. The study finds that board meeting frequency has a 
positive and significant effect on asset quality and performance of banks because the 
board that meets more frequent tends to be more effective in advising and supervision 
functions. Data for the study is collected from Bank-scope database of 50 largest banks 
in China covering periods from 2003 to 2010.  The dependent variable is performance 
(proxied by ROA & ROE) and asset quality (proxied by Non-performing loan, NPL & 
Net Charge Offs, NCOs), and the study utilizes OLS for the purpose of analysis. 
However, the study dwells only on selected largest banks in China while ignoring small 
banks, and large here is not clearly defined. Here, other financial institutions need to be 
included to know the overall relationship between board meetings and performance of 
financial institutions because it may amount to the generalizability of findings. In 
addition, only financial performance measures (ROA & ROE) are considered while 
overlooking market performance measures.  
 
Additionally, Barisua, Torbira, and Lenee (2012) find that board meeting has significant 
positive effect on the performance of banks in Nigeria. Data is collected from published 
annual reports and accounts of 21 deposit money banks (DMBs) in Nigeria for the period 
2005 to 2009. Performance variable is proxied by earnings per share (EPS) and net profit 
margin (NPM). For analysis purpose, the study uses multivariate regression and short-




firms in the Nigerian financial services industry. In addition, the revised Code of 
Corporate Governance for publicly traded companies in Nigeria is issued after the study 
period (2005-2009) by SEC in 2011 which is based on international standard practices. 
 
Logically, Al-Matari et al. (2014a) studied the impact and relationship between 
characteristics of the board of directors and firm performance. The study collected data 
from annual financial reports of 81 companies listed on the Muscat Security Market 
(MSM) in Oman for two years' period (2011 and 2012). Descriptive statistics, 
correlation and multiple regression are used in analyzing the data collected. The result 
obtained indicates that board meetings have a positive but not significant association 
with performance (represented by ROA). This shows that boards that meet more 
frequent are likely to have better performance than boards that meet less often. 
Nevertheless, despite the relatively large sample size used, the study lacks 
generalization as financial companies (banks) are excluded from the study due to their 
peculiarity of structure, mode of operation, and accounting practices. The study also 
considers the periods of 2011 and 2012 only, this is not enough to know the trends of 
board meetings and performance over several business periods, hence, the need to 
extend the period of study. 
 
On the other hand, Hassan, Naser, and Hijazi (2016) found that board meeting frequency 
has a significant negative influence on the performance of companies listed on 
Palestinian Stock Exchange. Data for the study was obtained from 27 non-financial 
firms listed on the Palestinian Stock Exchange for the period of 2010 to 2012. The 
proxies of performance include ROA, ROE, Tobin's Q, and Market value to book value 




regression analysis were utilized. The end period of the study is 2012 which not up to 
date and may make the result of the study redundant. Moreover, the study considers all 
nonfinancial companies excluding financial companies, hence, the result suffers from 
generalization.  
 
Vafeas (1999) examines the relationship between board meeting frequency and 
performance of firms in Cyprus. Data is collected from the published financial reports 
of 307 sampled firms. The dependent variable of the study is Firm value, proxied by 
return on assets (ROA) and market-to-book ratio. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and 
Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) are used in analyzing the data, where the results 
indicate that board meeting has a negative relationship with performance because board 
meetings are not proactive but reactive. This means that board that frequently meets is 
less valued by the market. As a limitation, the study explores only two performance 
variables besides that there are other measures of performance that can be utilized. 
Moreover, the periods need to be extended because the study is carried out (1990-1994) 
prior to 2002 Enron scandal and the 2008 global financial crisis, where many issues 
(reforms of CG Codes, company laws, and so on) might have taken place after the study. 
 
Harvey Pamburai et al., (2015) investigate the association between CG mechanisms and 
performance of firms in South Africa. The study uses 158 companies as a sample from 
the population of 374 listed firms in South Africa for accounting period 2012. The study 
excludes property, insurance and banking sector from the sample due to their peculiar 
governance rule and companies Act. Return on assets, economic value added (EVA), 
and Tobin's Q are employed as proxies of performance. For analysis purpose, 




results indicate that board meeting frequency has significant negative relation with both 
Tobin's Q and ROA, showing that board of companies that hold meetings less often have 
better performance than those that hold board meetings frequently. One of the major 
flaws of the study is the use of data for only one accounting period (the year 2012). 
Here, the operational trends of the sampled companies over several periods may be 
difficult to ascertain, hence making the generalization of results difficult. Moreover, 
comparisons of result with the results of other studies carried out in different economies 
may be difficult because of the limited period used in carrying out the study. 
 
Similarly, Jackling and Johl (2009) assess the association between CG internal features 
and financial performance (ROA) of firms in India. The study uses agency and resource 
dependence theory. Data is collected from 180 top listed companies in India (on Bombay 
Stock Exchange) on the basis of market capitalization in 2006. finance companies and 
banks are excluded from the sample due to their amount of regulations and difficulty in 
ascertaining Tobin's Q. 3SLS is utilized for analysis purpose, and the result obtained 
indicates that board meeting frequency has no significant relation with firm performance 
in India. The drawback in the study is the use of limited variables linked to corporate 
governance which hinders the generality of the study findings. Another important issue 
that may hinder the generalizability of the result is the use of one accounting period. 
Moreover, the study excludes financial firms from its sample despite the pivotal role the 







2.10.2.1.4 CEO Tenure  
 
Tenure denotes a period of time during which something is possessed. Afrifa and 
Tauringana (2015) opined that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) that hold office for a 
longer time period is predictable to perform better compared to those CEOs who have 
been in office for a shorter time period. They further argued that longer tenure assists 
the CEO to develop a good relationship with stakeholders, alongside having a good plan 
and implement a long-term strategy that will improve performance and operational 
efficiency of the company. 
 
In line with the recommendation of the NCCG 2011 and provisions of the Companies 
and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) (1990) in Nigeria, all directors of publicly traded 
companies should be due for re-election at regular intervals of at least once every three 
(3) years. This is specifically referring to executive directors (including the CEO) 
because the NCCG 2011 requires that “non-executive directors should serve for a 
reasonable period on the board”.  This means that CEOs should hold office for a term 
of three (3) years subject to re-election at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of a 
company.  
 
A positive relationship is found between CEO tenure and firms’ performance (Agrawal 
& Knoeber, 1996). CEO tenure has been an important element for research concerning 
executive and organization leadership (Simsek, 2007). Kyereboah-Coleman (2008) 
argues that the longer period a CEO of a firm serves in office, the better for the 





On the basis of Agency theory, Eisenhardt (1989) reports that outcome-focused 
contracts are considered effective in reducing the conflict of interests in a principal-
agent relationship. Therefore, the significant or longer period of a CEO of a firm, the 
better the performance and value of a firm (Tsai, Hung, Y. Kuo, & L. Kuo, 2006). 
Furthermore, McCelland (1961) argues that organizational executives are considered as 
being inspired by a need to attain a certain goal, to exercise accountability and authority, 
to gain inherent satisfaction by performing challenging work, and to be recognized by 
peers and principals (bosses). Donaldson and Davis (1991) suggest that “identification 
by managers with the corporation, especially likely if they have served there with long 
tenure and have shaped its form and directions, promotes a merging of individual ego 
and the corporation, thus melding individual self-esteem with corporate prestige” (p. 
51).  
 
Considering resource dependence theory, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) that provide a 
particular focus on organizational dependence and uncertainties, they concluded that, 
"executive succession is itself one strategic response to environmental contingencies" 
(p. 248). By the same token, the authors provide a model of effects as thus: 
 
"(1) the environmental context, with its contingencies, uncertainties, and   
interdependencies, influences the distribution of power and control within the 
organization; (2) the distribution of power and control within the organization affects 
the tenure and selection of major organizational administrators; (3) organizational 
policies and structures are results of decisions affected by the distribution of power and 
control; and (4) administration who control organizational activities and resultant 




Hillman et al. (2009) emphasize that when a company experiences unfavourable 
performance, they are more probable to replace their CEO and market for the business 
is likely to react better. Moreover, firms that highly depend on the environment are more 
likely to faced higher executive turnover (Harrison, Torres, & Kukalis, 1988). It is 
therefore expected that the tenure of a CEO may influence the performance of firms.     
 
Specifically, Al-Matari et al. (2014a) report that CEO tenure has a positive but not 
significant impact on firm performance (represented by ROA) of listed companies in 
Muscat Security Market (MSM) in Oman. This indicates that a CEO that spends a long 
time in his position will lead to a better performance of firms. The study collected data 
from annual financial reports of 81 firms listed on the Muscat Security Market (MSM) 
for 2-years period (2011 and 2012). Descriptive statistics, correlation and multiple 
regression are used in analyzing the data collected. Nonetheless, the study lacks 
generalization as financial companies (banks) are excluded from the study due to their 
peculiarity of structure, mode of operation, and accounting practices. 
 
In Nigeria, Sanda, Garba, and Mikailu (2011) identify that the tenure of the chief 
executive officer has significant positive effect on firm performance. ROA, ROE, P/E 
ratio, and stock returns are used as proxies of performance variable. Data for the study 
is collected from annual reports of 89 sampled firms via Securities and Exchange 
Commission office in Abuja, Lagos Stockbroking firm, NSE Factbook for the period 
1996 to 2004. Descriptive statistics, t-test, and fixed effect regression (to overcome the 
biases of omitted variables in panel data) are used for analysis purposes. The flaw of the 
study is the use of mixed firms from various industries which might affect the results 




industrial ethics. More so, the period used in the study needs to be extended because the 
NCCG was revised in 2011 which is different from the one used in the study. 
 
Goldsmith (2012) examines the effect of CEO tenure on firm performance. The study 
finds that CEO tenure has significant positive impact on the performance of US financial 
service firms.  Performance measures utilized by the study are ROE and ROA collected 
from the annual reports of 282 US financial service firms. The data from annual reports 
of the sample firms is obtained for 10-years period (1999 to 2009) via Security and 
Exchange Commission. For analysis purpose, the study utilizes Logistic Regression 
Model, Multiple Regression Model, and Linear Mixed Model. Still, the study did not 
address the issue of risk management practices of the sample firms despite the sensitivity 
of their operations, as they are highly exposed to risk. 
 
Contrarily, Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) found that tenure of CEO has a 
negative relation with the profitability of micro finance institutions (MFIs) in Ghana. 
The researchers collected primary and secondary data from a sample of 52 MFIs for a 
period of 10 years (1995-2004). Return on assets is used as a proxy of profitability (that 
is performance), while descriptive statistics and regression analysis are used for the 
panel data analysis. The study is limited to micro finance institutions and considering 
52 sample only. Therefore, the sample size, period of time, and other firms (like banks 
and other non-banks financial institutions) need to be considered in future research. 
 
In determining the relationship between CEO tenure and firm performance, Belkhir 
(2009) finds that tenure of CEO has significant negative relation with firm performance 




of 174 companies (banks and savings-and-loans holding companies) through the period 
of 1995 to 2002. For performance variable, Tobin's q and return on assets are used as its 
proxies, while descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and fixed effect regression are 
used for in analyzing the data. the major setback in the study lack of concentrating on 
the risk management practices of the sampled firms despite their role in boosting an 
economy through acceptance of deposits and granting of loan functions.   
 
Furthermore, Kyereboah-Coleman (2008) finds that CEO's tenure negatively affects 
firm's profitability, because when CEOs stay longer in a position, they tend to pursue 
their personal objectives rather than firm's objectives which have an adverse effect on 
performance. The study acquired data from financial reports of 103 listed firms selected 
from four (4) African countries including Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, and Kenya. The 
data covers a 5-year period ranging from 1997 to 2001. Return on assets and Tobin's Q 
are variables that proxied performance. For analysis purpose, the study utilizes Dynamic 
Panel Model estimation, Random Effect, Fixed Effect, and OLS. However, the result of 
the study may be influenced by factors like corporate/business laws of different 
countries, market capitalization, and Code of Corporate Governance differences, this is 
a significant drawback to the findings of the study. 
 
Moreover, Afrifa and Tauringana (2015) studied on how the performance of UK SMEs 
is related with mechanisms of corporate governance. CEO tenure has been found to have 
no significant positive relationship with the performance of listed SMEs in the UK. The 
study uses data from AMADEUS commercial data base of 234 listed SMEs on the UK 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) for 10 years (2004-2013). Descriptive statistics, 




utilized as a proxy for performance which is the dependent variable of the study. One of 
the setbacks of the study is, it concentrates only on SMEs which may have different 
capital requirements, operational mode, listing requirements, and nature of transactions 
with general products and service firms, this will make the generalization of findings 
difficult. 
 
2.10.2.1.5 Board Expertise  
 
Expertise denotes the great skill or knowledge in a particular field or hobby. An expert 
can be described as one having an elongated or concentrated experience through 
education and practice in a given field. It is generally agreed that it is not compulsory 
for one to have an academic or professional qualification before being regarded as an 
expert. For instance, a herdsman with 30 years of experience nurturing Cattles would 
safeguard acknowledged as having broad expertise in the training and care of Cattles. 
Therefore, board expertise can be regarded as having great skill and knowledge through 
education, training, and prolonged participation of a board member on board matters in 
various companies' boards. Yatim (2010) argues that board expertise is imperative in 
ensuring that the oversight function of the board is successfully carried out. In the same 
vein, it has been argued that directors that sit on the board of more than one company 
will enable them to acquire more skill, knowledge, and become more expertise in 
carrying out their oversight functions on managers’ activities (Nadarajan, Chandren, 
Bahaudin, Mohammed Elias, & Mohd Nawi, 2015).   
 
Notwithstanding, the NCCG 2011 recommends on board expertise (multiple 




number of concurrent directorships a director of a company may hold. However, 
concurrent service on too many boards may interfere with an individual's ability to 
discharge his responsibilities, the board and the shareholders should, therefore, give 
careful consideration to other obligations and commitments of nominees in assessing 
their suitability for appointment to the board" (p. 16). 
 
Meanwhile, previous studies argue that serving on various companies' boards (multiple 
directorships) by directors enable them to gain expertise, experience, and skills that are 
essential for better decision making that will improve company's performance 
(Ashbaug-Skaife, Collins, & LaFaond, 2006; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Field, Lowry, & 
Mkrtchyan, 2013). Andreou, Louca, and Panavides (2014) contended that a director that 
serves on other boards who can be referred to as a ‘busy director' is a gauge of expertise 
and competency of the board which can boost firm performance. In contrast, Bhagat and 
Black (1999), and Klein (1998) argue that board members that serve on several boards 
overseeing management are weak, hence, negatively affects firm performance. 
 
Theoretically, proponents of resource dependence theory argue that directors serving on 
boards of several companies will have more experience and become beneficial to the 
success of organizations. This is consistent with Boyd (1990) who recommends that 
multiple directorships of the board of directors are beneficial, and the main focus of 
board should compose of ‘resource-rich’ directors. Boyd states further that number of 
directors doesn't matter, but the sort of directors serving on the board. More so, resource 
dependence theory argues that directors holding multiple positions on several boards 
rely on external resources so as to enhance firm performance (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003), 




linkages and resources that can ensure effective and efficient business operations. Board 
interlocks (multiple directorships of directors) play a significant role in circulating 
timely and profitable information among firms which help in reducing transaction costs 
when dealing with environmental uncertainties, thereby improving firm performance 
(Burt, 1984; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
 
As reported by Kapoor and Goel (2017), board expertise (termed as busy directors) has 
a significant positive association with firm performance and earnings quality in India. 
The study collected data from the annual reports and accounts of 297 large companies 
listed on Bombay Stock Exchange for the years 2008 to 2013. For analysis purpose, 
descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, multiple regression were employed. 
However, the study fails to consider other important variables of board characteristics 
(for instance, board meetings, board tenure, and board age), board committees and risk 
management disclosure in examining the relationship between CG mechanisms and firm 
performance. Moreover, the end of the study period (2013) is not up to date, hence, the 
generalization of the result may be difficult since other economic activities might have 
occurred between 2013 to 2017. Therefore, there is the need to carry out a new study so 
as to overcome the setbacks identified. 
 
Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) assess the relationship between multiple directors and 
performance and risk of bank holding companies in the U.S. The authors identify that 
multiple directorships (expertise) is positively related to the performance of bank 
holding companies. The performance variable is represented by earnings before interest 
and tax, Tobin's Q, and ROA. The data used in the study is collected from 116 bank 




analyzing the data. Despite the riskiness of banks' operations, the study did not consider 
the efficiency of risk management committee structure and risk management practices 
which might have an influence on the banks' activities. 
 
Andreou et al. (2014) investigate the association between financial management 
(Abnormal accruals and accruals), firm performance (ROA & Inverted Q), and 
corporate governance in the United State Maritime industry. The result of the study 
reveals that the proportion of directors sitting on the boards of other companies have a 
positive association with firm performance and financial management decisions. The 
study generates its sample from 33 maritime firms quoted in the US for 12-years period 
(1999-2010), and multiple regression is utilized in analyzing the data. However, the 
study did not concentrate on risk management practice of the firms despite the amount 
of risk involved in maritime operations. 
 
In another study by Dass, Kini, Nanda, and Wang (2014) who assess the role of 
"directors from related industries" on board of firms found that directors from other 
related industries have significant impact on firm performance/value, indicating that 
directors of firms that serve on other companies' boards enhance performance and value 
of firms in the US. The study obtained data from a sample of 12750 firms from Compact 
Disclosure on directors and officers spanning from 1990 to 2005. The study utilizes 
Tobin's Q as a measure of performance, and Probit model, OLS model, and 2SLS model 
are used in regressing the variables. Despite the large sample size used by the study, it 
ignores the risk management practices and disclosure of the sample firms. Moreover, 
the period used in the study need to be extended as it is conducted for the last 11 years 




A study by Routray and Bal (2017) shows that multiple directorships have a positive 
but insignificant effect on performance (Market-to-book value ratio) of listed companies 
in India. The researchers collected data from a sample of 123 companies listed on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange for the period of 2007 to 2014. Descriptive statistics, 
correlation analysis, and random effect regression were employed in analyzing the data. 
The study considers only market performance measure without incorporating 
accounting performance measures like ROA, ROE, and NPM. This makes the 
implication of the study skewed to one party (investors) and ignoring other stakeholders 
(for instance, managers). Moreover, the study pays less attention to board committees 
and risk management practice in establishing the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance.     
 
However, Using the sample of eight (8) firms in the Nigerian food and beverages 
industry, Nwonyuku (2016) finds that there is a significant negative relation between 
board skill and competence, and financial performance represented by ROE and net 
asset per share (NA/S). Data for the study is collected from the annual accounts and 
reports of the sampled firms for the period of 2004 to 2014, while descriptive statistics, 
correlation analysis, and OLS multiple regression are used in analyzing the data. 
However, the sample used by the study is small which will make generalization difficult. 
Moreover, the study has paid less attention to incorporate market performance variables 
to have a more robust result. 
 
The study by Hauser (2013) found that "a reduction in director workload is associated 
with higher earnings, higher market to book ratios and higher pay-performance 




workload matters, the performance gains are particularly stark when directors are 
geographically far from firm headquarters, and when marginal value of directors' time 
and effort is high" (p. 1). This means that multiple directorships have a negative effect 
on firm's performance. Data is obtained from Risk Metrics which provides yearly board 
information of companies that encompass the S&P 1500, thereby having a sample of 
22, 465 firm-years from 1996 to 2011. Return on assets and Tobin's Q are proxies for 
performance, and multiple regression is used as a tool for analysis. The study use sample 
that involves firms that homogeneous and heterogeneous characteristics which may 
have an influence on the result obtained. 
 
2.10.2.2 Risk Management Committee (RMC) Structure 
 
The risk in business may be viewed as any expected negative consequence of an event, 
determined by combining the likelihood of the event occurring with the effect should it 
occur. In regards to this, therefore, companies need to manage risk in order to achieve 
their predetermined goals. However, risk management involves identifying, analyzing, 
and control of all related risks which may likely threaten a firm's resources, assets, or its 
earnings capacity (Chatterjee & Bose, 2007). Consequently, risk management is 
considered as one of the major facets of corporate governance, especially in the instance 
of financial institutions (Karatzias, 2011). Coherently, Karatzias further stresses that 
various financial institutions internationally do not longer exist, have been taken over, 






Demidenko and McNutt (2010) upheld that corporate governance is generally accepted 
as a significant element in refining economic efficiency, that eventually standardized a 
company's relationship with its board, its management, its investors, and other 
stakeholders. The authors added that" Enterprise risk management (ERM) is a key 
component of corporate governance. It provides a means of realizing a company's 
objectives and monitoring performance of an agent by a principal. ERM can reassure 
the principal that their interests are being netted through the diligent and efficient 
behaviour of the agent" (p. 803).   
 
Risk management committee structure has now become an important issue with a lot of 
emphases, and activities on risk management are regarded as part of the significant audit 
committee functions (Ng et al., 2012). However, various corporate failures like that of 
Enron and WorldCom have become a challenge to the trust that shareholders placed on 
auditor's report, and this has cast doubt on the integrity of audit committees in 
monitoring and implementing programs on risk management (Bates & Leclerc, 2009). 
Therefore, this prompts the need for risk management committee (RMC) (which has 
some characteristics that encompass RMC size, RMC composition [Independence], and 
RMC meetings) to oversee and implement risk management programs of firms (Ng et 
al., 2012).   
 
Yatim (2010) states that "boards that establish a stand-alone committee that focuses 
solely on the risk management function demonstrates their commitment to improving 
the overall corporate governance structures of their firms" (p. 18). This is consistent 
with OECD (2015) which reports that one of the new issues in the revised OECD's Code 




management, internal audit, and tax planning. In the same vein, the board of directors 
should maintain final oversight function of the firm's risk management system, and 
guarantee the effectiveness of the reporting method. De Andres and Vallelado (2008) 
contended that within a framework involving limited competition, greater information 
asymmetries, and intense regulation, the board turn into a significant way element to 
oversee managers' behavior and to offer advice on strategic identification, risk 
management, and implementation. 
 
Agency theory argues that one of the ways to determine the efficacy of board of 
directors' information is through its subcommittees. Equally, an important mechanism 
that seems to enhance the oversight function of the board in order to ensure that 
shareholders' interests are achieved is the risk management committee, because it will 
add to the usefulness and greatness of boards' information (Eisenhardt, 1989). The risk 
management committee include elements such as; size, composition, and meetings (Tao 
& Hutchinson, 2013). The efficiency of risk management committee characteristics to 
corporation performance has been noted by prior studies (for instance., Chatterjee & 
Bose, 2007; Karatzias, 2011; Ng et al., 2012; Pathan, 2009). Accordingly, agency theory 
explains the relationship between risk management structure (size, composition, 
meetings) and firm performance as it does to similar variables under board attributes 
explained earlier.  
 
2.10.2.2.1 Risk Management Committee (RMC) Size  
 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission [COSO], 




enterprise-wide approach to risk management. Because management is accountable to 
the board of directors, the board's focus on effective risk oversight is critical to setting 
the tone and culture towards effective risk management through strategy setting, 
formulating high-level objectives, and approving broad-based resource allocations". 
Risk management has become one of the key focus to committees of companies' boards, 
and the finance, audit, and/or risk management committee of the board of directors 
generally reflects risk management (Yatim, 2010). 
 
Theoretically, since the postulate of agency theory is primarily to solve the problem of 
principal-agent relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989) which reduces agency costs from 
separating of ownership and control (Fama & Jensen, 1983), larger board size will 
hinder CEO’s domination of the board because directors will be in a more upright 
position to exercise their powers and right in governing the firm, and thereby improve 
performance of the company (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). For this cause, agency theory will 
be employed to study the relationship between risk management committee size and 
performance of listed financial service firms in Nigeria.  
 
Albeit, the NCCG 2011 encourages companies’ board of directors in establishing a risk 
management committee separate from the audit committee, but it does not specify the 
exact required size of a risk management committee. However, studies on the risk 
management committee are limited and remain inconclusive (Ng et al., 2012). Pathan 
(2009) submits that there is a positive relationship between strong board monitoring and 
bank risk-taking because bank shareholders are with incentives for more risk. The author 





Particularly, a study by Ng et al. (2012) found that risk management committee size is 
negatively associated with underwriting risk of insurance companies in Malaysia. The 
study obtained data from published financial reports of 37 insurance companies licensed 
(under the insurance Act 1996) in Malaysia from 2003 to 2011. For analysis purpose, 
Pearson's correlation, panel regression model and pooled ordinary least squares 
regressions are utilized in the study. One of the limitations of the study is the use of a 
sample from insurance companies only, and a link between risk management committee 
size and firm performance is not explored in the study.       
 
Consistently, risk management committee size has significant negative relation with 
corporate social responsibility disclosure in Nigeria as found by Pantamee (2014). The 
researcher collected data from annual accounts and reports of 7 sampled firms in the 
Nigerian petroleum marketing industry for the period of 2008 to 2012. For analysis 
purpose, the author uses descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, fixed effect and 
random effect regressions. The limitation of the study is the use of small sample size, 
and there is no link between risk management committee size and firm performance. 
 
2.10.2.2.2 Risk Management Committee (RMC) Composition  
 
It is pertinent to mention that most national and international Codes of Corporate 
Governance acclaimed that boards of companies should compose a majority of non-
executive directors that significantly contribute: (1) an outside perspective and greater 
impartiality in their judgements; (2) additional external experience and knowledge; and 
(3) useful contracts (International Finance Corporation, IFC, 2010). Moreover, in the 




directors’ is to be satisfied that financial report is accurate, risk management systems, 
and financial controls are robust and defensible (IFC, 2010).   
 
In line with agency theory perspective, boards with significant outside directors will 
effectively perform their responsibility and deliver better decisions than a board that is 
dominated by inside directors. Moreover, non-executive directors' representation on the 
board increases board independence, directors' objectivity and enhances directors' 
expertise, so also committee composition (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jones & Goldberg, 
1982; Spencer, 1983). Therefore, it is presumed that a risk management committee with 
a larger number of non-executive directors will aid in influencing firm performance. 
 
Equally important, the NCCG 2011 requires that board committees of publicly traded 
companies should compose of a majority of non-executive directors, and also be chaired 
by a non-executive director. Ng et al. (2012) suggest that independence (composition) 
of committee members is a significant instrument in corporate governance. This is 
because independent directors are vital in overseeing management actions (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983), and have no self-interest in the company, which permits them to make 
an objective judgement without prejudice or fear (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & 
Lapides, 2000).       
 
Despite the scant literature on the board risk management committee, Tao and 
Hutchinson (2013) empirically examine the role of risk committee and compensation 
committee in overseeing and managing the risk behaviour of financial firms in Australia 
from prior time to the period of world financial crisis (that is 2006 to 2008). The study 




Securities Exchange’ (ASX) 2010. Firm performance (EPS) and Risk (BETA) (that is 
standard deviations of stock returns) are used as dependent variables, while random 
effects (GLS) regression estimated alongside Huber-White (clustered-robust) are 
utilized in analyzing the data. The result indicates that risk committee composition is 
positively related with risk and firm performance. The drawback of the study is in its 
less emphasis to explore the risk management practice and disclosure of the financial 
service firms, but only dwelling on risk committee structure.  
 
Moreover, Pantamee (2014) finds that risk management committee composition is 
positively associated with corporate social responsibility disclosure. As stated earlier,  
The researcher collected data from annual accounts and reports of 7 sampled firms in 
the Nigerian petroleum marketing industry for the period of 2008 to 2012. For analysis 
purpose, the author uses descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, fixed effect and 
random effect regressions. The limitation of the study is the use of small sample size, 
no link between risk management committee composition and firm performance. 
 
On the other hand, Ng et al. (2012) find that risk management committee independence 
(composition) is negatively associated with underwriting risk of insurance companies 
in Malaysia as shown by correlation result. The study obtained data from published 
financial reports of 37 insurance companies licensed (under the insurance Act 1996) in 
Malaysia from 2003 to 2011. Pearson's correlation, panel regression model and pooled 
ordinary least squares regressions are utilized for analyses purpose. One of the 
limitations of the study is using a sample from insurance companies only, and the study 





2.10.2.2.3 Risk Management Committee (RMC) Meetings 
 
The International Finance Corporation (2010) states that directors of companies should 
make sure that boards and committee meetings are well-ordered and are held on regular 
basis, and that director should fully participate in the meetings of the board of directors. 
Meeting provides an opportunity to risk management committee to freely communicate, 
deliberate, and attained a common goal in monitoring and control of a firm’s risk (Ng 
et al., 2012). Based on agency theory assumption, corporate boards display vibrant 
abilities in evaluating, penalizing, and controlling management actions, hence, 
enhancing the performance of firms where there is a higher frequency of board meetings 
(Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Vafeas, 1999). Thus, the expectation is that 
frequent meetings of risk management committee may ensure that objectives of 
companies are achieved especially regarding their performance. 
 
The frequency of meeting shows the extent effort devoted by a committee towards 
achieving the roles and responsibilities vested in it (Muhamad Sori, & Mohamad, 2009), 
and it indicates the amount of time dedicated to committee members to sanitized 
situations (Abdul Rahman, & Haneem Mohamed Ali, 2006). The NCCG 2011 doesn't 
specifically state the required frequency of risk management committee meetings but 
has stipulated that a member of senior management, CEO, executive directors, and head 
of internal audit unit should attend meetings of the risk management committee. 
 
The frequency of meetings of risk committee has a positive and significant impact on 
bank performance as found by Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid (2012). This means that risk 




performance of banks in the US during the financial crisis. The study obtained data from 
North America database (COMPUSTAT Bank) for a sample of 573 Banks for the year 
2006 and a year prior to financial crisis. Return on assets and return on equity are used 
as performance variables, while the only result on ROE is reported because of similarity 
between ROA and ROE figures. For analysis purpose, descriptive statistics, t-test, and 
regression are used. The limitation of the study is the use of two accounting periods 
before the financial crisis, and events after the financial crisis are not known. Therefore, 
this calls for a further study in the area. In the same vein, the study only dwells on banks 
without considering non-banks financial institutions. 
 
In addition, with a sample size of 7 firms from the Nigerian petroleum marketing sector, 
risk management committee meeting has a significant positive relationship with 
corporate social responsibility disclosure (Pantamee, 2014). Data was collected from 
the annual reports of the sampled firms through the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The 
descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, fixed effect and random effect regressions are 
used as a tool for analyses. The drawback of the study is small sample size, only 
petroleum marketing companies are considered, and no connection is examined between 
risk management committee meetings with the performance of firms. 
 
In contrast, the study by Ng et al. (2012) which aimed at investigating the association 
between characteristics of risk management and risk taking of insurance companies in 
Malaysia, reported that the frequency of risk management committee meetings has no 
significant association with risk taking (based on correlation and multiple regression 
outputs). Data is obtained from published financial reports of 37 insurance companies 




to 2011. Pearson's correlation, panel regression model and pooled ordinary least squares 
regressions are utilized for analyses purpose. Yet, the study has not explored the risk 
management practice and disclosure of insurance companies. It also concentrates on 
insurance firms only without considering other financial institutions like banks, and it 
doesn't show any link between risk management committee meetings with firms' 
performance. 
 
2.10.3 Risk Management Practice and Disclosure 
 
Shareholders of corporations are entitled to be furnished sufficiently about the 
extraordinary and periodic information disclosure on activities of a company (IFC, 
2010). This disclosure is usually in the annual accounts and reports of companies that 
serve as a medium of communication between the company (management) and 
stakeholders for their decision making. Moreover, OECD (2015) reports that companies 
(not only financial sector) that have complex or huge risks (both financial and 
otherwise), should provide a familiar reporting system, involving direct reporting of risk 
management to the board of directors who are acting on behalf of shareholders. 
 
Wong (2012) opines that risk management practices of companies particularly financial 
institutions are disclosed in their annual published accounts and reports, which (the 
reports) are subject to scrutiny by professional auditors and prepared in accordance with 
rules and regulations governing financial reports. In addition, Holland (1998), and Lang 
and Lundholm (1993) agreed that annual reports of companies are a dependable medium 
for shareholders and other stakeholders to assess information on risk management 




However, the collapse of large corporations and the global economic crisis over a decade 
have caused a general concern and unsteadiness in the major financial markets in the 
world (Buckby et al., 2015). The authors added that the major concern is usually 
criticisms on the inadequacy or inaccuracy of disclosures regarding corporate 
governance practices, and most especially those that are related to risk management. In 
this effect, Abraham and Shrives (2014) suggest that inadequate corporate disclosures 
have a significant effect on the investor's ability in evaluating public companies and the 
risks associated with them. Even though there is no consensus on the extent and manner 
of communicating risk management by corporations, but there is general agreement on 
the need to have an effective risk management disclosure (Buckby et al., 2015).  
 
The Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] (2011) has stated in the 
NCCG 2011 that the board of directors for publicly traded companies should: (1) obtain 
and periodically review relevant reports to confirm the continuing efficacy of the 
company's framework on risk management, and (2) ensure that there is adequate 
disclosure of the company's procedures and practices on risk management. Similarly, 
the Central Bank of Nigeria (2006 and 2014) has required financial firms to disclose 
clearly in their annual reports, the corporate governance structure and all matters related 
to risk management practices. Moreover, the report should also indicate the board 
responsibility and their role in the overall risk management process as this may improve 
the performance of the financial institutions. 
 
Regarding risk management practices and disclosure by firms, agency theory was used 
in explaining its effectiveness because it theoretically elucidates that one of the best 




various stakeholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Consequently, since corporate directors 
are in a better position to acquire information on the firm's future expectations than their 
shareholders, enhancing the flow of information between "investor" and "investee" 
company will help to cushion for information asymmetry and enhance investor-relations 
and practice of corporate governance (J. F. Solomon, Solomon, Norton, & Joseph, 
2000). The authors added that "modern portfolio theory would suggest that improving 
risk disclosure would, in turn, enable investors to deal more effectively with risk 
diversification…. Indeed, institutional investors would also require information on the 
unsystematic risks faced by their investee companies, so as to build up a comprehensive 
profile of corporate risk and to form expectations about the company as a going concern" 
(p. 450). In addition, agency theory postulates that disclosure of information on 
corporate risk reduces monitoring costs (Hemrit & Arab, 2011), which ensures that 
information is provided in the annual reports of companies (Depoers, 2000). 
 
Moreover, Abraham and Cox (2007) opine that contemporary portfolio theory is the 
premise that information about the risk of a company is significant in improving 
investment decisions. Agency theory suggests that in a joint-stock company, there is a 
divergence of interests between managers and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
in which the shareholders require effective corporate governance to oversee the 
activities of corporate managers and improve accountability (O'Sullivan, 2000). In this 
effect, the disclosure of corporate policy stems from the board of directors, and the 
boards prepare annual reports because the disclosure policy of the company is expected 





Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, and Simpson (2010), and Tao and Hutchinson (2013) are of 
the view that according to agency theory, boards are considered as the most important 
mechanism of corporate governance because characteristics of boards determine their 
ability to oversee and control managers' activities, provide significant information to 
management, ensure appropriate laws are adhered to and connect the company with the 
external environment which would improve the performance of a company. Agency 
theory also proposes that disclosure of information on corporate risk reduces monitoring 
costs (Hemrit & Arab, 2011), which enable more incentive package for managers to 
provide more information in annual reports (Depoers, 2000). Therefore, agency theory 
will also suit this study in terms of risk management practice and disclosure, since part 
of the board function is to ensure adequate compliance with applicable rules and 
regulations and its reporting to stakeholders (Carter et al., 2010; Tao & Hutchinson, 
2013).  
 
Empirically, Buckby et al. (2015) examine ‘how listed Australian Companies disclose 
risk management information in annual report governance statements in accordance 
with the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) corporate governance framework’. The 
study finds that there is an extensive deviation by companies in the disclosure practices 
and less conformity with principle 7 of the Australian principles and recommendations 
of corporate governance. This means that there is less disclosure by firms regarding 
“material business risk”. The study also finds that board expertise, audit committee 
independence, board independence, and Big-4 audit firm do not have any impact on the 
level of risk management committee disclosure in the context of Australia. Data for the 
study is obtained from top 300 companies listed on the ASX based on market 




thematic content analysis to examine the data collected. The study is limited to one 
accounting period, a sample of top 300 firms only, and does not link risk management 
disclosure with firm performance. 
 
Furthermore, Abraham and Shrive (2014) undertook a study to explain how best to 
enhance reporting of risk factors by publicly traded companies. The study uses a 
longitudinal approach in examining the quality of risk reporting from 4 companies in 
food production and processing sector listed on Northcote for the period of July 2008. 
To determine how disclosures of risk changed over time, the annual reports and accounts 
of the sampled firms from 2002 to 2007 are utilized by the study using content analysis. 
The finding of the study indicates that disclosures made my companies seem to be less 
or not related to the actual risk facing the companies, that is it can be regarded as 
"symbolic window dressing". Symbolic disclosures remain unlikely to provide useful 
information to users of financial reports who may like to make decisions regarding their 
investments alongside their risk appetite. The study sampled only 4 companies, 
therefore makes generalization difficult. 
 
Nahar, Jubb, and Azim (2016) report that there is a significant relationship between risk 
disclosure, the existence of risk management committee, and a number of risk 
committees are significantly related with performance of banks in Australia. The 
dependent variable, which is performance, is proxied by return on equity, return on 
assets, Tobin's q, and buy-and-hold returns. Data for the study was collected using 210-
year observations including hand-collected data for the 2006-2012 period, and 
descriptive statistics, t-test, correlation, and regression are used in analyzing such data. 




institutions-which this current study concentrates on. More so, the study was not able to 
assess the effectiveness of risk management committees or units. The authors 
recommend future researchers to include variables that capture the effectiveness of these 
corporate governance mechanisms, and that similar studies be carried out in countries 
where there is poor or no application of risk governance mechanisms.   
 
Another study by Said Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) which aims to assess the level of 
voluntary and mandatory risk reporting, and examine the effect of competition, CG, and 
ownership structure on risk reporting, reveal that there is a low extent of voluntary risk 
reporting. Their finding also shows that the risk reporting distillates more on backwards-
looking and qualitative risk disclosure and forward-looking and quantitative risk 
disclosure. The study collected data from annual reports of 105 quoted firms in Egypt 
for the year 2007 through unweighted disclosure index based on Egyptian Accounting 
Standards (EAS) 25 to measure mandatory risk disclosure and using content analysis-
sentence approach to measure voluntary risk disclosure. For analysis purpose, 
descriptive statistics and multiple regression are used. One of the limitations of the study 
is the use of a single period (2007), therefore changes in companies' operations before 
or after the period are not captured which make generalization rare. Also, the study did 
not link risk reporting with the performance of the sampled firms which may help to the 
effectiveness of risk reporting in annual reports of the companies.   
 
In Nigeria, Dabari and Saidin (2015) whose study aimed at investigating the level of 
implementing Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) in the Nigerian banking industry 
find that ERM is implemented by banks in Nigeria, but yet to be implemented by some.  




headquarters of the 21 banks in Nigeria, and the logistic regression model is utilized for 
data analysis. The study didn't explore risk management practice and disclosure, risk 
management committee structures, and linking them with firm performance. Collecting 
data from a primary source, in this case, may temper the validity of result because the 
responses obtained on ERM may be subjective, as companies are required to report 
about their risk profile in financial statements (CBN, 2015; Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of England & Wales, ICAEW, 2011). 
 
Equally important, an exploratory study on risk reporting has been conducted by Amran 
et al. (2008). Their study identifies that there is no adequate disclosure of risk 
management by Malaysian companies.  Annual reports of 100 listed companies in Bursa 
Malaysia are used as the sample, and content analysis was used to determine the level 
of risk management disclosure by the sample firms in the year 2005. Descriptive 
statistics, percentage, Q-Q plot, and multiple regression are used in analyzing the data 
collected. The study concentrates on one accounting period only, did not also focus on 
the level of risk management practices and disclosure with company performance. 
  
Voluntary risk management disclosure in Malaysian firms is positively and significantly 
related to the firm value (Abdullah et al., 2015). For the purpose of the study, the authors 
conducted a content analysis of a sample of 395 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia for 
the year 2011. Firm value is proxied by the market to book value of equity ratio, Tobin's 
Q, and market capitalization. In conducting analysis, descriptive statistics, correlation 
analysis, and panel data multiple regression are used. Nevertheless, the researchers 




sampled firms. In the same line, the study focuses on one-year data and this makes the 
authors conclude that their study lacks generalizability to other periods of time. 
 
However, despite the extant literature on corporate governance mechanisms most 
especially board structure and firm performance (e.g., Adams & Meharan, 2003; Afrifa 
& Tauringana, 2015; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Fidanoski et al., 2013; Joe Duke & 
Kankpang, 2011; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; O’Connel & Cramer, 2010; Ogege & 
Boloupremo, 2014; Vafeas, 1999), risk management committee structure (e.g., Aebi, 
Sabato, & Schmid, 2012; Ng et al., 2012; Pantamee, 2014; Tao & Hutchinson, 2013; 
Yatim, 2010), and risk management disclosure (e.g., Abraham & Shrive, 2014; Buckby 
et al., 2015; Dabari & Saidin, 2015), there is limited studies on the relationship between 
risk management committee structure (size, composition, and meetings) and risk 
management practices and disclosure with firm performance especially relating to 
financial service institutions.  
 
Coherently, Karatzias (2011) argues that financial crisis can work to weaknesses and 
failures in corporate governance practices and risk management malpractices. The 
author further states that system of risk management in financial firms have failed 
because of corporate governance processes, identification of risk and its measurement. 
In a call for future research, Karatzias opines that there is a need for future researchers 
to explore into a ‘new duty of care' of companies' boards especially those of banks and 
other financial institutions which have significant role in an economy and also acting in 





Therefore, this study will examine the relationship between board of directors’ attributes 
(board size, board composition, board meetings, CEO tenure, board expertise), risk 
management committee structure (risk management committee size, risk management 
committee, composition, risk management committee meetings), and risk management 
practices and disclosure with performance of publicly traded financial service firms in 
Nigeria. 
 
However, the summary of some previous studies on corporate governance mechanisms 








Table 2.3  
Summary of Corporate Governance Mechanisms (boards), risk management, and Firm Performance Literature 




Variables Methods Theory Applied Main Result 
(Significance @ 
5%) Independent Dependent Sample Techniques 
Fidanoski et al. 
(2013) 
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20 firms Multiple 
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(2014) 
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significant (-) with 
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Not Available RMC is significant 
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activities. 
Source: Developed by the author of this study. 
 




2.11 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter discusses the overview of Nigerian economy, the underpinning theories 
(that is., agency theory and resource dependence theory), literature on performance, 
corporate governance, risk management practices. The chapter starts by stating the 
background of Nigeria in terms of political and economic overview and presents a map 
that shows the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria. Additionally, the chapter furthers by 
illustrating the structure of Nigerian financial system, regulatory agencies in the 
Nigerian financial sector, institutional development in the Nigerian financial sector with 
key challenges facing the sector. Besides, the performance of the Nigerian financial 
institutions in the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), development of corporate 
governance in Nigeria, and regulations governing financial institutions practice in 
Nigeria is providing in the chapter. Moreover, underpinning theories of this study 
(agency and resource dependence), the concept of corporate performance and its 
measurements are discussed, where accounting-based and market-based performance 
measures are considered. The chapter also looks at the concept of corporate governance, 
mechanisms of corporate governance like board attributes (board size, board 
composition, board meetings, CEO tenure, and board expertise), risk management 
committee structure (risk management committee size, risk management committee 
composition, risk management committee meetings), and risk management practices 













The preceding chapter provides the background of the Nigerian economy, explain 
related theories to the study, reviews the relevant literature of previous studies 
concerning corporate governance mechanisms (board of directors' attributes, risk 
management committee structure, and risk management practices and disclosure) and 
firm performance. This present chapter provides the theoretical framework of the study 
as well as the formulation of hypotheses on the basis of related theories and evidence 
from the empirical review. The subsequent sections provide the operational definition, 
measurement of study variables, the research methodology pertaining data collection, 
sampling, data collection procedures, and techniques of data analysis. Finally, a 
summary of the chapter is provided in the last section. 
 
3.2 Research Framework 
 
This study utilizes agency theory and resource dependence theory in order to essentially 
examined the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance. The theories assist in highlighting different hypotheses relating corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. Nevertheless, agency theory explains 
agency problem and reconciles the conflicting interests between agents (corporate 
managers) and principals (shareholders) (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency costs ascend in a 




(Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and agency problems come up for the reason that contracts 
are not costlessly recorded and imposed (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
 
Controlling agency problem becomes indispensable in the decision-making process of 
a company since the decision makers (corporate managers) are not its residual claimants 
of organizational resources, they may probably take actions or decisions that differ from 
interests of the main residual claimants (shareholders) (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In this 
effect, agency theory helps in resolving the problems occurring in an agency 
relationship. Eisenhardt (1989) stresses that agency theory dwells in solving two 
problems in agency relationship. The first is "the agency problem that arises when (a) 
the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive 
for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. The second is the problem of 
risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk" 
(p. 58). 
 
Moreover, Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that there is need of a system that can be 
used to differentiate between decision control and decision management of firms which 
will help to reduce agency costs through control of management power and assuring an 
appropriate attention to stockholders’ interests. The required system as opined by Fama 
and Jensen is corporate governance, which is a system that safeguard and promote the 
rights of stockholders and other stakeholders. This is also consistent with agency theory 
assertion which aims to reduce agency costs and ensures that the interests of resources 
providers (shareholders) are met (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Consequently. Fama 
(1980), McKnight and Weir (2009), Shleifer and Vishny (1980), and Williamson (1984) 




to mitigate agency problem, curtail unscrupulous behaviour of agents, and reduce 
agency costs, hence, enhances corporate performance.  
 
Agency theory illustrates the relationship between owners of resources (shareholders) 
and management (agents), and significantly ensures the separation of ownership 
functions and control so as to improve owners-managers’ relationship, which as a result 
enhance corporate performance and value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Lefort and Urzua 
(2008) highlight that corporate board is considered as the key among the main 
mechanisms of corporate governance that provides an oversight function and tackles 
agency problems.  
 
Agency theorists contend that a significant role for the board of directors is effective 
monitoring of management activities on behalf of shareholders which can reduce agency 
costs and enhances firm performance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Board of directors are 
considered as key players in safeguarding shareholders' resources and their interests, 
and assist in resolving agency problems existing in organizations (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003). Consistently, Fama (1980), Mizruchi (1983), and Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) reported that monitoring role by corporate boards can lessen agency costs inborn 
in the ownership and control separations, hence, increases firm performance. 
 
In addition, Fama and Jensen (1983) express the opinion that the main function of the 
board is aimed at reducing agency costs, increases information disclosure that work for 
the stakeholders and serves to enhance the interests of shareholders. Furthermore, 




and size that helps to improved strategic plans and decision-making processes of a firm 
and its performance (Abdullah, 2004).  
 
In contrast to the agency theory, resource dependence theory is primarily aimed to link 
the organization with the external environmental ties and provides the organization with 
the required human capital to effectively and efficiently oversee the management 
function. This is because resource dependence theorists assess how board of directors’ 
capital paves the way for adequate manning of capitals (human resources) to the firm 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
 
Specifically, resource dependence theory postulates that corporations operate in an 
environment that have a significant number of external elements which may leads to 
uncertainty and poses external dependencies (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 
1999). As such, organizations should effectively deal with the factors leading to the 
uncertainties so as to be successful in the uncertain competitive economic environment. 
In this effect, corporate directors function as a link between the firm and environmental 
uncertainties, and assist the firm in dealing with the said factors for better decision 
making (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
 
Equally important, Zahra and Pearce (1989) assert that board of directors do not only 
provide a significant connection to other firms, but also ensures a favourable transaction 
is carried out among firms. In the same vein, Pfeffer (1972) states that the function of 
corporate board is to acquire firm’s resources based on the relationship they established 
with friendly firms.  As a result, the board ensures a considerable increase in 




assist in reducing uncertainty and transaction costs, and aid in enhancing firm 
performance (Bazerman & Schoorman, 1983; Boyd, 1990). 
 
Correspondingly, corporate directors ensure effective and efficient operations of firms 
and also confirm that the interests of shareholders are met and performance increases 
(Coles & Jarrel, 2001). As an illustration, empirical evidence from resource dependence 
theory has shown that there is a significant relationship between board capital and 
performance of firms (e.g., Boyd, 1990; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Pfeffer, 1972). Yet, 
the findings are inconclusive and fragmented based on the empirical review in the 
previous chapter. 
 
Therefore, this study integrates agency theory and resource dependence theory to 
examine the relationship between corporate governance represented by board attributes 
(board size, board composition, board meeting frequency, CEO tenure, and board 
expertise), risk management committee structure (RMC size, RMC composition, and 
RMC meetings), risk management practices and disclosure and performance (ROA, 
ROE, and market-to-book-value ratio [MTB]) of listed financial service firms in 
Nigeria. The integration of the two theories is important because Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) state that “integrating examinations of monitoring and the provision of resources 
and their antecedents is important for practitioners, because directors engage in both 
functions”. In significant way, the authors further claim that “integration of monitoring 
and the provision of resources will not only more accurately reflect the real world but 
also may overcome theoretical weaknesses in choosing one approach over another” (p. 





Consequently, with the integration of agency theory and resource dependence theory, 
this study attempts to accomplish it objectives and provide answers to its research 
questions via the research framework established as shown in Figure 3.1.   
 





















Risk Mgt. Practices and Disclosure:  
(Governance structure related to risk, 
RMC responsibility & function, 
description of RM policies & 
objectives, audit committee 
responsibility and functions, 
capital/market risk, environmental risk, 
and operational risk) 
Board of Directors’ Attributes 
▪ Board Size 
▪ Board Composition 
▪ Board Meetings 
▪ CEO Tenure 
▪ Board Expertise 
Risk Mgt. Committee (RMC) 
Structure  
▪ RMC Size 
▪ RMC Composition 
▪ RMC Meetings 
Firm Performance 
▪ Return on Assets 
(ROA) 






▪ Firm Size 
▪ Leverage  
▪ Firm Age 
▪ Asset Tangibility 




3.3 Research Hypotheses  
 
This section discusses the hypotheses of this study for the purpose of assessing the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms as board of directors' attributes 
(board size, board composition, board meetings, CEO tenure, board expertise), risk 
management committee structure (RMC size, RMC composition, RMC meetings), risk 
management practices and disclosure and performance of financial service firms listed 
on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The development of the hypotheses is based on the 
theoretical framework in Figure 3.1 and previous literature on several corporate 
governance dimensions and firm performance. The hypotheses will control and guide 
the study to a logical conclusion. 
 
3.3.1 Board of Directors’ attributes and Firm Performance  
 
3.3.1.1 Board Size and Firm Performance  
 
Board size is viewed as the amount of board of directors of a company and is considered 
as the most fundamental dimension of board features due to fragmented views in the 
literature regarding it (Kakanda et al., 2016a). John and Senbet (1998) claim that 
corporate board of directors is regarded as the fundamental element of corporate 
governance and is the primary means through which the shareholders can control top 
executive activities indirectly. However, Adams and Mehran (2003) notified that a 
required number of board members of a company relies on the industry type, age, and 
company size, as board size in the banking industry is found to be larger than board size 
in the manufacturing industry. To this end, the number of the company board of directors 




(1993) views that when a number of board members exceed seven or eight, their 
functions will become less effective. However, the NCCG 2011 has required publicly 
traded companies to have a minimum size of 5 members on board but did not specify 
the maximum number required because this depends on organizational complexity and 
requirement. This reflects that board size should be optimal, rather than smaller in size 
to function effectively. 
 
Consistently, it has been contended that a larger board size leads to diversity that would 
assist corporations to safeguard their resources and lessen uncertainties in environments, 
enhance directors’ oversight function, and guarantee effective decisions by management 
(Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Pfeffer, 1987; de Villiers, Naiker, & van Staden, 2011). In 
addition, the diversity in extra resources emanates from an increase in board size 
because of various individual interactions in both internal and external boundaries of 
the company by board members (Eulerich et al., 2014).  Abdullah (2004) maintains that 
a board with a reasonably large size will be more capable to monitor the actions of top 
management. Zahra and Pearce (1989) conclude that larger board size will hinder CEO’s 
domination of the board because directors will be in a better position to exercise their 
powers and right in governing the firm, and thereby improve performance a firm.  
 
In line with the agency theory, a larger board size ensures an effective and efficient 
monitoring of management which reduces the power of the CEO on corporate board of 
directors and therefore enhances firm performance (Singh & Harianto, 1989). Again, 
based on resource dependence theory which aims at provision of intangible resources 




performance (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003), the size of boards is expected to contribute to 
better operations and performance of companies  
 
Nonetheless, despite the empirical evidence concerning the impact of board size on 
corporate performance, the findings still remain inconclusive because of mixed findings. 
For instance, Suhail et al. (2017) found that board size has a significant positive impact 
on the performance of listed firms in Pakistan. Fidanoski et al., (2013) opine that board 
size is positively related to performance (ROA and Cost-Income ratio) of banks in 
Macedonia. Likewise, Ogege and Boloupremo (2014) found that board size has a 
significant positive relationship with financial performance (ROA and ROE) of Deposit 
Money Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria. Moreover, Afrifa and Tauringana (2015) examined 
the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of listed Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in the UK and found that board size is positively related to 
performance.  Additionally, other studies that found a positive relationship between 
board size and firm performance are but not limited to: Al-Najjar (2013), Anderson, 
Mansi, and Reeb (2004), Arslan, Karan, and Eksi (2010), Chahine and Safieddine 
(2011), Coles, Daniels, and Naveen (2008), Galbreath (2010). Khan and Javid (2011), 
Larmou and Vafeas (2010), LI, Kankpang, and Okonkwo (2012), Saibaba and Ansari 
(2013), Yasser et al., (2011). 
 
Expressively, Abdurrouf (2011), Nanka-Bruce (2011), and Yermack (1996) reported 
that a significant increase in board size leads to interruption and delay in the decision-
making process, management, communication, crafts additional conflicting interests 
between shareholders and executives, and diminishes the moral of majority members 




smaller board is more effective than larger board because a significant increase in board 
size may lead to meaningless discussions alongside difficulties in coordination and 
decision making.   
 
There are other studies that found that board size to be negatively related to firm 
performance, for instance; Guest (2009) whose study examined the effect of board size 
on the performance of UK listed firms found that board size has significant negative 
effect on firm performance measured by profitability, share returns, and Tobin's Q. in 
the same line, O'Connel and Cramer (2010) also found that board size has negative 
impact on performance after assessing the association between board characteristics and 
performance of listed firms on Irish Stock Market (ISM) Ireland. Furthermore, other 
studies that found a negative relationship between board size and firm performance 
include; Ali and Nasir (2014), Chang and Duta (2012), Chechet, Jnr., and Akanet 
(2013), Cheng (2008), Conyon and Peck (1998), Dahya, Dimitrov, and McConnell 
(2008), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Liang 
et al., (2013), Mollah and Talukdar (2007), Nanka-Bruce (2011), Singh and Davidson 
(2003), Vafeas (1999), Yermack (1996) among others.  
 
As a result of the foregoing discussions, and based on the recommendation by the NCCG 
2011 that board size should be of optimal size, alongside the assertion of agency theory 
that, a larger board size ensures an effective and efficient monitoring of management 
which reduces the power of the CEO on corporate board of directors, resource 
dependence theory which aims at provision of intangible resources by board of directors 





 H1:  Board size has a positive relationship with firm performance. 
 H1a:  Board size has a positive relationship with ROA.  
 H1b:  Board size has a positive relationship with ROE.  
 H1c:  Board size has a positive relationship with MTB.  
  
3.3.1.2 Board Composition and Firm Performance  
 
Kakanda et al. (2016a) report that “board composition is the number of non-executive 
directors on board of a company” (p. 174). Marn and Romuald (2012), and Yasser et 
al., (2011) opined that board composition is the ratio of non-executive directors to total 
directors serving on the board of a company. It is reputed that corporate board with a 
significant number of outside directors may perform their functions effectively and 
contribute significantly to better decision making than the board of a company 
dominated by inside directors (Kakanda et al., 2016a). Similarly, representation of non-
executive directors on a corporate board increase (1) board independence; (2) directors' 
objectivity and boost directors'' proficiency (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jones & Goldberg, 
1982; Spencer, 1983). Moreover, the involvement of non-executive directors in 
controlling and overseeing any abnormal activities by the management reduces agency 
costs and finally enhances firm performance (Le, et al., 2006). Contrarily, Geneen 
(1984), and Vance (1983) argued that outside directors have no adequate time, 
knowledge and skills to perform the functions required of them effectively.  
 
The NCCG 2011 has recommended that publicly traded companies should have a board 
comprising of both executive (inside) and non-executive (outside) directors so as to be 




that a company that has a board of directors dominated by non-executive directors may 
become independent of the management and functions more effectively. 
 
Based on agency theory perspective, a corporate board that is dominated by a large 
number of nonexecutive directors are in a better position to in the best interest of 
shareholders and improve firm performance via effective oversight functions on the 
management (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). Similarly, as an assumption of resource 
dependence theory, companies that invite and appoints powerful community members 
into their boards acquired vital resources from the external environment which may lead 
to performance increase (Provan, 1980). 
 
However, despite the extant literature that examined the relationship between the 
composition of the board of directors and firm performance, yet the results are 
inconclusive because of conflicting findings. In this effect, some studies found that 
board composition is positively related to firm performance. case in point, Ali et al. 
(2017) examine the relationship between CG and performance (ROA and ROE) of peer 
firms in Pakistan and found that board composition has a significant positive effect on 
firm performance. Harvey Pamburai et al. (2015) investigate the association between 
CG mechanisms and performance of firms in South Africa and the result shows that 
composition of the board of directors (non-executive directors) is positively related to 
firm performance. Paul et al., (2015) also found that board composition has significant 
positive relation with performance of microfinance banks in Nigeria. More so, Chechet 
et al., (2013) found that board composition has significant positive effect on the 





Similarly, other studies that found a positive association between board composition and 
performance of firms are Abdurrouf (2011), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Ali and Nasir 
(2014), Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990), Bhagat and Bolton (2009), Bozcuk (2011), 
Chaghadari (2011), Chamberlin (2010), Chiang and Lin (2011), Connelly and 
Limpaphayom (2004), Galbreath (2010), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Juras and Hinson 
(2008), Nanka-Bruce (2011), Nuryana and Islam (2011), Saibaba and Ansari (2011), 
Sheikh & Wang (2012), Yasser et al., (2011), Yermack (1996).  
 
Contrarily, some studies that found board composition to be negatively related to firm 
performance include Narwal and Jindal (2015) who undertook a study in the Indian 
textile industry and found that board composition is not positively related to firm 
performance. Furthermore, Marn and Romuald (2012) examined the effect of Corporate 
governance and firm performance in Malaysia, and their result indicates that 
composition of the board of directors has no significant effect on performance (earnings 
per share). This finding is also consistent with the study by Latif et al., (2013) in 
Pakistan. In the same vein, studies that belong to this group include Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008), Bozec (2005), Chahine & Safieddine (2011), Chang (2009), Ghabayen (2012), 
Irina and Nadezhda (2009), Jermias and Gani (2014), Khan and Javid (2011), Pan, Lin, 
and Chen (2012), Singh and Gaur (2009), Switzer and Tangb (2009), Wang and Oliver 
(2009). While other studies that found an insignificant relationship between board 
composition and firm performance are Chaghadari (2011), Ghazali (2010), Kajola 
(2008), and Wei (2007). 
 
Based on the above supportive arguments from empirical findings, and based on agency 




non-executive directors stand a better chance to be more effective and acquire vital 
resources from the external environment, this study suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
 H2:  Board composition has a positive relationship with firm performance 
 H2a:  Board composition has a positive relationship with ROA 
 H2b:  Board composition has a positive relationship with ROE 
 H2c:  Board composition has a positive relationship with MTB 
 
 
3.3.1.3 Board Meetings and Firm Performance  
 
The board meeting is viewed as "the gathering of directors on the board to discuss issues 
regarding the company" (Kakanda et al., 2016a, p. 174). Equally, board meetings serve 
as a means or avenue for making effective decisions of a firm. It is measured as the 
number of meetings during a year by a company board of directors (Al-Matari et al., 
2014a; Chechet et al., 2013; Vafeas, 1999). Board meetings attendance is the basic 
medium via which board of directors obtained vital information needed to carry out their 
functions (Das & Dey, 2016). Khan and Javid (2011), and Pearce and Zahra (1992) 
stress that the more the number of meetings, the better for a company, for the reason 
that the boards stand a better chance of making a decision. In a link to this, the NCCG 
2011 recommends that board of quoted companies in the country should meet at least 
once every quarter (that is 4 times a year) in order to effectively perform its oversight 
function and monitor the performance of management. 
 
Equally important, the board meeting is an important resource for improving the 
effectiveness of the board of directors (Conger et al., 1998), and the more frequency of 




Lorsch, 1992). Coherently, Hsu and Petchsakulwong (2010) state that the effectiveness 
of the board of directors depends on its meeting frequency which can improve firm 
performance because boards will have great opportunity to perform an oversight 
function on the activities of management. Therefore, default in attending board meetings 
may amount to unsuitable counselling by the board of directors regarding strategic 
decisions of a firm, alongside bring about ineffective monitoring and oversight function 
of the board (Das & Dey, 2016). 
 
In line with agency theory, it is presumed that frequency of board meetings may ensure 
that objectives of companies are achieved, especially their performance. Likewise, 
agency theory assumes that with frequency meetings, boards exhibit significant abilities 
in terms of counselling, penalizing, and overseeing management actions, hence 
enhancing the performance of firms (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Vafeas, 
1999).    
 
Nevertheless, prior studies that try to examine the relationship between board meetings 
and performance of firms end-up in mixed findings. For example, Arora and Sharma 
(2016) found that board meeting frequency significantly and positively influences the 
performance of quoted firms in India. More so, Liang et al. (2013) examine the impact 
of board characteristics on performance and asset quality of banks in China. The study 
finds that board meeting has a positive and significant effect on asset quality and 
performance (ROA and ROE) of banks. Likewise, Barisua et al. (2012) found that board 
meeting has significant positive effect on performance (EPS and NPM) of banks 
(DMBs) in Nigeria. This is in consensus with Al-Matari et al. (2014a) who found that 




quoted on the Muscat Security Market (MSM) in Oman. Additionally, other stream of 
studies that found board meetings to be positively related to firm performance are Brown 
and Caylor (2004), Gavrea and Stegerean (2012), Kang and Kim (2011), Khan and Javid 
(2011), Khanchel (2007), Mangena and Pike (2005), Sahu and Manna (2013). 
 
Notwithstanding, some studies found board meeting frequency to be negatively related 
to firm performance. In this regard, Vafeas (1999) examines the relationship between 
board meeting frequency and performance of firms in Cyprus and found that board 
meeting is negatively related with performance. Harvey Pamburai et al. (2015) 
investigate the association between CG mechanisms and performance of firms in South 
Africa and found a negative association between board meeting frequency and 
performance (ROA, EVA, and Tobin's Q). while Jackling and Johl (2009) who 
examined the association between CG internal features and financial performance 
(ROA) of firms in India found that board meeting has no significant relation with 
performance. Other studies belonging to this set include; Donashana and Ravivathani 
(2014), Garcia-Sanchez (2010), Kamardin (2009), Kyereboah-Coleman (2008).   
 
As a result of the empirical supports presented, and based on the agency theory that 
frequency of board meetings allows the board to perform their oversight functions that 
will ensure the attainment of a company's objective, this study proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
 
 H3: Board meeting frequency has a positive relationship with firm performance. 
 H3a: Board meeting frequency has a positive relationship with ROA.  
 H3b: Board meeting frequency has a positive relationship with ROE.  




3.3.1.4 CEO Tenure and Firm Performance  
 
The tenure of a company's chief executive officer has been an important element for 
research concerning executive and organization leadership (Simsek, 2007). Coupled 
with this, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) that hold office for a longer time period is 
predictable to perform better compared to those CEOs who have been in office for a 
shorter time period. They further argued that longer tenure assists the CEO to develop a 
good relationship with stakeholders, alongside having a good plan and implement a 
long-term strategy that will improve performance and operational efficiency of the 
company (Afrifa & Tauringana, 2015). Kyereboah-Coleman (2008) argues that the 
longer period a CEO of a firm serves in office, the better for the shareholders' interest 
to be achieved, and the significant relationship between CEO tenure and firm 
performance, the better a firm's value (Tsai et al., 2006).   
 
Regarding the recommendation by the NCCG 2011 and provisions of the CAMA 
(1990), all directors of publicly traded companies should be due for re-election at regular 
intervals of at least once every three (3) years. This is specifically referring to executive 
directors (including the CEO) because the NCCG 2011 requires that “non-executive 
directors should serve for a reasonable period on the board”.  This means that CEOs 
should hold office for a term of three (3) years subject to re-election at the Annual 
General Meeting (AGM) of a company.  
 
On the basis of theoretical view point, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) that hold office 
for a longer time period is predictable to perform better compared to those CEOs who 




performance of companies (Afrifa & Tauringana, 2015). Likewise, resource dependence 
theory is in support of CEO's longer tenure because on the opinion of Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) "executive succession is itself one strategic response to environmental 
contingencies" (p. 248). This means that a long tenured CEO may have a better 
understanding of the environment in which the organization is operating and may help 
to have better strategic plans for organizational success. 
 
Albeit, there are various studies that investigate the association between the tenure of a 
CEO and firm performance, yet their findings are conflicting because some found 
positive relationship while others found a negative relationship. For instance, 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2008) found that CEO’s tenure enhances a firm’s profitability. 
That is CEO tenure has significant positive impact on profitability (ROA and Tobin’s 
Q) of firms in Africa. Alike, Al-Matari et al. (2014a) found that CEO tenure has a 
positive but not significant impact on firm performance (represented by ROA) of listed 
companies in Muscat Security Market (MSM) in Oman. In Nigeria, Sanda et al. (2011) 
found that the tenure of the chief executive officer has significant positive effect on firm 
performance (ROA, ROE, P/E ratio, and stock returns). Goldsmith (2012) finds that 
CEO tenure has significant positive impact on the performance of US financial service 
firms.  Other studies that found a positive relationship between CEO turnover and firm 
performance include Goldsmith (2012), Herly and Sisnuhadi (2011), Koufppoulos, 
Zoumbos, Argyropoulou, and Motwani (2008), and Simsek (2007).   
 
Contrarily, a negative relationship between CEO tenure and performance of firms has 
been recorded by studies such as that of Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) who 




institutions (MFIs) in Ghana. Belkhir (2009) also finds that tenure of CEO has 
significant negative relation with firm performance in the banking industry in United 
Arab Emirates (UAE). Similarly, Afrifa and Tauringana (2015) that examined the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of listed SMEs in the 
UK found a negative relationship between CEO tenure and performance. Studies that 
also belong to this group involve; Al-Matari et al. (2012), Evans, Nagarajan, and 
Schloetzer (2010), Limbach, Schmid, and Scholz (2015), and Maury (2006).  
 
Therefore, on the basis of empirical evidence with corporate governance 
recommendations, and based on resource dependence theory and agency theory that a 
long tenured CEO will be more acquaintance with the organization and its economic 
environment which will help to improve performance, this study hypothesized that: 
 
 H4:  CEO tenure has a positive relationship with firm performance. 
 H4a:  CEO tenure has a positive relationship with ROA.  
 H4b:  CEO tenure has a positive relationship with ROE.  
 H4c:  CEO tenure has a positive relationship with MTB.  
 
3.3.1.5 Board Expertise and Firm Performance 
 
Board expertise is imperative in ensuring that the oversight function of the board is 
successfully carried out (Yatim, 2010). Nadarajan et al. (2015) argued that directors that 
sit on the board of more than one company will enable them to acquire more skill, 
knowledge, and become more expertise in carrying out their oversight functions on 




‘busy director’ (Andreou et al., 2014), and is considered as a measure of expertise and 
competency of the board which can enhance firm performance. 
 
Busy directors are likely to gain experience with various issues facing public firms and 
are also likely to acquire a broader linkage of contacts (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2102; 
Hellman & Puri, 2002; Stuart & Yatim, 2010). To Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), Fama 
and Jensen (1983), and Field et al. (2013) stressed that directors serving on various 
boards (multiple directorships) are probable to become experts, acquire more skills and 
experience for better decisions that can improve firms' performance.    
 
However, the CG code issued in Nigeria by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
in 2011, has recommended on board expertise (multiple directorships) of publicly traded 
companies that:  
 
"There should be no limit on the number of concurrent directorships a director 
of a company may hold. However, concurrent service on too many boards may 
interfere with an individual's ability to discharge his responsibilities, the Board 
and the shareholders should, therefore, give careful consideration to other 
obligations and commitments of nominees in assessing their suitability for 
appointment to the Board" (p. 16). 
 
Theoretically, resource dependence theory argues that directors holding multiple 
positions on several boards rely on external resources that assist the firm in having 
access to external linkages and resources that can ensure effective and efficient business 
operations which finally enhances firm performance (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). Equally, 
proponents of resource dependence theory argue that directors serving on boards of 
more than one company will have more experience and become valuable to 




In order to assess the relationship between board expertise and firm performance, 
several empirical studies are conducted that end-up having opposite results. One group 
of studies found that positive association exists between board expertise and 
performance of firms in various nations. For illustration, Kapoor and Goel (2017), report 
that board expertise has a significant positive association with firm performance and 
earnings quality in India. In the same token, Andreou et al. (2014) found that the 
proportion of directors sitting on the boards of other companies have a positive 
association with firm performance and financial management decisions in the United 
State. Moreover, the result of Dass et al. (2014) is consistent with Andreou et al. (2014) 
because their study finds that directors from other related industries have a significant 
impact on firm performance/value (Tobin's Q) in the US.   
 
Coherently, Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) found that multiple directorships (expertise) is 
positively related to performance (earnings before interest and tax, Tobin's Q, and ROA) 
of bank holding companies in the United State. Relatively, other studies supporting this 
finding are; Ashbaug-Skaife et al. (2006), Boyd (1990), Burt (1984), Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006), Hillman and Dalziel (2003), and Kiel and Nicholson (2003).  
 
In opposite to positive findings between board expertise and firm performance, other 
studies arrived at a negative relationship. Nwonyuku (2016) finds that there is a 
significant negative relation between board skill and competence, and financial 
performance (ROA and NA/S) of food and beverages industry in Nigeria. To this like, 
Hauser (2013) found that when directors serve on less board it will reduce their 




leads to decrease in earnings and market value. Other studies supporting these findings 
are; Bhagat and Black (1999), Field et al. (2013), and Klein (1998).  
 
After scrutinizing the findings of previous studies and the assertion of resource 
dependence theory that directors holding multiple positions on several boards rely on 
external resources that assist the firm in having access to external linkages and resources 
that can ensure effective and efficient business operations which finally enhances firm 
performance, this study suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
 H5:  Board expertise has a positive relationship with firm performance. 
 H5a:  Board expertise has a positive relationship with ROA.  
 H5b:  Board expertise has a positive relationship with ROE.  
 Hc5:  Board expertise has a positive relationship with MTB.  
  
3.3.2 Risk Management Committee (RMC) Structure and Firm Performance 
 
3.3.2.1 RMC Size and Firm Performance 
 
Risk management is considered as one of the major facets of corporate governance, 
especially in the instance of financial institutions (Karatzias, 2011). It has been argued 
that “Boards that establish a stand-alone committee that focuses solely on the risk 
management function demonstrates their commitment to improving the overall 
corporate governance structures of their firms" (Yatim, 2010, p. 18). The efficiency of 
risk management committee characteristics to corporation performance has been noted 
by prior studies (for instance., Chatterjee & Bose, 2007; Karatzias, 2011; Ng et al., 2012; 




evidence on RMC and factors associated with it remains little in literature. This is also 
consistent with Ng et al. (2012) who opined studies on the risk management committee 
are limited and remain inconclusive. According to agency theory postulate, larger board 
committee size will hinder CEO's domination of the board because directors will be in 
a more upright position to exercise their powers and right in governing the firm, and 
thereby improve the performance of the company (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  
 
Even though the NCCG 2011 has recommended companies' board of directors in 
establishing a risk management committee separate from the audit committee, but it 
does not specify the exact size required by a risk management committee. The size of 
board RMC should be based on complexity and requirements of the company. To this 
end, Subramaniam et al. (2009) said “it can be argued that a larger board is likely to 
entail more resources for the board to allocate. For example, the larger the number of 
board members on the board, the greater the opportunity to find directors with the 
necessary skills to coordinate and be involved in a sub-committee devoted to risk 
management” (p. 324).   
 
Despite the limited empirical evidence on the association between RMC and firm 
performance, there are few studies that found conflicting results regarding it. In this 
manner, Pathan (2009) submits that small bank boards have a positive relationship with 
more risk-taking in the United States ‘bank holding companies’. Tao and Hutchinson 
(2013) substantiate that “the efficacy of the risk committee (RC) and compensation 
committee (CC) in monitoring and identifying excessive risk-taking depends on the 
composition and size of RC and CC which, in turns, leads to better performance” (p. 




is negatively associated with underwriting risk of insurance companies in Malaysia. In 
consensus to this, Pantamee (2014) found that risk management committee size has 
significant negative relation with corporate social responsibility disclosure in Nigeria. 
  
Consequently, the NCCG 2011 has required that the size of board committees of 
publicly traded companies be of optimal size. Thus, this study finds it reasonable that 
an optimum board committee size may lead to an effectiveness of the committee 
members in performing their functions effectively. In this effect, this study proposes the 
following hypothesis:  
 
H6:  RMC size has a positive relationship with firm performance.  
H6a:  RMC size has a positive relationship with ROA.   
H6b:  RMC size has a positive relationship with ROE.   
H6c:  RMC size has a positive relationship with MTB.   
  
3.3.2.1 RMC Composition and Firm Performance 
 
Board composition is also referring to as the percentage of the executive (inside) and 
non-executive (outside) directors on a company's board (Akbar, 2015). Fama and Jensen 
(1983) opined that boards with significant outside directors will effectively perform 
their duty and have better decisions than a board that is dominated by inside directors. 
As a matter of fact, non-executive directors' representation on the board increases board 
independence, directors’ objectivity and enhances directors’ expertise (Jones & 
Goldberg, 1982; Spencer, 1983). On the basis of agency theory, a board that is 
dominated by a large number of nonexecutive directors are in a better position to the 




functions on the management (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; 
Jones & Goldberg, 1982; Spencer, 1983).   
 
Nonetheless, the NCCG 2011 requires that board committees of publicly traded 
companies should compose of a majority of non-executive directors, and also be chaired 
by a non-executive director. The International Finance Corporation (2010) stresses that 
Higgs report in the United Kingdom states that that one of the functions of non-executive 
directors' is to be satisfied that financial report is accurate, risk management systems, 
and financial controls are robust and defensible. Ng et al. (2012) suggest that 
independence (composition) of committee members is a significant instrument in 
corporate governance. Likewise, the influence of decisions by management becomes 
less when members of a committee seem to be more independent (Mangena & Pike, 
2005). 
 
Empirically, studies have been scant on the relationship between RMC composition and 
firm performance. However, the available studies on risk management committee 
composition have found varying findings such as; Tao and Hutchinson (2013) who 
examined the role of risk and compensation committees in overseeing and managing the 
risk behaviour of financial firms in Australia found that risk committee composition is 
positively related with risk and firm performance. Moreover, Pantamee (2014) finds that 
risk management committee composition is positively associated with corporate social 
responsibility disclosure in the Nigerian petroleum marketing industry. Conversely, Ng 
et al. (2012) found that risk management committee independence (composition) is 





Accordingly, based on the empirical and theoretical supports presented, and the 
requirement of NCCG 2011 which states that risk management committees of publicly 
traded companies in Nigeria should compose of a majority of non-executive directors, 
this study, therefore, hypothesized that: 
 
 H7:  RMC composition has a positive relationship with firm performance. 
 H7a:  RMC composition has a positive relationship with ROA.  
 H7b:  RMC composition has a positive relationship with ROE.  
 H7c:  RMC composition has a positive relationship with MTB.  
 
3.3.2.1 RMC Meetings and Firm Performance 
 
Board of directors hold meetings on behalf of the company to discuss issues of the past, 
present, and future that is related to the company, and resolutions are passed during 
board meetings (Kakanda et al., 2016a). Khan and Javid (2011) and Pearce and Zahra 
(1992) contend that the more the number of board meetings, the better for a company 
because the boards will have more and better chances of making various decisions. In 
addition, a board meeting is regarded as an important resource of strengthening board 
of directors’ effectiveness (Conger et al., 1998), and the more regularity a board meets, 
the higher probability to obtain better performance (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Based on 
agency theory assumption, corporate boards display vibrant abilities in evaluating, 
penalizing, and controlling management actions, hence, higher frequency of board 
meetings increases firm performance (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Vafeas, 
1999). Accordingly, the higher the meetings of risk management committee the better a 





Although, the NCCG 2011 doesn’t specifically state the required frequency of risk 
management committee meetings, but has recommended that a member of senior 
management, CEO, executive directors, and head of internal audit unit should attend 
meetings of the risk management committee. Accordingly, directors of companies 
should make sure that boards and committee meetings are well-ordered and are held on 
regular basis, and that director should fully participate in the meetings of the board of 
directors (IFC, 2010). 
 
In compatibility with IFC report, the frequency of meeting portrays the level of 
commitment by a committee in performing their predetermined functions (Muhamad 
Sori & Mohamad, 2009), and depicts the extent of devotion by committee members in 
solving problems (Abdul Rahman, & Haneem Mohamed Ali, 2006). Ng et al. (2012) 
buttressed that "even if an RMC is well-structured with best practices in corporate 
governance, its function is, however, less effective without members' participation, 
which possibly explains how vital the activity criteria are related to the role of the 
committee" (p. 76).   
 
Regardless of the limited studies on risk management committee meetings and firm 
performance, the relevant studies to the topic have recorded contradictory results. For 
example, Frequency of meetings of risk committee has a positive and significant impact 
on the performance of banks in U.S. during the financial crisis (Aebi et al., 2012). 
Consistently, Pantamee (2014) has found that risk management committee meeting is 
significantly and positively related to corporate social responsibility disclosure in 
petroleum marketing sector in Nigeria. On the other hand, Ng et al. (2012) who 




insurance companies in Malaysia, found that the frequency of risk management 
committee meetings has no significant association with risk taking.  
 
Therefore, on the basis of empirical findings presented, and the assertion by the NCCG 
2011 that risk management committee should be held by quoted companies and should 
have CEO, executive directors, internal audit unit in attendance of the committee 
meetings, this study reasonably proposes the following hypothesis: 
 
 H8:  RMC meetings has a positive relationship with firm performance. 
 H8a:  RMC meetings has a positive relationship with ROA.  
 H8b:  RMC meetings has a positive relationship with ROE.  
 H8c:  RMC meetings has a positive relationship with MTB.  
  
3.3.3 Risk Management Practices and Disclosure (RMPD) and Firm Performance 
 
Reporting via annual reports by corporate entities is a means of disclosing their business 
activities including risk management practices. This statement is on the basis of the 
report by IFC (2010) that periodic information and activities of a company is usually 
disclosed in the annual accounts and reports of companies which serve as a medium of 
communication between the company (management) and stakeholders for their decision 
making. This is because annual reports of companies are a dependable medium for 
shareholders and other stakeholders to assess information on risk management regarding 
a company (Holland, 1998; Lang & Lundholm, 1993). 
 
Notably, companies with a significant amount of risk should provide a familiar reporting 




acting on behalf of shareholders (OECD, 2015). The reporting system required is the 
annual reports of companies, as this suggestion is consistent with Wong (2012) who 
states that risk management practices of companies are usually disclosed in their annual 
published accounts and reports that are subject to scrutiny by professional auditors and 
prepared in accordance with a given rules and regulations governing financial reports. 
 
Specifically, the NCCG 2011 has made recommendations to the publicly traded 
companies that the board of directors should make adequate disclosure on the company's 
procedures and practices on risk management. In the same line, the CBN code (2006 
and 2014) has required financial service firms to make a disclosure regarding corporate 
governance and risk management practices in their annual reports as it may boost their 
performance. 
 
On the basis of agency theory perspective, the disclosure of information on corporate 
risk reduces monitoring costs (Hemrit & Arab, 2011), which ensures that information is 
provided in the annual reports of companies (Depoers, 2000) that enable investors to 
make an effective decision. However, linking risk management practices and disclosure 
with firm performance has been limited in the literature. But studies relevant to risk 
management practices and disclosure made varying reports. For instance, Buckby et al. 
(2015) examined ‘how listed Australian Companies disclose risk management 
information in annual report governance statements in accordance with the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) corporate governance framework’, and found that there is 
an extensive deviation by companies in the disclosure practices and less conformity with 
principle 7 of the Australian principles and recommendations of corporate governance. 




enhance reporting of risk factors by publicly traded companies in Northcote, where they 
found that disclosures made my companies seem to be less or not related to the actual 
risk facing the companies, that is it can be regarded as ‘symbolic window dressing’.  
 
Comparatively, Dabari and Saidin (2015) assessed the level of implementing Enterprise 
Risk Management (ERM) in the Nigerian banking industry and found that ERM is 
implemented by banks in Nigeria, but yet to be implemented by others. Equally 
important, Amran et al. (2008) found that there is no adequate disclosure of risk 
management by Malaysian companies. Whereas, Abdullah et al. (2015) found that 
voluntary risk management disclosure in Malaysian firms is found to be positively and 
significantly related to firm value. 
 
Nonetheless, with the slight evidence from empirical findings and theory, and a support 
from the NCCG 2011 which states that publicly traded companies should make adequate 
disclosure of their risk management practices in their annual reports in order to improve 
performance, this study suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
H9:  Risk management practice and disclosure (RMPD) has a positive 
relationship with firm performance.    
H9a:  RMPD has a positive relationship with ROA.   
H9b:  RMPD has a positive relationship with ROE.   






3.4 Control Variables 
 
Apart from the independent variables pinpointed earlier, some control variables will also 
be utilized in this study. Control variables play an important role in quantitative 
research, and they are variables that a researcher controlled for so as to determine the 
true impact of the Independent Variables (IVs) on the Dependent Variables (DVs) 
(Creswell, 2013). In addition, controlling for variables will take into consideration the 
various firms' characteristics that may influence the magnitude of firm performance. As 
a matter of fact, the characteristics are considered as critical in ensuring a better result 
in assessing the relationship between corporate governance and company performance, 
and if they are not controlled for, they might be complicated and distort results (Aljifri 
& Moustafa, 2007). For the purpose of this study, therefore, three variables will be 
controlled namely; firm size, leverage, and firm age so as to control for variations in 
size of companies, capital structure, and time period (Alfijir & Moustafa, 2007; Afrifa 
& Tauringana, 2015; Grossman & Hart, 1982; Harvey Pamburai et al., 2015; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Ward & Mendoza, 1996).  
 
3.4.1 Firm Size 
 
Firm size has been used as a control variable by various studies that examined the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance 
(e.g., Aljifri & Moustafa, 2007; Ghosh, 2006; Patro, Lehn, & Zhao, 2003). Specifically, 
firm size affects firm performance because Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argued that 
larger firms stand in a better position in their economic environment to employ 




effective and efficient plan and decisions that will significantly assist in achieving 
organizational objectives.   
 
Furthermore, larger firms are found to perform superior to smaller firms, due to their 
capacity and dimensions in risk diversification (Ghosh, 2001), and are more effective 
and efficient than smaller ones because of their staff competencies, market power, 
economies of scale (Helmich, 1977; Kumar, 2004). Nevertheless, more board members 
are required for better firm growth because they are considered competent in monitoring 
functions (Coles & Jarrell, 2001), and larger firms are significantly effective than 
smaller firms due to their large economies of scales and recruiting of highly skilled 
employees (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2006).  
 
Wu, Lin, C., and Lin, I. (2009) who studied the impact of CG mechanisms on 
performance of Taiwan firms (excluding financial firms) for the period of 2001 to 2008 
(7130 year-observations), used firm size as a control variable. Their result shows that 
firm size has a significant positive effect on firm performance (represented by ROA and 
Tobin’s Q). In the same vein, Reguero-Alvarado and Bravo (2017) examined the 
influence of independent directors’ characteristics on the performance of the US firms 
for the period of 2008 to 2012 and employed firm size as a control variable. The result 
of their analysis shows that firm size has a significant positive impact on performance 
(as represented by Tobin’s Q).  
 
Per contra, Mayur and Saravanan (2017) investigate the ‘performance implications of 
board size, board composition, and frequency of board meetings on the performance of 




study used return on asset (ROA), Tobin’s Q, and non-performing asset ratio (NPA 
ratio) as measures of firm performance, while controlling for firm size. Their result 
indicates that firm size has positive, but insignificant effect on all the three performance 
measures used in their study. Whereas, Arora and Sharma (2016) found a mixed result 
on the effect of firm size on performance of firms in India. The result shows that firm 
size has negative, but insignificant effect on ROA and Tobin’s Q, while having a 
positive insignificant effect on ROE, and a significant positive impact on Net Profit 
Margin (NPM) and Stock Returns (SR).    Consequently, this study will control for firm 
size and will measure it as the natural logarithms of a firm’s total assets (Afrifa & 
Tauringana, 2015; Bhagat & Black, 1999; Harvey Pamburai et al., 2015).  
 
3.4.2 Leverage  
 
Debt financing or leveraging can be referring to as application of money borrowed by 
companies to enhance their performance, and has been widely utilized as a control 
variable by various studies that examined the relationship between performance of firms 
and corporate governance, who found a positive effect of leverage on performance (e.g., 
Chiang & Lin, 2011; Hurdle, 1974; Kang & Kim, 2011; Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 
2006).  
 
Moreover, leverage is also found to have a positive relationship with information 
disclosure (Ho & Wong, 2001; Imam & Malik, 2007), and organizations are more 
probable to disclose relevant information in order to meet the requirements of funds 
borrowers (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). Leverage is determined by dividing total debt of a 




effect may reduce cash flow and company’s control to reveal more information about 
the market, as managers may be pressured to enhance firm’s performance and market 
value (Alzharani et al., 2011; Harris & Raviv, 1991). Therefore, this study finds it 
reasonable to control for firm’s leverage.  
 
3.4.3 Firm Age 
 
This study will utilize firm age as a control variable in order to assess the performance 
of the study sampled firms over the periods under investigation. It is considered as the 
period or number of years a firm has been in operation since incorporation (Afrifa & 
Tauringana, 2015; Alhaji, 2014; Faruk, 2011). Moreover, it is presumed that a firm that 
has been in operation for a longer period will have an economic advantage over smaller 
ones. This statement is consistent with the opinion of Ward and Mendoza (1996) who 
argued that smaller firms are defenseless with firm age because they are expected to last 
for the period of five (5) to ten (10), therefore on the verge of winding-up.   
 
Consistently, Stinchcombe (1965) argue that when the age of firm increases, 
management of such firm acquire more comprehension of their abilities, skills, and 
competencies over time. Empirically, Arora and Sharma (2016) who examined the 
relationship between CG mechanisms and performance of large firms in India and used 
firm age as one of their control variable arrived at mixed findings. In this effect, the 
result shows that firm age has a significant positive effect on ROA, a positive, but 
insignificant effect on Net Profit Margin (NPM). However, the result also shows that 
firm age has a significant negative influence on ROE and Tobin’s Q, and has a negative, 




Moreover, a study by Mayur and Saravanan (2017) shows that firm age has positive, 
but insignificant impact on ROA, Tobin’s Q, and non-performing asset ratio (NPA ratio) 
of large firms in India. The study utilizes 40 listed banks as a sample, covering the period 
of 2008 to 2012. Using a sample of 100 listed companies on the Karachi Stock Exchange 
spanning from 2009 to 2013, Yasser, Mamum, and Rodrigs (2017) found that firm age 
(a control variable) has a positive, but insignificant effect on ROA and Tobin’s Q, while 
having a negative, but insignificant impact on Economic Value Added (EVA). The 
study aims at examining relationship between board characteristics and performance of 
firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange. Hence, in order to assess the association 
between corporate governance and company performance, the age of firms will be 
controlled so as to control for variations in the time period between the sampled firms 
in this study.   
 
3.4.4 Asset Tangibility 
 
For the purpose of this study, the tangibility of assets will also be controlled for in order 
to effectively examine the relationship between board attributes, risk management 
structure, risk management practices and disclosures and firm performance. This is in 
consensus with previous studies on corporate governance and firm performance who 
report that asset tangibility effects performance variables like ROA and Tobin's Q 
(Mishra, Randøy, & Jenssen, 2001; Randøy & Goel, 2003). Moreover, asset tangibility 
is considered as a major determinant of a company performance (Onaolapo & Kajola, 
2010), and a firm that has a higher proportion of its assets as tangibles (like plant and 
equipment), are more probable to debt choices which influence performance (MacKIE-




Furthermore, Maury and Pajuste (2005) investigate the impact of multiple large 
shareholders on the value of 136 Finnish listed firms from 1993-2000. The authors argue 
that asset tangibility has a significant effect on firm performance, and therefore control 
it. In the same vein, Akintoye (2008) contends that a company with a large portion of 
its asset structure as tangible assets will have fewer costs of financial constraints than a 
firm that heavily relies on non-tangible assets. However, Onaolapo and Kajola (2010) 
assess the effect of capital structure on the performance of 30 non-financial quoted firms 
in Nigeria from 2001 to 2007. The result from their study indicates that asset tangibility 
is negatively related to firm performance (ROA & ROE). As such, this study will control 
for asset tangibility of the sample firms as it may have a significant impact on 
performance. 
 
3.5 Methodology  
 
3.5.1 Research Design 
 
In an attempt to achieve the objectives of this study, the correlational kind of Ex post 
facto research design was utilized. This is because an Ex post facto is “a method that 
can also be used instead of an experiment, to test hypotheses about cause and effect in 
situations where it is unethical to control or manipulate the dependent variable” (Cohen, 
Manion, & Morrison, 2007, p. 264). In addition, Ex post facto research design is 
considered as a substitute for real experimental research which is used in testing 
hypotheses about correlational relationships or cause-and-effect, where it is not ethical 
or practical to apply experimental or quasi-experimental designs (Cohen et al., 2000). It 
is a research design that utilizes data already gathered not necessarily collected for 




Therefore, this study utilizes Ex post facto research design to examine the association 
between board attributes (board size, board composition, board meetings, CEO tenure, 
and board expertise), risk management committee structure (RMC size, RMC 
composition, RMC meetings), and risk management practices and disclosure as 
independent variables, and corporate performance (ROA, ROE, and MTB) as dependent 
variables. Subsequently, the variables (dependent, independent, and control) were 
utilized in this study in form of panel data. 
 
3.5.2 Population of the Study 
 
The population for this study is fifty-five (55) financial service companies listed on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange operating of the end of the year 2016. In this way, the 
population is presented in Table 3.1. 
 
(Insert Table 3.1 here) .... See Appendix I 
 
3.5.3 Sample Size of the Study 
 
For the purpose of this study, only forty-five (45) out of the 55 financial services firms 
quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) actively operating to end of the year 
2016 were used as the sample. For the reason that they are those with the available data 
required to accomplish this study. The sample for this study is presented in Table 3.2.   
 





3.5.4 Method of Data Collection 
 
To achieve the objectives of this study, data was collected from the annual reports and 
accounts of the 45 sampled firms for four (5) years period spanning from 2012 to 2016. 
The year 2012 is considered the initial year because the Nigerian CG Code was revised 
in early 2011, and publicly traded companies adopt its full implementation before 
January 2012, hence, paves the way to assess the 5 years trends from implementation 
period (2012) to 2016. Therefore, the data for this study were collected based on the 
NCCG 2011 from the annual accounts and reports of the companies which were 
collected from the NSE website, websites of the sampled firms and some hard copies of 
the annual reports and accounts from the zonal office of NSE in Kaduna state (Northern 
Nigeria). 
 
Data on ROA, ROE, MTB, firm size, leverage, firm age, and asset tangibility were 
utilized from the statement of financial position and statement of comprehensive income 
of the companies' annual reports. While data on board size, board composition, board 
meetings, CEO tenure, board expertise, RMC size, RMC composition, RMC meetings, 
and risk management practices and disclosure were gathered from both chairmen 
statements and directors’ reports, and reports on companies’ profile regarding corporate 
governance for the periods under investigation from the audited annual accounts and 







3.5.4.1 Content Analysis  
 
For the purpose of collecting data regarding risk management practices and disclosure, 
this study uses quantitative content analysis. Content analysis is referring to as the 
coding and analyzing of textual or visual data to determine meaningful patterns, and it 
is a technique that summarizes any type of content by counting several parts of the 
contents (Weber, 1990). Notably, analyzing data through contents enable researchers to 
process a large amount of data with relative affluence and in a more systematic fashion, 
and in analyzing the patterns and trends in documents (Stemler, 2001). For the purpose 
of measuring the volume or number of disclosures, various studies applied quantitative 
content analysis by counting the number of sentences, words or pages (for instance, 
Deegan, Rankin, & Voght, 2000; Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy 
& Neri, 2014; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Linsley & Shrives, 2005). 
 
Nevertheless, content analysis is not limited to the counting of words only but extends 
to categorizing and coding of data (Stemler, 2001). Data categorization basic is summed 
up as "A category is a group of words with similar meaning or connotations" (Weber, 
1990, p. 37). While U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO (1996) states that "categories 
must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive" (p. 20). Consequently, Stemler (2001) adds 
that "mutually exclusive categories exist when no unit falls between two data points, 
and each unit is represented by only one data point. The requirement of exhaustive 
categories is met when the data language represents all recording units without 





Consequently, there are studies that used categories in analyzing contents of firms (e.g., 
Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Linsely & Shrives, 
2005; Wong, 2012). Therefore, this study also extends word counts in the contents of 
annual reports of the sampled companies by concentrating on the category of risk 
management disclosure based on the requirement of the NCCG 2011 and CBN code 
(2006). The main category is “Risk Management Framework” which is sub categorized 
into; 
 
1) Governance structure related to risk management. 
2) Risk management committee responsibility and function explanations.  
3) Description of risk management policies and objectives. 
4) Audit committee responsibility and function explanations. 
5) Capital/Market risk disclosure. 
6) Environmental risk disclosure; and  
7) Operational risk and other risks disclosure.  
 
However, it is worthy to mention that the above-stated categories are adapted from 
Wong (2012) to suit the necessities of this study based on the requirement of SEC (2011) 
and CBN (2006). Moreover, it should be noted that this study does not intend to 
elaborate on the seven (7) categories of risk management practice and disclosure 
developed, but to determine the extent of their disclosure and how they are related to 
the performance of firms, as shareholders and other stakeholders might be interested in 
it. Following Linsley and Shrives (2005), the researcher reads through the annual reports 
of each company in the sample to identify the sentences providing risk elements and/or 




coded using risk management disclosure index relating to each category of disclosure 
explained earlier.  
 
3.5.4.1.1 Development of Disclosure Score Index 
 
In order to collect data on risk management practices and disclosure of financial service 
firms in Nigeria, a disclosure index was developed based on the seven (7) categories of 
disclosure identified above. Following Wong (2012), one ‘1' is scored for disclosure 
item category when disclosed, and zero ‘0' if there is no disclosure observed, because 
this method can eliminate the probability of research bias which may be present in some 
items when different values are provided and will ensure that the allotment of a rating 
score is made only to a particular category, not word counts. Furthermore, in consistent 















Risk Management Practices Disclosure Index 
Name of 
Company 
S/n Item Category Years  
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
E.g., Coy 
‘X’ 
1. Governance structure 
related to risk 
management. 
     




     
 3. Description of risk 
management policies 
and objectives. 
     
 4. Audit committee 
responsibility and 
function explanations. 
     
 5. Capital/Market risk 
disclosure. 
     
 6. Environmental risk 
disclosure. 
     
 7. Operational risk and 
other risks disclosure. 
     
Total - -------------------------- ----- ---- ---- ----  
Source: Adapted from Wong (2012). 
 
Moreover, explanations to the above risk disclosure categories are presented as thus 












Risk Disclosure Categories Explained 
S/n Item Category Explanation 
1. Governance structure related to 
risk management. 
 
Risk management committee availability. 
2. Risk management committee 
responsibility and function 
explanations. 
 
Explanation of responsibilities and 
functions of risk management committee. 
3. Description of risk management 
policies and objectives. 
Availability of explanations to risk 
management policies and objectives of 
the firms. 
 
4. Audit committee responsibility 
and function explanations. 
 
Availability of audit committee structure 
and explanations to their responsibility. 
5. Capital/Market risk disclosure. The interest rate, exchange rate, 
commodity, liquidity, and credit. 
 
6. Environmental risk disclosure. Health and safety, erosion of brand name, 
and corporate social responsibility. 
 
7. Operational risk and other risks 
disclosure. 
Customer satisfaction, product 
development, sourcing, product and 
service failure, stock obsolescence and 
shrinkage. 
Source: Adapted from Linsley and Shrives (2005), SEC (2011), and Wong (2012). 
 
Reasonably, to obtain the real scores of the data under each firm for each accounting 
period, a rating score is provided for all the seven (7) risk management practices and 
disclosure categories. In line with Wong (2012), a total of “0” under each firm for each 
accounting year indicates no disclosure at all, which might be difficult after adopting 
SEC (2011) code of corporate governance in Nigeria. Likewise, a total value of “1 to 2” 
indicates weak disclosure intensity, “3 to 4” is moderate disclosure intensity, “5 to 6” is 








Rating on Degree of Risk Management Practice Disclosure Intensity. 
Rating Score  Degree of Disclosure Rating Parameter  
1. No disclosure                         - 0----disclosure item 
2. Weak disclosure                     - 1-2—disclosure items 
3. Moderate disclosure               - 3-4---disclosure items  
4. Strong disclosure                    - 5-6---disclosure items 
5. Very strong disclosure            - Above 6--disclosure item 
Source: Adapted from Wong (2012). 
 
3.5.4.1.2 Justification for the use of Content Analysis 
 
This study used content analysis in gathering the data on risk management practices and 
disclosure because the quantitative content analysis can be utilizing to measure the 
disclosure indexes (Wong, 2012), and can allow the researcher to determine the various 
category of risk management practices and disclosure of Nigerian financial service 
firms. Equally important, content analysis can only be applied when the points of 
reliability with consistency and validity are achieved (Stemler, 2001).  
 
Significantly, these requirements of content analysis are presumed to be met, since 
annual reports of the companies are generally prepared based on the requirements of 
statute (that is, Companies and Allied Matters Act [CAMA], 1990), and professional 
pronouncements like; International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), local 




Nigeria). In like manner, the annual reports are always subject to examination and 
independent judgement by professional auditors before being published as required by 
law (CAMA, 1990). Moreover, the disclosure of the risk management practices is 
required by the NCCG 2011 for publicly trading companies and complemented by the 
CBN code (2006) for best practices in the Nigerian financial service sector. As such, it 
is assumed that the contents of the annual reports used in this study were reliable, 
consistent, and valid. 
 
3.5.5 Definition and Measurement of Variables  
 
The variables in this study include ROA, ROE and MTB as dependent variables and 
independent variables embodied by proxies such as; board size, board composition, 
board meetings, RMC size, RMC composition, RMC meetings, and risk management 
practices and disclosure. Moreover, the control variables in this study include; firm size, 
leverage, firm age, and asset tangibility.  
 
3.5.5.1 Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable for this study is firm performance represented by accounting 
based performance measurements and market-based performance measurement. Return 
on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) symbolize accounting based performance 






3.5.5.1.1 Return on Assets (ROA) 
 
Return on assets as a proxy for financial performance is the proportion of net income 
generated from the total assets of a company. It is usually measured as net income 
divided by total assets (Al-Matari et al., 2012; Alzharani, Che Ahmad, & Aljaaidi, 2011; 
Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Gentry & Shen, 2010; Kaur, 2014; Khan, 2012; Onaolopo & 
Kajola, 2010; Saibaba & Ansari, 2013; Yermack, 1996; Zeitun & Tian, 2007). It is 
mathematically determined as thus: 
 
 ROA =             Net Income   X 100  =  X% 
   Total Assets 
 
 
3.5.5.1.2 Return on Equity (ROE) 
 
Return on equity is often regarded as the percentage of income generated as a return to 
shareholders on their capital investment in a company. It is measured as the total net 
income divided by total owners’ equity (Alzharani et al., 2011; Gentry & Shen, 2010; 
Khan, 2012; Maina & Ishmail, 2014; Maury, 2006; Onaolopo & Kajola, 2010; Sunday, 
2015; Zeitun & Tian, 2007). It can be stated mathematically as thus: 
 
 ROE =            Net Income   X 100  =  X% 








3.5.5.1.3 Market-to-book-value ratio (MTB) 
 
Market-to-book-value ratio represents the market-based performance measures which 
is “a powerful complement to conventional measures of financial performance” (Best, 
2004, p. 33). It is measured as the ratio of firm’s total market value divided by its total 
assets (Gentry & Shen, 2010; Richard, Devinney, Yip, & Johnson, 2009). It can 
mathematically be presented as thus: 
  
MTB = Total Market Value  = X 
         Total Assets 
 
 
3.5.5.2 Independent Variables 
 
The independent variables of this study include board attributes represented by board 
size, board composition, board meetings, CEO tenure, board expertise; risk management 
committee structure (RMC size, RMC composition, and RMC meetings); and risk 
management practices and disclosure. Their measurements are provided in the 
subsequent subtitles.  
 
3.5.5.2.1 Board Size  
 
board size as the degree of the board of directors of a company, and It is the total number 
of directors serving on a company's board (Kakanda et al., 2016a; Ogege & 
Boloupremo, 2014; Vafeas, 1999). Specifically, board size is measured as the total 
number of directors serving on a company’s board (Donashana &Ravivathani, 2014; 




3.5.5.2.2 Board Composition 
 
Board composition may be referring to as the collection or combination of various 
director types serving on a company’s board. It is the number of non-executive directors 
on board of a company (Kakanda et al., 2016a). It is measured as the ratio of non-
executive directors to total directors (Akbar, 2015; Al-Najjar, 2014; Bhagat & Black, 
1999; Kurawa & Kabara, 2014; Liang et al., 2013; Marn & Romuald, 2012; Uadiale, 
2010; Yasser et al., 2011). 
 
3.5.5.2.3 Board Meetings 
 
Significant issues and major decisions of a company are discussed in the board 
meetings, and board of directors hold meetings on behalf of the company to discuss 
issues of the past, present, and future that is related to the company, and resolutions are 
passed during board meetings (Kakanda et al., 2016a). Board meeting is measured as 
the number of meetings during a year by a company board of directors (Al-Ghamdi, 
2012; Al-Matari et al., 2014a; Chechet, Jnr., & Akanet, 2013; Donashana & 
Ravivathani, 2014; Harvey Pamburai et al., 2015; Jackling & Johl, 2009; Karamanou & 
Vafeas, 2005; Liang et al., 2013; Rodriguez-Fernandez, Fernandez-Alonso, & 
Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 2014; Sahu & Manna, 2013; Vafeas, 1999).  
 
3.5.5.2.4 CEO Tenure 
 
Tenure denotes a period of time during which something is possessed, and the tenure of 




concerning executive and organization leadership (Simsek, 2007). Tenure of corporate 
CEO is measured as the period (in years) the CEO has been in his position at each 
financial year end (Afrifa & Tauringana, 2015; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Al-Matari 
et al., 2014a; Belkhir, 2009; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2008; Sanda et al., 2011). 
 
3.5.5.2.5 Board Expertise 
 
Board expertise is imperative in ensuring that the oversight function of the board is 
successfully carried out (Yatim, 2010), and directors that sit on the board of more than 
one company will enable them to acquire more skill, knowledge, and become more 
expertise in carrying out their oversight functions on managers’ activities (Nadarajan et 
al., 2015). Board expertise is measured as the “average number of outside directorships 
held in other firms by non-executive directors” (Andreou et al., 2014; Elyasiani & 
Zhang, 2015; Fich & Shivdasani, Field et al., 2013; Yatim, 2010).   
 
3.5.5.2.6 Risk Management Committee (RMC) Size 
 
For the purpose of this study, risk management committee size will be measured as the 
number of directors serving on the RMC. This is consistent with Ng et al. (2012), 
Michelon and Parbonetti (2012), Pantamee (2014), and SEC (2011). 
 
3.5.5.2.7 Risk Management Committee (RMC) Composition 
 
The composition of committee members is a significant instrument in corporate 




management actions (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Therefore, risk management committee 
composition is measured in this study as the number of non-executive directors serving 
on the risk management committee as consistent with Pantamee (2014), SEC (2011), 
and Tao and Hutchinson (2013).  
 
3.5.5.2.8 Risk Management Committee (RMC) Meetings 
 
The frequency of meetings is an indication of how committee members dedicated their 
time in solving organizational problems towards achieving predetermined objectives 
(Abdul Rahman, & Haneem Mohamed Ali, 2006). As in the case of board meetings, 
risk management committee is also measured as the number of meetings held by RMC 
during a financial period (Aebi et al., 2012; Alhaji, 2011; Pantamee, 2014; SEC, 2011). 
 
3.5.5.2.9 Risk Management Practices and Disclosure 
 
Risk management practice of a company is usually disclosed in the annual reports of the 
company (SEC, 2011; Wong, 2012).  However, since it may be a bit difficult to analyze 
risk management practice and disclosure directly from the figures in Statements of 
Financial Position and Comprehensive Income of companies, a disclosure index was 
used in generating the data. The disclosure index on risk management practices and 
disclosure adapted from Wong (2012) was utilized for this purpose to suit the 





3.5.5.3 Control Variables  
3.5.5.3.1 Firm Size 
 
To follow the norms of other studies, firm size is measured as the natural logarithm (Ln) 
of a company’s total assets (Afrifa & Tauringana, 2015; Aljifri & Moustafa, 2007; 2015; 
Bhagat & Black, 1999; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Harvey Pamburai et al., 2015; Peng, 




Leverage or debt is the money borrowed by firms in order to carry out their business 
activities and enhance performance. It is measured as the ratio of total debts to corporate 
total assets at the end of a given accounting period (Afrifa & Tauringana, 2015; Myers, 
1977; Najid & Abdul Rahman, 2011).  
 
3.5.5.3.3 Firm Age 
 
This is the number of years a company is being in existence. It is measured as the 
“number of years between incorporation and the calendar year-end of each firm” (Afrifa 
& Tauringana, 2015, p. 725; Alhaji, 2014; Faruk, 2011; Pantamee, 2014).   
 
3.5.5.3.4 Asset Tangibility 
 
This is the composition of tangible assets in total assets structure of a company. It is 




(Akintoye, 2008; Maury & Pajuste, 2005; Mishra et al., 2001; Onaolopo & Kajola, 
2010; Randøy & Goel, 2003).  
 
However, to have a snapshot understanding of the variables in this study, the following 





Summary of Research Variables and their Measurements 
S/n Variables Acronym Measurement 
 Dependent Variables (DVs) 
 
  
1. Return on Assets  ROA Net income divided by total assets. 
 
2. Return on Equity  ROE Net income divided by total owners’ equity. 
 
3. Market-to-book-value ratio MTB The ratio of firm's total market value divided by its 
total assets. 
  
Independent Variables (IVs) 
 
  
4. Board Size BSZ The total number of directors serving on a company’s 
board. 
 
5. Board Composition BCOMP The number of non-executive directors on board of a 
company. 
 
6. Board Meetings BM The number of meetings during a year by a company 
board of directors.  
 
7. CEO Tenure CEOT The period (in years) the CEO has been in his 
position at each financial year end. 
 
8. Board Expertise BEXP The “average number of outside directorships held in 
other firms by non-executive directors”. 
 
9. Risk Mgt. Committee Size RMCS The number of directors serving on the RMC. 
 






11. Risk Mgt. Committee Meetings  RMCM The number of meetings held my RMC during a 
financial period. 
 
12. Risk Mgt. Practices and Disclosure RMPD Based on the score index developed for this study. 
  
Control Variables (CVs) 
 
  
13. Firm Size FSZ The natural logarithm (LnTA) of a company’s total 
assets 
 
14. Leverage  LEV The ratio of total debts to corporate total assets at the 
end of a given accounting period. 
 
15. Firm Age FAG The number of years between incorporation and the 
calendar year-end of each firm. 
 
16 Asset Tangibility ASTAN The book value of fixed assets divided by total assets.  
Source: Developed by the author for this stud




3.6 Techniques of Data Analysis  
 
For the purpose of this study, descriptive statistics, correlations, and multivariate 
techniques were used in analyzing the panel data collected.  
 
3.6.1 Panel Data  
 
For the purpose of this study, a panel (longitudinal) data method was utilized in order 
to assess the effect of the independent variables (board size, board composition, board 
meetings, CEO tenure, board expertise, RMC size, RMC composition, RMC, meetings, 
and risk management practices and disclosure) on the dependent variable (return on 
assets, return on equity, and market-to-book value ratio). This is because Hsiao (2003) 
states that “a longitudinal or panel data set is one that follows a given sample of 
individuals over time, and thus provides multiple observations on each individual in the 
sample” (p. 3). Similarly, Baltagi (2005) reports that “panel data refers to the pooling of 
observations on a cross-section of households, countries, firms, etc. over several time 
periods” (p. 1). An important advantage of using panel data is due to several data 
options, the degree of freedom increased, and collinearity among the explanatory 
variables is reduced, thereby, improving the efficiency of results (Asteriou & Hall, 
2007). 
 
Moreover, there are several benefits in the use of panel data (Hsiao, 2003; Klevmarken, 
1989), among them include: (1) it controls for ‘individual heterogeneity’ because panel 
data assumes that firms are heterogeneous (diverse), and longitudinal studies that don’t 




and measuring the effects that are not simply measurable in a pure cross-section or time-
series data; (3) it also allows one to construct and analyze more complicated behavioral 
models than pure cross-sections or time-series data; (4) data gathered on micro panel 
data on firms may be measured more accurately, hence biases occasioning from 
combination of firms may be condensed or eliminated. Therefore, the rationalization of 
using panel data in this study is the combination of fifty-five (55) financial service firms 
over four years’ period from 2012 to 2015.  
 
3.6.2 Descriptive Analysis 
 
Descriptive analysis is used to define some situation or features by providing measures 
of an activity or event (Hair, Money, Samouel, & Page, 2007). Descriptive statistics 
gives a description of samples of subjects in form of variables or collection of variables 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The authors added that descriptive statistics are used to 
provide in a given population, the estimations of central tendencies, minimum, 
maximum, and standard deviation. Moreover, descriptive analysis is considered as the 
initial step in analysing large data set that serve as a proofreading of data and 
examination of variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).    
 
Therefore, to achieve objective one of this study, descriptive analysis was employed to 
identify the extent of risk management practices and disclosure among financial services 






3.6.3 Multivariate Analysis 
 
In attempting to achieve the second, third, and fourth objectives of this study, 
multivariate analysis was employed in analyzing the data. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) 
stress that multivariate statistics “provide analysis when there are many independent 
variables (IVs) and/or many dependent variables (DVs), all correlated with one another 
to varying degrees’ (p. 1). The authors added that “with the use of multivariate statistical 
techniques, complex interrelationships among variables are revealed and assessed in 
statistical inference, and it is possible to keep the overall Type I error (the incorrect 
rejection of a true null hypothesis) rate at, say, 5% no matter how many variables are 
tested” (p. 3).   
 
Therefore, the technique used by this study in examining the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables is multivariate regression. Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2007) buttressed that "multiple regression is used to predict the score on the DV from 
the scores of several IVs, and it emphasizes the prediction of the DV from the IVs. 
Moreover, in multiple correlation and regression, the IVs may or may not be correlated 
with each other, and the techniques also allow assessment of the relative contribution of 
each of the IVs toward predicting the DV" (p. 18). As such, multiple regression analysis 
was used in analyzing the data for this study (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
 
Furthermore, with the utilization of correlation analysis, multicollinearity among the 
variables can be assessed. Multicollinearity is said to exist when the IVs are highly 
correlated with each other (e.g., 0.90 and above) (Hair Jr., Black, Babin, & Anderson, 




using Pearson's correlation so as to know the relationship between the variables as well 
as the significance thereon. In addition, other analyses like normality test, 
homoscedasticity, and independent errors were conducted in order to ensure that the 
assumptions to use multiple regression are met.   
 
Therefore, in order to run the analyses of the data in this study, SPSS version 20, and 
STATA version 14 were employed. The SPSS version 20 was used to conduct the data 
management and screening, while STATA version 14 was used to run the multivariate 
regression test. However, the analyses were conducted based on the models in this study. 
 
3.6.4 Model Specification  
 
In order to achieve objectives two, three, and four which aimed at examining the 
relationship between the independent variables (board size, board composition, board 
meetings, CEO tenure, board expertise, RMC size, RMC, composition, RMC meetings, 
and risk management practices and disclosure) and dependent variable (ROA, ROE, and 
MTB), multiple regression models were utilized, hence, leads to the development of 
three different models as thus: 
 
Model 1: 
ROAit = β0 + β1BSZit + β2BCOMPit + β3BMit + β4CEOTit + β5BEXPit + β6RMCSit + 








ROEit = β0 + β1BSZit + β2BCOMPit + β3BMit + β4CEOTit + β5BEXPit + β6RMCSit + 




MTBit = β0 + β1BSZit + β2BCOMPit + β3BMit + β4CEOTit + β5BEXPit + β6RMCSit + 




β0 = Intercept (constant)  
ROAit = Return on assets of firm i in time t 
ROEit = Return on equity of firm i in time t 
MTBit = Market-to-book ratio of firm i in time t 
BSZit = Board size of firm i in time t 
BCOMPit = Board composition of firm i in time t 
BMit = Board meeting of firm i in time t 
BEXPit = Board expertise of firm i in time t 
RMCSit = Risk management committee size of firm i in time t 
RMCCit = Risk management committee composition of firm i in time t 
RMCMit = Risk management committee meetings of firm i in time t 
RMPDit = Risk management practices and disclosure of firm i in time t 
FSZit = Firm size of firm i in time t 




FAGit = Age of firm i in time t 
ASTANit = Asset tangibility of firm i in time t 
εit = Error term 
 
3.7 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter discusses the research framework which shows the direction and 
relationship between the variables in this study. In addition, the research hypotheses 
were formulated indicating the expected results. The research methodology was also 
presented consisting of research design, panel data, population, sample size, the method 
of data collection, operational definition and measurement of variables, and techniques 























This chapter presents the results from data analysis and findings associated with the 
research framework and the developed model of this study as presented in the previous 
chapter. Explicitly, the chapter is split into subsections, starting with the analysis of the 
sample used as well as the descriptive statistics of the study variables. Furthermore, the 
Pearson correlation analysis, data cleaning and screening prior to multivariate analysis, 
diagnostics tests, panel data results, and summary of the findings relating to the 
hypothesis testing between the CG variables and performance variables are reported.  
 
4.2 Analysis of the Sample Used 
 
As initially stated in the previous chapter, the population of the study will be maintained 
as the sample, which comprises of 55 financial services companies operating in the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange from the year 2012 to 2016, and whose data are available for 
the said period.   However, due to the availability of data for the five years (2012 to 
2016) period, only 45 companies were utilized as the sample for this study, in which 
225-year observations are obtained. Moreover, the data on the board of directors' 
attributes, risk management committee structure, risk management practice and 
disclosure, and firm performance were collected from the annual reports and accounts 
of the 45 sampled companies spanning from 2012 to 2016. The analysis of the sample 





Table 4.1  
Analysis of Sample Used 
Year of Financial Report Status of Firms No. of Firms Percentage  
2012 to 2016 Available 45 82% 
2012 to 2016 Not Available 10 18% 
Total  55 100% 
 
However, the companies with the available data for the study period under review were 
45 that served as the sample and represent 82% of the population of this study, which 
were considered adequate after considering previous similar studies in Nigeria. For 
instance, Akingunola, Adekunle, and Adedipe (2013) used 24 banks for their studies out 
of the total quoted financial service firms in Nigeria, while Fatimoh (2012) in her study, 
considers only nine (9) banks for 10 years-period (2001-to-2010) as the sample. As such, 
the sample used in this study is considered to be adequate. On the same line, the sample 
maintained by this study arises based on the fact that, they are those companies whose 
annual reports and accounts are available for the period under review (2012-to-2016).  
 
4.2.1 Distribution of Sample of the Study Based on Company Type 
 
Table 4.2 
Sample of Companies According to Type 
S/N Company Type Number Observations % of Observations 
1 Banks 15 75 33.33 
2 Nonbanks 30 150 66.67 




Table 4.2 reports the distribution of the sample of this study based on company type 
(banks and nonbanks). The study covers financial service firms listed on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange (NSE) over a five (5) year period ranging from 2012 to 2016 that 
consists of banks and nonbanks. The nonbanks operators have the highest frequency of 
30 firms and the highest number of observations of 150 that constitutes 66.67% of the 
sample. Nonbanks financial companies in Nigeria refer to companies that do not offer 
purely commercial banking but engaged into other financial services like provision of 
loans, discounting of bills, and safeguarding of business against loss (for instance, 
insurance companies, mortgage companies, and thrift companies). While bank operators 
have the frequency of 15, with a number of observations of 75 that constitutes 33.33% 
of the sample in this study. In Nigeria, banks are termed as ‘Deposit Money Banks’ 
(DMBs), that is those banks that engaged in a purely commercial banking services 
including; acceptance of public deposits, granting of loans, and providing other 
investment products.  
 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics  
 
This subsection presents the descriptive statistics as well as the univariate test (t-test) 
results for the dataset as used for this study. Descriptive statistics usually give the 
description of samples of subjects in terms of variation or combination of variables 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). In addition, Ott and Longnecker (2010) state that “good 
descriptive statistics enable us to make sense of the data by reducing a large set of 
measurements to a few summary measures that provide a good, rough picture of the 




involving the mean, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation of the continuous 




Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample (N = 225) 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
ROA Ratio  0.252 0.215 0.014 0.756 0.794 2.680 
ROE Ratio  0.136 0.121 -0.168 0.464 0.383 2.894 
MTB Ratio  0.126 0.107 0.007 0.378 0.794 2.680 
BSZ Number 10.587 3.314 6.000 20.000 0.775 2.543 
BCOMP Ratio  0.643 0.115 0.250 0.917 0.110 2.989 
BMT Number  5.613 1.734 3.000 13.000 1.179 4.848 
CEOT Number  3.667 1.822 1.000 9.000 0.394 2.574 
BEXP Ratio  0.276 0.104 0.111 0.667 0.860 4.457 
RMCS Number  5.591 1.714 3.000 14.000 1.166 5.708 
RMCC Ratio  0.612 0.114 0.200 0.857 -0.533 3.855 
RMCM Number  3.729 1.135 1.000 7.000 -0.116 3.741 
RMPD Number  5.307 1.153 3.000 7.000 -0.337 2.442 
FSZ Obtained Ratio  24.585 2.190 21.488 29.177 0.751 1.991 
LEV Ratio  0.618 0.404 0.001 3.025 0.163 2.435 
FAG Number  34.404 16.082 9.000 94.000 1.278 4.990 
ASTAN Ratio  0.101 0.104 0.0001 0.492 1.484 4.659 
Note: BSZ= board size; BCOMP= board composition; BM = board meeting; CEOT= chief executive 
officer’s tenure; BEXP= board expertise; RMCS= risk management committee size; RMCC= risk 
management committee composition; RMCM= risk management committee meeting; RMPD= risk 
management practice and disclosure; FSZ= firm size; LEV= leverage; FAG= firm age; ASTAN= asset 
tangibility; ROA= return on assets; ROE= return on equity; MTB= market-to-book ratio.   
 
In view of performance measures, the mean value of return on asset (ROA) is 0.25, a 
minimum of 0.01, and a maximum of 0.76. The standard deviation is 0.21 depicting a 




the mean value of 0.25 for ROA depicts that 25% of profits of the sample firms was 
generated from the companies’ assets. This shows that the management of such 
companies are utilizing their resources judiciously in generating returns. While the 
minimum value of ROA is 0.01, meaning that 1% is the minimum return (in terms of 
ROA) generated from the assets of the sampled firms during the study period. Moreover, 
the maximum value of 0.76 indicates that 76% was generated as returns (ROA) from 
the assets of listed financial service firms in Nigeria. On the overall, it can be said that 
corporate managers of listed financial service firms in Nigeria are effectively 
performing their agency relationship the shareholders of the companies.  
 
On the other hand, the average value of return on equity (ROE) is 0.14, minimum of      -
0.17, with a maximum of 0.46, and a standard deviation of 0.12, indicating a thin 
variation across firms. Nevertheless, the average value of 0.14 portrays that 14% of 
returns (ROE) was generated from owners’ equity. This means that as agent of the 
stockholders, the corporate managers are effectively and efficiently working in order to 
ensure that returns expected are obtained by the shareholders. The minimum value of                  
-0.17 shows a downfall in returns on shareholders’ equity by 17%, while the maximum 
score of 0.46 reveals a 46% return from shareholders’ equity which is quite favorable. 
Whereas, market-to-book ratio (MTB) has a mean score of 0.13, with a minimum of 
0.007 and a maximum of 0.38, while the standard deviation is 0.11, which is also 
showing a narrow variation across the sampled firms in this study. The mean score of 
0.13 for MTB indicates that the average returns on the market value of their assets is 
13%, which is considerably favorable in most stock markets. The minimum value of 




0.38 for MTB is considered a favorable performance for the listed financial service firms 
in Nigeria.     
 
Based on the summarized descriptive statistics analysis as presented in Table 4.3, it is 
perceptible that the mean value for Board Size (BSZ) within the listed Financial Service 
companies operating in Nigeria is 10, with a minimum of 6, maximum value of 20, and 
a standard deviation of 3.31 (meaning that, variations in board size between the 
companies is not wide).  In this regard, the minimum board size of 6 is in line with 
studies on CG in Nigeria (for instance, Pantamee, 2014). More so, the result is also in 
line with the requirement of the NCCG 2011 which requires that publicly traded 
companies should have a minimum size of 5 members of their board. Likewise, this has 
coincided with the opinion of Lipton and Lorsch (1992) who asserted that the reasonable 
number of the company board of directors should be between seven and eight. 
 
Regarding board composition (BCOMP), the result from Table 4.3 discloses that the 
mean value of board composition is 0.64 (64%), the minimum value of 0.25 (25%), 
maximum of 0.92 (92%) and a standard deviation of 0.11 (12%). This indicates that the 
board of quoted financial service firms in Nigeria comprised of both executive and non-
executive directors. In essence, this result coincides with the requirement of the NCCG 
2011 which requires that publicly traded companies should have a majority of non-
executive directors on their boards. This is also consistent with the position of Lin 
(2011) who discoursed that non-executive directors should be majorly in a board of 





Furthermore, the descriptive statistics result concerning board meeting (BMT) shows 
that the average board meeting is 5.613, a minimum and maximum values of 3 and 13 
respectively, and a standard deviation of 1.73. The result indicates that some companies 
do not strictly follow the requirements of NCCG 2011 of a minimum of 4 meetings per 
annum by publicly traded companies in Nigeria in order to effectively perform their 
oversight function and monitor the performance of management. Nevertheless, some 
companies have even met up to 13 times in a year, while the average number of meetings 
with some companies in the sample is 5.613. The standard deviation of 1.73 indicates 
that the variation of a number of meetings between the sample firms is not wide.  
 
In addition, the average tenure of chief executives (CEOT) of listed financial service 
firms in Nigeria is 3.67, the minimum value of 1, maximum of 9, and a standard 
deviation of 1.82. This indicates that the minimum year a CEO can spend in his position 
across the firms is 1 year, maximum of 9 years, and an average of 3 years 6 months. 
Additionally, the standard deviation of 1.82 indicates that the variation in tenure of CEO 
across financial service firms in Nigeria is not wide. The NCCG 2011 stipulates that the 
CEOs of publicly traded companies should hold office for the period of at least 3 years, 
subject to re-election at the annual general meeting (AGM). Hence, the result is in line 
with the provision of the NCCG 2011. Similarly, the average CEO tenure of 3 years is 
consistent with Sanda et al. (2011), who document that the average tenure of CEO in 
the Nigerian quoted firms is 3.06.   
 
The descriptive result on board expertise (BEXP) from Table 4.3 shows that the mean 
score of BEXP is 0.27 (27%), a minimum score of 0.11 (11%) and a maximum value of 




that the average number of board members of financial service firms in Nigeria that 
serve on the board of other firms constitute 27%, minimum of 11% and a maximum of 
67%. In regards to the NCCG 2011, it does not stipulate the limit of a number of 
concurrent directorships a director of a company may hold. However, Yatim (2010) 
argues that board expertise is imperative in ensuring that the oversight function of the 
board is successfully carried out. 
 
Considering the risk management committee size (RMCS), the result from Table 4.3 
shows that it has an average score of 5.59, with a minimum and maximum of 3 and 14 
respectively, and a standard deviation of 1.71. Contrastingly, Pantamee (2014) reports 
that the average risk management committee size (RMCS) of quoted petroleum 
marketing companies in Nigeria is 4.86. Albeit, the NCCG 2011 encourages companies 
on the establishment of risk management committee distinct from the audit committee, 
but does not stipulate the exact size the committee should be. In this case, the size of the 
committee is based on the size and requirements of the firm.  
 
Moreover, the result from Table 4.3 demonstrates that the mean value of risk 
management committee composition (RMCC) is 0.61, a minimum score of 0.20, with a 
maximum value of 0.86, and a standard deviation of 0.11. As such, the outcome 
specifies that the risk management committee of financial service firms in Nigeria 
comprises of both executive and non-executive directors. The result shows that non-
executive directors on the committee constitute an average of 61%, a minimum of 20%, 
and a maximum of 86%. To Pantamee (2014), the average value of risk management 
committee composition (RMCC) in the Nigerian petroleum marketing companies is 




companies should compose of a majority of non-executive directors, and also be chaired 
by a non-executive director. Ng et al. (2012) suggest that independence (composition) 
of committee members is a significant instrument in corporate governance. 
 
Regarding risk management committee meeting (RMCM), the descriptive result in 
Table 4.3 displays that it has an average value of 3.729, a minimum and maximum score 
of 1 and 7 respectively, with a standard deviation value of 1.13. The result indicates that 
the committee meets averagely 4 times per annum, while some of the companies in the 
sample meet only once in the periods under review. However, the maximum time that 
the risk management committee of listed financial service firms in Nigeria meets is 7 
times per annum. Although, the NCCG 2011 does not specifically state the number of 
meetings required to be held by the committee, but the frequency of meeting portrays 
the level of commitment by a committee in performing their predetermined functions 
(Muhamad Sori & Mohamad, 2009).   
 
However, the descriptive output from Table 4.3 delineates that risk management 
practice and disclosure (RMPD) has an average score of 5.31, a minimum value of 3, 
and a maximum of 7, while the standard deviation stood at 1.15. Therefore, based on 
the rating of RMPD intensity provide in the previous chapter (chapter three) in Table 
3.5, the mean value of 5.31 indicates that the disclosure of risk management is averagely 
strong, while the minimum value of 3 means weak disclosure, and a maximum of 7 
shows very strong disclosure. In light of this, the NCCG 2011 has required all publicly 
traded companies in Nigeria to adequately disclose their procedures and practices on 




regarding the frequencies of each risk disclosure category and the overall frequencies of 
RMPD are presented in the subsequent subsections.  
 
While considering control variables, result from Table 4.3 indicates that firm size (FSZ) 
has a mean of 24.59, a minimum of 21.49, and a maximum of 29.18, while the standard 
deviation score stood at 2.19. The size of a firm is considered as an important 
determining factor of board structure and size, and also affects performance, hence, used 
as a control variable in CG studies (Ghosh, 2006; Patro et al., 2003).  For leverage 
(LEV), the result from Table 4.3 shows that its mean value is 0.62, minimum of 0.001, 
and a maximum of 3.03, while the standard deviation is 0.40. Leverage, which is 
measured as total debts to total assets is considered to have an impact on a company’s 
cash flow and control. Based on the result obtained, the average value of 0.62 means 
that some of the listed financial service firms in Nigeria have 62% as debt in their capital 
structure (that is external financing). In addition, minimum of leverage is 0.1%, and a 
maximum of 303% (highly leveraged, that may lead to loss of control by the real owners 
of the business).     
 
In regards to firm age (FAG), the descriptive results in Table 4.3 indicate that it has an 
average score of 34.40 years, with a minimum of 9 years and maximum of 94 years. The 
standard deviation of firm age is 16.08 in the listed financial service firms in Nigeria. 
Relatively, the age of the firm is presumed to have an effect on the performance of firms 
because firms that have been in operation for a longer period will have an economic 
advantage over smaller ones (Ward & Mendoza, 1996), even though this presumption 
is now overtaken by technological advances. However, Ehikioya (2009) examines the 




The author used 107 firms as the sample covering the period of 1998 to 2002. The result 
shows that the average age of firms operating on the Nigerian Stock Exchange is 19.40 
years.  
 
Lastly, as to asset tangibility (ASTAN), the outcome of descriptive analysis from Table 
4.3 shows an average value of ASTAN to be 0.10, a minimum score of 0.00, and a 
maximum of 0.49, whereas, the standard deviation is 0.10. Asset tangibility which is 
measured as the composition of tangible assets to total assets is also considered to have 
an effect on the outcome of a firm in terms of performance (Mishra et al., 2001).  
 
4.3.1 Annual Mean Descriptive Statistics for 2012 to 2016  
 
The mean descriptive statistics for the study variables for every year covered by the 
















Mean Descriptive Statistics from 2012 to 2016 for full Sample 
Variables 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Overall 
 
Dependent 
      
ROA .265 .264 .260 .224 .245 .252 
ROE .139 .144 .139 .127 .134 .136 
MTB 
 
.132 .132 .130 .112 .123 .126 
Independent       
BSZ 10.67 10.60 10.489 10.422 10.756 10.587 
BCOMP .643 .637 .642 .648 .645 .643 
BMT 5.467 5.356 5.556 5.844 5.844 5.613 
COET 3.044 3.444 3.733 4.133 3.978 3.667 
BEXP .269 .274 .274 .290 .280 .278 
RMCS 5.444 5.60 5.467 5.644 5.80 5.591 
RMCC .606 .642 .605 .604 .605 .612 
RMCM 3.533 3.60 3.667 3.911 3.933 3.729 
RMPD 
 
4.20 5.267 5.333 6.244 5.489 5.307 
Control       
FSZ 24.536 24.540 24.564 24.678 24.607 24.585 
LEV .607 .597 .667 .610 .608 .618 
FAG 32.822 33.80 34.80 35.80 34.80 34.404 
ASTAN .098 .101 .101 .103 .100 .101 
N 45 45 45 45 45 225 
 
Considering firm performance, the descriptive statistics from Table 4.4 shows that the 
percentage of return on assets (ROA) is somewhat stable over the study period with 0. 
265 (26.5%) in 2012 and 0.245 (24.5%) in 2016 even though with a slight decrease. The 
overall mean of ROA is 0.252 (25.2%). For return on equity (ROE), there is also a stable 
mean score even though with a slight decrease over the study period. The ROE has a 




0.136 (13.6%). The stability in ROA and ROE is an indication of an effective and 
efficient utilization of the limited resources at the corporate managers’ disposals which 
is favorable to the expectations of the shareholders. Meanwhile, there is a slight decrease 
regarding the mean score of market-to-book (MTB) ratio over the years under review, 
because the mean decreases from 0.132 (13.2%) in 2012 to 0.123 (12.3%) in 2016, and 
the overall mean stood at 0.126 (12.6%). The decrease in the mean of MTB may be due 
to the insurgency caused by ‘Boko Haram' in Nigeria, which affected various sectors of 
the economy, including activities in the capital market that face lower turnover of stocks 
in the market.  
 
Moreover, Figure 4.1 also depicts the trends of financial performance (return on assets, 
return on equity, and market-to-book ratio) of listed financial service firms in Nigeria 
over the study period. The trends of the firm performance are for five years, from 2012 
to 2016. Over the years, performance (financial and market) of the financial service 
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From Figure 4.1, it can be seen that the average performance of listed financial service 
firms in Nigeria was moving on a steady track, until in 2015 when it drops down and 
later picks up in 2016. The resultant decreased of performance in the year 2015 is due 
to a persistent increase in the rate of inflation from January 2015 to the end of the year, 
as noted by CBN (2016). Moreover, the decrease has been more often to MTB which 
occurs due to the poor performance of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) market in 
2015 ("A Review of Nigerian Stock Exchange", 2015). Moreover, other factors that 
affect the activities of companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange as argued by 
financial analysts include foreign exchange problems, deteriorating crude oil price, 
alongside exodus of foreign portfolio investors.    
 
According to a report by Okonji (2016), business activities in Nigeria halted due to 
skepticism of uncertainty as a result of extending the 2015 general elections which 
significantly affect business confidence. Even though the election was successfully 
conducted and tension was relaxed after the election, yet, the business environment 
became tough due to delay in appointing ministers and in approving the 2016 budget, 
which affected every business in Nigeria as there is no enough liquidity in circulation. 
Moreover, the new policy of Treasury Single Account (TSA) which requires all federal 
government agencies to pay their revenues directly into one single account of the central 
government, has drastically affected the activities of Nigerian banks, hence, reduce the 
amount of liquidity in circulation, and eventually affects most businesses in the country.          
 
However, based on the result from Table 4.4, the mean of board size is relatively stable 
within the study period with 10.67 in 2012 and 10.76 in 2016. On the overall, the average 




board composition, there is also a stable trend over the study period because the mean 
is 0.643 (64.3%) in 2012 and 0.645 (64.5%) in 2016. In the overall, the mean value 
remains at 0.643 (64.3%). Therefore, this indicates that listed financial service firms are 
complying with the requirements of the NCCG 2011 that the board should comprise of 
more outside directors than executive directors. The gathering of the board from one 
period to the other is seen as a medium via which vital information can be shared and 
obtained which can be used by the board to carry out their functions. Board meeting 
(BMT) remained stable at 5.5 times in 2012 and 5.8 times in 2016. The overall mean 
stood at 5.6 times. This implies that listed financial service firms in Nigeria complied to 
the requirement of the NCCG 2011. 
 
The tenure of CEO (CEOT) has an insignificant increase over the study period with 3.04 
in 2012 and 3.98 in 2016. This implies that the sample firms comply with the CG code 
2011, which requires that CEOs should hold office for a term of three (3) years subject 
to re-election at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of a company. The mean of board 
expertise (BEXP) also remains stable over the study period, having 0.269 (26.9%) in 
2012, although with a slight increase in 2016, having 0.28 (28%). This shows that the 
sampled firms have fewer directors serving on the board of other firms.  
 
Considering the risk management committee size (RMCS), the mean value remains 
steady with 5.4 in 2012 and 5.8 in 2016. The overall mean stood at 5.6, which is 
considered reasonable, even though the NCCG 2011 did not specifically state the size 
of the risk management committee required. In this regard, Subramaniam et al. (2009) 
held that “the larger the number of members on the board, the greater the opportunity to 




devoted to risk management” (p. 324).  On the risk management committee composition 
(RMCC), the mean scores over the years under review are steady with 0.606 (60.6%) in 
2012, and 0.605 (60.5%) in 2016 and the overall stood at 0.612 (61.2%). Just like board 
composition (BCOMP), the risk management committee composition (RMCC) also has 
a higher proportion of non-executive directors than the executive directors.  
 
The mean of risk management committee meetings (RMCM) in 2012 is 3.5 times, while 
in 2016 is 3.9 times and the overall mean is 3.7 times. This shows a considerable 
steadiness in the number of meetings held my risk management committee of financial 
service firms in Nigeria. Discoursing on the risk management practice and disclosure 
(RMPD), there was a progressive increase from 4.2 in 2012 to 5.5 in 2016, while the 
overall mean stood at 5.3. This shows an increase in compliance with the NCCG 2011 
that requires all listed financial service firms in Nigeria to disclose their activities on 
risk management in their annual reports so as to improve performance. This is consistent 
with the regression results regarding return on assets and market-to-book ratio in the 
subsequent subsection.  
 
On control variables, the mean of firm size (FSZ) remains stable over the years under 
review with 24.5 in 2012, 24.6 in 2016 and overall mean of 24.6. Leverage (LEV) also 
has a stable mean score over the study period having 0.607 in 2012 and 0.608 in 2016, 
with an overall mean of 0.618. This implies that the capital structure of listed financial 
service firms in Nigeria has a higher proportion of debts than assets, which those not 
mean a good signal to their survival. For firm age (FAG), the mean in 2012 is 32.8 years, 
and in 2016 is 34.8 years with an overall mean of 34.4 years. To asset tangibility, the 




The lower percentage in the asset tangibility of listed financial firms may be due to the 
fact that the firms are financial services oriented and not manufacturing concerns, as 
such they might not be dealing with many tangible assets.  
 
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Banks and Non-Banks   
 
The descriptive statistics for banks and nonbanks as contained in the sample of this study 
is presented in Table 4.5. The sampled banks in this study constitute a total number of 
75 year-observations (i.e., 15 banks for 5 years) while that of nonbanks constitute a total 
of 150 years-observations (i.e., 30 companies for 5 years). The result from Table 4.5 
shows that the average performances of banks in Nigeria are 18.5%, 11.3%, and 9.3% 
for ROA, ROE, and MTB respectively, while that of nonbanks are 28.5%, 14.8%, and 
14.2% respectively, which is a bit higher than those of banks. The difference may be 
owing to the introduction of Treasury Single Account (TSA) policy which directs all 
government agencies, departments, and parastatals to pay revenues directly into the 
federal government single account as against to the previous approach of depositing all 
revenues into government accounts with various Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) in 
Nigeria. In view of this, most activities of DMBs were affected, resulting in dwindling 





Descriptive Statistics for Banks and Non-Banks Financial Service Firms  
Variables Banks  Non-Banks 



















ROE 0.113 0.106 -0.028 0.353  0.148 0.126 -0.168 0.464 



















BCOMP 0.618 0.114 0.350 0.917  0.656 0.114 0.250 0.889 
BMT 6.347 2.023 3.000 13.000  5.247 1.442 3.000 10.000 
CEOT 3.960 1.969 1.000 8.000  3.520 1.733 1.000 9.000 
BEXP 0.297 0.057 0.188 0.455  0.268 0.120 0.111 0.667 
RMCS 6.960 1.728 3.000 14.000  4.907 1.233 3.000 10.000 
RMCC 0.622 0.090 0.4000 0.857  0.608 0.125 0.200 0.833 
RMCM 4.267 0.935 1.000 7.000  3.460 1.133 1.000 7.000 



















LEV 0.741 0.295 0.001 0.995  0.556 0.436 0.104 3.025 
FAG 32.867 14.756 11.000 70.000  35.173 16.700 9.000 94.000 
ASTAN 0.031 0.013 0.000 0.053  0.135 0.112 0.002 0.492 




Considering the board size (BSZ), the mean is 14.28, minimum of 7, and a maximum 
of 20 members for banks. While for nonbanks, the mean value stood at 8.74, minimum 
of 6, and a maximum of 15 members which is lower than that of banks. Nevertheless, 
the average number of board size (BSZ) for both banks and nonbanks do not deviate 
from the requirements of the NCCG 2011, and it shows that the size is optimal that will 
make them carry out their duties effectively. For board composition (BCOMP), the 
mean is 0.618 (61.8%) indicating that the boards of banks in Nigeria are dominated by 
non-executive directors which is given the board more power to make decisions 
independently. The board composition for banks has a minimum of (0.114) 11.4% and 
a maximum of (0.917) 91.7%. Whereas, the average value of board composition for 
non-banks financial service firms in Nigeria is (0.656) 65.6%, a minimum of (0.25) 
(25%), and a maximum of 0.889 (88.9%), meaning that the boards of nonbanks are also 
dominated by the non-executive directors. Meanwhile, this result indicates that the 
percentage of board composition of nonbanks companies is higher than that of banks in 
Nigeria.  
 
Equally important, the average number of board meetings (BMT) for banks is 6.3 times, 
minimum of 3 and maximum of 13 times. On the other hand, nonbanks have average 
meetings of 5(5.25), with a minimum and maximum of 3 and 10 times respectively. 
Important to realize, the board meets regularly in order to be discussing important issues 
regarding their organization, because board meeting is an important resource for 
improving the effectiveness of boards of directors (Conger et al., 1998). Regarding CEO 
tenure (CEOT), the mean in years is 3.96, minimum of 1 year, and a maximum of 8 




tenure (CEOT) is 3.52, minimum of 1 year and a maximum of 9 years which are almost 
similar to those of banks.  
 
Then again, the mean of board expertise (BEXP) is (0.297) 29.7% and (0.268) 26.8% 
respectively for banks and nonbanks financial service firm in Nigeria, indicating that 
boards of Nigerian banks and nonbanks financial service firms do not have a significant 
number of directors of other companies serving on their boards. Although, the minimum 
percentage of board expertise is (0.188) 18.8% and the maximum is (0.455) 45.5% for 
banks, meaning that among the banks, there are some with a large proportion of other 
companies' directors on their boards. While for nonbanks, the minimum proportion of 
board expertise (BEXP) is (0.111) 11.1%, and a maximum of (0.667) 66.7%. This 
specifies that nonbanks have more directors with multiple directorships serving on their 
boards than banks. This may also be the reason for nonbanks having higher performance 
(ROA, ROE, and ROE) than banks in Nigeria. As it is believed that having a significant 
number of board expertise (multiple directorships) on a company's board may influence 
company’s performance (Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015).   
 
From the descriptive result in Table 4.5, the size of the risk management committee 
(RMCS) of banks has a mean of 6.96, a minimum of 3 members and a maximum of 14. 
While the risk management committee size (RMCS) of nonbanks is 4.91, a minimum 
of 3 and a maximum of 10 members, a bit lower than those for banks. For risk 
management committee composition (RMCC), the mean value for banks is (0.622) 
62.2%, while that of nonbanks is (0.608) 60.8%. This shows that the risk management 




directors, which will give them more powers to make viable decisions regarding the risk 
appetite of their companies.   
 
More so, the risk management committee composition (RMCC) for banks has a 
minimum of (0.40) 40% and a maximum of (0.857) 85.7%. To nonbanks, the minimum 
proportion of non-executive directors in the risk management committee is (0.20) 20%, 
and a maximum of (0.833) 83.3%. In terms of risk management committee meetings 
(RMCM), the mean is 4 (4.3) times for banks, and 3 (3.46) times for nonbanks (a bit 
lower than that of banks). Notwithstanding, the average meetings of the risk 
management committee for both banks and nonbanks are in concordance with the 
NCCG 2011 stipulations.    
 
Further, with the mean of 5.51 for risk management practice and disclosure (RMPD) for 
banks, and 5.21 for nonbanks, the result indicates that there is strong disclosure of risk 
management practice in the Nigerian financial service firms, for the reason that 5.51 and 
5.21 falls within the rating parameter of risk disclosure provided in Table 3.5 in chapter 
three of this study. Specifically, this is consistent with the requirements of the Nigerian 
CG Code 2011, that publicly traded companies should disclose in their annual reports 
and accounts, all information regarding their procedures and practices of risk 
management.   
 
For the control variables, firm size (FSZ), leverage (LEV), firm age (FAG), and asset 
tangibility (ASTAN), they have average values of 27.46, 0.741, 32.87, and 0.031 




(LEV), firm age (FAG), and asset tangibility (ASTAN) are 23.15, 0.56, 35.17, and 0.135 
respectively as displayed in Table 4.5.  
 
4.3.3 Univariate Analysis 
 
For the purpose of comparing the mean scores of two different groups of companies 
(banks and non-banks) in this study, a form of univariate analysis known as the 
independent sample t-test was conducted and the result is presented in Table 4.6. 
Normally, the independent sample t-test is used when one wants to compare the mean 
scores of two different groups of people or condition (Pallant, 2005). The independent-
samples t-test conducted to compare the mean scores for banks and nonbanks for the 
independent, dependent, and control variables, shows that there is a statistically 
significant difference on ROA between banks and nonbanks (t = -3.35, p <.01). In the 
same vein, there is a significant difference in the mean scores of ROE banks and 
nonbanks financial service companies (t = -2.08, p <.05). Likewise, the result of the t-
test shows that there is a significant difference on MTB between the two groups of 
companies (banks and non-banks) in this study (t = -3.351, p <. 01).  
 
The significant difference in the mean scores of banks and nonbanks on all the three 
dependent variables (ROA, ROE, and MTB) in this study do not occur as a surprise due 
to several economic activities (for example., drop-down of crude oil prices, fluctuations 
in foreign exchange rate, and over dependence on government funds) that affects the 
operations of financial service firms in Nigeria especially banks. For instance, Kontein 
(2017) reports that banks in Nigeria faced a severe problem of foreign currency liquidity 




consequence, these have and will continue weakening the core earnings generation of 
banks in the near future.   
 
Table 4.6 
Univariate Comparisons for the Study Sample of Banks and Non-Banks Financial 



















ROE 0.113 0.148 -2.078 0.039** 











BCOMP 0.618 0.656 -2.342 0.020** 
BMT 6.347 5.247 4.692 0.000*** 
CEOT 3.960 3.520 1.714 0.088 
BEXP 0.297 0.268 1.971 0.050 
RMCS 6.960 4.907 10.249 0.000*** 
RMCC 0.623 0.608 0.858 0.392 
RMCM 4.267 3.460 5.324 0.000*** 











LEV 0.741 0.556 3.314 0.001*** 
FAG 32.867 35.173 -1.014 0.312 
ASTAN 0.031 0.135 -8.030 0.000*** 
N 75 150   
Note: 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.1 level  
 
Furthermore, another factor the effects the operations of banks in Nigeria is the 




inflows from various government agencies into one and only single account at the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). The implementation of TSA becomes unruly for banks 
in Nigeria because of states and other government agencies that usually fix deposited a 
huge amount of money at once, can no longer do that, since all inflows have to be posted 
into the nation's general TSA (Kontein, 2017). Prior to the implementation of TSA, 
banks usually use the huge amount of fixed deposits by states and other government 
agencies to issue out loans and engaged in other financial transactions in order to 
generate interest and revenues for itself.  Hence, the introduction of TSA has become a 
major challenge for banking operation in Nigeria, especially in 2015 (Kontein, 2017).  
 
However, the result of t-test in Table 4.6 displays that there are statistically significant 
differences (at a cut-off of 0.05) between banks and nonbanks financial service 
companies on the independent variables except for CEO tenure, board expertise, risk 
management committee composition, and risk management practice and disclosure that 
are significant at the 0.1 level. This implies that the independent variables that are 
significant at the 0.05 level (board size, board composition, board meeting, risk 
management committee size, and risk management committee meeting) are influenced 
by the categorization of the companies into whether it is bank or non-bank. For instance, 
the mean of t-test for board size (BSZ) is 14 for banks and 8 for nonbanks, showing a 
wide disparity. Board composition (BCOMP) for banks is 62% and for nonbanks is 
66%, and board meeting (BMT) for banks is 6 times, for nonbanks is 5. For risk 
management committee size (RMCS), mean for banks is 7, while for nonbanks is 5. 
There is also unequal mean for risk management committee meeting (RMCM) between 





While the independent variables that show no significant difference between banks and 
nonbanks at the cutoff level of 0.05 include: CEO tenure (CEOT), board expertise 
(BEXP), risk management committee composition (RMCC), and risk management 
practice and disclosure (RMPD). This implies that the affected variables are not 
influenced by the categorization of companies into, whether it is bank or non-bank. 
However, there is a statistically significant difference between banks and nonbanks in 
all the control variables in this study except for firm age that is not statistically 
significant (p >0.05). This means that firm size, leverage, and asset tangibility are 
influenced by categorization of the companies into banks and nonbanks, while it is not 
in the case of firm age. All these discrepancies (in variables) between banks and 
nonbanks in Nigeria may be due to their various customer needs. Because customer 
needs in the bank are more often than nonbanks in Nigeria, which occurs on a daily 
basis with an increasing rate.                       
 
4.4 Frequency of Risk Management Practice and Disclosure Intensity  
 
Prior to provide answer to the first research question in this study which was on the 
extent of disclosure of risk management practice by listing financial service firms in 
Nigeria, the frequency distribution of the 7 items of Risk Management Practice and 
Disclosure (RMPD) categories are provided. However, the 7 items of RMPD categories 
have been explained already in the previous chapter (chapter three, Table 3.4) that 
include: (1) governance structure related to risk management, (2) risk management 
committee responsibility and function, (3) description of risk management policies and 
objectives, (4) audit committee responsibility and function, (5) capital/market risk 
disclosure, (6) environmental risk disclosure, and (7) operational/other risk disclosure. 




intensity of risk management practice and disclosure (RMPD) of listed financial service 
firms in Nigeria. 
 
In any case, it is worthy to mention that information on some of the categories 
(categories 1, 2, and 4) of risk management practices were fully disclosed, while others 
(categories 3, 5-to-7) were partially disclosed. The reason for the nondisclosure may 
stem from the fact that information disclosure consumes higher cost to corporate 
entities. For instance, if not because of introducing the Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) information system (used by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission), a total amount of $0.15/page is being spent daily by the US 
companies on information disclosure involving 3 million pages daily.  
 
In Nigeria, Pantamee (2014) highlights that for a better information disclosure on 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) by the listed petroleum marketing companies in 
Nigeria, number of board meetings alongside the board size of the companies should be 
reduced since they involved higher costs which also influence profitability. This means 
that a huge amount of money is involved in disclosing of information by corporate 
entities in their annual reports. Therefore, this may be the reason why some information 
on the categories of risk management practices were not disclosed by the sampled firms 
in this study since some of the companies may be in favorable condition (having a higher 
profitability) to disclose information on their risk practices, others may not (that is they 
are having lower profitability or loss). The frequency results of the categories of risk 







Governance Structure Related to Risk Management  
Status Frequency  Percentage 
Disclosure 225 100% 
No Disclosure 0 0% 
Total 225 100% 
  
The frequent result obtained from Table 4.7 shows that disclosure regarding governance 
structure related to risk management which involves the availability of risk management 
committee is made fully by all the listed financial service firms in Nigeria. Moreover, 
the disclosure on this was made completely throughout the period under review across 
the sampled firms. This indicates that listed financial service firms in Nigeria have 




Risk Management Committee Responsibility & Function  
Status Frequency  Percentage 
Disclosure 225 100% 
No Disclosure 0 0% 
Total 225 100% 
  
From the result in Table 4.8, it has become apparent that disclosure of information on 
risk management committee responsibility and function appears up to 225 times 
(100%). This means that listed financial service firms in Nigeria have fully tendered 
explanations on the responsibilities and functions of their risk management committee 
during the period covered by this study. This also shows strict adherence to the 






Description of Risk Management Committee Policies and Objectives   
Status Frequency  Percentage 
Disclosure 157 69.8% 
No Disclosure 68 30.2% 
Total 225 100% 
  
The frequency result in Table 4.9 shows that there is significant disclosure on the 
description of risk management committee policies and objectives in the listed financial 
service firms in Nigeria. This can be evidenced by having a view of the disclosure status, 
which has a frequency of 157 (69.8%), and nondisclosure status that has a frequency of 
68 (30.2%). Even though the result shows that there are companies that do not disclose 
information on this particular risk disclosure category, yet, there is a higher proportion 
of companies that adhered to the requirements of the NCCG 2011 on this risk category 
disclosure item.   
 
Table 4.10 
Audit Committee Responsibility and Function  
Status Frequency  Percentage 
Disclosure 225 100% 
No Disclosure 0 0% 
Total 225 100% 
 
The result in Table 4.10 shows that disclosure regarding audit committee responsibility 
and function which involves the availability of audit committee structure and 
explanations to their responsibility is made fully by all the listed financial service firms 
in Nigeria. Moreover, the disclosure on this was made completely throughout the period 




in Nigeria are adhering to the requirements of the NCCG 2011 on the disclosure of this 
risk item category during the period under review.  
 
Table 4.11 
Capital Market Risk Disclosure   
Status Frequency  Percentage 
Disclosure 148 65.8% 
No Disclosure 77 34.2% 
Total 225 100% 
 
Regarding disclosure of capital/market risk which involves information on interest rate, 
exchange rate, commodity, liquidity, and credit in the market environment where the 
listed firms operate, the result in Table 4.11 indicates a significant disclosure having a 
frequency of 148 (65.8%), and nondisclosure appearances of about 77 (34.2%). As such, 
it can be boldly argued that listed financial service firms in Nigeria are adhering to the 
requirements of the NCCG 2011 on this issue of capital/market risk disclosure.  
 
Table 4.12 
Environmental Risk Disclosure 
Status Frequency  Percentage 
Disclosure 110 48.9% 
No Disclosure 115 51.1% 
Total 225 100% 
 
The frequency result in Table 4.12 demonstrates that there is a frequency of 110 (48.9%) 
disclosure, and 115 (51.1%) nondisclosure of environmental risk information (that is, 
the disclosure of health and safety, erosion of brand name, and corporate social 
responsibility).  This specifies that information about environmental risk is not fully 




during the period under review. As a result, there is a moderate adherence to the 
requirements of the NCCG 2011 on the issue of environmental risk in the financial 
service industry in Nigeria.  
 
Table 4.13 
Operational/other Risks Disclosure  
Status Frequency  Percentage 
Disclosure 104 46.2% 
No Disclosure 121 53.8% 
Total 225 100% 
 
In consideration of operational risk and other risk disclosure (which encompasses 
customer satisfaction, product development, sourcing, product and service failure, stock 
obsolescence and shrinkage among others), the result in Table 4.13 indicates that there 
is no adequate disclosure of such item of risk category. This is because the nondisclosure 
cumulates a frequency of 121 (53.8%), whereas the disclosure status amassed 104 
frequencies (46.2%). The result shows that there is no adequate disclosure of 
information on operational risk by listing financial service firms in Nigeria, hence, an 
indication of partial adherence to the requirements of the NCCG 2011 on operational 
risk.  
 
In the quest to answer the first research question in this study on the extent of disclosure 
of risk management practice by the listed financial service firms in Nigeria, the 
frequency distribution of how categories of Risk Management Practice and Disclosure 
(RMPD) behaved were analyzed using SPSS version 20. For this reason, the categories 
(from Table 4.7 to 4.13) of RMPD are summed-up based on a panel data basis (that is 




3.3 (chapter three). The risk management practice and disclosure (RMPD) categories 
have been explained already in the previous chapter (chapter three, Table 3.4), and 
which the degree of its ratings on disclosure intensity has been provided in Table 3.5 
also in chapter three of this study. The scores for rating parameter on risk management 
practice and disclosure as provided in Table 3.5 are as thus: a score of ‘0’ means ‘no 
disclosure, 1 to 2 means ‘weak disclosure’, 3 to 4 is ‘moderate disclosure’, 5 to 6 is 
‘strong disclosure’, and above 6 is ‘very strong disclosure’. The result obtained for the 




Risk Management Practice and Disclosure Intensity  
Status Frequency  Percentage 
No disclosure 0 0.00% 
Weak disclosure 0 0.00% 
Moderate disclosure 49 21.78% 
Strong disclosure 140 62.22% 
Very strong disclosure 36 16.00% 
Total 225 100% 
 
The result from Table 4.14 shows that ‘No disclosure’ and ‘Weak disclosure’ have zero 
scores. Nonetheless, the result further shows that ‘Moderate disclosure’ has a frequency 
of 49 (21.78%), the ‘Strong disclosure’ has 140 frequencies (62.22%), and a frequency 
of ‘Very strong disclosure’ of 36 (16%). Therefore, it can be arguably stated that there 
is a high intensity of disclosure on risk management practices and procedures of listed 
financial service companies in Nigeria during the period under review. In addition, the 




adhering to the requirements of the NCCG 2011 on the disclosure of information on 
their risk management practices and procedures. Based on this result, it is expected that 
risk management practice and disclosure will have a positive effect on the performance 
of listed financial service firms in Nigeria.  
 
Equally important, the intensity of information disclosure on risk management practices 
by listed financial service firms in Nigeria will help to boost the companies’ market 
share since investors are interested in a company that is transparent in information 
disclosure. Hence, investors will be skeptic with less information disclosure because 
when financial statements are not transparent, they (investors) can never be indisputable 
on the factual risk and actual nitty-gritties of a company. Case in point, lack of 
transparency by a company may leads to the concealment of important information on 
the company’s debt level which may obstruct investors in performance evaluation and 
in estimating the exposure of the company to bankruptcy. For example, high profile 
companies like Enron and WorldCom went into financial shenanigans due to lack of 
transparency by their corporate managers. Therefore, it is advisable that listed financial 
service firms in Nigeria should further intensify their extent of information disclosure, 
especially on their risk management practices, as it may in a long way, paves a path for 
a better performance.     
 
4.5 Correlation Analysis  
 
Correlation analysis is "used to describe the strength and direction of the linear 
relationship between two variables" (Pallant, 2005; p. 121). In this study, Pearson 




relationship between the study variables as provided in Table 4.15. The strength of the 
relationship among variables is usually ascertained by the correlation coefficient 
donated by (r) of the variables.  
 
In addition, Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (2010) suggested that in determining 
correlation coefficient, a value of zero (0) means no relationship, whereas the correlation 
value of ±1 indicates a perfect relationship. More specifically, the correlation (r) is seen 
as smaller where the r value falls between ±0.1 and ±0.29. But where the correlation 
value ranges between ±0.3 to ±0.49, the relationship is said to be medium, while a 
correlation value of ±0.50 and above specifies a strong relationship (Cohen, 1988). 
However, a high correlation of 0.8 (Gujarati, 2009) or 0.9 (Hair et al., 2014; Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007) between independent variables is an indication of multicollinearity 
which may distort the regression results. Hence, there is no issue of multicollinearity in 
this study since all the correlation coefficients are less than the threshold of 0.8 or 0.9 





Results of Pearson Correlation Analysis of the Study Variables (N = 225) 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 BSZ 1                
2 BCOMP -.2137*** 1               
3 BMT .2221*** -.0551 1              
4 CEOT .0543 -.0056 -.0589 1             
5 BEXP .1627** .2283*** -.0889 -.0012 1            
6 RMCS .6047*** -.1583** .1899*** -.0051 .1745** 1           
7 RMCC .1099 .2132*** .0654 .0548 .2535*** .1933*** 1          
8 RMCM .3593*** -.0203 .1918*** -.1043 .2381*** .3512*** .1360** 1         
9 RMPD .1214* .0059 .0798 .0722 .0948 .0682 .0332 .0775 1        
10 FSZ .6892*** -.2788*** .2468*** .0346 -.1376** .6098*** .0545 .3896*** .1368** 1       
11 LEV .1633** -.2096*** .1321** -.1521** -.1396** .1508** -.1934*** .0100 .0609 .2243*** 1      
12 FAG -.0553 .0217 -.0342 .1228* .0655 .1346* .1630** -.0639 .0679 -.0560 -.0938 1     
13 ASTAN -.4255*** -.0108 -.1311** -.0973 -.3632*** -.4885*** -.2378*** -.3429*** -.0734 -.5433*** .2027*** -0.1614** 1    
14 ROA .1348** .0168 -.1404** .0908 .1503** .0948 .1147* .1333** .0494 .1566** -.4040*** -.0744 -.3372*** 1   
15 ROE .1592** -.1154 -.0805 .0252 -.0239 .0468 -.0097 .0702 .0529 .2340*** .0853 -.1277 -.1297 .6163*** 1  
16 MTB -.0921 -.0209 -.0190 .0897 -.0301 -.0861 .0685 .0375 -.0987 -.1987*** -.2233*** .2794*** -.0671 -.0197 -.131** 1 
Notes: 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 




Regarding return on assets (ROA), the correlation result from Table 4.15 displays that 
leverage (LEV) and asset tangibility (ASTAN) are significantly and negatively related 
to ROA at the 0.01 level, while board meeting (BMT) is at the 0.05 level. Meaning that 
higher leverage may leads to lower performance or loss. So also, a high concentration 
of tangible assets (ASTAN) may result to lower performance or loss to the firm. In the 
same vein, frequency of board meetings (BMT) does not improve the performance of 
listed financial service firms in Nigeria since it has significant negative relationship with 
ROA. On the other hand, board size (BSZ), board expertise (BEXP), risk management 
committee meeting (RMCM) and firm size (FSZ) are significantly and positively related 
with ROA at the 0.05 level. In line with the agency theory assertions, a larger number 
of board size (BSZ) ensures an effective and efficient monitoring of management which 
reduces the power of the CEO on corporate board of directors and therefore enhances 
firm performance. Moreover, board expertise (BEXP) improves firm performance as 
presumed by both agency and resource dependence theories since the directors with 
multiple directorships have vast experience on environment uncertainties and social ties 
that will help in reducing cost of obtaining relevant information and ultimately improves 
company’s performance. Hence, this is consistent with the correlation result obtained in 
this study for board expertise (BEXP).  
 
Relatively, the significant positive relationship between risk management committee 
meeting (RMCM) and ROA is consistent with the agency theory assertion. Meaning 
that higher meetings of risk management committee ensures better performance (in 
terms of ROA) to the company. Further, risk management committee composition has 
significant positive relationship with ROA at the 0.1 level. This indicates that a 




improve the performance of listed financial service firms in Nigeria. Notwithstanding, 
the correlation result from Table 4.15 indicates that board composition (BCOMP), CEO 
tenure (CEOT), risk management committee size (RMCS), and risk management 
practice and disclosure (RMPD) are positively but not significantly related with ROA. 
In this sense, it can be said that board composition (BCOMP), CEO tenure (CEOT), risk 
management committee size (RMCS), and risk management practice and disclosure 
(RMPD) have a breakeven relationship, that is not contributing to the increase in 
performance and not affecting it unfavorably. However, the same result from Table 4.15 
also depicts that firm age (FAG) has negative, but not a significant relationship with 
ROA.   
 
Considering the second dependent variable which is the return on equity (ROE), the 
correlation result from Table 4.15 shows that it is positively related to firm size (FSZ) 
and board size (BSZ) at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively. Meaning that size of a 
firm and board size may contribute to the improvement of performance in terms of ROE 
of listed financial service firms in Nigeria. Moreover, the correlation result illustrates 
that CEO tenure (CEOT), risk management committee size, (RMCS), risk management 
committee meeting (RMCM), risk management practice and disclosure (RMPD), and 
leverage (LEV), are positive but not significantly related with ROE. Indicating that they 
are neither leading to an increase in performance nor decreasing it (that is breakeven 
relationship) since the correlation is not significant. Whereas, board composition 
(BCOMP), board meeting (BMT), board expertise (BEXP), risk management 
committee composition (RMCC), firm age (FAG), and asset tangibility (ASTAN) have 




variables in this case are not contributing to the increase in performance (ROE) of listed 
financial service firms in Nigeria. 
 
In measuring the relationship between the explanatory variables and market-to-book 
ratio (MTB), the correlation outcome from Table 4.15 shows that firm age (FAG), firm 
and leverage (LEV) are positively and significantly related to MTB at 0.01 level. This 
means that the age of a company in operation from incorporation and the amount of 
leverage in record may contribute in increasing performance (MTB). Whereas, firm size 
(FSZ) has a negative relationship with MTB at the same 0.01 significant level. On the 
other hand, CEO tenure (CEOT), risk management committee composition (RMCC), 
and risk management committee meeting (RMCM) are positive, but not significantly 
related with MTB (that is a breakeven relationship). While board size (BSZ), board 
composition (BCOMP), board meeting (BMT) board expertise (BEXP), risk 
management committee size (RMCS), risk management practice and disclosure 
(RMPD), and asset tangibility (ASTAN) have a negative, but not a significant 
association with MTB, but not significant.  
 
Besides, the correlation matrix from Table 4.15 also shows that there is no presence of 
multicollinearity among the independent variables as well as the control variables, 
because none of them has a correlation coefficient of 0.7 (Pallant, 2005), 0.8 (Gujarati, 
2009) or 0.9 (Hair et al., 2014; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). However, a comprehensive 
explanation of the relationship between the study variables is also provided under the 





4.6 Panel Data Analysis  
 
As opined by Hair et al. (2014), regression analysis is considered as one of the most 
widely used and multipurpose statistical technique that is applicable in almost every 
facet of business decision making and is also the basis of econometric models. Equally, 
multiple regression is a complex extension of correlation which is used to discover the 
predictive power of a group of independent variables (usually continuous) on a 
continuous dependent variable (Pallant, 2005). Therefore, this study utilizes multiple 
regression in order to explore the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables. As such, a panel data analysis was conducted because one of the merits of 
using panel data is due to several data options, the degree of freedom increased, and 
collinearity among the explanatory variables is reduced, thereby, improving the 
efficiency of results (Asteriou & Hall, 2007).  
 
However, prior to the execution of multivariate regression analysis, the data were first 
examined to meet the assumptions of multivariate analysis. Although, missing value 
analysis and detection of outliers were examined before testing of regression 
assumptions. The basic assumptions required before running a regression analysis that 
was carried out in this study are normality, heteroscedasticity, linearity, 
multicollinearity, cross-sectional dependence, and autocorrelation.    
 
4.6.1 Missing Data Analysis 
 
Missing data arises when a respondent(s) to a questionnaire left a question(s) 




missing where a researcher flops to record the data completely and appropriately. Hair 
et al. (2014) stressed that missing data occur "where valid values on one or more 
variables are not available for analysis are a fact of life in multivariate analysis" (p. 40). 
The authors further strengthened that the rule of thumb for missing values is to replace 
them using mean where there are less than 5% missing values per item. For the purpose 
of analysing missing data in this study, SPSS version 20 was used. However, missing 
value analysis conducted in this study indicates that none of the indicators has 5% 
missing values, rather, it has 0%. Hence, missing values are not present in this study, as 
can be seen from Table 4.16 of the result of the univariate analysis of missing values. 
 
Table 4.16 
Univariate Analysis of Missing Values 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Missing 
Count Percent (%) 
ROA 225 0.252 0.215 0.00 0.00 
ROE 225 0.136 0.121 0.00 0.00 
MTB 225 0.126 0.107 0.00 0.00 
BSZ 225 10.590 3.314 0.00 0.00 
BCOMP 225 0.643 0.115 0.00 0.00 
BMT 225 5.610 1.734 0.00 0.00 
CEOT 225 3.670 1.822 0.00 0.00 
BEXP 225 0.278 0.104 0.00 0.00 
RMCS 225 5.590 1.714 0.00 0.00 
RMCC 225 0.612 0.114 0.00 0.00 
RMCM 225 3.730 1.135 0.00 0.00 
RMPD 225 5.310 1.153 0.00 0.00 
FSZ 225 24.585 2.188 0.00 0.00 
LEV 225 0.618 0.404 0.00 0.00 
FAG 225 34.400 16.082 0.00 0.00 
ASTAN 225 0.101 0.104 0.00 0.00 
Note: ROA=Return on Assets; ROE=Return on Equity; MTB=Market-to-Book ratio; BSZ=Board Size; 
BCOMP=Board Composition; BMT=Board Meeting; CEOT=Chief Executive Officer Tenure; BEXP=Board 
Expertise; RMCS=Risk Management Committee Size; RMCC=Risk Management Committee Composition; 
RMCM=Risk Management Committee Meeting; RMPD=Risk Management Practice and Disclosure; FSZ=Firm 





4.6.2 Outliers Detection 
 
An outlier is considered as a case having an extreme value of a particular variable 
(univariate outlier), an odd mixture of scores on two or more variables (multivariate 
outlier) which alters statistics (Tabchnick & Fidell, 2007). The authors further buttressed 
that “outliers are found in both univariate and multivariate situations, among both IVs 
and DVs, and in both data and results of analyses. They lead to both Type I and Type II 
errors, frequently with no clue as to which effect they have in a particular analysis” (p. 
72).  
 
According to Hair et al. (2010), inspecting outliers is a momentous step in multivariate 
analysis because skipping initial investigation of outliers can corrupt statistical tests if 
it occurs to be a problematic outlier. Specifically, it alters statistics and probably leads 
to results that do not generalize to certain samples except one with the same type of 
outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007 & 2013). In the same vein, problematic outliers are 
not representative of the population of a study, rather, they counter the objectives of 
analysis, and can significantly affect statistical tests (Hair et al., 2014).        
 
Dealing with multivariate outliers (a group variable analysis and selecting those cases 
falling at the outer range [higher or lower]) will take care of univariate outliers (a single 
variable analysis and select as outliers those scores having extreme cases [higher or 
lower]), but treating univariate outliers may not necessarily take care of multivariate 
outliers' (Hair et al., 2014).  Nonetheless, multivariate outliers can be detected by the 




To this effect, the Mahalanobis D2 measure was used to detect and deal with multivariate 
outliers in this study.  
 
Hereafter, the Mahalanobis D2 measure was calculated using linear regression methods 
with SPSS v20, alongside the computation of Chi-square (X2) value.  Given that 225 
items were used, 276.16 represents the degree of freedom in the X2 Table with p<.001, 
so the criterion is 276.16 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007 & 2013). This means that any case 
with a Mahalanobis D2 value of 276.16 and beyond is a multivariate outlier and therefore 
be removed. Hence, no case with a value of 276.16, meaning that outliers are not present 
in this study. As such, further analysis proceeded. However, the result is presented in 
Table 4.17.  
 
Another way of determining multivariate outlier is’bacon’ command in Stata software. 
BACON, which is an acronym for blocked computationally efficient outlier nominators 
is a more effective and efficient way of detecting multivariate outliers' (Weber, 2010). 
This (bacon) algorithm was originated by Billor, Hadi, and Velleman (2000) which is a 
modified version and procedure executed in hadimvo that Hadi (1992, 1994) initially 
proposed. Even though both bacon and hadimvo, when used in Stata, give out a similar 
result of outliers, yet, bacon becomes faster and easier in detecting multivariate outliers, 
most especially with a large data set having larger observations (Billor et al., 2000; 
Weber, 2010).     
 
Therefore, for the purpose of detecting multivariate outliers in this study, bacon was 
executed in Stata, and the output shows that outliers are not present in regards to the 




distance (D2) is presented in Table 4.17. In addition to the multivariate outliers' result 
presented in Table 4.17, Figures (4.2 and 4.3) are annexed showing bacon outlier 
frequency graph and data error graph (relating to Mahalanobis D2). Both the graphs 
show that multivariate outliers are not present in this study.  
 
Table 4.17 
Multivariate Outliers Detection (bacon and Mahalanobis D2) 
 BACON (p=0.15) Mahalanobis D2 
Observations 225 225 
Outliers 0 0 
Non-outliers remaining 225 225 
Chi-X2 ---- 0.000 
df (224)         Critical value 

































Mahalanobis D2 Data Error Graph 
 
4.6.3 Diagnostic Tests for Multiple Regression Assumptions   
 
Prior to execution of multivariate regression analysis, it is of paramount importance to 
check whether the regression assumptions are fulfilled.   The assumptions include; 
normality, linearity, multicollinearity, the absence of heteroscedasticity, and 
autocorrelation (Gujarati, 2003; Hair et al., 2014). After regression model have been 
formulated, the most important step is to test individual variables for the assumptions 
underlying regression analysis. If all assumptions are satisfied, then the model is said to 
be estimated (Hair et al., 2014). The authors further argued that "once results are 
obtained, diagnostic analyses are performed to ensure that the overall model meets the 
regression assumption and that no observation has undue influence on the results" (p. 
164). Therefore, all the aforementioned regression assumptions were tested in this study 




4.6.3.1 Normality Test  
 
In almost every multivariate analysis, screening of continuous variables for normality is 
a very important phase, especially when one's objective is for inferencing. Even though 
achieving normality of study variables is not a constant requirement for analysis, but the 
result is considerably better if the variables are found to be normally distributed. 
However, the result of the analysis will be degraded if the variables deviate from a 
normal distribution (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Moreover, the normality of variables 
is usually ascertained using mathematical (statistical) or graphical approach. The most 
usable mechanisms of normality are skewness and kurtosis. In essence, skewness deals 
with the asymmetry (centre or mean oriented) of a given distribution while kurtosis 
looks at the peakedness (high or flatness) of the distribution (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). 
 
For the purpose of this study, the statistical approach (skewness and kurtosis) was 
employed to test for normality of the data distribution as suggested by Kline (2008), 
Hair et al. (2010), Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), and West, Finch, and Curran (1995). 
According to West et al. (1995), skewness and kurtosis values should be less than 2 and 
less than 7 respectively. While Kline (1998 & 2011), opines that the total values of 
skewness greater than 3 and a kurtosis greater than 10 are deemed to be indicators of 
problems.  
 
Therefore, all the variables in this study are found to be normally distributed because 
the value of skewness ranges from 0.11 to 1.48, while kurtosis value ranges from 2.54 




in this study does not deviate from normally distributed as they are within the acceptance 
criterion of lower than 3 and 10 for skewness and kurtosis respectively.   Additionally, 
normality can also be determined using residual plots of the dependent variables. Thus, 














































Residual Plot for Market-to-Book ratio (MTB) 
 
From the residual plots of the three models (ROA, ROE, and MTB) as Figure 4.4, 4.5, 
and 4.6, it can be said that the data is normally distributed, even though the plots for 
ROA and MTB have dispersed a little, but yet, not different from a normal distribution.  
 
4.6.3.2 Multicollinearity Check  
 
Multicollinearity arises where a single explanatory (independent) variable is highly 
correlated with a given set of other explanatory variables (Hair et al., 2014). According 
to Pallant (2005) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), multicollinearity is said to be 
present when independent variables are highly correlated, for say, the coefficient (r) is 
0.9 and above. But, Pallant (2010) advocates that the benchmark for multicollinearity 
among independent variables is a correlation value of 0.7 and higher. Based on the 
correlation matrix in Table 4.15, multicollinearity does not exist between the 
independent variables in this study because none of the correlation values amongst the 

















However, the most significant and dependable way of assessing multicollinearity is by 
examination of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance (Hair et al., 2014). In 
addition, tolerance (TOLi) is the direct measure of multicollinearity because it is the 
amount of variability of the selected independent variable not explained by the other 
independent variables. While VIF is the inverse of Tolerance (VIFi = 1/TOLi). The 
thresholds for tolerance and VIF are values of more than 0.1 and less than 10 
respectively (Hair et al., 2014; Pallant, 2005).          
 
In this study, the values of tolerance and the variance inflation factor of the variables 
are presented in Table 4.18, and the outcome shows that multicollinearity does not exist, 
because it is apparent that tolerance is between 0.14 and 0.60, reasonably greater than 
the threshold of 0.1 (Hair et al., 2014; Pallant, 2005). In the case of VIF, it ranges 
between 1.67 and 7.26, considerably less than the threshold of 10 (Hair et al., 2014; 
Pallant, 2005). Therefore, this indicates that multicollinearity does not exist in this 
study.   
 
Table 4.18 
Multicollinearity Test Based on VIF and Tolerance Values 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
FSZ 3.77 0.27 
BSZ 2.97 0.34 
ASTAN 2.10 0.48 
RMCS 2.01 0.50 
LEV 1.33 0.75 
BEXP 1.33 0.75 
RMCM 1.31 0.76 
BCOMP 1.24 0.80 
RMCC 1.19 0.84 
FAG 1.14 0.88 
BMT  1.14 0.88 
CEOT 1.07 0.93 
RMPD 1.04 0.96 




4.6.3.3 Checking for Linearity  
 
Linearity shows the mathematical correlation or function between variables in the form 
of a straight line. Hair et al. (2010) state that “an implicit assumption of all multivariate 
techniques based on a correlation measure of association, including multiple regression, 
logistic regression, factor analysis, and structural equation modelling, is linearity (p. 76). 
Furthermore, Pallant (2005) discourses that for linearity to be present, there should be a 
straight-line relationship between the residuals and predicted dependent variable scores. 
Although, “failure of linearity of residuals in regression does not invalidate an analysis 
so much as weaken it” (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 127).  
 
In determining linearity as an assumption of multiple regression, some scholars have 
suggested the use of residual plots (e.g., Palllant, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), 
where others have recommended the use of a more scientific method by comparing the 
standard deviation of the dependent variables’ scores and that of their respective 
residuals (Hair et al., 2010). Here, linearity is said to be achieved if the standard 
deviations of dependent variables are greater than that of residuals. In this study, 
linearity is confirmed because the standard deviations of the performance variables 
(DVs) are considerably higher in comparison to their respective residuals, as presented 









Table 4.19  
The Standard Deviation of Dependent Variables and Their Residuals 
Variables Std. Deviation Residuals 
ROA 0.2148 0.1944 
ROE 0.1208 0.1093 
MTB 0.1074 0.0954 
 
4.6.3.4 Heteroskedasticity Test  
 
The multivariate analysis assumed that the residuals in a regression model are 
homoscedastic, that is, the variance of error terms are constant or are equally spread 
over a range of independent variables (Hair et al., 2014). Heteroscedasticity, the failure 
of homoscedasticity, occurs when the error terms have a modulating or increasing 
variance, that may be triggered by nonnormality of a particular variable, transformation 
error, or greater error of measurement of some independent variables (Hair et al., 2014; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). However, “heteroscedasticity is not fatal to the analysis of 
ungrouped data. The linear relationship between variables is captured by the analysis, 
but there is even more predictable if the heteroscedasticity is accounted for. If it is not, 
the analysis is weakened, but not invalidated” (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 87). 
 
In order to detect heteroscedasticity, a graphical approach can be used, where the 
residuals of the model are always plotted in comparison to the predicted values of 
dependent variables and every predictor variable to ascertain whether or not the error 
terms of the model have constant variance. Contrastingly, heteroscedasticity can be 
detected using the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test which gives the chi-square value 




For the purpose of this study, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test was employed to 
detect the presence or otherwise of heteroscedasticity. Consequently, the result from 
Table 4.20 indicates that the model for ROE fails to reject the null hypothesis, hence, 
no presence of heteroscedasticity because the p-value is 0.6138 (61.38%), which is 
above the threshold of 0.05 (5%). In contrast, for ROA and MTB, their p-values are 
significant at the 0.05 level, and thus, the two models rejected the null hypotheses as 
there is an issue of heteroscedasticity. Moreover, the outcome signposts that the variance 




DVs Chi2 (1) Prob > Chi2 Null (Ho) 
ROA 9.21 0.0024 Rejected 
ROE 0.25 0.6138 Accepted 
MTB 11.27 0.0008 Rejected 
Note: Ho (null): Homoscedasticity 
 
In handling the problem of heteroscedasticity that appeared in return on asset (ROA) 
and market-to-book ratio (MTB) models, the Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) 
was employed as suggested and used by previous scholars (e.g., Bailey & Katz, 2011; 
Beck & Katz, 1995; Reed & Ye, 2011).   
 
4.6.3.5 Checking for Cross-sectional Dependence   
 
Cross-sectional dependence, also known as contemporaneous correlation or ‘between 
group’ dependence, is the relationship of the overlooked factors throughout the units. 




are cross sectionally independent, which is particularly true with large cross section 
dimension (N). In a coherent manner, Sarafidis and Wansbeek (2012) stressed that "one 
major issue that inherently arises in every panel data study with potential implications 
for parameter estimation and inference is the possibility that the individual units are 
interdependent" (p. 2). Additionally, the impact of cross-sectional dependence which 
may lead to bias in test results depends on factors like, the extent of the correlations 
throughout the cross sections, and the nature of cross sectional dependence itself 
(Sarafidis & Wansbeek, 2012).   
 
In the quest to check for contemporaneous correlation in this study, the Pesaran’s CD 
(Cross-section Dependence) test was employed using STATA (version 14) with syntax; 
xtcsd, pesaran abs. In essence, the test was executed on the three regression models in 
this study, involving; ROA, ROE and MTB, and the results obtained which are 
presented in Table 4.21 show that cross-sectional dependence is not an issue since the 
probability values for all the three models (ROA, ROE, and MTB) are greater than the 
threshold of 0. 05. 
 
Table 4.21 
Pesaran’s CD (Cross-section Dependence) Test 
Variables  Pesaran’s test of Cross-sectional 
Independence 
 Av. Absolute value of off-
diagonal element 
ROA -0.227, Pr = 0.8202  0.549 
ROE -0.523, Pr = 0.6013  0.486 
MTB -0.207, Pr = 0.8364  0.556 





4.6.3.6 Test for Autocorrelation   
 
Autocorrelation, also termed as serial correlation, occurs when a relationship exists 
between a particular variable and itself over time periods, or when the error terms of 
cross-sections observations are correlated over time intervals. Born and Breitung (2016) 
argued that “the classical error component panel data model assumes serially 
uncorrelated disturbances, which might be too restrictive” (p. 1). For the reason that 
unabsorbed shocks to economic relationships, investment or consumption will often 
have an impact for more than one period (Baltagi, 2008). Hence, the test for serial 
correlation in the disturbances becomes necessary as overlooking this matter would 
result in inefficient estimates and biased standard errors (Born & Breitung, 2016).      
 
In order to test for serial correlation (autocorrelation) in panel data model, various 
techniques were proposed in the literature. For instance, the Durbin-Watson statistics 
for fixed panel model generalized by Bhargava, Franzini, and Narendranathan (1982), 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistics for first order serial correlation derived from Baltagi 
and Li (1991, 1995). Moreover, Wooldridge (2002) developed a test for serial 
correlation but has been elaborated by Drucker (2003) who utilizes the Wooldridge test 
in determining autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic error term in the panel-data model.   
 
For the purpose of this study, the Wooldridge test was employed in checking for serial 
correlation using STATA (version) 14 with the help of the command: xtserial. Based on 
the results displayed in Table 4.22, all the three regression models suffered from the 
serial correlation problem because all the p-values for the three dependent variables 




(Ho) hypotheses which state that: ‘No first order autocorrelation', was rejected. 
Therefore, the problem of serial correlation inherited in this study for all the three 
models (ROA, ROE, and MTB) was handled using the Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSEs) (see; Bailey & Katz, 2011; Beck & Katz, 1995; Hoechle, 2007; Reed & Ye, 




Variables F (1, 44) Prob > F Ho (null) hypothesis 
ROA 21.469 0.000 Rejected 
ROE 6.153 0.017 Rejected 
MTB 21.116 0.000 Rejected 
Notes: H0: No first order autocorrelation. 
 
 
4.7 Results of Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test 
 
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test is usually conducted in order to make 
a choice between the Random Effects (RE) regression and the pooled OLS regression. 
According to Baltagi (2008), the random effect model is the most fitting specification 
where 'N' individuals are drawn randomly from a large population. Likewise, the 
individual effect is characterized as random and inference relating to the population 
from which a sample was drawn randomly. Accordingly, "the population consists not 
of an infinity of individuals, in general, but of an infinity of decisions, that each 
individual might make" (Baltagi, 2008, p. 15). This assertion is in line with a random 
effects specification. In essence, OLS estimates remain consistent and unbiased under 





However, the pooled OLS estimator ignores the panel structure of data (Schmidheiny & 
Basel, 2013). Pooled OLS usually treat all observations for all time periods as a single 
sample, and estimates α and β consistently. In essence, OLS estimates remain consistent 
(that is, it estimated µ and β consistently) and unbiased under the RE model, but no 
longer efficient. To this effect, the Breusch-Pagan LM test is appropriate. As a rule of 
thumb, if the LM test produces an insignificant p-value (p > 0.05), then the null (Ho) 
hypothesis will not be rejected, hence, random effects regression is not suitable. But 
where the LM test generates a significant p-value (p < 0.05), then the null hypothesis 
will be rejected, indicating that the random effect model is more appropriate than the 
pooled OLS.      
 
Based on the Breusch-Pagan LM test executed in this study using STATA (version) 14, 
the result obtained from the three models in the study shows that the random effects 
model is more appropriate against the pooled OLS because all the p-values are less than 
0.05. For this reason, the RE regression results are preferable for inferences. However, 
the results of the Breusch-Pagan LM test are delineated in Table 4.23 as thus:   
 
Table 4.23 
Breusch-Pagan LM Test 




ROA 0 257.55 0.000 Rejected 
ROE 0 189.44 0.000 Rejected 






4.8 Results of F-Test  
 
In order to compare and make a choice between the Fixed Effects (FE) model and pooled 
OLS, the result of F-test is always considered. Breusch and Pagan (1980) claimed that 
FE is examined by the use of F-test, whereas, random effects are tested using Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test.  Comparatively, the FE model assumes the existence of individual 
heterogeneity, and it is normally related with one or more regressors. Therefore, if one 
is concentrating on a specific N firm, and the behaviour is limited to the behaviour of 
the said firm, then, the FE model is the suitable specification (Baltagi, 2008). However, 
the pooled OLS assumes the existence of individual homogeneity (that is, no individual 
heterogeneity) among the observations. Thus, making a choice between the two models 
(FE and OLS) depends on the result of F-test.  
 
More importantly, where the result of F-test has a significant p-value (p <0.05), the null 
hypothesis of no individual effect will be rejected, and the FE model will be favoured 
over the pooled OLS, and vice versa (Breusch & Pagan, 1980). Therefore, based on the 
result of F-test displayed in Table 4.24, significant p-values (p <0.05) were obtained 
from all the three models in this study, hence, the fixed effect model is preferable for 




Variables F-stat. P >F Null (Ho) hypothesis 
ROA 24.79 0.000 Rejected 
ROE 13.63 0.000 Rejected 





4.9 Hausman’s Specification Test  
 
The significant consideration in selecting amid a fixed effect (FE) and a random effect 
(RE) models is whether ci (unobserved effect) and xit (explanatory variables) are 
correlated, hence, it is vital to have an approach to examining this assumption 
(Wooldridge, 2002).  For this reason, Hausman (1978) developed a test based on the 
differences between the FE and RE estimates.  Thus, the Hausman specification test is 
usually utilized when comparing the FE and RE models, to ascertain whether or not, the 
explanatory variables and the error terms are correlated (Baltagi, 2008).   
 
Additionally, Wooldridge (2002) stresses that “since FE is consistent when ci and xit are 
correlated, but RE is inconsistent, a statistically significant difference is interpreted as 
evidence against the random effects assumption" (p. 288). Bearing in mind that the FE 
model assumes the existence of a relationship between error term and explanatory 
variables, while the RE model does not, leading to the following hypothesis:  
 
H0: Individual effects are uncorrelated with other regressors   
H1: Individual effects are correlated with other regressors   
 
In this regard, the null (Ho) hypothesis for RE model, which means that its estimated 
variance component is not greater than zero (0), assumes the use of RE, and the 
alternative hypothesis which is the opposite of the null, adopt the use of the FE model. 
Specifically, “applied researchers have interpreted a rejection as an adoption of the fixed 
effects model and nonrejection as an adoption of the random effects model” (Baltagi, 




hypothesis is rejected, and the FE model is selected. In this study, three different 
Hausman specification tests for ROA, ROE, and MTB were conducted. The results of 
Hausman tests for the three models as shown in Table 4.25 exhibited significant p-
values, and thus, the null hypotheses were rejected. Therefore, this study preferred the 
fixed effect model over the random effect model for inferences. The result of the 




Variables  Chi2 (13) Prob >Chi2 Hypothesis 
ROA 58.22 0.000 Rejected 
ROE 15.56 0.000 Rejected 
MTB 31.37 0.003 Rejected 
 
 
4.10 Model Specification Test 
  
The model specification in multivariate analysis is usually conducted to determine 
whether or not, the regression model is linear and functionally formulated. For the 
purpose of model specification test in this study, link test was performed using STATA 
(version) 14 for each of the three models for ROA, ROE, and MTB. The command 
'linktest' was utilized after regressing each of the three models in this study. However, 
the link test utilized here is based on the idea developed by Tukey (1949) which was 
described further in the work of Pregibon (1980). Specifically, linktest is a test of the 
specification of the dependent variable. It is regarded as a test which is conditional on 





Furthermore, the link test is grounded on the premise that if a regression or regression-
like equation is properly specified, one is deemed to find no additional independent 
variables (IVs) that are significant except by chance. In regression, there is a particular 
specification error known as the “link error”, which translates that transformation or 
“link” function of the dependent variable is required to appropriately relate to the IVs. 
(Pregibon, 1980). Here, the principle of link test is to add an independent variable to the 
stated equation that is exclusively likely to be significant if there is a link error. Based 
on the idea of Tukey (1949) as suggested by Predigon (1980), the significance of link 
test is based on _hatsq that is generated by the command; linktest.   
 
Therefore, based on the results of link tests for model specification presented in Table 
4.26, the null hypotheses which assume that the models are correctly specified were not 
rejected because all the p-values of _hatsq for the three models are not significant (p 
>0.05), hence, the regression models are said to be correctly specified.  
 
Table 4.26 
Linktest for Model Specification 
ROA Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
_hat 0.2384 0.4513 0.53 0.598 -0.6510 1.1278 
_hatsq 1.4049 0.7976 1.76 0.080 -.1670 2.9768 
_cons 0.0891 0.0614 1.45 0.149 -0.0320 0.2103 
       
ROE       
_hat 0.8378 0.1882 4.45 0.000 0.4670 1.2086 
_hatsq 0.7911 0.7384 1.07 0.285 -0.6641 2.2462 
_cons 0.0044 0.0172 0.25 0.800 -0.0296 0.0383 
       
MTB       
_hat 0.2588 0.4477 0.58 0.564 -0.6235 1.1411 
_hatsq 2.7550 1.5940 1.73 0.085 -0.3863 5.8961 





Moreover, in addition to the link test for model specification conducted in this study, 
the Ramsey Regression Equation Specific Error Test (RESET) was also conducted to 
further check for any omission of variables in the model. The essence of the RESET test 
is to check for specification errors (i.e., omitted variables) in the regression model, and 
whether the functional form of the model is incorrectly specified (Ramsey, 1969). The 
Ramsey’s RESET test “is based on the notion that if the functional form of the model is 
incorrect, then the correct specification might be approximated by the inclusion of the 
powers of the variables in the original model. The original set of independent variables 
is augmented by the powers of these variables. If the coefficients associated with that 
added variables are statistically significant, misspecification from sources such as an 
incorrect functional form or the exclusion of relevant variables is suggested" (Long & 
Trivedi, 1992, p. 163).     
 
Likewise, Ramsey's RESET test is developed to notice if there are any ignored 
nonlinearities in the model. At this point, the RESET test was performed in this study 
using STATA version 14 by means of the command ovtest. The result of the Ramsey 
RESET test is presented in Table 4.27, and the result shows that none of the three models 
in this study is statistically significant at the 0.05 level (p > 0.05). As a result, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected since there are no evidence of omitted variables in the 
regression models, hence, the models are said to be correctly specified. The Ramsey’s 









Ramsey RESET Test 
Variables F-Test Statistics Prob > F 
ROA 1.83 0.143 
ROE 1.73 0.162 
MTB 2.09 0.103 
 
4.11 Results of Pooled OLS, Fixed Effect, and Random Effect Models 
 
Albeit, the main regression result utilized in this study is a Panel Corrected Standard 
Errors (PCSEs) since the data in this study suffers from heteroscedasticity (for ROA and 
MTB models) and serial correlation problems (for ROA, ROE, and MTB models), yet, 
the study presents the regression results from Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS), 
Fixed Effect (FE) model, and Random Effect (RE) model. The reason is to examine how 
the variables have behave in each of the three models (ROA, ROE, and MTB) under the 
pooled OLS model, FE model, and RE model. 
 
Pooled OLS usually treat all observations for all time periods as a single sample, and 
estimates α and β consistently, and it estimator ignores the panel structure of data 
(Schmidheiny & Basel, 2013). While the RE model assumes that individual effect is 
characterized as random and inference relating to the population from which a sample 
was drawn randomly (Baltagi, 2008). Moreover, Baltagi added that the random effect 
model is the most fitting specification where N individuals are drawn randomly from a 
large population. However, FE model assumes the existence of individual heterogeneity, 
and it is normally related with one or more regressors. Thus, if one is concentrating on 




the FE model is preferable (Baltagi, 2008). Therefore, the results for ROA, ROE, and 






Pooled OLS, Fixed-Effects and Random Effects Panel Regressions for ROA, ROE, and MTB 
Variables Pooled OLS 
 
 Fixed-Effects Model  Random Effects Model 
 ROA 
 











































































































































































































































































































Wald chi2(13) ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ----  38.76*** 24.22** 38.06*** 
R2 0.210 0.264 0.219  0.895 0.840 0.896  0.041 0.133 0.039 
Adjusted R2 0.161 0.219 0.163  0.859 0.785 0.860  ---- ---- ---- 
F-Statistics 4.32*** 5.83*** 4.36***  3.81*** 1.92** 3.94***  ---- ---- ---- 











The regression results for the three models in this study (ROA, ROE, and MTB) under 
the Pooled OLS, FE model and RE model are presented in Table 4.28. Under the Pooled 
OLS model, the first model which ROA has an R2 of 0.21 (21%) and an adjusted R2 of 
0.161 (16.1%). The R2 value of 0.21 indicates that all the explanatory variables in the 
model explained 21% of variations in the dependent variable (ROA), while the adjusted 
R2 of 0.161 portrays that the independent variables that really affects the dependent 
variable accounted for 16.1% of the variation in ROA. Moreover, the model is 
significant (F = 4.32, p < 0.01), indicating a goodness of fit and validity of the model. 
 
Table 4.28 also shows that for model one (ROA) under pooled OLS, the variable with 
the largest beta coefficient (-0.37) is asset tangibility (ASTAN), and was also found to 
be statistically significant at the 0.01 level (p <0.01). This signifies that ASTAN made a 
strongest unique contribution in explaining the performance variable represented by 
ROA. The beta coefficient for risk management committee meeting (RMCM) is (0.278) 
and p <0.05, which is a bit lower than that of ASTAN. Likewise, other variables that 
made a statistically significant contribution to ROA are: board composition (BCOMP) 
(β= -0.233, p <0.1), board size (BSZ) (β= 0.141, p <0.1), firm size (FSZ) (β= -0.041, p 
<0.01), and firm age (FAG) (β= 0.003, p <0.01).              
 
Whereas, board meeting (BMT) (β=0.023, p>0.1), CEO tenure (CEOT) (β=0.021, 
p>0.1), board expertise (BEXP) (β= -0.168, p>0.1), risk management committee size 
(RMCS) (β=-0.014, p>0.1), risk management committee composition (RMCC) 
(β=0.017, p>0.1), risk management practise and disclosure (RMPD) (β= -0.017, p>0.1), 




contribution to firm performance, as measured by ROA, because they all have p-values 
greater than 0.1  
 
For model two (ROE) under pooled OLS, the R2 value is 0.264 and the adjusted R2 value 
is 0.219. The R2 value of 0.264 indicates that 26.4% of the variations in ROE is 
accounted for by the explanatory variables in this study. Whereas, the adjusted R2 of 
0.219 showcases that the explanatory variables that actually influenced the dependent 
variable accounted for 21.9% of the variability in ROE. The model as a whole is 
considered significant, well fitted and valid (F = 5.83, p < 0.01). Logically, the variable 
with the highest beta coefficient (-0.310) is ASTAN and was statistically significant at 
0.01 level (p <0.01), hence, having a significant unique contribution in explaining ROE.  
Other variables that have significantly contributed in explaining ROE include: FSZ (β= 
-0.177, p<0.01), BCOMP (β= -0.136, p<0.1), LEV (β= -0.085, p<0.01), BSZ (β= 0.075, 
p<0.1), RMCM (β= 0.015, p<0.05), and FAG (β= 0.001, p<0.01). Contrastingly, 
variables like: BMT (β= -0.224, p>0.1), CEOT (β=0.010, p>0.1), BEXP (β= -0.095, 
p>0.1), RMCS (β=-0.007, p>0.1), RMCC (β=0.020, p>0.1), and RMPD (β= -0.005, 
p>0.1), do not make a statistically significant contribution to firm performance, as 
measured by ROE as all their p-values go beyond 0.1. 
 
The third model is market-to-book ratio (MTB) which its result is not much different 
from ROA and ROE under pooled OLS. For MTB, the R2 value is 0.219 and the adjusted 
R2 value is 0.163. The R2 value of 0.219 specifies that 21.9% of the variations in MTB 
is accounted for by the independent variables in this study. Whereas, the adjusted R2 of 
0.163 demonstrates that the independent variables that essentially impacted on the 




is considered significant, well fitted and valid (F = 4.36, p < 0.01). More so, the variable 
with larger beta coefficient (-0.185) is ASTAN with p<0.05. This means that asset 
tangibility has made a unique and statistical significant contribution in explaining MTB. 
The like of this variable (ASTAN) are: BCOMP (β= -0.118, p<0.1), BSZ (β= 0.070, 
p<0.1), RMCM (β= 0.044, p<0.05), FSZ (β= -0.021, p<0.01), and FAG (β= 0.002, 
p<0.01). On the other hand, variables in the model that do not make any statistically 
significant contribution (p-values >0.1) in explaining MTB involve: BMT (β= 0.014, 
p>0.1), CEOT (β=0.003, p>0.1), BEXP (β= -0.087, p>0.1), RMCS (β= -0.007, p>0.1), 
RMCC (β=0.012, p>0.1), RMPD (β= -0.046, p>0.1), and LEV (β= -0.029, p>0.1). 
 
Under the pooled OLS, the independent variables (BSZ, BCOMP, and RMCM) that 
made a statistically significant contribution behaved in a similar fashion for all the three 
models (ROA, ROE, and MTB). The control variables (FSZ, FAG, ASTAN) also 
behave in a similar direction with those control variables regarding ROA and MTB, 
while all the control variables (FSZ, LEV, FAG, and ASTAN) made a statistically 
significant contribution in explaining ROE.  
 
Under the fixed effect (FE) model, ROA has an R2 of 0.895 and adjusted R2 of 0.859 
which means that all the independent variables in the model explained 89.5% of the 
variations in ROA, while those independent variables that really affects the dependent 
variable (ROA) accounted for 85.9% of variations in it (ROA). The model as a whole is 
considered significant, well fitted and valid (F = 3.81, p < 0.01). The variable with the 
strongest unique contribution in explaining ROA is leverage (LEV) (β=0.200), and was 




was also found to be statistically significant with ROA (β= -0.153, p <0.1), alongside 
CEO tenure (β= 0.025, p <0.1).  
 
Other variables that were found not be statistically significant with ROA under the FE 
model are: BSZ (β= 0.058, p>0.1), BMT (β= 0.013, p>0.1), BEXP (β= -0.086, p>0.1), 
RMCS (β= 0.004, p>0.1), RMCC (β= 0.087, p>0.1), RMCM (β= 0.005, p>0.1), RMPD 
(β= -0.008, p>0.1), FSZ (β= 0.005, p>0.1), FAG (β= -0.011, p>0.1), and ASTAN (β= 
0.129, p>0.1).          
 
Regarding the second model (ROE) under the FE model, it has an R2 of 0.84 and an 
adjusted R2 of 0.785, indicating that all the independent variables in the study 
contributed about 84% of the variation in ROE, while the explanatory variables that 
really affect the dependent variable accounted for 78.5% variation in ROE. The model 
is statistically significant (F = 1.92, p <0.05), showing the goodness of fit and the 
validity of the model. Under the FE model, the variable that makes a strong unique 
contribution in explaining ROE is board expertise (BEXP) (β= -0.152, p<0.1). Other 
variables that were also found to be statistically significant with ROE consist of: RMCC 
(β= 0.108, p<0.05), LEV (β= 0.072, p<0.05), RMCM (β= 0.011, p<0.1). Whereas those 
variables that were found not to be statistically significant with ROE comprised of: BSZ 
(β= 0.060, p>0.1), BCOMP (β= -0.077, p>0.1), RMCS (β= -0.005, p>0.1), RMPD (β= -
0.000, p>0.1), FSZ (β= -0.009, p>0.1), FAG (β= -0.004, p>0.1), ASTAN (β= -0.020, 
p>0.1). 
 
The third dependent variable (MTB) under the Fixed Effect model has an R2 of 0.896 




for by all the explanatory variables in the model, while those variables that really 
impacted the dependent variable accounted for 86% of the variability in the model 
(MTB). The model is fit and valid having a statistical significant as a whole (F = 3.94, 
p <0.01). The variables that have a statistical significant with MTB include: board 
composition (BCOMP) (β= -0.075, p <0.1), CEO tenure (β= 0.006, p <0.05), leverage 
(LEV) (β= 0.103, p <0.01), and firm age (FAG) (β= -0.007, p <0.1). While variables 
that show no significant effect on MTB are: BSZ (β= 0.030, p >0.1), BMT (β= 0.006, p 
>0.1), BEXP (β= -0.045, p >0.1), RMCS (β= 0.002, p >0.1), RMCC (β= 0.042, p >0.1), 
RMCM (β= 0.005, p >0.1), RMPD (β= -0.017, p >0.1), FSZ (β= 0.003, p >0.1), and 
ASTAN (β= 0.075, p >0.1).  
 
Based on the results of the three models (ROA, ROE, and MTB) obtained under the 
Fixed Effect (FE) model, it can be seen that the variables with a significant effect on the 
dependent variables moved in somewhat the same direction for ROA and MTB, while 
differently for ROE. However, the explanatory variables under the FE model behaved 
differently as compared to pooled OLS model as displayed in Table 4.28.  
 
Under the Random Effect (RE) model, the first dependent variable (ROA) has an R2 of 
0.041 (4.1%) which is a bit smaller, indicating that only 4.1% of the variability in ROA 
was contributed by the explanatory variables in the model. However, based on the Wald 
chi2 (38.76, p<0.01), the model is valid and well fitted. Those variables that made a 
strong unique contribution in explaining the variability in the dependent variable, 
represented by ROA comprised of: BCOMP (β= -0.118, p <0.05), RMCC (β= 0.127, p 
<0.1), RMPD (β= -0.015, p <0.01), FSZ (β= -0.027, p <0.05), and LEV (β= 0.134, p 




variability in ROA are: board size (BSZ) (β= 0.088, p >0.1), board meeting (BMT) (β= 
0.012, p >0.1), CEO tenure (β= 0.018, p >0.1), board expertise (BEXP) (β= -0.044, p 
>0.1), risk management committee size (RMCS) (β= -0.002, p >0.1), risk management 
committee meeting (RMCM) (β= 0.004, p >0.1), firm age (FAG) (β= 0.003, p >0.1), 
and asset tangibility (ASTAN) (β= -0.053, p >0.1) since they have p-values greater than 
0.1. 
 
For ROE under the RE model, it has an improved R2 value of 0.133 over that of ROA. 
Meaning that 13.3% of the variation in ROE was accounted for by the explanatory 
variables in the model. Based on the Wald chi2 (24.22, p <0.05), the model is said to fit 
and valid. Essentially, the variables that made a statistically significant contribution in 
explaining the dependent variable (ROE) consist of: BSZ (β= 0.076, p <0.1), BCOMP 
(β= -0.098, p <0.1), RMCC (β= 0.127, p <0.05), RMCM (β= 0.011, p <0.1), and FSZ 
(β= -0.017, p <0.05). On the other hand, those variables that failed to make a statistical 
significant contribution in explaining ROE under the RE model are: BMT (β= -0.010, p 
>0.1), CEOT (β= 0.002, p >0.1), BEXP (β= -0.098, p >0.1), RMCS (β= -0.007, p >0.1), 
RMPD (β= -0.003, p >0.1), LEV (β= 0.014, p >0.1), FAG (β= 0.001, p >0.1), and ASTAN 
(β= -0.200, p >0.1) because they all have p-values above 0.1.  
 
Lastly, under the RE model, MTB has an R2 value of 0.039 lower than those for ROA 
and ROE. The R2 value of 0.039 indicates that only 3.9% of the variation in MTB was 
accounted for by the explanatory variables in the model. With a Wald chi2 (38.06, p 
<0.01), the model is deemed well fit and valid. In regards to statistical significant 
contribution in explaining the dependent variable (MTB), the following explanatory 




<0.1), RMPD (β= -0.035, p <0.01), FSZ (β= -0.014, p <0.05), and LEV (β= 0.065, p 
<0.01). Whereas, the explanatory variables that failed to make any statistical significant 
contribution towards explaining MTB involve: BSZ (β= 0.045, p >0.1), BMT (β= 0.006, 
p >0.1), CEOT (β= 0.003, p >0.1), BEXP (β= -0.025, p >0.1), RMCS (β= -0.001, p >0.1), 
RMCM (β= 0.006, p >0.1), FAG (β= 0.001, p >0.1), and ASTAN (β= -0.028, p >0.1) 
since they all have p-values beyond the threshold of 0.1.  
 
In a nutshell, the variables that show a significant impact on all the three models (ROA, 
ROE, and MTB) under the pooled OLS, FE model, and RE model behave in a distinct 
manner. Moreover, the R-squared (R2) values under the three techniques (Pooled OLS, 
FE model, and RE model) of analysis have a wide variation for the three regression 
models (ROA, ROE, and MTB) in this study. For instance, the R2 values are better under 
the FE model, than those under Pooled OLS and RE model. Whereas the R2 values under 
the Pooled OLS are far better than those under the RE model. As explained earlier, the 
study utilizes the Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) in executing the main 
regression analysis as the data in this study are posed with the problems of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.  
 
4.12 Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) Estimation 
 
For the purpose of executing the three regression models (ROA, ROE, and MTB) in this 
study, the correlated Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) was used because the 
data suffers from the problem of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, and the 
essence is to obtain best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) for the coefficients (Gujarati, 




usually inhabited in panel data (Jӧnsson, 2005), and most panel data do not 
simultaneously handle this problem, and which, if not properly addressed can cause 
inefficiency in coefficient estimation and biases in the estimation of standard errors 
(Reed & Ye, 2011). 
 
Nevertheless, the OLS is ideal (based linear unbiased) for panel data models if the errors 
are assumed to be produced in a spherical (uncomplicated) manner (Beck & Katz, 1995). 
For this assumption to hold under the OLS, it is pertinent to assume that all the error 
processes have equal variance (homoscedasticity) and are independent of each other (no 
serial and spatial correlation). If these assumptions are met, the panel data should be 
estimated using OLS and OLS standard errors are correct, and where the assumptions 
are disrupted, there is no assurance that the ordinary least squares (OLS) standard errors 
will be correct. In this case, therefore, there will be other available estimators that make 
more efficient utilization of the data (Beck & Katz, 1995).     
 
Therefore, in handling the issues of heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and/or cross-
sectional dependence (contemporaneous correlation), various techniques are used that 
include; the Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) initiated by Parks (1967) and 
the modified version of the OLS estimator known as the Panel Corrected Standard 
Errors (PCSEs) developed by Beck and Katz (1995). However, Parks’ FGLS estimator 
is used for panel data models where the errors indicate the presence of panel data 
contemporaneous correlation, heteroskedasticity, and serial correlation, but can only be 
used where T (time) is as big as N (number of units) (Beck, Katz, Alvarez, Garrett, & 





Moreover, Parks’ FGLS estimator cannot be used in solving contemporaneous and serial 
correlation unless N is equal to T (N = T) or N is greater than T (N > T) (Blackwell III, 
2005; Beck & Katz, 1995; Reed & Ye, 2011). Another setback of the Parks' FGLS 
estimator is that it often overvalues the standard errors and is biased in finite samples 
which arise due to the fact that the true variance and the covariance matrix is not known 
(Reed & Ye, 2011). 
 
Based on the flaws in the use of the Parks’ FGLS estimator in correcting for 
contemporaneous correlation, heteroskedasticity, and serial correlation in finite 
samples, Beck and Katz (1995) suggested that the use of a modified version of OLS that 
can handle the said problems in panel data which is known as ‘Panel Corrected Standard 
Errors’ (PCSEs). Beck and Katz (1995) further buttressed that the combination of 
ordinary least squares alongside PCSEs allows for accuracy of variability estimation, 
where panel error structures are present, without conveying the serious problems 
produced by the Parks method. As such, the PCSEs estimator was developed for panel 
models with panel heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and contemporaneous 
correlation.  
 
Based on the results of Monte Carlo analysis obtained by Beck and Katz (1995) in 
comparing the efficiency of Parks’ FGLS and OLS with PCSEs when both corrected for 
serially correlated errors, results for PCSEs were found to be more efficient as they two 
and a half larger than the Parks’ standard errors. Similarly, Reed and Ye (2011) 
conducted a Monte Carlo analysis to evaluate the efficiency of common panel data 
estimators when auto-correlation (serial correlation) and contemporaneous correlation 




performance considered where N is less than or equal to T (N ≤ T) and where N is greater 
than T (N > T). As a result, Reed and Ye (2011) recommended the use of PCSEs in 
handling panel models with heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and contemporaneous 
correlation.   
 
Consequently, this study follows the likes of other studies (for instance, Bitzer & 
Stephan, 2007; Mosca, 2007) that utilized OLS with Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSEs) in solving the problem of panel models with serial correlation, 
heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous correlation. More importantly, PCSEs 
estimator has been extensively adopted as Beck and Katz (1995) who popularized the 
method have over 5000 citations across the web. In order to examine the relationship 
between the explanatory variables and the dependent variables in this study, the PCSEs 
estimator was utilized using STATA version 14, with the command xtpcse. However, 
the regression results from OLS with PCSEs estimator in this study are presented in the 
subsequent tables.  
 
4.13 Evaluation of the Models   
 
For the purpose of this study, multivariate regression analysis was conducted for the 
three models using STATA (version) 14, in order to test the predictive power of board 
of directors’ attributes (board size, board composition, board meeting, CEO tenure, 
board expertise), risk management committee structure (risk management committee 
size, risk management committee composition, risk management committee meeting), 




and MTB). More so, the essence of this multivariate regression analysis is to ascertain 
the predictive power of each explanatory variable on the dependent variables.  
 
For this reason, this part is divided into three subsections. The first section investigates 
the relationship between the independent variables: board of directors’ attributes (board 
size, board composition, board meeting, CEO tenure, board expertise), risk management 
committee structure (risk management committee size, risk management committee 
composition, risk management committee meeting), risk management practice and 
disclosure and firm performance as proxied by ROA. While the second subsection 
examines the relationship between the independent variables and firm performance as 
proxied by ROE. Whereas, the third subsection investigates the relationship between the 
independent variables and firm performance as represented by MTB.    
 
4.13.1 Model 1 (ROA as Dependent Variable)   
 
The result of testing the hypotheses for model 1 (ROA) was utilized through OLS with 
Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) estimator in order to evaluate firm 
performance, which is presented in Table 4.29. The PCSEs result presented in Table 
4.29 portrays some important indicators like R-square (R2), which is the coefficient of 
determination and it evaluates the goodness of fit for the regression model. Moreover, 
other indicators are the P-values, the WaldChi2 statistic, and the beta (β) coefficients 
(showing the impact of an independent variable on a dependent variable). The PCSEs 





Main Regressions Results (PCSEs) for Models 1, 2, and 3 (Dependent variables = ROA, ROE, and MTB) 
Variables Model 1 (ROA) 
 
 Model 2 (ROE)  Model 3 (MTB) 
 Coef. 
 
t-stat. p>t  Coef. t-stat. p>t  Coef. t-stat. p>t 






































BCOMP -0.233 -2.12** 0.034  -0.134 -2.17** 0.030  -0.141 -2.92** 0.003 
 
BMT 0.023 0.53 0.595  -0.023 -1.21 0.226  0.011 0.53 0.539 
 
CEOT 0.021 1.67* 0.094  0.003 1.68* 0.092  0.002 1.21 0.225 
 
BEXP -0.168 -1.90* 0.058  -0.095 -1.87* 0.062  -0.084 -1.91* 0.056 
 
RMCS -0.014 -2.05** 0.040  -0.007 -1.89* 0.059  -0.008 -2.23** 0.025 
 
RMCC 0.017 0.21 0.837  0.020 0.33 0.739  0.028 0.76 0.448 
 
RMCM 0.028 2.82*** 0.005  0.016 3.87*** 0.000  0.049 2.74*** 0.006 
 























LEV -0.060 -2.30** 0.021  -0.085 -4.80*** 0.000  -0.011 -1.25 0.210 
 





















No. of groups   45    45    45 
Wald chi2 
(13) 
  12644.14***    33380.50***    10499.51*** 
R2   0.210    0.2637    0.211 
Prob>chi2   0.0000    0.0000    0.0000 
Notes: BSZ= board size; BCOMP= board composition; BM = board meeting; CEOT= chief executive officer’s tenure; BEXP= board expertise; RMCS= risk 
management committee size; RMCC= risk management committee composition; RMCM= risk management committee meeting; RMPD= risk management practice 
and disclosure; FSZ= firm size; LEV= leverage; FAG= firm age; ASTAN= asset tangibility; ROA= return on assets; ROE= return on equity; MTB= market-to-book 
ratio.   
***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  




 In this model (ROA), the value of R2 as revealed in Table 4.29 is 0.210. This means 
that the regression model explains 21% of the variation in firm performance as measured 
by ROA. As a result, the outcome is considered reasonable. Furthermore, the R2 value 
of 21% is an indication that the variance in ROA as a measure of firm performance, was 
statistically accounted for by the regression equation (independent variables). The same 
result in Table 4.29 also reveals that the model is significant (p<0.01), indicating the 
validity of the model utilized.      
 
In consideration of hypothesis testing, the beta coefficients are employed. The beta 
coefficients are used to determine the impact of each independent variable on the 
dependent variable. In this regard, the higher the beta coefficient, the greater impact an 
explanatory variable has on a dependent variable.  
 
In this model, the variable with the largest beta coefficient (-0.370) is asset tangibility 
(ASTAN) and was also found to be statistically significant at the 0.01 level (p<0.01). 
This shows that ASTAN made a strongest unique contribution in explaining the 
performance variable as represented by ROA. In addition, the beta coefficient score for 
board composition (BCOMP) is (-0.233) which is a bit lower than that of ASTAN. In the 
same vein, BCOMP was also found to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
(p<0.05).  
 
Likewise, other variables that were found to be statistically significant with ROA 
include: board size (BSZ) (β=0.141, p<0.01), chief executive officer tenure (CEOT) 
(β=0.021, p<0.1), board expertise (BEXP) (β= -0.168, p<0.1), risk management 




(RMCM) (β=0.028, p<0.01), risk management practice and disclosure (RMPD) (β= -
0.017, p<0.05), firm size (FSZ) (β= -0.041, p<0.01), leverage (LEV) (β= -0.060, 
p<0.05), and firm age (FAG) (β=0.003, p<0.01). This means that these eleven variables 
(ASTAN, BSZ, BCOMP, CEOT, BEXP, RMCS, RMCM, RMPD, FSZ, LEV and FAG) 
were found to be statistically significance to firm performance, as measured by ROA.  
 
Whereas, board meeting (BMT) (β=0.023, p>0.1) and risk management committee 
composition (RMCC) (β=0.017, p>0.1), failed to make a statistically significant 
contribution to firm performance, as measured by ROA, because they all have p-values 
greater than 0.1. However, the result is displayed in Table 4.29.  
 
4.13.2 Model 2 (ROE as Dependent Variable)   
 
The second model which considers ROE as the dependent variable and board of 
directors’ attributes (board size, board composition, board meeting, CEO tenure, board 
expertise), risk management committee structure (risk management committee size, risk 
management committee composition, risk management committee meeting), risk 
management practice and disclosure as independent variables, has an R2 value of 0.2637 
as displayed in Table 4.29. This means that the regression model explains 26.37% of the 
variation in firm performance as measured by ROE. As such, the outcome is considered 
reasonable. Besides, the R2 value of 26.37% is an indication that the variance in ROE 
as a measure of firm performance, was statistically accounted for by the regression 
equation (independent variables). The result in Table 4.29 also shows that the model is 





In terms of significant contribution to the model, asset tangibility (ASTAN) has the 
highest beta coefficient (-0.308) and was also found to be statistically significant at the 
0.01 level (p<0.01). This indicates that ASTAN has made a strong unique contribution 
in explaining the performance variable as represented by ROE. Moreover, the beta 
coefficient value of board composition (BCOMP) is (-0.134) which is slightly lower 
than that of ASTAN, and was also found to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
(p<0.05). Additionally, other variables that were found to contribute significantly in 
explaining ROE comprised of: board size (BSZ) (β=0.077, p<0.01), CEO tenure 
(β=0.003, p<0.1), board expertise (BEXP) (β= -0.095, p<0.1), risk management 
committee size (RMCS) (β= -0.007, p<0.01), risk management committee meeting 
(RMCM) (β=0.016, p<0.01), firm size (FSZ) (β= -0.018, p<0.01), leverage (LEV) (β= 
-0.085, p<0.01), and firm age (FAG) (β=0.001, p<0.01).              
 
On the other hand, board meeting (BMT) (β= -0.023, p>0.1), risk management 
committee composition (RMCC) (β=0.020, p>0.1), and risk management practice and 
disclosure (RMPD) (β= -0.005, p>0.1) have failed to make a statistically significant 
contribution to firm performance as measured by ROE, because they all have p-values 
greater than 0.1 as can be seen in Table 4.29.  
 
4.13.3 Model 3 (MTB as Dependent Variable)   
 
In this model, the value of R2 as revealed in Table 4.29 is 0.211, which means that the 
regression model explains 21.1% of the variation in firm performance variable as 
explained by Market-to-book ratio (MTB). Hence, the R2 value is considered reasonable 




was found to be statistically significant (p<0.01), indicating the goodness of fit and 
validity of the model used as shown in Table 4.29.    
   
The variable with the largest beta coefficient in this model is asset tangibility (ASTAN) 
(β= -0.204, p<0.01). Therefore, ASTAN has made a strong unique contribution in 
explaining the performance variable as measured by MTB. Additionally, the beta 
coefficient value of board composition (BCOMP) is (-0.141) which is slightly lower 
than that of ASTAN, and was also found to be statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
(p<0.01). Likewise, other variables that made a significant contribution in explaining 
MTB are; board size (BSZ) (β=0.069, p<0.01), board expertise (BEXP) (β= -0.084, 
p<0.1), risk management committee size (β= -0.008, p<0.05), risk management 
committee meeting (RMCM) (β= 0.049, p<0.01), risk management practice and 
disclosure (RMPD) (β= -0.048, p<0.05), firm size (FSZ) (β= -0.022, p<0.01), and firm 
age (FAG) (β= 0.002, p<0.01).  
 
In contrast, board meeting (BMT) (β=0.011, p>0.1), chief executive officer tenure 
(CEOT) (β=0.002, p>0.1), risk management committee composition (RMCC) (β=0.028, 
p>0.1), and leverage (β= -0.011, p>0.1), were not able to make any significant statistical 
contribution to firm performance, as measured by MTB, for the reason that they all have 







4.14 Hypotheses Testing  
4.14.1 Model 1, 2, and 3 (ROA, ROE, and MTB) and Results of Analysis  
 
Under this section, discussions and decisions were made regarding the hypotheses and 
results of analysis that examines the relationship between board attributes (board size, 
board composition, board meeting, CEO tenure, board expertise), risk management 
committee structure (risk management committee size, risk management committee 
composition, risk management committee meeting), risk management practice and 
disclosure (as independent variables), and firm size, leverage, firm age, and asset 
tangibility (as control variables) and the dependent variables represented by ROA, ROE, 
and MTB.  
 
4.14.1.1 Board of Directors’ Attributes and Firm Performance (ROA, ROE, and 
MTB)   
 
In this section, the results of the multivariate regression analysis between the board of 
directors’ attributes (board size, board composition, board meeting, CEO tenure, board 
expertise) and firm performance (ROA, ROE, and MTB) with their corresponding 
coefficients and p-values are presented as shown in Table 4.29. Consistent with the 
prediction, Board size (BSZ) has a statistically significant positive effect on ROA 
(β=0.141, p<0.01), ROE (β=0.077, p<0.01), and MTB (β=0.069, p<0.01). These results 
signify that the relationship between BSZ and performance is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that the higher the board size, the better the performance (ROA, 
ROE, and MTB) of listed financial service firms in Nigeria. This indicates that a larger 




decisions effectively and efficiently that may aid in boosting the performance of a firm. 
Consequently, this outcome has supported hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c. Also, the result is 
in line with the findings of Chang and Leng (2004) that found a positive and significant 
association between board size and firm performance of listed Malaysian companies. 
Onakoya et al. (2014) also documented that board size is significant and positively 
associated with the performance of Banks in Nigeria.  
 
Equally, Suhail et al. (2017) document that board size has a significant positive effect 
on the performance of Indonesian quoted firms. Also, Ogege and Boloupremo (2014) 
found that board size has significant positive relation to the performance of Deposit 
Money Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria. Furthermore, the result is in concordance with 
Fidanoski et al., (2013) who found that board size is positively related to the 
performance of banks in Macedonia. Likewise, Chechet et al. (2013) document that 
board size has a significant positive effect on the performance of DMBs in Nigeria. The 
result has also accorded with agency theory which holds that larger board size enhances 
the performance of firms because it certifies an effective and efficient monitoring of 
management, which reduces the power of the chief executive officer (CEO) on corporate 
boards of directors (Singh & Harianto, 1989).  
 
This finding is also consistent with the resource dependence theory which assumes that 
the size of the board is expected to enhance operations and performance of firms since 
the board of directors will provide intangible resources to the firm (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). Contrary to the significant finding regarding board size, 




India. Similarly, Arora and Sharma (2016) document a negative, but significant 
relationship between board size and firm performance in India.  
 
However, the significant positive effect of board size on performance of listed financial 
service firms in Nigeria might be due to the contribution of various board members 
towards the success of the organization since it was assumed that an increased board 
will provide human resource to the organization which may eventually enhance 
operations and performance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Moreover, the mean for board 
size for the full sample is 10.58 which is within a conventional range to make the board 
effective in decision making (Odewale, 2016), monitoring managerial actions, and 
having great skills and expertise required to contribute to the betterment of their 
companies. Akpan and Amran (2014), found that board size has a significant positive 
effect on performance of manufacturing companies in Nigeria, and the average of board 
size is 9.7, which may be considered as small in the Nigerian context, and recommend 
companies to be cautious about a sizeable number of boards who serve as agents tend 
to be more concerned with their interests. However, since the average size of board as 
found in this study is 10.58 and has shown a significant impact on firm performance, 
listed financial service firms in Nigeria should have an average of 10 members and/or 
above it, although, depending on the size and need of the firm.     
   
For board composition (BCOMP) variable, the result of this study shows that it has a 
significant negative effect on firm performance, ROA (β= -0.233, p <0.05), ROE (β= -
0.134, p <0.05), and MTB (β= -0.141, p <0.01). Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c, which state 
that there is a positive relationship between board composition and firm performance 




opposite direction with the agency theory which states that a firm that has a larger 
proportion of non-executive directors stands in a better position to have an improved 
performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). Also, as an assumption of the resource 
dependence theory, an organization with non-executive directors are expected to have 
individuals with a lot of potentials that may help to improve the performance of the 
organization (Provan, 1980).           
  
This result is consistent with the finding of Farhan et al. (2017) who state that board 
independent (composition of nonexecutive directors) has a significant negative 
association with performance of listed companies in the United Arab Emirate (UAE). 
Likewise, Chechet et al. (2013) who report that board composition has a significant 
negative effect on the performance of deposit money banks in Nigeria. Likewise, 
Chahine and Safieddine (2011) found a significant relationship between board 
independence (composition of non-executive directors on the board) and firm 
performance after controlling for the nonlinear relationship between board 
independence and operating performance. Similar studies that document a significant 
negative relationship between board composition and firm performance are but not 
limited to; (Bhagat & Black, 2002; Fernandes, 2008; Yermack, 1996).  
 
The findings of this study which shows that board composition has a significant negative 
effect on the performance of listed financial service firms in Nigeria may be that the 
outside directors have little knowledge of the firm and their number may become a 
distraction to the progress of the business. This view is in line with Baysinger and 
Hoskisson (1990) who opined that outside directors may not effectually understand the 




Hoskisson) further argue that banks may prefer to focus on their strategies and exclude 
outside directors from their boards (that is when making decisions). Moreover, Geneen 
(1984), and Vance (1983) argued that outside directors have no adequate time, 
knowledge and skills to perform the functions required of them effectively since they 
are not involved in the day-to-day running of the business. On the contrary, a well-
diversified firm may prefer to have a significant number of non-executive directors who 
may offer their potentials in the improvement of performance (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 
1990; Chahine and Safieddine, 2011). As such, "empirical investigations should control 
for non-linearities in the relationship between bank performance and board 
independence" (Chahine & Safieddine, 2011, p. 213).  
 
On the opposite, some studies found a significant positive effect of board composition 
on firm performance. For instance, Reguero-Alvarado and Bravo (2017) quote that 
board independence (defined as the composition of nonexecutive directors) has a 
significant effect on the performance of U.S listed companies.  Likewise, Harvey 
Pamburai et al. (2015) reported that composition of the board of directors has a positive 
impact on the performance of the firm in South Africa. Paul et al., (2015) also found 
that board composition has significant positive relation to the performance of 
microfinance banks in Nigeria. However, other studies document a non-significant 
relationship between board composition and firm performance (for example, Hermalin 
& Weisbach, 1991; Marn & Romual, 2012; Narwal & Jindal, 2015; Onakoya et al., 
2014).    
 
From Table 4.29, the regression result shows that board meeting (BMT) has no 




ROA (β=0.023, p >0.1), ROE (β= -0.233, p <0.05), and MTB (β= -0.233, p <0.05). This 
means that an increase in board meeting will not lead to any increase in firm 
performance (ROA, ROE, and MTB). Therefore, hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c which state 
that the board meeting frequency has a positive relationship with firm performance 
(ROA, ROE, and MTB), are not supported. This finding is also not in support of agency 
theory which presumes that agency theory assumes that with frequent meetings, boards 
exhibits significant abilities in terms of counselling, penalizing, and overseeing 
management actions, hence enhancing the performance of firms (Jensen, 1993; Lipton 
& Lorsch, 1992; Vafeas, 1999).  
 
This result is consistent with Arora and Sharma (2016) who proclaimed that board 
meeting frequency has no significant negative influence on performance (ROA and 
ROE) of companies in India. In the same vein, Gavrea and Stegerean (2012) report that 
board meeting has no significant effect on the firm performance of companies listed on 
the Bucharest Stock Exchange of Romania. Also, Jackling and Johl (2009) found that 
board meetings have no significant relation with the financial performance of listed 
firms in India. Others who also articulated that board meeting is not significantly 
affecting firm performance include Donashana and Ravivathani (2014), Garcia-Sanchez 
(2010), Kamardin (2009), Kyereboah-Coleman (2008), and Rodriguez-Fernandez et al. 
(2014). Whereas, Hassan et al. (2016) who report that board meeting frequency has a 
significant negative impact on the performance of Palestinian listed firms.   
 
The reason behind insignificance of BMT on performance may be attributed to the fact 
that most agendas of board meetings are set by the CEOs and other directors could not 




time on routine issues which limit vital opportunities to the directors (Jensen, 1993). In 
relation to Nigerian environment, Kantudu and Ismail (2015) buttressed that non-
significance of a board meeting to firm performance might be due to lack of financial 
expertise on the board when conducting meetings. Nonetheless, even if some of the 
directors are knowledgeable in financial matters, their failure to regularly attend 
meetings would reasonably disrupt the discussion and consequently affects the 
company’s outcome. Moreover, the board may be fully or partially controlled by the 
management which might potentially affect the decisions of the business on their 
personal interests at the expense of the business objectives.  
 
Moreover, Rodriguez-Fernandez et al. (2014) argued based on their findings that the 
higher number of meetings in Spanish companies might be related to culture, where 
socio-personal relations are extremely rooted and play a significant role. In regards to 
the corporate environment, the authors expressed that frequency of board meetings does 
not essentially result in higher performance, as it involves a higher expense that is not 
commensurate with the benefit derived. Therefore, social and business encounters 
should be distinguished for the reason to assure board meetings to be free of social 
encounters so that opportunity like having intra-company interaction will be formed, 
which may allow the board to be well informed on most aspects of the firm’s operations.    
Based on the regression result from Table 4.29, CEOT tenure (CEOT) was found to be 
positive, and significantly related to performance of listed financial service firms in 
Nigeria, ROA (β=0.021, p<0.1) and ROE (β=0.003, p<0.1), but has no significant effect 
on MTB (β=0.002, p>0.1). This result has support for hypotheses 4a and 4b which state 
that CEO tenure has a positive relationship with firm performance (ROA and ROE), 




and ROE) concord with both agency theory and resource dependence theory which 
presumes that the longer tenured CEO is deemed to understand the economic 
environment better, and hence, helps to boost the efficiency and performance of a firm 
(Afrifa & Tauringana, 2015; Eisenhardt, 1989). This finding is concomitant with that of 
Goldsmith (2012) who finds that CEO tenure has significant positive impact on the 
performance of US financial service firms. In a coherent manner, Kyereboah-Coleman 
(2008) found that CEO's tenure has significant positive impact on the profitability of 
firms in Africa.  
 
This is also what has been documented by Sanda et al. (2011) that the tenure of the chief 
executive officer has a significant positive effect on firm performance in Nigeria. The 
positive significant effect of CEO tenure on firm performance might be due to their 
understanding of the business environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) in which their 
companies operate, thereby helping to develop an effective business strategy that will 
boost the operations and performance of their firms. Linking this result with what has 
been obtained from the descriptive statistics (Table 4.3) of this study, the average tenure 
of a CEO in the Nigerian financial service firms is 3.6 years and a maximum of 9 years. 
This has gone with the requirements of the NCCG 2011 on the average number of years 
a CEO can serve. Moreover, due to the abnormalities (for instance, poor performance 
and liquidity) in the Nigerian financial service sector that led to the removal of 178 
directors in the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in 1996, the tenure of the CEO has 
therefore been revised to the maximum of 10 years in the 2011 code by the CBN 
(Aburime, Gannon, & Corrado, 2011; Sanusi, 2010). In response to this, it can be argued 




the NCCG 2011 which consequently boost their performance in terms of ROA and ROE 
as can be evidenced from the regression result in Table 4.29.  
 
In view of model 3 from Table 4.29, CEOT has no significant impact on performance 
as represented by MTB (β=0.002, p>0.1). Therefore, hypothesis 4c which states that 
CEO tenure has a positive relationship with firm performance (MTB), is not supported. 
The non-significant of CEOT on MTB may emanate from the reason that the CEO may 
lack financial knowledge or have little experience on the stock market operation which 
is highly dynamic in nature due to the forces of demand and supply in the market.  
Specifically, the result is consistent with Afrifa and Tauringana (2015) who document 
that CEO tenure has no significant effect on the performance of SMEs in the UK, and 
Al-Matari et al. (2014) who report that CEO tenure has positive but no significant 
impact on performance of listed companies in the Muscat Security Market (MSM) in 
Oman. Contrarily, this result contradicts the assumption of resource dependence theory 
which states that environmental uncertainties and contingencies determine the power 
and control in an organization which in turn determine the tenure of major 
administrators. This means that the longer the tenure of a CEO, the better the 
performance and value of a firm because he will have more understanding of the 
economic environment within which the organization operates (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Tsai et al., 2006).     
  
However, some argued that a long tenured CEO can only have a negative influence on 
the performance of a firm. For instance, Belkhir (2009) expresses that the tenure of CEO 
has significant negative relation to firm performance in the banking industry in United 




tenure and firm performance are but not limited to; Al-Matari et al. (2012), Evans et al. 
(2010), Limbach et al. (2015), and Maury (2006).  
     
Considering the regression result from Table 4.29, board expertise (BEXP) has a 
negative statistical significance of firm performance at 0.01 significant level, ROA (β= 
-0.168, p<0.1), ROE (β= -0.095, p<0.1), and MTB (β= -0.084, p<0.1). Therefore, 
hypotheses 5a, 5b, and 5c which state that board expertise has a positive effect on firm 
performance (ROA, ROE, and MTB) are partially supported. This means that a 1-unit 
increase in a director with multiple directorships on a board will lead to a decrease in 
performance by 16.8%, 9.5%, and 8.4% for ROA, ROE, and MTB respectively. Even 
though this result is significant, yet, it goes in the opposite direction with a resource 
dependence theory which argues that directors holding multiple positions (board 
expertise) on several boards rely on external resources with the view to enhance firm 
performance (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). To elaborate, Burt (1984) and Hillman and 
Dalziel (2003) further stressed that directors serving on multiple boards (board 
expertise) play an important role in disseminating vital information among companies 
which aid in saving transaction costs in handling environmental uncertainties, thus 
enhancing the performance of firms.  
 
Nevertheless, the significant negative relationship between board expertise and 
performance obtained in this study is consistent with Hauser (2013) who finds that 
busyness of a director has a significant negative effect on the performance of S&P 1500 
composite firms in the US. Likewise, a study in Nigeria by Nwonyuku (2016) finds that 
board expertise has a negative impact on the performance of listed food and beverage 




Field et al. (2013) found that boards with busy directors have a significant negative 
effect on performance. These reported findings from the literature have therefore 
supported the result of this study in relation to board expertise and firm performance.  
On the contrary, the result from Table 4.29 which shows that BEXP has a significant 
negative effect on firm performance has contradicted the relevant findings of other 
scholars. For instance, Kapoor and Goel (2017) found that board expertise (termed as 
busy directors) has a significant positive association with firm performance and earnings 
quality in India. While in the United States, Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) found that 
multiple directorships (board expertise) has a significant positive impact on the 
performance of bank holding companies. Similarly, Andreou et al. (2014) found that the 
proportion of directors sitting on the boards of other companies has a positive 
association with firm performance and financial management decisions in the United 
State. Other scholars belong to this assertion include Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003).   
 
More importantly, the NCCG 2011 has stated that despite the benefits associated with 
board expertise (multiple directorships) to a company, the concurrent service of board 
members on too many boards may interfere with their individual ability to fully 
discharge the responsibilities allotted to them. Forthwith, shareholders should take 
caution in appointing outside directors attached with many obligations and commitment 
into their boards. On this basis, the significant negative result obtained may be due to 
the reason that much expense spent on multiple directors on the board is not 
commensurate with the benefits derived, as the directors (serving on several boards) 
may be busy with other obligations and commitments that may hinder them from 




In the same way, the significant negative impact of BEXP on firm performance obtained 
in this study may be due to lack of understanding by the directors with multiple 
directorships on how the business of the company is been operated, since a director with 
multiple directorships will be busy trying to fulfill his/her obligations and commitments 
with the boards of various companies, it may, therefore, become difficult to have full 
understanding of how various companies operates especially if they are not from the 
same industry. In concurrence to this statement, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) 
contend that for the reason that since outside directors habitually interfere on multiple 
boards, they may find it difficult to successfully understand the business.  
  
In relation to the aforementioned reasons of significant negative impact of BEXP on 
firm performance, other factors that may lead to this result in Nigerian environment 
include: (1) failure of the boards of listed financial service firms to appoint the directors 
with the right mix of skill and competencies to deliver what is required of them by the 
investors; (2) inability of the directors to personally identify and address issues on the 
board's competencies and ways to maintain and enhance it. Moreover, the failure of the 
directors to adequately take proactive measures and collective responsibilities to ensure 
that professional skills with the business environment and technical knowledge of the 
directors are preserved, and might lead to the significant negative effect (Nwonyuku, 
2016). 
       
4.14.1.2 Risk Management Committee Structure and Firm Performance   
 
Under this section, a discussion was made on three variables regarding the risk 




variables are; risk management committee size (RMCS), risk management committee 
composition (RMCC), and risk management committee meeting (RMCM). The findings 
under this section as displayed in Table 4.29 partially supported hypothesis 6a, 6b, and 
6c, because from the regression result in Table 4.29, risk management committee size 
(RMCS) has significant negative impact on firm performance; ROA at the 0.05 level 
(β= -0.014, p<0.05), ROE at the 0.1 level (β= -0.007, p<0.1), and MTB at the 0.05 level 
(β= -0.008, p<0.05). This means that any increase in the size of the risk management 
committee by 1, will result in a decrease in performance by 1.4%, 0.7%, and 0.8% for 
ROA, ROE, and MTB respectively. Despite the limited studies on the risk management 
committee structure, this result is consistent with that of Ng et al. (2012) who report that 
the risk management committee size is negatively associated with underwriting risk of 
insurance companies in Malaysia.  
 
In consensus to the foregoing, Pantamee (2014) finds that risk management committee 
size has a significant negative effect on the corporate social responsibility disclosure in 
Nigeria. Pagach and Warr (2010) also reported that enterprise risk management does 
not help in creating the value of the firm. However, this result is not in support of the 
notion that a board with a larger number has an opportunity of having more skilful 
members that will aid in enhancing the performance of a firm. To link to this, 
Subramaniam et al. (2009) contend that a company with a large number of board 
members has a greater chance of having directors with the required skills to manage 
activities and even involved in a subcommittee that has been dedicated to risk 
management. In contrast to the significant negative effect of RMCS on firm 
performance, Pathan (2009) submits that small bank boards have a positive relationship 




and Hutchinson (2013) argue that the effectiveness of the risk management committee 
depends on size and composition, which eventually improves the performance of a firm.  
 
Specifically, the negative effect of risk management committee size on firm 
performance might result from high administrative costs expended by the companies in 
running the affairs of members of the committee in the Nigerian financial service firms. 
Concurrent to this, Barde (2009) and Pantamee (2014) buttressed that a larger number 
of members on every board consumes administrative costs that diminish a firm's 
profitability. Thus, the company might be spending on the members of the committee 
for them to provide fruitful ideas on management of risk and improvement of 
performance, but members of the committee might have failed either due to the 
inadequate experience of the nature of risk involved, or due to shady understanding of 
uncertainties surrounding the business environment.  
 
More to note, the Nigerian economy might be difficult to understand by many since it 
is emerging in nature with a capital market that is operating at a rudimentary level. 
Again, the business environment is affected by the insurgency and social unrest that 
resulted from attacks and bombings in the dreaded group ‘BOKO-HARAM’. This has 
made the business environment so dynamic and undefinable in nature by various 
business experts since the year 2010. This has made the business environment ‘volatile' 
that might distort the efforts of the risk management committee members in discharging 
their duties effectively, which may finally influence the performance of listed financial 





For risk management committee composition (RMCC), the regression result from Table 
4.29 shows that it has no significant effect on firm performance at the conventional 
significant levels; ROA (β=0.017, p>0.1), ROE (β=0.017, p>0.1), and MTB (β=0.017, 
p>0.1). Hence, this result does not support hypotheses 7a, 7b, and 7c, which state that 
the risk management committee composition has a positive relationship with firm 
performance (ROA, ROE, and MTB). In addition, this finding is not in support of the 
NCCG 2011, which states that all publicly traded companies should have a majority of 
non-executive directors in their risk management committee that may aid in increasing 
their performance. Equally, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) opine that a board that is 
engulfed by a high proportion of non-executive directors stands a better position to 
shareholders’ interest, and may elevate firm performance through an effective oversight 
function upon the management.     
 
Studies on risk management structure are seldom, yet, Tao and Hutchinson (2013) who 
examined the role of risk and compensation committees in overseeing and managing the 
risk behaviour of financial firms in Australia found that risk committee composition is 
positively related to risk and firm performance. In the same way, Pantamee (2014) finds 
that risk management committee composition is positively associated with corporate 
social responsibility disclosure in the Nigerian petroleum marketing industry. On the 
contrary, Ng et al. (2012) found that risk management committee independence 
(composition) is negatively associated with underwriting risk of insurance companies 
in Malaysia.  
 
Meanwhile, the insignificant effect of RMCC on the performance of listed financial 




their duties. That is, members of the risk management committee might have an 
insignificant number of persons with adequate skill and experience required to handle 
risk among them, and the significant portion of members may not necessarily agree with 
the opinion of the experienced and skilful member. As a result, the best decision for the 
organization required might be deterred since appointments in Nigeria are mostly not 
on merit, but on favouritism, and decisions in a group are based on the highest number. 
Coherently, this view is in line with the opinion of Okponobi (2011), who states that 
most appointments in Nigeria are not based on skill, experience, or qualification, but 
based on what is labelled as ‘MAN KNOWS MAN’ or social and political affiliations. 
 
Furthermore, other reasons for the result obtained in this study between RMCC and firm 
performance might be due to poor information flow from the top management to the 
risk management committee, which results in inefficient communication flow among 
committee members (Nwonyuku, 2016). Another essential point is that appointing a 
higher number of directors with multiple directorships among the non-executive 
directors on the RMCC may affect the activities of the committee since busy directors 
will be full of engagements trying to fulfil their various obligations and commitments 
on the boards of other companies where they are also directors. Moreover, this outcome 
might be due to the absence of actual independence of the board which might have been 
hindered by a powerful CEO, lack of adequate experience and skill to tackle 
environmental uncertainties, and composed of older and/or less effective or productive 
individuals particularly in the Nigerian financial institution. 
   
The third and final variable under the risk management structure is risk management 




has a significant positive effect on the firm performance of listed financial service firms 
in Nigeria at the 0.01 level; ROA (β=0.028, p<0.01), ROE (β=0.016, p<0.01), and MTB 
(β=0.049, p<0.01). For this reason, hypotheses 8a, 8b, and 8c which state that RMCM 
has a positive relationship with firm performance (ROA, ROE, and MTB) are supported. 
This means that as the frequency of risk management committee meeting increases by 
1, so also the performance of listed financial service firms will increase by 2.8%, 1.6%, 
and 4.9% for ROA, ROE, and MTB respectively. In the same fashion, this result is in 
agreement with agency theory which presumes that with frequent meetings, boards 
exhibit significant abilities in terms of counselling, penalizing, and overseeing 
management actions, hence enhancing the performance of firms (Jensen, 1993; Lipton 
& Lorsch, 1992; Vafeas, 1999). Then again, IFC (2010) and Muhammad Sori and 
Mohamad (2009) conclude that the frequency of meetings portrays the level of 
commitment by a committee in performing their predetermined functions.   
 
By the same token, the significant positive effect of RMCM on firm performance is in 
concordance with the findings of prior research. For instance, Aebi et al. (2012) found 
that frequency of meetings of risk committee has a significant positive effect on the 
performance of banks in the US during the financial crisis. In Nigeria, Pantamee (2014) 
finds that risk management committee meeting is significant and positively influencing 
corporate social responsibility disclosure in the petroleum marketing sector. Concisely, 
the more the number of board meetings the healthier for a company (in terms of 
performance and value), because the boards will have more and better chances of 
making various decisions (Khan & Javid, 2011; Pearce & Zahra, 1992).   
The significant positive effect of RMCM on firm performance of the listed financial 




reason for this result might be due to the fact that Nigerian business environment has 
been volatile within the period under study. The business environment was unstable due 
to reshuffling of economic policies by the government, such as; introducing of the 
Treasury Single Account (TSA) policy (which has been explained earlier) (Okonji, 
2016), and restrictions on the importation of raw food items especially rice, which 
affected a significant number of businessmen and at last affected the Nigerian financial 
system. As a result, the risk management committee might be busy with several 
meetings trying to cope with the situation in the business environment so as to reduce 
the volatility of their business operations, which may ultimately improve their 
performances. Therefore, this might be the reason for the significant positive effect of 
RMCM on the performance of listed financial service firms in Nigeria.  
 
In view of the foregoing, Conger et al. (1998) and Lipton and Lorch (1992) clarify that 
board meeting is considered as a vital resource on solidifying board of directors' 
effectiveness. Once more, the higher the frequency of board meetings, the higher the 
probability to obtain better performance. This, therefore, corroborates with the finding 
of this study that risk management committee meeting has a significant positive effect 
on performance (as represented by ROA, ROE, and MTB) of the listed financial service 
firm in Nigeria. However, despite the significant positive effect of RMCM on firm 
performance obtained in this study, Ng et al. (2012) claim that risk management 
committee meeting has no significant effect on risk taking on Malaysian insurance 






4.14.1.3 Risk Management Practice and Disclosure and Firm Performance 
 
In this section, the study discusses the relationship between risk management practice 
and disclosure and firm performance, as measured by ROA, ROE, and MTB. 
Nevertheless, the result from Table 4.29 reveals that risk management practice and 
disclosure (RMPD) has a significant, but negative effect on firm performance; ROA (β= 
-0.017, p<0.05) and MTB (β= -0.048, p<0.05), while having an insignificant negative 
effect on ROE (β= -0.005, p>0.1). This has therefore partially supported hypotheses 9a 
and 9c which state that risk management practice and disclosure has a positive 
relationship with firm performance (as represented by ROA, and MTB). Whereas, the 
result controverts hypothesis 9b which states that risk management practice and 
disclosure has a positive relationship with firm performance (ROE). Conjointly, this 
result means that the more the disclosures of risk management practices of listed 
financial service firms in Nigeria, the more their profitability will shrink by almost 1.7% 
and 4.8% for ROA and MTB respectively. However, this result has contravened the 
proposition of agency theory which presumes that disclosure of information on 
corporate risk reduces monitoring costs (Hemrit & Arab, 2011), that enable more 
incentive package for managers to provide more information in annual reports (Depoers, 
2000) which may attract more investors and ultimately increases performance.  
 
Moreover, the result obtained in this study from Table 4.29 regarding RMPD and 
performance (ROA and MTB), goes in the opposite direction with the findings of Nahar 
et al. (2016) who report that risk disclosure, existence of risk management committee, 
and a number of risk committees are significantly and positively related to banks 




information disclosures have a significant positive effect on the firm performance of 
nonfinancial firms and utility firms listed on Bursa Malaysia. Meaning that the more a 
firm discloses information about its activities to investors, the more it will generate 
profit. In light of this, other studies document a positive impact of a firm’s information 
disclosure on its value. For instance, Patel and Dallas (2002) report that a company’s 
disclosure increases its price-to-book-ratio, and even creates an increased value 
(Akhigbe & Martin, 2006).  
 
Howbeit, the result obtained from Table 4.29 which shows a negative impact of RMPD 
on performance (ROA and MTB) is consistent with that of Zhang (2007) who finds that 
corporate disclosures (regarding Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002) have a negative impact on 
the firm’s value (i.e. destruction of value). The negative effect may be due to several 
reasons in Nigerian environment. Case in point, too much administrative costs might be 
associated with the disclosure of the activities and procedures of risk management. More 
so, the costs of producing and disseminating the information on risk management might 
be unfavorable since a lot of pages on it (risk management) need to be produced which 
may consume lots of costs, as annual and financial reports in Nigeria are mostly in print 
versions. Relevance instance, Bethel (2007) reports that prior to the introduction of 
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) information system 
utilized by the United States SEC, 3 million pages of information disclosures by 
companies pass daily and which consumes a cost of $0.15/page.    
 
Withal, since there is adequate (strong) disclosure of information on risk management 
practice by listing financial service firms in Nigeria as seen in the frequency distribution 




sector, which in turn, may have a negative effect on the company’s performance. In 
addition, the cost of information disclosure related to risk management practice by the 
companies, which is expected to generate a positive return might not be commensurate 
to the returns if the users of such information do not use it for the purpose expected. For 
instance, Farvaque, Refait-Alexnadre, and Saïdane (2011) report that opinion polls have 
shown that 85% of finance directors in the U.S are of the view that the costs of 
implementing Sarbanes-Oxley act were not commensurate with their benefits, even after 
their four years of adoption by companies.   
 
Relatively, the information disclosure of risk management practice by the listed 
financial service firms in Nigeria might remain redundant due to none use or lack of 
proper utilization of it (information) by the investors, which might lead to insignificant 
effect (in terms of ROE) or significant negative effect of their performances (in terms 
of ROA and MTB). In effect, Farvaque et al. (2011) quote that "as well as the costs of 
establishing disclosure, the disclosure also raise informational costs, which are probably 
even more problematic with regard to the objective. The question here is about how the 
information received by the investor is transformed into usable knowledge that can be 
used to value the firm. In fact, in the end, the disclosure is desirable in order to allow 
shareholders to exert control, by voting or by leaving, and to found their decisions about 
the purchasing and selling of shares" (p. 19).   
 
4.14.1.4 Control Variables and Firm Performance  
 
For the purpose of this study, four control variables were used, viz: firm size, leverage, 




some scholars (e.g., Aljifri & Moustafa, 2007; Ghosh, 2006), as it may affect firm 
performance due to the various distinctions of companies in terms of size. In terms of 
leverage, it has been controlled for in this study because organizations are more probable 
to disclose relevant information in order to meet the requirements of funds borrowers 
which may affect their performance (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). On firm age, as an 
organization becomes older, its management may acquire more skills, abilities, and 
competencies over time (Stinchcombe, 1965), hence, influencing the performance of 
firms. The fourth control variable is asset tangibility, because a firm that has a higher 
proportion of its assets as tangibles (e.g., plant and equipment), are more probable to 
debt choices which influence performance (MacKIE-MASON, 1990). 
 
From the regression result in Table 4.29, firm size (FSZ) is negatively and statistically 
significant related to firm performance; ROA (β= -0.041, p<0.01), ROE (β= -0.018, 
p<0.01), and MTB (β= -0.022, p<0.01). This result has contradicted the finding of 
Kakanda et al. (2016b) who documents that firm size (FSZ) has negative, but 
insignificant effect on the performance of listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria. 
However, this result coincides with the findings of Harvey Pamburai et al. (2015) and 
Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006) who reported that larger firms are significantly 
more effective than smaller firms, due to their large economies of scales and recruiting 
of highly skilled employees. In the same line, Helmich (1977), Kumar (2004), and 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argued that larger firms stand in a better position in their 
economic environment to employ individuals with great talents over their counterparts 
(small firms) in order to have an effective and efficient plan and decisions that will 





For leverage (LEV), which is the second control variable, it was found to be negative, 
but statistically significant relation to firm performance; ROA (β=-0.060, p<0.05) and 
ROE (β=-0.085, p<0.01) which is similar to the findings of Arora and Sharma (2016), 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Harvey Pamburai et al. (2015). However, this result has 
contravened the finding of Adenikinju (2012) who reports that leverage has positive but 
insignificant impact on performance of quoted companies in Nigeria. Even though, the 
result indicates a statistical significance, yet, it contradicts the findings of similar studies 
(e.g., Chiang & Lin, 2011; Hurdle, 1974; Kang & Kim, 2011). As such, the result 
indicates that an increase in leverage by 1 unit, will result in a decrease in ROA by 0.060 
and in ROE by 0.085, which does not mean well to a company because the profit 
generated will be used in offsetting the capital borrowed from lenders. On the other 
hand, LEV has negative, but no significant impact on performance (β=-0.011, p>0.1). 
This result is consistent with the finding of Al-Matari et al. (2014b) who claim that 
leverage has an insignificant negative effect on the performance of listed firms in Oman.    
 
The third control variable which is firm age (FAG), has a significant positive effect on 
the performance of listed financial service firms in Nigeria; ROA (β=0.003, p<0.01), 
ROE (β=0.001, p<0.01), and MTB (β=0.002, p<0.01). Specifically, this result indicates 
that a 1-year increase in the age of a firm may lead to an increase in firm performance 
by 0.3%, 0.2%, and 0.1% for ROA, ROE, and MTB respectively. This result is 
consistent with that of Afrifa and Tauringana (2015) that found firm age to have a 
significant positive effect on the performance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
in the UK. More so, this finding is constant with that of Ujunwa (2012) who documents 
that firm age has a significant positive effect on the performance of quoted companies 




production/service processes of modern businesses. In this sense, it is presumed that a 
firm that has been in operation for a longer period will have an economic advantage 
over smaller ones.   
 
Asset tangibility (ASTAN) is the fourth and final control variable in this study. The 
result from Table 4.29 reveals a negative, but significant relationship between ASTAN 
and performance of listed financial service firms in Nigeria; ROA (β=-0.370, p<0.01), 
ROE (β=-0.308, p<0.01), and MTB (β=-0.204, p<0.01), which is consistent with Afrifa 
and Tauringana (2015) that found a significant (at the 1 % level) negative impact of 
asset tangibility on the performance of SMEs in UK. This result means that a 1-unit 
increase in asset tangibility will lead to a decrease in performance by 0.37, 0.308, and 
0.204 for ROA, ROE, and MTB respectively. In essence, this may be due to the 
injudicious utilization of intangible assets to generate profit, but expending much in 
maintenance and up-keep of the assets. Likewise, this result is consistent with that of 
Onaolapo and Kajola (2010) who found that asset tangibility has a negative impact on 

























(ROA) Hypothesis (a) 
 Model 2 
(ROE) Hypothesis (b) 
 Model 3 
(MTB) Hypothesis (c) 
Coef. p>t Decision 
(Supported) 
 Coef.  p>t Decision 
(Supported)  
 Coef.  p>t Decision  
(Supported) 
H1 BSZ +/- 0.141*** 0.000 Yes  0.077*** 0.002 Yes  0.069*** 0.000 Yes 
H2 BCOMP +/- -0.233** 0.034 Partially  -0.134** 0.030 Partially  -0.141** 0.003 Partially 
H3 BMT +/- 0.023 0.595 No  -0.023 0.226 No  0.011 0.539 No 
H4 CEOT +/- 0.021* 0.095 Yes  0.003* 0.092 Yes  0.002 0.225 No 
H5 BEXP +/- -0.168* 0.058 Partially  -0.095* 0.062 Partially  -0.084* 0.056 Partially  
H6 RMCS + -0.014** 0.040 Partially  -0.007* 0.059 Partially  0.028 0.448 No 
H7 RMCC + 0.017 0.837 No  0.020 0.739 No  0.049*** 0.006 Yes 
H8 RMCM + 0.028** 0.045 Yes  0.016*** 0.000 Yes  0.049*** 0.006 Yes 
H9 RMPD + -0.017*** 0.000 Partially  -0.005 0.315 No  -0.048** 0.019 Partially  
 FSZ +/- -0.041*** 0.000 N/A  -0.018*** 0.000 N/A  -0.002*** 0.000 N/A 
 LEV +/- -0.060** 0.021 N/A  -0.085*** 0.000 N/A  -0.011 0.210 N/A 
 FAG +/- 0.003*** 0.000 N/A  0.001*** 0.000 N/A  0.002*** 0.000 N/A 
 ASTAN +/- -0.370*** 0.000 N/A  -0.308*** 0.000 N/A  -0.204*** 0.000 N/A 
Notes: BSZ= board size; BCOMP= board composition; BM = board meeting; CEOT= chief executive officer’s tenure; BEXP= board expertise; RMCS= risk 
management committee size; RMCC= risk management committee composition; RMCM= risk management committee meeting; RMPD= risk management practice 
and disclosure; FSZ= firm size; LEV= leverage; FAG= firm age; ASTAN= asset tangibility; ROA= return on assets; ROE= return on equity; MTB= market-to-book 
ratio; N/A= Not Applicable.    





From Table 4.30, it can be seen that the hypotheses for the three models (ROA, ROE, 
and MTB) and their respective decisions are individually reported. Under model 1 
(ROA), H1, H4, and H8 are supported, H2, H5, H6, and H9 are partially supported, while 
H3 and H7 are not supported. For model 2 (ROE), H1, H4, and H8 are supported, H2, H5, 
and H6 are partially supported, whereas H3, H7, and H9 are not supported. However, for 
model 3 (MTB), H1, H7, and H8 are supported, H2, H5, and H9 are partially supported, 
while H3, H7 and H6 are not supported.  
 
Generally, the result obtained in this study from multivariate regression analysis (Panel 
Corrected Standard Errors) depicts that some hypotheses were fully supported, some 
partially supported, while others were not supported. Precisely, based on the summary 
of the hypotheses of the three models (ROA, ROE, and MTB) in this study as presented 
in Table 4.30, only H1 and H8 were fully supported, H2, H4, H5, H6, H7, and H9 are 
partially supported, while only H3 was not fully supported. Therefore, the summary of 

























Hypothesis Statement Decision 
H1 Board size has a positive relationship with firm performance. 
 
Supported 









H4 CEO tenure has a positive relationship with firm performance. Partially 
supported 
 





H6 Risk management committee size has a positive relationship 




H7 Risk management committee composition has a positive 




H8 Risk management committee meeting has a positive 
relationship with firm performance. 
 
Supported 
H9 Risk management practice and disclosure has a positive 




4.15 Robustness Check   
 
For the purpose of examining the consistency of the main regression result and findings 
of this study, robustness test was performed. To this end, the sample was divided based 
on two groups of companies used in this study; (1) Banks and (2) Non-banks. Table 4.32 
shows the result of Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) for banks under the three 
(3) models (ROA, ROE, and MTB), while Table 4.33 displays the result of PCSEs for 





Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) Result for Banks 
Variables Model 1 (ROA) 
 
 Model 2 (ROE)  Model 3 (MTB) 
 Coef. 
 
t-stat. p>t  Coef. t-stat. p>t  Coef. t-stat. p>t 






































BCOMP -0.048 -0.15 0.878  -0.077 -0.45 0.655  0.077 0.41 0.680 
 
BMT 0.106 2.67*** 0.008  0.017 0.79 0.431  0.057 2.48** 0.013 
 
CEOT 0.041 1.08 0.280  0.011 1.72* 0.086  0.0141 2.12** 0.034 
 
BEXP 0.589 1.75* 0.080  0.252 1.32 0.186  0.279 1.29 0.198 
 
RMCS 0.003 0.54 0.587  -0.000 -0.06 0.949  0.000 0.15 0.877 
 
RMCC 0.225 1.15 0.250  0.127 1.22 0.221  0.082 0.97 0.330 
 
RMCM -0.050 -2.21** 0.027  -0.022 -1.76* 0.078  -0.094 -2.02** 0.043 
 























LEV -0.529 -3.03*** 0.002  -0.334 -3.31*** 0.001  -0.032 -1.76 0.078 
 





















No. of groups   15    15    15 
Wald chi2 
(13) 
  1552.65***    1199.95***    437.5*** 
R2   0.392    0.390    0.317 
Prob>chi2   0.0000    0.0000    0.0000 
 











   24.60*** 
(0.000) 
   20.70*** 
(0.000) 






   8.06** 
(0.045) 
   10.23** 
(0.0167) 
Notes: BSZ= board size; BCOMP= board composition; BM = board meeting; CEOT= chief executive officer’s tenure; BEXP= board expertise; RMCS= risk 
management committee size; RMCC= risk management committee composition; RMCM= risk management committee meeting; RMPD= risk management practice 
and disclosure; FSZ= firm size; LEV= leverage; FAG= firm age; ASTAN= asset tangibility; ROA= return on assets; ROE= return on equity; MTB= market-to-book 
ratio.   
***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  




From Table 4.32 which shows the result of PCSEs for banks, the R2 for ROA is 0.392, 
ROE is 0.39, and MTB is 0.317, indicating that 39.2%, 39%, and 31.7% of the variations 
in ROA, ROE, and MTB respectively, are explained by the models. Moreover, the three 
models under banks are significant at the 0.01 levels (p<0.01), indicating the fitness and 
validity of the models. So also, the PCSEs result for nonbanks from Table 4.33 shows 
that ROA has an R2 of 0.339, ROE 0.401., and MTB 0.34, indicating that 33.9%, 40.1%, 
and 34% of the variations in ROA, ROE, and MTB respectively, are explained by the 
models. Furthermore, all the three models under non-banks financial service companies 
are significant at the 0.01 levels (p<0.01), signifying that the models are valid and well 
fitted.       
 
From the result of PCSEs for banks in Table 4.32, there are only three variables under 
board attributes that show a significant positive relationship with firm performance. 
Firstly, board meeting (BMT) has a significant positive effect on performance; ROA 
(β=0.106, p<0.01) and MTB (β=0.057, p<0.05). This result is different from the main 
regression output where BMT has no any significant effect on all the three models (ROA, 
ROE, and MTB). In essence, the result provides support for hypotheses 3a and 3c which 
state that the board meeting frequency has a positive relationship with firm performance 
(for ROA and MTB). In the same vein, the result is in support of agency theory which 
assumes that with frequent meetings, boards exhibit significant abilities in terms of 
counselling, penalizing, and overseeing management actions, hence enhancing the 
performance of firms (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Vafeas, 1999). This finding 
is consistent with Al-Matari et al. (2014a), Barisua et al. (2012), and Liang et al. (2013) 
that found a positive relationship between board meetings and firm performance. Yet, 





Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) Result for Nonbanks 
Variables Model 1 (ROA) 
 
 Model 2 (ROE)  Model 3 (MTB) 
 Coef. 
 
t-stat. p>t  Coef. t-stat. p>t  Coef. t-stat. p>t 






































BCOMP -0.334 -2.44** 0.015  -0.171 -2.57** 0.010  -0.177 -2.33** 0.020 
 
BMT -0.007 -0.13 0.900  0.043 -1.62 0.105  -0.002 -0.10 0.924 
 
CEOT 0.016 0.96 0.337  0.000 0.15 0.881  0.000 0.20 0.839 
 
BEXP -0.346 -3.10*** 0.002  -0.189 -3.11*** 0.002  -1.172 -3.01*** 0.003 
 
RMCS -0.040 -2.62*** 0.009  -0.019 -2.33** 0.020  -0.019 -2.43** 0.015 
 
RMCC -0.075 -0.66 0.510  -0.033 -0.46 0.646  -0.044 -0.76 0.445 
 
RMCM 0.058 4.67*** 0.000  0.030 5.18*** 0.000  0.082 4.26*** 0.000 
 























LEV -0.004 -0.25 0.805  -0.061 -3.49*** 0.000  -0.017 -1.93* 0.054 
 





















No. of groups   30    30    30 
Wald chi2 
(13) 
  14098.71***    1951.89***    13911.41*** 
R2   0.339    0.401    0.340 
Prob>chi2   0.0000    0.0000    0.0000 
 











   35.62*** 
(0.000) 
   49.03*** 
(0.000) 






   34.64*** 
(0.000) 
   23.32*** 
(0.000) 
Notes: BSZ= board size; BCOMP= board composition; BM = board meeting; CEOT= chief executive officer’s tenure; BEXP= board expertise; RMCS= risk 
management committee size; RMCC= risk management committee composition; RMCM= risk management committee meeting; RMPD= risk management practice 
and disclosure; FSZ= firm size; LEV= leverage; FAG= firm age; ASTAN= asset tangibility; ROA= return on assets; ROE= return on equity; MTB= market-to-book 
ratio.   
***, **, and * represent significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  




Coherently, the result regarding BMT for banks is not consistent with that for nonbanks 
(Table 4.33) of which board meeting shows no any significant effect on firm 
performance (ROA, ROE, and MTB). The reason for this may be due to the fact that 
banks had frequent meetings more than nonbanks, where banks have an average of 6 
meetings and maximum of 13 meetings, while nonbanks have an average meeting of 5 
times, and a maximum of 10 times. In this case, it can be argued that non-banks financial 
companies in Nigeria need to increase their frequency of meetings in order to have better 
performance.  
 
Secondly, from the PCSEs result of banks in Table 4.32, CEO tenure (CEOT) has a 
significant positive effect on firm performance; ROE (β=0.011, p<0.1) and MTB 
(β=0.0141, p<0.05). Hence, the result provides support for hypotheses 4b and 4c 
alongside supporting resource dependence theory which assumes that a long tenured 
CEO of a firm is expected to have a better knowledge of the organization’s economic 
environment which will help in the betterment of the firm (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
This result is not much that different from the main regression output, only that the 
CEOT has a significant positive effect on ROA and ROE for the main regression result. 
Contrastingly, CEOT for nonbanks has no any significant effect on firm performance 
for all the three models (ROA, ROE, and MTB). This difference of result regarding 
CEOT for banks and nonbanks might be that CEOs of banks are more concerned on 
their primary responsibilities of managing the affairs of their firms, since managers of 
Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria are mostly given targets of profit returns per 
annum by their owners, of which if they failed to meet, may result to the end of their 






Thirdly, board expertise (BEXP) is the final variable under board attributes that has a 
significant relationship with the firm performance for banks. From Table 4.32, the 
regression result shows that BEXP has significant positive impact on firm performance 
at the 0.1 level; ROA (β=0.589, p<0.1). This result indicates that there is an evidence of 
the inverted U relationship between BEXP and firm performance (represented by ROA), 
because the main regression result for the full sample shows a significant negative 
relationship between BEXP and firm performance (ROA, ROE, and MTB), while the 
split result shows a significant positive relationship between BEXP and firm 
performance (ROA only). This result supports hypothesis 5a which states that there is a 
positive relationship between BEXP and ROA.  
 
Moreover, the result concords with a resource dependence theory which argues that the 
directors that serve on multiple boards will have more experience that can assist in 
attaining better performance (Burt, 1984; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Kiel & Nicholson, 
2003). Notwithstanding, the result does not correspond with that for non-banks which 
show a negative effect of BEXP on firm performance (β=-0.346, p<0.01), (β=-0.189, 
p<0.01), and (β=-1.172, p<0.01) for ROA, ROE, and MTB respectively just like the 
main regression result for the full sample. More specifically, board size and board 
composition have no any effect on the three models (ROA, ROE, and MTB) for banks, 
resulting in the rejection of hypotheses 1a and 2a.  
 
For risk management structure, it is only risk management committee meeting (RMCM) 
that has significant, but negative effect on performance of banks; ROA (β=   -0.050, 
p<0.05), ROE (β=-0.022, p<0.1), and MTB (β=-0.094, p<0.05), indicating an inverted 






regression result for the full sample shows a significant positive relationship between 
RMCM and firm performance for the three models in this study. Therefore, this result 
partially supported hypotheses 8a, 8b, and 8c which state that there is a positive 
relationship between risk management committee meeting (RMCM) and firm 
performance (ROA, ROE, and MTB). Nevertheless, this result has gone in the opposite 
direction with that for nonbanks, which shows a significant positive effect of RMCM on 
firm performance (β=0.058, p<0.01), (β=0.030, p<0.01), and (β=0.082, p<0.01) for 
ROA, ROE, and MTB respectively. Here, risk management committee size (RMCS) 
and risk management committee composition (RMCC) have no any significant impact 
on the performance of banks.  
 
In regards to risk management practice and disclosure (RMPD), the result of Panel 
Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) in Table 4.32 for banks depicts a significant 
negative relationship between RMPD and firm performance; ROA (β=-0.028, p<0.05), 
ROE (β=-0.015, p<0.1), and MTB (β=-0.060, p<0.1). This result has coincided with the 
main regression output for the full sample, thereby providing a partial support to the 
hypotheses 9a, 9b, and 9c. while for nonbanks, risk management practice and disclosure 
(RMPD) do not show any impact on their performance, rather, shows a negative relation 
(β=-0.010, p>0.1), (β=-0.000, p>0.1), and (β=-0.022, p>0.1) for ROA, ROE, and MTB 
respectively. 
 
On the other hand, the result of PCSEs for nonbanks financial service firms is presented 
in Table 4.33, where three variables (BSZ, BCOMP, and BEXP) under board attributes 
display a significant impact on firm performance. In this effect, board size (BSZ) has a 






p<0.01), ROE (β=0.162, p<0.01), and MTB (β=0.141, p<0.01). Therefore, this result is 
consistent with the main regression output for the full sample in this study. Hence, 
hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c which state that there is a positive relationship between board 
size and firm performance (ROA, ROE, and MTB) are fully supported. However, this 
result for nonbanks does not correspond with that of banks.  
 
The reason for BSZ of nonbanks having a significant positive effect on performance, 
and that of banks without any significant impact on performance might be that banks 
have too many members on their boards which may distract the activities on board and 
also causes delays in decision making that may ultimately affect their performance. This 
assertion is based on the result of descriptive statistics, which shows that banks in 
Nigeria have an average number of members to be 14 and a maximum of 20, while 
average board size for nonbanks is 8 and maximum of 15. Moreover, the reason for the 
difference might be that the boards lack expertise or skill to make appropriate decisions 
(Odewale, 2016), and the inability of boards in Nigeria to concentrate on decision 
making (Pierce, 2011).        
 
For board composition (BCOMP), the result is still consistent with the main regression 
output since the PCSEs result from Table 4.33 shows that BCOMP has a significant 
negative effect on firm performance at the 0.05 level; ROA (β=-0.334, p<0.05), ROE 
(β=-0.171, p<0.05), and MTB (β=-0.177, p<0.05). Additionally, the result has partially 
supported hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c which state that there is a positive relationship 
between board composition and firm performance (ROA, ROE, and MTB). In contrast, 
the result is contrary to that of banks that shows no significant impact of BCOMP on 






more dedicated outside directors on the boards of non-banks financial service firms than 
those of banks, despite the fact that both of them have a high proportion of non-executive 
directors on their boards as evidenced by the result of descriptive statistics. 
 
Given consideration to board expertise (BEXP), the regression result from Table 4.33 
shows that it has a significant negative effect on firm performance; ROA (β=-0.346, 
p<0.01), ROE (β=-0.189, p<0.01), and MTB (β=-1.172, p<0.01). This result is steady 
with the main regression output for the full sample of this study. As such, hypotheses 
5a, 5b, and 5c which state that there is a positive relationship between board expertise 
and firm performance (ROA, ROE, and MTB) are partially supported. Case in point, 
under board attributes, board meeting (BMT) and CEO tenure failed to make any 
significant impact on performance relating to nonbanks. 
 
Under the risk management structure, risk management committee size (RMCS) and 
risk management committee meeting (RMCM) were found to be significantly related to 
firm performance relating to nonbanks financial service firms in Nigeria. Explicitly, 
based on the regression output from Table 4.33, RMCS has significant negative impact 
on performance; ROA (β=-0.040, p<0.01), ROE (β=-0.019, p<0.05), and MTB (β=         -
0.019, p<0.05). This result is not different with main regression output for the full 
sample in this study, to that end, hypotheses 7a, 7b, and 7c which state that there is 
positive relationship between risk management committee size and firm performance 
(ROA, ROE, and MTB) are partially supported.  
 
In consideration to RMCM, the regression result from Table 4.33 demonstrates that it 






p<0.01), ROE (β=0.030, p<0.01), and MTB (β=0.082, p<0.01). This result is consistent 
with the main regression output for the full sample in this study, hence, a support for 
hypotheses 8a, 8b, and 8c. Moreover, it can be argued that RMCM has an inverted U 
relationship since it shows a significant negative impact on performance relating to 
banks as shown in Table 4.32. Howbeit, risk management committee composition 
(RMCC) does not show any significant influence on the performance of nonbanks as 
evidenced in Table 4.33 leading to rejection of hypotheses 7a, 7b, and 7c. In like manner, 
risk management practice and disclosure (RMPD) also fails to have any significant 
impact on performance relating to nonbanks, hence, hypotheses 9a, 9b, and 9c were not 
supported. In contrast, the result of banks regarding RMPD shows a significant negative 
impact on performance (see Table 4.32) which might be due to administrative costs 
relating to disclosure or underutilization of the disclosed information on risk 
management practices of banks.  
 
More importantly, it should be noted that the risk management committee composition 
(RMCC) fails to have any significant effect on performance (ROA, ROE, and MTB) 
both for the main regression result and robust test results (under banks and non-banks), 
which might be due to mismatch of members of the committee, the subjective 
appointment of the committee members, high administrative costs, and poor information 
flow from top management to the committee members. As such, an examination of 
RMCC of financial service firms in Nigeria may go beyond composition by considering 








As revealed in Table 4.32 and 4.33, the Wald test of joint significant indicates that both 
the board attributes variables and risk management structure variables were jointly 
significant in explaining the variability in firm performance (ROA, ROE, and MTB) at 
1% and 5% significance levels. Precisely, board attributes under banks is significant; 
ROA (F=23.48, p<0.01), ROE (F=24.60, p<0.01), and MTB (F=20.70, p<0.01), and 
nonbanks, ROA (F=54.91, p<0.01), ROE (F=35.62, p<0.01), and MTB (F=49.03, 
p<0.01). This means that board attributes variables are jointly significant in explaining 
the variations in performance of both banks and nonbanks financial service firms in 
Nigeria. 
 
On the other hand, the result of the Wald test from Tables 4.32 and 4.33 depicts that risk 
management structure variables have jointly significant in explaining the variations in 
performance of banks; ROA (F=10.23, p<0.05), ROE (F=8.06, p<0.05), and MTB 
(F=10.23, p<0.05), and for nonbanks; ROA (F=23.32, p<0.01), ROE (F=34.64, 
p<0.01), and MTB (F=23.32, p<0.01). This portrays that risk management structure 
variables are jointly significant in explaining the variations in performance of banks and 
nonbanks financial service firms in Nigeria. 
 
4.16 Summary of the Chapter   
 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms that involve the board attributes variables, risk management 
structure variables, risk management practice and disclosure and performance (ROA, 
ROE, and MTB) of listed financial service firms in Nigeria during the period of 2012 to 






elements (risk management structure and risk management practice and disclosure) of 
the 2011 revised CG code in Nigeria can improve the performance (accounting [ROA 
& ROE] and market [MTB]) of listed financial service firms in Nigeria during the period 
of 2012 to 2016. Given that there was weak corporate governance practice, inadequate 
disclosure and transparency in reporting, inadequate risk management frameworks for 
identifying, measuring and controlling the risks associated with the activities of deposit 
money banks (DMBs) and other financial service firms among others in Nigeria, which 
placed them (financial service firms) to be operating at the risk of failure (CBN, 2010). 
Therefore, this study provides new evidence of the influence of risk management 
structure and risk management practice and disclosure on firm performance. The result 
of this study indicates that there is an improvement in the application of the NCCG 2011 
in Nigerian (especially in the listed financial service firms)  
 
Univariate analysis was used to examine the extent of disclosure of risk management 
practices of quoted financial service firms in Nigeria, whereas multivariate analysis was 
used in examining the study hypotheses. In addition, a robust check was executed and 
compared to the main regression results to test its validity. The univariate analysis 
(frequency distribution) shows that there is adequate disclosure of risk management 
practice and disclosure in Nigeria. Moreover, the univariate analysis (t-test) signifies 
that there is no significant difference in the disclosure of risk management practice 
between banks and nonbanks financial service firms in Nigeria. For this reason, the 
requirements of the NCCG 2011 on disclosure of risk management practice of publicly 
traded firms in Nigeria is significantly adhered to by quoted financial service firms in 






The findings from multivariate analysis indicate that board size (BSZ), board 
composition (BCOMP), chief executive officer tenure (CEOT) board expertise (BEXP), 
risk management committee size (RMCS), risk management committee meeting 
(RMCM) and risk management practice and disclosure (RMPD) influence firm 
performance as there were significant relationships between them. On the overall, the 
board attributes variables and risk management structure variables have satisfied the 
effective monitoring and resource provision arguments put forward for their 
establishment.  
 
The robustness check shows consistency with the main regression result, particularly to 
that of nonbanks. Three of the board attributes (BMT, CEOT, and BEXP) variables, risk 
management committee meeting (RMCM) and risk management practice and disclosure 
(RMPD) show significance impact on firm performance under the regression result for 
banks. Whereas, three other board attributes (BSZ, BCOMP, and BEXP), two risk 
management committee structure (RMCS and RMCM) variables illustrate the 
significance for nonbanks financial service firms. Therefore, this shows that there is no 
significant difference between banks and nonbanks financial service firms in the 
application of the NCCG 2011. Consequently, the revision of the CG code in Nigeria in 
2011 seems to make a significant impact on the performance of listed financial service 
firms in Nigeria as is shown by the regression result. Thus, this provides evidence of the 
strength and improvement in the NCCG 2011. Lastly, the next chapter presents a 














This chapter presents the summary and conclusion of the overall thesis. The main 
purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between CG mechanisms (board 
attributes and risk management) and firm performance in Nigeria. To achieve this 
objective, a brief background of Nigeria has been presented to provide an understanding 
of the vital fundamental issues. A sample of 45 quoted financial service companies in 
Nigeria for five years (2012 to 2016) for data collection were used. Additionally, 
previous related studies and theories (agency and resource dependence theory) have 
been reviewed to provide a scientific foundation for building the relationship between 
firm performance and CG mechanisms as well as developing the research framework. 
Nine hypotheses (subdivided into twenty-seven) have been prepared based on 
theoretical arguments. Lastly, a discussion of methods and results of hypothesis testing 
in relating firm performance and CG mechanisms was presented. Specifically, the rest 
of this chapter is organized into the following: section 5.2 provides the summary of the 
study, while section 5.3 presents the implications of the study findings. Limitation of 
the study is discussed in section 5.4, whereas suggestion for future research is presented 









5.2 Summary of the Study 
 
The motivation of this study was based on the issues stemming from the conflict of 
interests prevailing between the shareholders and management within the system of the 
corporate governance structure of any environment. However, this may influence the 
performances of companies (for example financial institutions) in various economies, 
including those in Nigeria. In mitigating the agency conflict that exists between 
shareholders and managers, several CG mechanisms have been recommended, which 
include; board characteristics, risk management characteristics to mention but a few (see 
Abdurrouf, 2011; Berle & Means, 1932; Bozec, 2005; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Saibaba & Ansari, 2011).   
 
Moreover, it is presumed that the financial reliability and stability, and profitability of a 
business solely depends on the process and practice of its corporate governance, and 
with effective corporate governance in operation, it is expected that the long-term value 
of stakeholders will be enhanced (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2002). Similarly, 
a crucial and valuable stair in constructing and encouraging market confidence, 
alongside more stable and long-term investment flows, depends mainly on good 
established corporate governance (Barbu & Bocean, 2007). It is further argued that 
investors often ensure that a business is financially reliable and stable and that long-
term profit generation is guaranteed before investing in a given venture (Millan, 2007). 
 
Relatively, investors go after a company with a better performance because it is the 
essential requirement for an organizational survival and growth (Kakanda et al., 2016a), 






willing to make investments in a more profitable firm, investors are also ready to make 
efficiency investments in a company with effective corporate governance (Stanwick, 
2008). To achieve the objective of mitigating the agency conflict, the board of directors 
is considered as the most significant CG mechanism that is saddled with the 
responsibility of overseeing the decisions of the executives (Al-Manseer et al., 2012, 
Kakanda, Salim, & Chandren, 2017). The main duty of the board is to direct the overall 
activities of the corporation in a more cautious and proactive way, since they are the 
highest authority in the decision-making process, and their directives to the organization 
enable a regular return to the shareholders (Topal & Dogan, 2014). The effectiveness of 
CG practice to alleviate the agency conflict and to improve firm performance is still an 
issue among various companies' stakeholders from a developed or emerging economy. 
 
Nevertheless, prior studies have found that CG characteristics have an influence on the 
performance of firms, although with mixed findings (Abdulla, & Smith, 2015; Abdul-
Qadir & Kwanbo, 2012; Afrifa & Tauringana, 2015; Al-Matari et al., 2014a; Arora & 
Sharma, 2016; Arouri et al., 2014; Elyasiani & Zhang, 2015; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Gill 
& Obradovich, 2012; Guest, 2009; Hauser, 2013; Liang et al., 2013; Marn & Romuald, 
2012; Narwal & Jindal, 2015; O’Connel & Cramer, 2010; Ogege & Boloupremo, 2014; 
Pamburai et al., 2015; Peter & David, 2014; Reguera_Alvarado & Bravo, 2017; Vafeas, 
1999; Velnampy & Pratheepkanth, 2013). Yet, these studies have failed to establish a 
relationship between risk management committee structure, risk management practice 
and firm performance. Therefore, this study extends previous research by examining the 
influence of CG mechanisms (concentrating on board attributes, risk management 
committee characteristics, and risk management practice and disclosure) on firm 






environment that quietly differs from developed markets on the system of capital 
markets, legal requirements, and political, social, and cultural settings.  
 
The data utilized in this study was extracted from the annual reports and accounts of 
forty-five listed financial service firms from 2012 to 2016 (amassing a total of 225 firm-
year observations). Make this study more unique, a robustness check was conducted by 
separating the samples into banks and nonbanks financial service firms in Nigeria. This 
segregation enables an investigation into how CG practice affects performance in listed 
financial service firms in Nigeria. This is important as the NCCG 2011 is playing a 
significant role in determining the performance of quoted banks and nonbanks financial 
service firms in Nigeria. Primarily, the concentration of this study is on the impact of 
board attributes, risk management committee structure and risk management practice 
and disclosure, on the performance of listed financial service firms in Nigeria.    
 
As a review, this study has four objectives that include: (1) To determine the extent of 
disclosure of risk management practice by the listed financial service firms in Nigeria; 
(2) To ascertain the relationship between board attributes (board size, board 
composition, board meetings, CEO tenure, and board expertise) and performance of 
listed financial service firms in Nigeria; (3) To assess the relationship between risk 
management committee structure (risk management committee size, risk management 
committee composition, and risk management committee meetings) and performance of 
listed financial service firms in Nigeria; and (4) To examine the relationship between 
risk management practices and disclosure and performance of listed financial service 
firms in Nigeria. Moreover, three groups of hypotheses were developed to examine the 






investigated the relationship between board attributes and firm performance. The second 
group with nine hypotheses examined the relationship between risk management 
committee structure and firm performance. While the third group with three hypotheses 
focused on the relationship between risk management practice and disclosure and firm 
performance.  
 
In side by side with the stated objectives of the study, this study puts on board to provide 
empirical answers to four major research questions that are restated as thus: (1) What is 
the extent of disclosure of risk management practice by listed financial service firms in 
Nigeria? (2) What is the relationship between board attributes (board size, board 
composition, board meetings, CEO tenure, and board expertise) and performance of 
listed financial service firms in Nigeria? (3) What is the relationship between risk 
management committee structure (risk management committee size, risk management 
committee composition, and risk management committee meetings) with the 
performance of listed financial service firms in Nigeria? (4) What is the relationship 
between risk management practice and disclosure and performance of listed financial 
service firms in Nigeria?  
 
For the research question one in this study, descriptive and univariate analyses were 
conducted to offer an empirical answer. The first descriptive result for the full sample 
shows that risk management practice and disclosure (RMPD) has a mean value of 5.31, 
which indicates that the disclosure of risk management practice in Nigeria is strong since 
5.31 falls within the rating of RMPD intensity as; ‘strong disclosure’. Further, when the 
sample was divided into banks and nonbanks, the finding on RMPD remains consistency 






which indicates a strong disclosure of risk management practices in the Nigerian 
financial service firms. On a yearly basis (2012 to 2016), the result is not that different 
from the full sample, only that in the year 2012 (take-off year of implementing 
disclosure of RMPD) the mean value being 4.20, indicating that there was a moderate 
disclosure of risk management practice. In years 2013 to 2016, the mean values are 5.27, 
5.33, 6.24, and 5.49 respectively, signifying that there was a strong disclosure of risk 
management practice by the listed financial service firm in Nigeria.  
 
Consistently, the second descriptive statistics result (frequency distribution) of RMPD 
intensity shows that there is a very strong disclosure of risk management practice by 
listed financial service firms in Nigeria. In summary, moderate disclosure has 21.78%, 
strong disclosure has 62.22%, and very strong disclosure has a score of 16%. In total, 
strong disclosure has a score of 78.22% (62.22+16), demonstrating that listed financial 
service firms in Nigeria have strongly disclosed information of their risk and 
management practices. However, considering the univariate analysis (t-test), the result 
shows that there is no significant difference in risk management practice and disclosure 
(RMPD) between banks and nonbanks financial service companies in Nigeria.   
Therefore, this indicates that the requirement of the 2011 revised CG code is highly 
accepted and considered by the listed financial service firm in Nigeria.  
 
In answering the second research question in this study, the regression results show that 
both collectively and singularly, board attribute variables influence the performance of 
listed financial service firms in Nigeria in all the three models (ROA, ROE, and MTB). 
The regression results showed the goodness of fit in all the estimations of board attribute 






Collectively, hypothesis H1 (a, b, and c) is supported because board size (BSZ) has a 
significant positive effect on performance (all the three models), which is line with the 
expectation of agency theory. This portrays that larger board size leads to better firm 
performance. This result might be due to the fact that larger board size may increases 
the board effectiveness in terms of skills and experience, and with a bunch of ideas that 
can provide an improved performance.   
 
Hypothesis H2 (a, b, and c) is partially supported because board composition (BCOMP) 
has significant, but negative effect on all the three performance measurements (ROA, 
ROE, and MTB). This result is contrary to the expectation of agency theory which 
argues that the involvement of non-executive directors in overseeing managers' 
activities may help to reduce agency costs and enhances performance. Specifically, the 
reason for this significant negative effect may be due to the reason that outside directors 
have no adequate time, knowledge and skills to perform the functions required of them 
effectively since they are not involved in the day-to-day running of the business.  
 
 Board meeting (BMT) was found to be significant, positively related to ROA and MTB, 
and negatively related to ROE. Therefore, hypothesis H3 (a, b, and c) is not supported. 
This has also moved in opposite direction with agency theory. The reason for this result 
might be that the limited time the directors have to spend together is not usually utilized 
for brainstorming among themselves. More so, most agendas of board meetings are set 
by the CEOs and other directors could not spare extra productive time to control over 
the management and spent most of their times on routine issues which limit vital 
opportunities to the directors. The tenure for the chief executive officer (CEOT) was 






insignificant on MTB. Collectively, this result has supported hypothesis H4 (a and b). 
the result has also concords with the assumptions of agency and resource dependence 
theories which state that the longer tenured CEO is deemed to understand the economic 
environment better, and hence, helps to boost the efficiency and performance of a firm. 
The justification for this result might be due to high dedication be the CEOs in 
discharging their responsibility as agents of the shareholders. In addition, it might be 
that the CEOs have shares in the ownership structure of their companies. This will make 
them perform effectively since they know that they have a stake (investments) in the 
company they are serving. Hence, the reason for better performance.  
 
The last variable for board attribute is board expertise (BEXP), which was found to have 
a significant, but negative impact on firm performance (ROA, ROE, and MTB). As a 
result, hypothesis H5 (a, b, and c) is partially supported. This result has contradicted the 
assumption of resource dependence theory which argues that directors serving on boards 
of several companies will have more experience and become beneficial to the success 
of organizations. The reason for this outcome might be that directors will multiple 
directorships will be busy with discharging their responsibilities in other firms, 
consequently consuming much of their time that will stop them from discharging their 
duties effectively.      
 
For the third research question, the result indicates that one of the risk management 
structure variables shows a significant negative association with performance, another 
one shows a positive, but insignificant effect on performance, while the third variable 
shows a significant positive effect on performance. Precisely, risk management 






performance (ROA, ROE, and ROE). In light of this, hypothesis H6 (a, b, and c) is 
partially supported. The reason for this may stem from high administrative costs 
expended by the companies in running the affairs of members of the committee since it 
is believed that larger number of every board members are associated with a high 
administrative cost that diminishes a firm's profitability. Moreover, it might be due to 
lack of experience of the committee members of the nature of the risk involved, or due 
to a shady understanding of uncertainties surrounding the business environment. 
 
However, risk management committee composition (RMCC) was found to have a 
positive, but insignificant effect on all the three performance measurements in this 
study. For this reason, hypothesis H7 (a, b, and c) is not supported. This outcome might 
be due to absence of actual independence of the board which might have been hindered 
by a powerful CEO, lack of adequate experience and skill to tackle environmental 
uncertainties, mismatch of committee members, and composition of older and/or less 
effective or productive individuals, lack of effective communication flow from top 
management to committee members or between members. On the other hand, risk 
management committee meeting (RMCM) was found to be positive and significantly 
associated with performance (ROA, ROE, and MTB), hence hypothesis H8 (a, b, and c) 
is supported. The reason behind this result might be that various number of meetings 
were held during the period under review as evidenced in the descriptive statistics result, 
since the Nigerian business environment became volatile due several reasons like, 
recession, change in government monetary policy, recession, and social unrest due the 







For the fourth research question that involves only one independent variable, the result 
indicates that risk management practice and disclosure was found to have a significant 
negative effect on performance (ROA and MTB), and insignificant negative effect on 
MTB. Together, hypothesis H9 (a, b, and c) is partially supported. The reason for this 
result might be due to high administrative costs attached to information disclosure 
related to risk management practice by the companies which are expected to generate a 
positive return might not be commensurate to the returns if the users of such information 
do not use it for the purpose expected. Moreover, lack of proper utilization of the 
disclosed information by the investors may lead to a negative or insignificant impact on 
a company's returns.   
 
5.3 Implications of the Study Findings     
 
There is stream of studies that relate corporate governance mechanisms with firm 
performance in various economic environments (for instance, Abdul-Qadir & Kwanbo, 
2012; Abdulla, & Smith, 2015; Abraham & Shrive, 2014; Afrifa & Tauringana, 2015; 
Al-Matari et al., 2014a; Amran et al., 2008; Arora & Sharma; 2016; Arouri et al., 2014; 
Buckby et al., 2015; Chechet Jnr., & Akanet, 2013; Dabarin & Saidin, 2015; Elyasiani 
& Zhang, 2015; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Gill et al., 2012; Guest, 2009; Joe et al., 2011; 
Liang et al., 2013; Marn & Romuald, 2012; Vafeas, 1999; Wong, 2012). However, 
despite the stream of studies conducted on CG mechanisms and firm performance, yet, 
there is inconsistency in their findings and there is an absence of empirical evidence on 
the relationship between risk management structure, risk management practice and firm 






Therefore, this study fills this vacuum by examining the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms (board characteristics, risk management committee structure, 
and risk management practice and disclosure) and performance of listed financial 
service firms in Nigeria from 2012 to 2016. Based on the presented findings in the 
foregoing section, the implication of this study to theory, to practice, to various 
companies’ stakeholders, and its implication to the academia are presented in the 
coming sections.  
 
5.3.1 Implication of the Findings to Theory   
 
Past studies relate corporate governance mechanisms with firm performance supporting 
from the agency theory perspective (Denis & McConnell, 2003; Eisenhardt,1989; Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) and resource 
dependence theory (Boyd, 1990; Hillman et al., 2009; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Johnson & Greening, 1999; Nicholson & Kiel, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Sing et 
al., 1986; Williams, 1984), yet, the theories are not without contra position.  
 
Firstly, the result of this study indicates that the size of the board of directors influences 
the performance of quoted financial service firms in Nigeria. This corroborates with 
agency theory that a larger board size ensures an effective and efficient monitoring of 
management which reduces the power of the CEO on corporate board of directors, and 
therefore enhances firm performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Singh & Harianto, 1989; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989). By the same token, this result has supported resource 
dependence theory that a larger board size leads to diversity that would assist 






enhance directors’ oversight function, and guarantee effective decisions by management 
(de Villiers et al., 2011; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Pearce & 
Zahra, 1992; Pfeffer, 1987). Consequently, both agency theory and resource dependence 
theory are supported by the finding of this study in regards to the board of directors' size 
in the Nigerian environment. 
 
Secondly, the result of this study shows an insignificant negative effect of board 
composition on firm performance. This does not support the postulates of agency theory 
that nonexecutive directors are effective overseers of managerial activities (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983), and that a corporate board that is dominated by a large number of 
nonexecutive directors are in a better position to operate in the best interest of 
shareholders, and improve firm performance via effective oversight functions on the 
management (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). Therefore, this result could be a 
signification that might have been influenced by the managerial power within the board, 
meaning that the board is dominated by a powerful CEO. In like manner, nonexecutive 
directors (who do not have the requisite skill and experience) might have been appointed 
based on political or social affiliations to serve on the board, hence, resulting in negative 
impact on the practices of CG and performance due to the absence of cooperation and 
effective communication. Explicitly, agency theory regarding board composition is not 
supported in Nigerian environment and specifically in listed financial service firms.    
 
Thirdly, the outcome of this study portrays that board meeting (BMT) has an 
insignificant effect on firm performance. This result does not support agency theory 
which highlights that corporate board of directors exhibit significant abilities in terms 






performance of firms where there is a higher frequency of board meetings. However, 
the result of this study reveals that CEO tenure has a significant positive influence on 
firm performance. Therefore, this result is consistent with both agency theory and 
resource dependence theory which presume that a longer tenured CEO is deemed to 
understand the economic environment better, and hence, aids to boost the efficiency and 
performance of the firm. The support for this theory in Nigeria might be due to the 
volatile nature of the Nigerian business environment, which requires an experienced and 
skilful manager that knows about the uncertainties surrounding the economic setting. 
 
Markedly, the result of this study delineates that board expertise does not positively 
influence the performance of listed financial service firms as expected by the postulation 
of resource dependence theory. In this effect, resource dependence theory which argues 
that directors holding multiple positions (board expertise) on several boards rely on 
external resources with the view to assist in enhancing firm performance (Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003), is not supported. This result may emanate from lack of understanding 
by the directors with multiple directorships on how the business of the company is been 
operated since a director with multiple directorships will be busy trying to fulfill his/her 
obligations and commitments with the boards of various companies, it may, therefore, 
become difficult to have full understanding of how various companies operate especially 
if they are not within the same industry. In addition, it might be due to the failure of the 
boards to appoint directors with the right mix of skill and competencies to deliver what 
is required of them by the investors or inability of the directors to personally identify 
and address issues on the board's competencies and ways to maintain and enhance it.  In 
response to this, resource dependence theory is not supported in the Nigerian 






For the risk management committee structure, the result of this study shows that it is in 
support of agency theory since risk management committee meeting has a significant 
positive influence on firm performance. Agency theory postulates that the more 
regularity of board meetings, the more likely of an organization to obtain high 
performance because board meetings attendance is the basic medium via which board 
of directors obtained vital information needed to carry out their functions. Consequently, 
agency theory is supported in the Nigerian environment regarding risk management 
committee meetings of quoted financial service firms in Nigeria. Nevertheless, risk 
management committee size (RMCS) and risk management committee composition 
(RMCC) do not support agency theory and resource dependence theory because RMCS 
has significant negative effect on performance, while RMCC has an insignificant 
positive effect on performance. 
 
Equally important, the result of this study shows that risk management practice and 
disclosure has a significant effect on firm performance. This result is contrary to the 
postulation of agency theory that disclosure of information on corporate risk reduces 
monitoring costs (Hemrit & Arab, 2011), which ensures that information is provided in 
the annual reports of companies (Depoers, 2000). The disclosure of corporate 
information enables investors to make various decisions on a company. Even though 
there is strong disclosure of risk management practice of listed financial service firm in 
Nigeria, yet, the result does not support agency theory in terms of its influence on 
performance. The reason behind this result might be due to the excessive administrative 
costs associated with production and disclosing of important information in their annual 
reports. And lack of judicious utilization of such information may have a negative 






More importantly, this study contributes to the corporate governance and firm 
performance theories (agency and resource dependence) by describing board size, CEO 
tenure, and risk management committee meeting as significant mechanisms of corporate 
governance for ameliorating the agency of conflict between the corporate managers and 
shareholders and for provision of good understanding of environmental uncertainties, 
which will help in reducing agency and administrative costs, and ultimately influences 
performance of firms. Therefore, the utilization of agency theory and resource 
dependence theory in relating corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance 
cannot be overlooked.  
 
5.3.2 Implication of the Findings to Practice    
 
The results of this study have immense importance to regulators, shareholders, corporate 
managers, and the general public. The regulatory authorities in Nigeria are saddled with 
the responsibility of ensuring adequate compliance to effective CG practice by publicly 
traded companies. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and friendly 
regulatory authorities in Nigeria will find the results of this study indispensable in 
developing new or updating the existing CG regulatory reforms and firm performance 
issues. For instance, the result of this study shows that board composition has significant 
negative effect on firm performance, and this is not supported by the corporate 
governance code in Nigeria. This depicts that despite the number of outside directors on 
the boards of listed financial service firms, yet, there is no evidence of the outside 
directors dominating the boards since they have no significant positive effect on 
performance. Moreover, it can be argued that outside directors do not bring their 






dominated by the CEOs. Therefore, there is a need by the regulatory authorities 
concerned to appraise the behaviour and actions of the outside directors on various 
boards to matters relating to performance and examine the possible reason(s) hindering 
their independence in making decisions that may enhance firms’ performance.  
 
The frequency of board meeting displays insignificant relationship with the performance 
of listed financial service firms in Nigeria. The implication of this result is that the 
performance of the sample firms does not depend on the frequency of meetings they 
held during an accounting period. This means that the board may be busy discussion 
other issues which are not beneficial to the progress of the firm. For this reason, 
authorities concerned need to scrutinized as to the possible reasons why the frequency 
of board meetings remained incommensurate to firm performance. A better 
understanding of this could aid in future CG reforms in Nigerian environment.  
 
In the same vein, the result of this study does not support the presence of directors with 
multiple directorships (busy directors) on the board of listed financial service firms in 
Nigeria since the outcome shows a negative association between board expertise and 
performance. The busy directors who are highly paid by firms, may not have the 
required time to effectively discharge their full responsibilities since they will be busy 
with the affairs of several boards. Consequently, regulatory authorities should inquire 
into the attitudes and performance of busy directors, identify other possible reasons for 
their insignificant effect on performance, and make reviews on the CG reform that could 







Risk management committee size is significant and negatively associated with firm 
performance. The size of risk management committee does not show any evidence of 
their magnitude in improving the performance of listed financial service firms in 
Nigeria. The size of the committee might be cost consuming since the mean of RMCS 
is 5 and a maximum of 14 members. This size might be a mere number of individuals 
with no knowledge and skill to tackle environmental risks and uncertainties surrounding 
the business. In this respect, there is a need to further examine as to the reason(s) for the 
negative impact of risk management committee size on performance, and devise any 
means if possible to overcome the issue since the revised CG code is at its rudimentary 
level. 
 
Relatively, the finding of this study indicates that risk management committee 
composition is not significantly related to firm performance. The nonexecutive directors 
have not shown any evidence of their presence on the boards in bettering the 
performance of listed financial service firms in Nigeria. This may result from 
mismatched of committee members, ineffective communication flow from top 
management to committee members, and unskillful and inexperienced members who 
might have appointed to the board based on their political or social affiliations. The 
concerned regulatory authorities in Nigeria should further investigate why the 
composition of risk management committee remain ineffective in enhancing 
performance. An understanding of this could assist the authorities concerned to further 
know the real appointed criteria for committee members and could know the attitude of 
nonexecutive directors within the committee. This could ultimately help in the future 







The finding of this study signifies that risk management practice and disclosure is 
associated with poor firm performance. This indicates that disclosures of risk 
management practices by the listed financial service firms in Nigeria have no any 
favorable influence on their performances. This may be due to the high cost associated 
with information disclosure, underutilization of the information disclosed, and high 
relatively time required to understand the content of the information disclosed. There is 
a need to further investigate by the regulatory authorities into the cause of this negative 
effect of risk management practice and disclosure on firm performance. Because this 
result has gone against the expectation of the revised code that disclosure of risk 
management practice may improve performance. Therefore, the regulatory authorities 
should if possible investigate the process of information disclosure on risk management 
practice from the firm to the ultimate users, so that if necessary, reviews to the revised 
CG code can be made effectively. 
 
Generally, the result of this study has provided immense information to the relevant 
authorities to effective corporate governance practice in Nigeria. The information is 
about the effectiveness of board attributes, risk management committee structure, and 
risk management practices and disclosure, and the performance of listed financial 
service firms in Nigeria. By this, the authorities concerned will know the effectiveness 
of the 2011 revised CG code as well as the extent of its application by Nigerian listed 
firms, which may serve as a basis for evaluation and review of future corporate 
governance reforms in Nigeria.        







5.3.3 Implication of the Findings to Various Company Stakeholders   
 
The findings of this study could be of significant relevance to the decisions of various 
companies’ stakeholders that include; shareholders, corporate managers, and the general 
public (financial analysts, potential investors etc.). The significant negative effect of 
board composition and board expertise and the insignificant effect of board meetings on 
performance portrays an unresponsive attitude of the non-executive directors, the 
executive directors, and multiple directorships toward firm performance. Therefore, this 
result provides the shareholders with a vital information on the relevance of non-
executive directors on the boards of their companies especially on mitigating the conflict 
of interest between corporate managers and shareholders. With this result, the 
shareholders are also in a better position to know how is the frequent meetings of the 
board is affecting their expectations, despite the huge amounts of money that companies 
usually spend during board meetings. This will enable them (shareholders) to take 
proactive measures in dealing with board meeting issues. 
 
Equally, the shareholders will find the result of this study indispensable in knowing the 
usefulness of risk management committee size, risk management committee 
composition, and risk management practice and disclosure, since they are at their 
rudimentary stage and have portrayed a significant negative effect as well as the 
insignificant effect on their firms' performances. Hence, the information will assist them 
(shareholders) in having more understanding of the effectiveness of their compliance to 








To corporate managers, the findings of this study will assist them in knowing the 
relationship between the board attributes variables, risk management committee 
structure variables, risk management practice and disclosure and firm performance. This 
will help the management in performance evaluation of their activities toward achieving 
the predetermined objectives of their firms. In other respects, this study contributes to 
the general public, especially financial analysts and investors. To the financial analysts, 
whose activities are mostly utilized by potential investors, will employ the results of this 
study to appraise the level of performance and that of corporate governance 
effectiveness in the Nigerian financial institutions. Moreover, the information on the 
intensity of disclosure on risk management practices of the listed financial service firms 
in Nigerian and how it is related to performance will serve as a basis for gauging a more 
transparent company, and as a yardstick for investment decisions by potential investors.                    
 
5.3.4 Implication of the Findings to Academia  
 
The findings of this study are of paramount importance to the academic community by 
adding value to the existing literature. In this sense, the study has provided important 
information to the literature by examining the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and performance in the Nigerian financial institutions. Thus, 
information on the nature of Nigerian market as well as the effectiveness of its 
(Nigerian) corporate governance practice can be easily obtained. Furthermore, since this 
study examines the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, by 
specifically contributing to the relationship between risk management committee 
structure and risk management practice and disclosure with firm performance, it 






Service firms or other listed companies in Nigeria and beyond. For this reason, the 
finding of this study is an added value to the academic communities and will function 
as a reference material and a basis for future scholars intending to explore the 
relationship between board attributes, risk management structure, risk management 
practice and disclosure and firm performance especially regarding financial institutions.            
 
5.4 Limitation of the Study     
 
Despite the contributions made by this study in establishing a relationship between 
board attributes, risk management committee structure, risk management practice and 
disclosure and firm performance in the Nigerian financial service firms, yet, the study 
has some limitations associated with it. First, in terms of domain, the study only dwells 
on the listed financial service firms while ignoring other sectors that are playing a 
significant role in the growth and development of the Nigerian economy. Thereupon, 
generalizing the result of this study may be difficult since the effectiveness of the 2011 
revised CG code especially on risk management structure and risk management practice 
and disclosure are yet to be explored on other quoted nonfinancial firms in Nigeria. In 
like manner, generalizing this result in other African economies may be complicated 
due to the existing disparities in socioeconomic characteristics, CG codes, political 
settings, company laws, and other legislations that may affect a company’s operations 
and performance.  
 
Additionally, this study considers only CEO tenure among the various characteristics of 
the CEO that include; CEO duality, the age of the CEO, CEO ownership, educational 






performance of firms. Besides, no attempt has been made by this study to examine the 
activities of the board of directors during their meetings which have been reported to 
have an influence on company performance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Although, 
information on board meeting activities was not provided in the annual reports of the 
sampled companies in this study. Moreover, this study has failed to scan into other 
features of risk management committee composition like; financial expert in the 
committee, educational level of committee members, and professional affiliations of 
members of the committee which may be as determinants of the committee functions 
that may ultimately influence performance.         
 
This study concentrates only on the disclosures of risk management practices without 
elaborating on the different available types of risk (for instance., market risk, liquidity 
risk, credit risk etc.), which may influence the performance of firms. Further, this study 
fails to establish the relationship between board attributes and disclosures of risk 
management practices, since it has been documented that board characteristics affect 
firm’s disclosure (J.F. Solomon et al., 2000; Pantamee, 2014). Also, this study collected 
data from annual reports which were primarily produced not for the researcher's 
purpose, but to fulfil the requirements of the law and various company stakeholders. As 
such, the data may have suffered from subjectivity from the preparers of the companies’ 
annual reports.  
 
5.5 Suggestions for Future Research   
 
It has been established that this study has contributed a lot to theory, to practice, to 






setbacks. Therefore, based on the identified flaws, this study has made some suggestions 
for future research in this promising area of academic endeavor. First, future research 
can replicate this study by examining the effect of board attributes, risk management 
committee structure, risk management practice and disclosure and firm performance in 
other sectors and /or other environments. This will assist in comparing the result of this 
study with the findings of similar studies, which could help generalization of the current 
study findings. 
  
At the same time, future studies can also extend this study by adding variables of CEO 
characteristics such as; CEO age, CEO ownership, CEO educational qualification and 
social ties and relate them with performance. In the same line, future studies can explore 
other features of risk management committee composition like; financial expertise, 
educational level, and professional affiliations of the committee members. More so, the 
relationship between board attributes variables and risk management practice and 
disclosure can be established by future research since it has been reported that board 
characteristics influence corporate disclosure. Finally, similar future studies can 
establish a relationship between the different types of risk like; market risk, liquidity 




It is evidenced that there is a stream of studies on corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm performance from different economies (developed and emerging). However, 
the majority of these researches were conducted in the developed countries like the UK, 






developed political environment. Although, there are also studies on corporate 
governance in other continents like Asia, Mediterranean, and Africa, not as much as 
those from the developed nations. Nevertheless, these studies pay less attention in 
establishing a relationship between risk management structure, risk management 
practice and disclosure and firm performance. Therefore, this study extends prior studies 
on CG mechanisms and performance by examining the relationship between board 
attributes (board size, board composition, board meeting, CEO tenure, and board 
expertise), risk management committee structure (risk management committee size, risk 
management committee composition, and risk management committee meeting), risk 
management practice and disclosure and performance of listed financial service firms 
in Nigeria spanning from year 2012 to 2016.  
 
The outcome of this study has provided evidence that board attributes have significant 
positive, significant negative, and insignificant (positive to negative) relationship with 
firm performance. As an example, the result displayed a significant positive relationship 
between board size with CEO tenure and firm performance. While board composition 
and board expertise showed a significant negative relationship with firm performance. 
Whereas, board meeting shows an insignificant positive effect on ROA and MTB and 
insignificant negative effect on ROE. This means that board attributes have mixed effect 
on the performance of listed financial service firms in Nigeria.   
 
The result of risk management structure shows that risk management committee meeting 
has significant positive effect, risk management committee composition has an 
insignificant positive effect, while risk management committee size has significant 






the result of this study has shown that risk management practice and disclosure has 
significant negative effect on firm performance regardless of the strong disclosure 
intensity of risk management practices in Nigeria. Hence, this study has suggested that 
the regulatory authorities concerned in Nigeria should assess the behavior and actions 
of the outside directors on various boards to matters relating to performance, and 
examine the possible reason(s) hindering their independence in making decisions that 
may enhance firms’ performance, as it will augment their (directors) roles on the board.  
 
Supplementary to the foregoing, the study also recommends that the regulatory 
authorities in Nigeria should inquire into the attitudes and performance of busy 
directors, identify other possible reasons for their insignificant effect on performance, 
and make reviews on the CG reforms that could tackle the matter. Relatively, the study 
also suggested that further inquiry as to why the composition of risk management 
committee remains ineffective in enhancing performance should be carried out by the 
regulatory authorities to the effectiveness of CG reforms in Nigeria. Further, the study 
suggested that the regulatory authorities should if possible investigate the process of 
information disclosure on risk management practice from the firm to the ultimate users 
so that if necessary, reviews to the NCCG 2011 can be made effectively. 
 
On a final note, the finding of this study indicates that there is an improvement in the 
performance of financial service firms in Nigeria due to the improvement in the 
application of corporate governance practice especially on the board attributes, risk 
management committee structure, and disclosures of risk management practices in the 
Nigerian financial institutions. This reveals that the NCCG 2011 has out-shined the 






lead to its revision in 2011. Despite the improvement of the NCCG 2011, the regulatory 
authorities to CG reforms in Nigeria should as a need, carry out performance evaluation 
on the application of the existing code, and make reviews on grey areas (for example, 
board meetings and risk management committee composition) that need to be upgraded 
especially in the Nigerian institutions.    
 






















A Review of Nigerian Stock Exchange in 2015 (2017, January 7), PM News. Retrieved 
from www.pmnewsnigeria.com  
Abdul Rahman, R., & Mohamed, A. F. H. (2006). Board, Audit Committee, Culture and 
Earnings Management: Malaysian Evidence. Managerial Auditing Journal, 
21(7) 783-804.  
Abdullah, M., Abdul Shukor, Z., Mohammed, Z. M., & Ahmad, A. (2015). Risk 
management disclosure: A study on the effect of voluntary risk management 
disclosure toward firm value. Journal of Applied Accounting Research, 16(3), 
400-432. 
Abdullah, S. N. (2004). Board composition, CEO duality and performance among 
Malaysian listed companies. Corporate Governance, 4(4), 47-61.  
Abdul-Qadir, B. A., & Kwanbo, L. M. (2012). Corporate Governance and Financial 
Performance of Banks in the Post-Consolidation Era in Nigeria. International 
Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies, 4(2), 27-36. 
Abdurrouf, M. A. (2011). The relationship between corporate governance and value of 
the firm in developing countries: Evidence from Bangladesh. The International 
Journal of Applied Economics and Finance, 5(3), 237-244. 
Abraham, S., & Cox, P. (2007). Analyzing the determinants of narrative risk 
information in UK FTSE 100 annual reports. The British Accounting Review, 






Abraham, S., & Shrives, P. J. (2014). Improving the relevance of risk factor disclosure 
in corporate annual reports. The British accounting review, 46(1), 91-107. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2013.10.002.  
Abuja Securities and Commodity Exchange, ASCE, (2016).” Brief of the Exchange” 
Retrieved 23/04/2016 from http://www.abujacomex.com/.  
Aburime, T. U., Gannon, G. L., & Corrado, C. J. (2011). How long should bank CEOs 
continue? Evidence from Nigeria. Social Science Research Network, 1-137. 
Adams, J., Khan, H. T., Raeside, R., & White, D. (2007). Research methods for 
graduate business and social science students. SAGE Publications India.  
Adams, R., & Mehran, H. (2003). Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding 
Companies? Economic Policy Review, 9, 123-142. 
Adekunle, O. A., Salami, G. O., & Adedipe, O. A. (2013). Impact of Financial Sector 
Development on the Nigerian Economic Growth, American Journal of Business 
and Management, 2(4), 347-356. DOI: 10.11634/216796061302361.    
Adelegan, O. J.  (2009). Does Corporate Leadership Matter? Evidence from Nigeria. 
African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi, AERC Research Paper 189, 
1-42.    
Adenikinju, O. (2012). Managerial characteristics, corporate governance and corporate 
performance: The case of Nigerian quoted companies. AERC Research Paper 
241 African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi (August, 2012). Retrieved 






Aderibigbe, J. (2004). An Overview of the Nigerian Financial System, Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) Bullion, 28(1). 
Adrian, T. (2009). Essential for Board of Directors: An A-Z Guide, Bloomberg Press, 
New York, ISBN 978-1-57660-354-3.  
Aebi, V., Sabato, G., & Schmid, M. (2012). Risk management, corporate governance, 
and bank performance in the financial crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance, 
36(12), 3213-3226. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.10.020.  
Afolabi, A. A. (2015). Examining Corporate Governance Practices in Nigerian and 
South African Firms, European Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance 
Research, 3(1), 10-29.  
Afrifa, G. A., & Tauringana, V. (2015). Corporate governance and performance of UK 
listed small and medium enterprises. Corporate Governance, 15(5), 719-733. 
Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. R. (1996). Firm performance and mechanisms to control 
agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of financial and 
quantitative analysis, 31(103), 377-397. 
Akbar, A. (2015). THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM IN 
OPTIMIZING FIRM PERFORMANCE: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR 
CORPORATE SECTOR OF PAKISTAN. Journal of Asian Business Strategy, 
5(6), 109-115. 
Akhigbe, A., & Martin, A. D. (2006). Valuation impact of Sarbanes–Oxley: Evidence 
from disclosure and governance within the financial services industry. Journal 






Akingunola, R. O., Adekunle, O. A., & Adedipe, O. A. (2013). Corporate governance 
and bank’s performance in Nigeria (Post–Bank’s Consolidation). European 
Journal of Business and Social Sciences, 2(8), 89-111. 
Akintoye, I. R. (2008). Effect of capital structure on firms’ performance: The Nigerian 
experience. European Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative 
Sciences, 10, 233-243. 
Akpan, E. O., & Amran, N. A. (2014). Board characteristics and company performance: 
Evidence from Nigeria. Journal of Finance and Accounting, 2(3), 81-89. 
Al-Ghamdi, S. A. (2012). Investigation into earnings management practices and the role 
of corporate governance and external audit in emerging markets: empirical 
evidence from Saudi Listed Companies (Doctoral dissertation, Durham 
University). 
Ali, A., & Nasir, S. Bin. (2014). Impact of board characteristics and audit committee on 
financial performance: A study of Manufacturing Sector of Pakistan. Research 
Journal of Finance and Accounting, 5(7), 144-152.  
Aljifri, K., & Moustafa, M. (2007). The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on 
the performance of UAE firms: an empirical analysis. Journal of Economic and 
Administrative Sciences, 23(2), 71-93. 
Al-Manaseer, M. F. A., Al-Hindawi, R. M., Al-Dahiyat, M. A., & Sartawi, I. I. (2012). 
The impact of corporate governance on the performance of Jordanian 






Al-Matari, E. M., Al-Swidi, A. K., & Bt. Fadzil, F. H. (2014a). The Effect on the 
Relationship Between Board of Directors Characteristics on Firm Performance 
in Oman: Empirical Study. Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research, 21(3), 
556-574. DOI: 10.5829/idosi.mejsr.2014.21.03.21410. 
Al-Matari, E. M., Al-Swidi, A. K., & Fadzil, F. H. B. (2014b). The effect of board of 
directors’ characteristics, audit committee characteristics and executive 
committee characteristics on firm performance in Oman: An empirical 
study. Asian Social Science, 10(11), 149. 
Al-Matari, Y. A., Al-Swidi, A. K., & Bt. Fadzil, F. H. (2012). Audit committee 
effectiveness and performance of Saudi Arabia listed companies. Wulfenia 
Journal, 19(8), 169-188. 
Al-Najjar, B. (2013). Corporate governance, tourism growth and firm performance: 
Evidence from publicly listed tourism firms in five Middle Eastern countries. 
Tourism Management, 1-10.  
Al-Najjar, B. (2014). Corporate governance, tourism growth and firm performance: 
Evidence from publicly listed tourism firms in five Middle Eastern countries. 
Tourism Management, 42, 342-35 1. 
Alzharani, A. M., Che Ahmad, A. B., & Aljaaidi, K., S. (2011). An empirical 
investigation of factors associated with firm performance: evidence from 
kingdom of Saudi Arabia. International Conference on E-business, Management 






Amba, S. M. (2013). Does CEO Duality Enhance Firms Business Performance? 
Empirical Evidence from Bahrain. International Journal of Business and Social 
Science, 4(6), 88-91. 
Amran, A., Manaf Rosli Bin, A., & Che Haat Mohd Hassan, B. (2008). Risk reporting: 
An exploratory study on risk management disclosure in Malaysian annual 
reports. Managerial Auditing Journal, 24(1), 39-57.  
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding-family ownership and firm 
performance: evidence from the S&P 50. The journal of finance, 58(3), 1301-
1327.  
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S., & Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board characteristics, accounting 
report integrity, and the cost of debt. Journal of Accounting & Economics. 37(3), 
315-342.  
Andreou, P. C., Louca, C., & Panavides, P. M. (2014). Corporate governance, financial 
management decisions and firm performance: Evidence from maritime industry. 
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 63, 59-
78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2014.01.005.  
Arora, A., & Sharma, C. (2016). Corporate governance and firm performance in 
developing countries: evidence from India. Corporate Governance, 16(2), 420-
436. 
Arouri, H., Hossain, M., & Badrul Muttakin, M. (2014). Effects of ownership structure 
on corporate performance: Evidence from GCC countries. Journal of 






Arslan, O., Karan, M. B., & Eksi, C. (2010). Board Structure and Corporate 
Performance. Managing Global Transitions, 8(1), 3-22.  
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., Collins, D. W., & LaFond, R. (2006). The effects of corporate 
governance on firm’s credit ratings. Journal of accounting and economics, 
42(1), 2003-243. 
Asteriou, D., & Hall, S. G. (2007). Applied econometrics: a random approach using 
Eviews and Microfit. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Baghat, S., & Bolton, B. (2008). Corporate governance and firm performance. Journal 
of Corporate Finance, 14, 257-273. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.03.006. 
Baghat, S., & Bolton, B. (2009). Corporate governance and financial performance: 
Recent Evidence Sanjai Bhagat, 1-57.  
Bailey, D., & Katz, J. N. (2011). Implementing Panel Corrected Standard Errors in R: 
The PCSE Package. Journal of Statistical Software, 42(CS1), 1-11. 
Baltagi, B. H. (2005). Econometric-Analysis of Panel Data (3rd. Ed.). UK: John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd. 
Baltagi, B. H. (2008). Econometric analysis of panel data. (4th ed.).  John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Baltagi, B. H., & Li, Q. (1991). A joint test for serial correlation and random individual 






Baltagi, B. H., & Li, Q. (1995). Testing ar(1) against ma(1) disturbances in an error 
component model. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 133-151.  
Bank for International Settlement (BIS), (2010). Principles for Enhancing Corporate 
Governance Issued by the Basel Committee. Retrieved September 10, 2015 from 
www.bis.org/press/p101004.htm. 
Bank for International Settlement, (2011). Sound Practices for the Management and 
Supervision of Operational Risk. Retrieved July 30, 2016 from (www.bis.org).  
Barbu, C. M., & Bocean, C. G. (2007). Corporate governance and firm performance. 
Management & Marketing-Craiova, 1, 125-131.  
Barde, M. I. (2009). An Evaluation of Accounting Information Disclosure in the Oil and 
Gas Marketing Industry. A PhD Thesis submitted to Bayero University, Kano, 
Nigeria. (Unpublished).  
Barisua, N., Torbira, F., & Lenee, L. (2012). Corporate Governance and Financial 
Performance of Publicly Listed Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria. Reiko 
International Journal of Social and Economic Research (Rijser), 4(4). 
Barungi, B., Ogunyele, E., & Zamba, C. (2015). Nigerian Economic Outlook. Retrieved 
April 06, 2016 from www.africaneconomicoutlook.org. 
Basu, A., Lal, R., Srinivasan, V., & Staelin, R. (1985). Sales-force compensation plans: 
An agency theoretic perspective. Marketing Science, 4, 267-291. 
Bathala, C. T., & Rao, R. P. (1995). The determinants of board composition: An agency 






Baysinger, B., & Hoskisson, R. E. (1990). The Composition of Directors and Strategic 
Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy. The Academy of Management Review, 
15(1), 72-87. 
Bazerman, M. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1983). A limited rationality model of 
interlocking directorates. Academy of Management Review, 8, 206-217.   
Beasley, M. S., Carcello, J. V., Hermanson, D. R., & Lapides, P. D. (2000). Fraudulent 
financial reporting: Consideration of industry traits and corporate governance 
mechanisms. Accounting Horizons, 14(4), 441-454. 
Beattie, V., McInnes, B., & Fearnley, S. (20040. A methodology for analyzing and 
evaluating narratives in annual reports: a comprehensive descriptive profile and 
metrics for disclosure quality attributes. Accounting Forum, 28(3), 205-236.  
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1995). What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-section 
data. American political science review, 89(3), 634-647. 
Beck, N., Katz, J. N., Alvarez, R. M., Garrett, G., & Lange, P. (1993). Government 
partisanship, labor organization, and macroeconomic performance: a 
corrigendum. American Political Science Review, 87(4), 945-948. 
Belkhir, M. (2009). Board of directors’ size and performance in the banking industry. 
International Journal of Managerial Finance, 5(2), 201-221. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17439130910947903.  
Bello, A. (2013). Corporate governance and risk exposure of banks in Nigeria. The 






Benjamin, I. E. (2009). Corporate governance structure and firm performance in 
developing economies: evidence from Nigeria. Corporate Governance: The 
international journal of business in society, 9(3) 231 – 243. 
Beretta, S., & Bozzolan, S. (2004). A framework for the analysis of firm risk 
communication. International Journal of Accounting, 39, 265-288.  
Berger, A. N., & Patti, E. B. D. (2002). Capital Structure and Firm Performance: A new 
Approach to testing agency theory and an Application to the banking Industry 
(Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2002-54). USA: Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, RePEC: Fip:Fedgfe: Retrieved September 20, 
2015 from:  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/Feds/2002/200254/200254pap.pdf . 
Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. 
The McMillan Company, New York, NY.  
Best, R. J. (2004). Market-Based Management: Strategies for Growing Customer Value 
and Profitability (3rd. Ed.). Prentice Hall, Inc. 
Bethel, J. E. (2007). Recent changes in disclosure regulation: Description and 
evidence. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(2), 335-342. 
Bhagat, S. & Black, B. (1999). The uncertain relationship between board composition 
and firm performance. Business Lawyer, 54, 921-963. 
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (2002). The non-correlation between board independence and 






Bhargava, A., Franzini, L., & Narendranathan, W. (1982). Serial correlation and the 
fixed effect model. Review of Economic Studies, 49(4), 533-549.  
Bitzer, J., & Stephan, A. (2007). A Schumpeter-inspired approach to the construction of 
R&D capital stocks. Applied Economics, 39(2), 179-189. 
Blackwell III, J. L. (2005). Estimation and testing of fixed-effect panel-data 
systems. Stata Journal, 5(2), 202-207. 
Bohren, O., & Strom, R. O. (2010). Governance and Politics: Regulating Independence 
and Diversity in the Boardroom. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 
37(9) & (10), 1281-1308. Doi:10.1111/j.1468-5957.2010.02222.x.   
Born, B., & Breitung, J. (2016). Testing for Serial Correlation in Fixed-Effects Panel 
Data Models. Econometric Reviews, 35(7), 1290-1316. 
Boyd, B. (1990). Corporate linkages and organizational environment. A test of the 
resource dependence model. Strategic Management Journal, 11, 419-430. 
Bozcuk, A. E. (2011). Performance effects of outside directors on corporate boards. 
International journal of Business and Social Science, 2(20), 80-84.  
Bozec, R. (2005). Board of Directors, Marketing Discipline and Firm Performance. 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 32(9) & (10), 1921-1960. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0306-686X.2005.00652.x.  
Brennan, N. (2006). Board of Directors and Firm Performance: is there an expectations 






Brennan, N., & McDermott, M. (2004). Alternative perspectives on independence of 
directors. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(3), 325-336. 
Breusch, T. S., & Pagan, A. R. (1980). The Langrange Multiplier Test and its 
Application to Model Specification in Econometrics. Review of Economic 
Studies, 47(1), 239-253.   
Brown, L. D., & Caylor, M. L. (2006). Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation. 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 25(2), 409-434. 
Doi:10.1016/i.iaccpubpol.2006.05.005.   
Buckby, S., Gallery, G., & Ma, J. (2015). An analysis of risk management disclosures: 
Australian evidence. Managerial Auditing Journal, 30(8/9), 812-869. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/MAJ-09-2013-0934.  
Burt, R. (1983). Corporate profits and cooptation. New York: Academic Press. 
Cannella, A. A., & Monroe, M. J. (1997). Contrasting perspectives on strategic leaders: 
Toward a more realistic view of top managers. Journal of Management, 23(3), 
213-237. 
Carter, D. A., D’Souza, F., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2010). The gender and 
ethnic diversity of US boards and board committees and financial performance. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(5), 396-414.  
Central Bank of Nigeria (2010). Financial Stability Report (January 2009-2010) Maiden 








Central Bank of Nigeria, [CBN] (2014). Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and 




Central Bank of Nigeria, CBN, (2015). CURRENCY ‘Issue System’ retrieved 
12/12/2015 from www.cbn.gov.ng.  
Central Bank of Nigeria, CBN, (2016). ‘Financial Stability’ retrieved 21/04/2016 from 
www.cbn.gov.ng.  
Central Bank of Nigeria, CBN, (2017). ‘Inflation Rate (Per cent)’ retrieved 01/09/2017 
from www.cbn.gov.ng/rates/inflrates.asp. 
Central Bank of Nigeria, CBN. (2006). Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and 
Non-Banks Financial Institutions. Retrieved January, 25, 2016 from: 
http://www.cbn.gov.ng. 
Chaghadari, M. F. (2011). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance. International 
Conference on Sociality and Economics Development IPEDR, 10, 484-489. 
Chahine, S., & Safieddine, A. (2011). Is corporate governance different for the Lebanese 
banking system? Journal of Management & Governance, 15(2), 207-226. 
Chakravarthy, B. (1986). Measuring Strategic Performance. Strategic Management 






Chamberlin, T. W. (2010). Board composition and firm performance: some Canadian 
evidence. International Advances in Economic Research, 16, 421-422. 
Chang, A., & Leng, A. (2004). The impact of corporate governance practices on firms’ 
financial performance: Evidence from Malaysian companies. ASEAN Economic 
Bulletin, 21, 308–318. 
Chang, B., & Duta, S. (2012). Dividends and Corporate Governance: Canadian 
Evidence. The IUP Journal of Applied Finance, 18(4), 5-30.  
Chang, C. (2009). The Corporate governance characteristics of financially distressed 
firms: Evidence from Taiwan. The Journal of American Academy of Business, 
Cambridge, 15(1), 125-133.  
Chatterjee, D., & Bose, S. K. (2007). Corporate Governance, Risk Management and 
Internal Audit: A Case Study. MANAGEMENT & LABOUR STUDIES, 32(4), 
515-521. 
Chechet, L. I., Yancy Jnr, F. S., & Akanet, S. (2013). Impact of Internal Governance 
Mechanisms on Corporate Performance in Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria. 
International Journal of Arts and Commerce, 2(8), 35-46. 
Cheng, S. (2008). Board size and variability of corporate performance. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 87(2), 157-176.  
Chiang, H., & Lin, M. (2011). Examining board composition and firm performance. The 






Claessens, S., & Fan, J. P. H. (2002). Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey. 
International Review of Finance, 3(2), 71-103.  
Clifford, P., & Evans, R. (1997). Non-Executive Directors: A Question of 
independence. Corporate Governance, 5(4), 224-231. 
Cohen, J. (1988), Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd Edition), 
New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
Cohen, J., Krishnamoorthy, G., & Wright, A. M. (2002). Corporate governance and the 
audit process. Contemporary accounting research,19(4), 573-594. 
Cohen, L., Manion, L., & Morrison, K. (2000). Research Methods in Education. 
London: Routledge Falmer.  
Cohen, L., Manion, L., & Morrison, K. (2007). Research Methods in Education (6th. 
Ed.). London & New York: Routledge; Taylor & Francis group.   
Coles, B., & Jarrell, G. (2001), leadership structure: Separating the CEO and chairman 
of the board. Journal of Corporate Finance, 4(3), 189-220.  
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2008). Boards: Does one size fits all. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 87(2), 329-356.  
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2012). Board advising. Available at SSRN 
2002250. 
Coles, J. W., McWilliams, V. B., & Sen, N. (2001). An examination of the relationship 







Companies and Allied Matters Act, CAMA, (1990). Chapter C.20, under the Law of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 2004.  
Conger, J. A., Finegold, D., & Lawler, E. E. (1998). Appraising boardroom 
performance. Harvard Business Review, 76, 136-164.  
Connelly, J. T., & Limpaphayom, P. (2004). Environmental reporting and firm 
performance: evidence from Thailand. The Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 
13(1), 37-149.  
Conyon, M. J., & Peck, S. I. (1998). Board size and corporate performance: Evidence 
from European countries. European Journal of Finance, 4, 291-304.  
Crawford, C. J. (2007). Compliance and Conviction: The Evolution of Enlightened 
Governance. England Oxford University Press.     
Creswell, J. W. (2013). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Method 
Approaches (4th. Ed.). USA: SAGE Publications Inc. 
Dabari, I. J., & Saidin, S. Z. (2015). DETERMINANTS INFLUENCING THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE 
NIGERIAN BANKING SECTOR. International Journal of Asian Social 
Science, 5(12), 740-754.  
Dahya, J., & McConnel, J. J. (2005). Outside directors and corporate board decision. 






Dahya, J., Dimitrov, O., & McConnell, J. J. (2008). Dominant shareholders, corporate 
boards and corporate value: a cross-country analysis. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 87(1), 73-100.  
Dalton, D., Daily, C., Johnson, J., & Ellstrand, A. (1999). Number of directors and 
financial performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 42, 
674-686.  
Danoshana, S., & Ravivathani, T. (20 14). Impact of corporate governance framework 
on the organizational performance. A study on financial institutions in Sri Lanka. 
International Journal of Technological Exploration and Learning, 16(1), 73-78. 
Das, A., & Dey, S. (2016). Role of corporate governance on firm performance: a study 
on large Indian corporations after implementation of Companies’ Act 2013. 
Asian Journal of Business Ethics, 1-16. DOI: 10.1007/s13520-016-0061-7. 
Dass, N., Kini, O., Nanda, V., Onal, B., & Wang, J. (2014). Board expertise: Do 
directors from related industries help bridge the information gap? Review of 
Financial Studies, 27(5), 1533-1592. doi:10.1093/rfs/hht071.  
De Andres, P., & Vallelado, E. (2008). Corporate governance in banking: The role of 
the board of directors. journal of banking & finance, 32(12), 2570-2580. 
doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.05.008.  
de Villiers, C., Naiker, V., & van Staden, C. J. (2011). The effect of board characteristics 







Deegan, C., Rankin, M., & Voght, P. (2000). Firm’s disclosure reaction to major social 
incidents: Australian evidence. Accounting Forum, 24(1), 101-130. 
Demaki, G. O. (2013). Proliferation of Codes of Corporate Governance in Nigeria and 
Economic Development. Business and Management Review, 3(3), 37-42.  
Demidenko, E., & McNutt, P. (2010). The ethics of enterprise risk management as a key 
component of corporate governance. International Journal of Social 
Economics, 37(10), 802-815. 
Demski, J., & Feltham, G. (1978). Economic incentives in budgetary control systems. 
Accounting review, 53, 336-359.  
Denis, D. K., & McConnell, J. J. (2003). International corporate governance. Journal of 
financial and quantitative analysis, 38(01), 1-36.  
Donaldson, L., Davis, J. H. (1991). Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO 
governance and shareholder returns. Australian Journal of Management, 16(1), 
49-64. 
Douglas, A. P. (2004). “Nigeria” Chelsea House Publishers: Philadelphia.   
Drukker, D. M. (2003). Testing for serial correlation in linear panel-data models. Stata 
Journal, 3(2), 168-177.  
Dugguh, S. I., & Diggi, J. (2015). Risk Management Strategies in Financial Institutions 
in Nigeria. The Experience of Commercial Banks. International Journal of 






Eccles, R. (1985). Transfer pricing as a problem of agency. In J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser 
(Eds.), Principals and agents: The structure of business (pp. 151-186). Boston: 
Harvad Business School Press.  
Eells, R. S. F. (1960). The Meaning of Modern Business: An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Large Corporate Enterprise, Columbia: Columbia University 
Press. 
Ehikioya, B. I. (2009). Corporate governance structure and firm performance in 
developing economies: evidence from Nigeria. Corporate Governance: The 
international journal of business in society, 9(3), 231-243. 
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, M. T. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing 
firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 48(1), 35-54.  
Eisenhardt, K. M., (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of 
management review, 14(1), 57-74.  
Ekpo, A. H., & Umoh, O. J. (2010). An overview of the Nigerian economic growth and 
development. OnlineNigeria.Com. 
Elshandidy, T., & Neri, L. (2015). Corporate governance, risk disclosure practices, and 
market liquidity: comparative evidence from the UK and Italy. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 23(4), 331-356. 
Elshandidy, T., Fraser, I., & Hussainey, K. (2013). Aggregated, voluntary and 
mandatory risk disclosure incentives: evidence from UK FTSE all-share 






Elyasiani, E., & Zhang, L. (2015). Bank holding company performance, risk, and “busy” 
board of directors. Journal of Banking & Finance, 60, 239-251.  
Erah, D. O., Samuel, E., & Izedonmi, F. (2012). Chief Executive Officer Duality and 
Financial Performance of Firms in Nigeria, International Journal of Business 
and Social Research (IJBSR), 2(6), 125-134. 
Ethics Resource Center (2002). Developing a Code of Conduct for a Corporate Board 
of Directors: A Roadmap. Retrieved September 13, 2015 from: 
www.ethics.org/resource/developing-code-conduct-corporate-board-directors-
roadmap.  
Eulerich, M., Velte, P., & Van Uum, C. (2014). The Impact of Board Diversity on 
Corporate Performance. An Empirical Analysis for the German Two-Tier 
System. An Empirical Analysis for the German Two-Tier System (November 8, 
2013). Problems and Perspectives in Management (PPM), 12, 25-39. 
Evans, J. H., Nagarajan, N. J., & Schloetzer, J. D. (2010). CEO Turnover and retention 
light: retaining CEOs on the board. Journal of Accounting Research, 48(5), 
1015-1047. doi:10.1111/j.1475-679X.2010.00383.x.  
Ezugwu, C. I., & Itodo, A. I. (2014). Impact of equity ownership structure on the 
operating performance of Nigerian Banks. Standard Global Journal of Business 
Management,1(4), 61-73. 
Fallatah, Y. & Dickins, D. (2012). Corporate governance and firm performance and 







Fama, E. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political 
Economy, 88, 288-307. 
Fama, E., & Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law 
and Economics, 26, 301–325. 
Fan, D. K., Lau, C. M., & Wu, S. (2002). Corporate governance mechanism. In The 
management of enterprises in the People’s Republic of China (pp. 211-239). 
Springer US.  
Farhan, A., Obaid, S. N., & Azlan, H. (2017). Corporate governance effect on firms’ 
performance–evidence from the UAE. Journal of Economic and Administrative 
Sciences, 33(1), 66-80. 
Farvaque, E., Refait-Alexandre, C., & Saïdane, D. (2011). Corporate disclosure: a 
review of its (direct and indirect) benefits and costs. Economie internationale, 
(4), 5-31.  
Fauzi, F., & Locke, S. (2012). Board structure, ownership structure and Firm 
performance: A study of New Zealand listed-firms. Asian Academy of 
Management Journal of Accounting and Finance, 8(2), 43-67. 
Federal Inland Revenue Service, FIRS, (2016). “About FIRS” Retrieved 23/04/2016 
from http://www.firs.gov.ng/aboutus/default.aspx.  







Fernandes, N. (2008). EC: Board compensation and firm performance: The role of 
“independent” board members. Journal of multinational financial 
management, 18(1), 30-44. 
Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2006). Are busy boards effective monitors? The Journal 
of finance, 61(2), 689-724. 
Fidanoski, F., Mateska, V., & Simeonovski, K. (2014). Corporate governance and bank 
performance: Evidence from Macedonia. Economic Analysis, 47(1-2), 76-99. 
Field, A. P. (2009). Discovering Statistics Using SPSS (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, 
California: Sage Publication.  
Field, L., Lowry, M., & Mkrtchyan, A. (2013). Are busy boards detrimental? Journal 
of Financial Economics, 109(1), 63-82. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.004.  
Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee, FSRCC, (2016). About 
FSRCC, ‘Our History’ retrieved from https://fsrcc.gov.ng/1/our-history/.  
Finkelstein, S., & Mooney, C. A. (2003). Not the usual suspects: How to use board 
process to make boards better. Academy of Management Executive,17(2), 101-
113. 
Firstenberg, P. B., & Malkiel, B.G. (1994). The twenty-first century boardroom: Who 
will be in charge. Sloan Management Review, 36, 27-35. 
Galbreath, J. (2010). Corporate governance practices that address climate change: An 






Garcia-Sanchez, I. M. (2010). The effectiveness of corporate governance: Board 
structure and business technical efficiency in Spain. CEJOR, 18, 31 1-339. 
Gavrea. C., & Stegerean. R. (2012). Corporate governance and firm performance: The 
Romanian case. Managerial Challenges of the Contemporary Society, 3(1), 179-
185. 
Geneen, H. (1984). Managing. New York: Doubleday. 
Gentry, R. J., & Shen, W. (2010). The relationship between accounting and market 
measures of firm financial performance: How strong is it? Journal of 
Managerial Issues, 514-530.  
Ghabayen, M. (2012). Board characteristics and firm performance: Case of Saudi 
Arabia. International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting, 2(2), 168-
200. 
Ghazali, IV. M. (2010). Ownership structure, corporate governance and corporate 
performance in Malaysia. International Journal of Commerce and Management, 
20(2), 109-1 19. 
Ghosh, A. (2001). Does operating performance really improve following corporate 
acquisitions? Journal of corporate finance, 7(2), 151-178. 
Ghosh, S. (2006). Do board characteristics affect corporate performance? Firm-level 
evidence for India. Applied Economics Letters, 13, 435-443. 
Gill, A. & Mathur, N. (2011). Factors that Influence Financial Leverage of Canadian 






Gill, A., & Obradovich, J. D. (2012). The Impact of corporate governance and financial 
leverage of American Firms, International Research Journal of Finance and 
Economics, 9, 1-14.  
Gill, A., Biger, N., Mand, H. S., & Shah, C. (2012). Corporate Governance and Capital 
Structure of Small Business Service Firms in India, International Journal of 
Economics and Finance, 8, 83-92.  
Glick, W. H., Washburn, N. T., & Miller, C. C. (2005, August). The myth of firm 
performance. In Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management. 
Goldsmith, D. M. (2012). CEO tenure and its effect on firm performance in the US 
financial services sector (Doctoral dissertation, ARGOSY 
UNIVERSITY/WASHINGTON DC).  
Goodstein, J., Gautum, K., & Boeker, W. (1994). The effect of Board size and Diversity 
on Strategic Change. Strategic Management Journal, 15(3), 241-250. 
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1982). Corporate financial structure and managerial 
incentives. In The economics of information and uncertainty. University of 
Chicago Press, 107-140. 
Guest, P. M. (2009). The impact of board size on firm performance: evidence from the 
UK. The European Journal of Finance, 15(4), 385-404. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518470802466121. 
Guillet, B. D., Seo, K., Kucukusta, D., & Lee, S. (2013). CEO duality and firm 






International Journal of Hospitality Management, 33, 339-346. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhm.2012.10.004.  
Gujarati, D. N. (2003). Essentials of econometrics (3rd ed.). Singapore: Irwin McGraw-
Hill.  
Gujarati, D. N. (2009). Basic econometrics. Tata McGraw-Hill Education. 
Gul, F. A., & Leung, S. (2004). Board leadership, outside director’s leadership expertise 
and voluntary corporate disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 
23(5), 351-379. 
Hackston, D., & Milne, M. J. (1996). Some determinants of social and environmental 
disclosures in New Zealand companies. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 9(1), 77-108. 
Hair Jr. J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., & Anderson, R. E. (2014). Multivariate Data 
Analysis (7th. Ed.). UK: Pearson International edition.   
Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., & Black, W. C. (2010). Multivariate data 
analysis (2nd Edition). New York: Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ.   
Hair, J.F. Jr., Money, A.H., Samouel, P. and Page, M. (2007). Research Methods for 
Business, John Wiley and Sons, Ltd, West Sussex.  
Haniffa, R., & Hudaib, M. (2006). Corporate governance structure and performance of 
Malaysian listed companies. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 33(7) 






Haniffa, R.M. & Cooke, T.E. (2002). Culture, corporate governance and disclosure in 
Malaysian corporations. Abacus 38, 317–349. 
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1991). The theory of capital structure. Journal of Finance, 
46(1), 297-355. 
Harrison, J. R., Torres, D. L., & Kukalis, S. (1988). The changing of guard: Turnover 
and structural change in the top-management positions. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 33, 211-232.  
Harvey Pamburai, H., Chamisa, E., Abdulla, C., & Smith, C. (2015). An analysis of 
corporate governance and company performance: a South Africa perspective. 
South African Journal of Accounting Research, 29(2), 115-131. 
Hassan, Y. M., Naser, K., & Hijazi, R. H. (2016). The influence of corporate governance 
on corporate performance: evidence from Palestine. Afro-Asian Journal of 
Finance and Accounting, 6(3), 269-287. 
Hauser, R. (2013). Busy directors and firm performance: Evidence from merger. 
University of Chicago working paper.  
Hausman, J. A. (1978). Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica, 46, 1251-
1271.  
Hellmann, T., & Puri, M. (2002). Venture capital and the professionalization of start‐up 
firms: Empirical evidence. The Journal of Finance, 57(1), 169-197. 
Helmich, D. (1977). Executive succession in the corporate organization: A current 






Hemrit, W., & Arab, M. B. (2011). The disclosure of operational risk in Tunisian 
insurance companies. The Journal of Operational Risk, 6(2), 69-111. 
Herly, M., & Sisnuhadi, (2011). Corporate governance and firm performance in 
Indonesia. International Journal of Governance, 1(1), 1-20.  
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1988). The determinants of board composition. 
RAND journal of Economics, 19(4), 589-606.  
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2003). Board of directors as an endogenously 
determined institution: a survey of the economic literature. Economic Policy 
Review, 9(1), 7-26.  
Hermalin, B., & Weisbach, M. (1991). The Effects of board composition and direct 
incentives on firm performance. Financial Management, 20(4), 101–112. 
Hidayat, A. A., & Utama, S. (2017). Board Characteristics and Firm Performance: 
Evidence from Indonesia (pp 137-154). INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH 
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS STUDIES, 8(3), 137-154.  
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and firm performance: 
Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of 
Management review, 28(3), 383-396.  
Hillman, A. J., Withers, M. C., & Collins, B. J. (2009). Resource dependence theory: A 
review. Journal of management. 1-24. doi: 10.1177/0149206309343469. 
Hitt, M. A. (1988). The Measuring of Organizational Effectiveness Domains and 






Ho, S.M. and Wong, K. S. (2001). A study of the relationship between corporate 
governance structures and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Journal of 
International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 10, 139-56. 
Holland, J. (1998). Private Disclosure and Financial Reporting. Accounting Business 
Research, 28(4), 255-269.  
Hoque, M. Z., Islam, M. D., & Azam, M. N. (2013). Board committee meetings and 
firm financial performance: An investigation of Australian companies. 
International Review of Finance, 13(4), 503-528. DOI: 10.1111/irfi.12009.  
Hsiao, C. (2003). Analysis of Panel Data (2nd. Ed.). UK: Cambridge University Press.  
Hsu, W., & Petchsakulwong, P. (2010). The impact of corporate governance on the 
efficiency performance of the Thai non-life insurance industry. The Geneva 
Papers on Risk and Insurance Issues and Practices, 35(1), S28-S49.  
Hurdle, G. J. (1974). Leverage, risk, market structure and profitability. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 56(4), 478-485. 
Ibrahim, Q., Rehman, R., & Raoof, A. (2010). Role of corporate governance in firm 
performance: A comparative study between chemical and pharmaceutical 
sectors of Pakistan. International Research Journal of finance and Economics, 
50(5), 7-16.  
ICAEW, (2011). Reporting Business Risks: Meeting Expectations. London: Institute of 






Imam, M. O. & Malik. M. (2007). Firm Performance and Corporate Governance 
Through Ownership Structure: Evidence from Bangladesh Stock Market. 
International Review of Business Research Papers, 3, 88-110. 
International Finance Corporation [IFC], (2010). Corporate Governance Manual 
(Second ed.). BASCON, Hanoi, Vietnam. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Report (2009). World Economic and Financial 
Survey: World Economic Outlook, Crisis and Recovery. Pp.3. Retrieved 
September 12, 2015 from: www.imf.org/external/.../text.pdf.  
International Monetary Fund. (2006). Financial Soundness Indicators: Compilation 
Guide, 11–16. http://doi.org/10.1002/9781118267639.ch1. 
Irina, I., & Nadezhda, Z. (2009). The relationship between corporate governance and 
company performance in concentrated ownership systems: The case of 
Germany. Journal of Corporate Finance, 4(12), 34-56.  
Ironkwe, U., & Adee, G. M. (2014). Corporate Governance and Financial Performance 
in Nigeria. Journal of Exclusive Management Science, 3(8), 1-6. 
Jackling, B., & Johl, S. (2009). Board Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from 
India’s top Companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(4), 
492-509. Doi:0.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00760.x.  
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of 






Jermias, J., & Gani, L. (2014). The impact of board capital and board characteristics on 
firm performance. The British Accounting Review: 46(2), 135-1 53. 
http://dx.doi: 10.1016/i.bar.2013.12.001.  
Joe Duke, I. I., & Kankpang, K. A. (2011). Linking corporate governance with 
organizational performance: New insights and evidence from Nigeria. Global 
Journal of Management and Business Research, 11(12). 
John, K., & Senbet, L. W. (1998). Corporate governance and board effectiveness. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 22, 371-403. http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/S0378-
4266(98)00005-3.  
Johnson, R. A., & Greening, D. W. (1999). The effects of corporate governance and 
institutional ownership types of corporate social performance. Academy of 
Management Journal, 42, 564-576.  
Jones, T. M., & Goldberg, L. D. (1982). Governing the large Corporation: more 
arguments for public directors. Academy of Management Review, 7, 603-611. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/257227.  
Juras, P. E., & Hinson, Y. L. (2008). Examining the effect of board characteristics on 
agency costs and selected performance measures in banks. Academy of Banking 
Studies Journal, 7(2), 87-108. 
Jӧnsson, K. (2005). Cross-sectional and serial correlation in a small-sample 







Kajola, S. O. (2008). Corporate governance and firm performance: the case of Nigerian 
listed firms. European Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative 
Sciences, 14(14), 16-28. 
Kakanda, M. M., Salim, B., & Chandren, S. (2017). Corporate Governance, Risk 
Management Disclosure, and Firm Performance: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Review Perspective. Asian Economic and Financial Review, 7(9), 836-845. 
Kakanda, M. M., Bello, A. B., & Abba, M. (2016b). Effect of Capital Structure on the 
Performance of Listed Financial Service Firms in Nigeria. Research Journal of 
Finance and Accounting, 7(8), 211-219. 
Kakanda, M. M., Salim, B., & Chandren, a/p. S. (2016a). Review of the Relationship 
between Board Attributes and Firm Performance. Asian Journal of Finance and 
Accounting, 8(1), 168-181.  
Kamardin, H. (2009). The impact of corporate governance and board performance on 
the performance of public listed companies in Malaysia. Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Universiti Sains Malaysia.  
Kang, S., & Kim, Y. (2011). Does earnings management arnplify the association 
between corporate governance and firm performance? Evidence from Korea. 
International Business and Economies Research Journal, 10(2), 53-47.  
Kantudu, A. S., & Samaila, I. A. (2015). Board characteristics, independent audit 
committee and financial reporting quality of oil marketing firms: evidence from 






Kapoor, N., & Goel, S. (2017). Board Characteristics, Firm Profitability and Earnings 
Management: Evidence from India. Australian Accounting Review, 27(2), 180-
194. 
Karamanou, I., & Vafeas, N. (2005). The association between corporate boards, audit 
committees, and management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis. Journal 
of Accounting research, 43(3), 453-486. 
Karatzias, V. (2011). The Relationship Between Corporate Governance and Risk 
Management During the Credit Crisis. The case of Financial Institutions. 
MIBES, 145-156. 
Kaur, J. (2014). Corporate governance and financial performance: A case of Indian 
banking industry. Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies, 2(2), 91-96.   
Kent, P., & Stewart, J. (2008). Corporate Governance and Disclosure on the Transition 
to International Financial Reporting. Journal of Accounting and Finance, 48, 
649-671. 
Khan, A. G. (2012). The relationship of capital structure decisions with firm 
performance: A study of the engineering sector of Pakistan. International 
Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting, 2(1), 245. 
Khan, K., Nemati, A. R., & Iftikhar, M. (2011). Impact of corporate governance on firm 
performance: Evidence from the tobacco industry of Pakistan. International 






Khan, M., & Javid, A. (2011). Determinants of board effectiveness: Logit model ferheen 
kayani. Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, 3(2), 
1970-1981. 
Khanchel, 1. (2007). Corporate governance: measurement and determinant analysis. 
Managerial Auditing Journal, 22(8), 740-760. 
Kiel, G. C., & Nicholson, G. J. (2003). Board composition and corporate performance: 
How the Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate 
governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(3), 189-205. 
Klein, A. (1998). Firm performance and board committee structure 1. The Journal of 
Law and Economics, 41(1), 275-304. 
Klevmarken, N. A. (1989). Panel studies: What can we learn from them? Introduction. 
European Economic Review, 33, 523-529.  
Kline, R. B. (1998). Principle and Practice of Structural Equation Modelling. New 
York: The Guilford Press. 
Kline, R. B. (2011). Principle and Practice of Structural Equation Modelling (5th ed.). 
New York: The Guilford Press. 
Kontein, I. (2017, May 4), InfoGuide Nigeria. Retrieved from 
www.infoguidenigeria.com  
Korn Ferry (1999). Survey of corporate governance. New York.  
Kosnik, R. (1987). Greenmail: A study in board performance in corporate governance. 






Koufopoulos, D., Zoumbos, V., Argyropoulou, M., Motwani, J. (2008). Top 
management team and corporate performance? a study of Greek firms. Team 
Performance Management, 14(8), 340-363. doi:10.1108/13527590810912322.  
Kukure, A. P. (2006). Elements of Excellence in Corporate Governance – Systems and 
Structures: Lessons Learned. Paper presented at the 2006 Union for 
International Cancer Control, World Cancer Congress, Washington DC. USA. 
Kumar, J. (2004). Does ownership structure influence firm value? Evidence from India. 
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance and Business Ventures, 9(2), 61-93. 
Kurawa, J. M., & Kabara, A. S. (2014). Effect of Corporate Governance on Voluntary 
Disclosure by Firms in the Downstream Sector of the Nigerian Petroleum 
Industry. Proceedings of World Business Research Conference 21 - 23 April 
2014. 
Kyereboah-Coleman, A. (2008). CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE IN AFRICA: A DYNAMIC PANEL DATA ANALYSIS. 
Journal for Studies in Economics & Econometrics, 32(2), 1-24. 
Kyereboah-Coleman, A., & Biekpe, N. (2006). The link between corporate governance 
and performance of the non-traditional export sector: Evidence from Ghana. 
Corporate Governance Journal, 6(5), 609-623. 
Kyereboah-Coleman, A., & Osei, K. A. (2008). Outreach and profitability of 
microfinance institutions: the role of governance. Journal of Economics Studies, 






Lai, O., & Bello, S. (2012). The Concept and Practice of Corporate Governance in 
Nigeria: The Need for Public Relations and Effective Corporate 
Communication, Journal of Communication, 3(1), 1-16. 
Lang, M., & Lundholm, R. (1993). Cross-sectional determinants of analyst ratings of 
corporate disclosures. Journal of accounting research, 3(2), 246-271. 
Larker, D. F., Richardson, S. A., & Tuna, I. (2007). Corporate Governance, Accounting 
Outcomes, and Organizational Performance. The Accounting Review, 82(4), 
963-1008. 
Larmou, S., & Vafeas, N. (2010). The relation between board size and firm performance 
in firms with a history of poor performance. Journal of Management and 
Governance. 14, 61-85. http://dx.doi:10.1007/s10997-009-9091-z.   
Latif, B., Shahid, M. N., Haq, M. Z. U., Waqas, H. M., & Arshad, A. R. B. A. B. (2013). 
Impact of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance: Evidence from Sugar 
Mills of Pakistan. European Journal of Business and Management, 5(1), 51-59. 
Le, S. A., Walters, B., & Kroll, M. (2006). The moderating effect of external monitors 
on the relationship between R&D spending & firm performance. Journal of 
Business Research, 59(2), 278-287. 
Lefort, F., & Urzua, F. (2008). Board independence, firm performance and ownership 
concentration: Evidence from Chile. Journal of Business Research, 16, 615-622.  
LI, J., Kankpang, K., & Okonkwo, G. (2012). Corporate governance as a driver of 
organizational efficiency in courier service firms: Empirical findings from 






Liang, Q., Xu, P., & Jiraporn, P. (2013). Board characteristics and Chinese bank 
performance. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(8), 2953-2968. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.04.018.    
Limbach, P., Schmid, M. M., & Scholz, M. (2015). All Good Things Come to an End: 
CEO Tenure and Firm Value. Available at SSRN 2626340.  
Lin, C. (2011). An examination of board and firm performance: evidence from Taiwan. 
The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, 5(4), 17-35.  
Linsley, P. M., & Shrives, P. J. (2005). Examining risk reporting in the UK public 
companies. The Journal of Risk Finance, 6(4), 292-305.   
Lipton, M., &. Lorch, J. W. (1992). A Modest Proposal for improved Corporate 
Governance. The Business Lawyer, 48(1), 59–77. 
Long, J. S., & Trivedi, P. K. (1992). Some specification tests for the linear regression 
model. Sociological Methods & Research, 21(2), 161-204. 
MacKIE‐MASON, J. K. (1990). Do taxes affect corporate financing decisions? The 
journal of finance, 45(5), 1471-1493. 
Maduka, A. C., & Onwuka, K. O. (2013). Financial Market Structure and Economic 
Growth: Evidence from Nigeria Data. Financial Economic and Financial 
Review, 3(1), 75-98.  
Maina, L., & Ishmail, M. (2014). Capital Structure and Firms Performance in Kenya: 
Evidence from firms listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange. International 






Mang’unyi, E. E. (2011). Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance and Its 
Effects on Performance: A Case of Selected Banks in Kenya. International 
Journal of Business Administration, 2(3), 2-18. 
Mangena, M., & Pike, R. (2005).  The effect of audit committee shareholding, financial 
expertise and size on interim financial disclosures, Accounting and Business 
Research,35 (4), 327-349.  
Marn, J. T. K., & Romuald, D. F. (2012). The Impact of Corporate Governance 
Mechanism and Corporate performance: A study of Listed Companies in 
Malaysia. Journal for the Advancement of Science & Arts, 3(1), 31-45. 
Masson, R. T. (1971). Executive motivations, earnings and consequent equity 
performance. Journal of Political Economy, 79, 1278-1292. 
Maury, B. (2006). Corporate performance, corporate governance and top executive 
turnover in Finland. European Financial Management, 12(2), 221-248.  
Maury, B., & Pajuste, A. (2005). Multiple large shareholders and firm value. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 29(7), 1813-1834. 
Mayur, M., & Saravanan, P. (2017). Performance Implications of Board Size, 
Composition and Activity: Empirical Evidence from the Indian Banking 
Sector. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in 
Society, 17(3). 






McKnight, P. J., & Weir, C. (2009). Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms, 
and ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies: A panel data 
analysis. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49(2), 139-158. 
Michelon, G., & Parbonetti, A. (2012). The effect of corporate governance on 
sustainability disclosure. Journal of Management & Governance, 16(3), 477-
509. 
Millan, C. (2007). Corporate Governance. Second edition. Oxford \university Press UK. 
Mishra, C. S., Randøy, T., & Jenssen, J. I. (2001). The effect of founding family 
influence on firm value and corporate governance. Journal of International 
Financial Management & Accounting, 12(3), 235-259. 
Mitnick, B. (1986). The theory of agency and organizational analysis. Unpublished 
working paper, University of Pitts-burgh.  
Mizruchi, M. (1983). Who controls whom? An examination between management and 
boards of directors in large American corporations. Academy of Management 
Review, 8, 426-435.  
Mmadu, R. A. (2013). Corporate Governance and Bank Sector Crisis in Nigeria: Rescue 
intervention or a Macabre Dance with the Economy? African Journal of Law 
and Criminology, 3(1), 83-109.  
Mohammed, F. (2012). Impact of corporate governance on banks performance in 
Nigeria. Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management 






Mollah, A. S., & Talukdar, M. B. U. (2007). Ownership structure, corporate governance, 
and firm’s performance in emerging markets: Evidence from Bangladesh. The 
International Journal of Finance, 19(1), 4315-4333.  
Mosca 1, I. (2007). Decentralization as a determinant of health care expenditure: 
empirical analysis for OECD countries. Applied Economics Letters, 14(7), 511-
515. 
Muhamad Sori, Z., & Mohamad, S. (2009). Audit committee and auditor independence: 
the bankers’ perception. International Journal of Economics and Management, 
3(2), 317-331.  
Mukolu. M. O., & Blessing, O. N. (2014). Corporate Governance: A Panacea for 
Effective Bank Performance in Nigeria. Journal of Research in Business and 
Management, 2,1-5.  
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial 
Economics 5, 147– 175. 
Nadarajan, S., Chandren, S., Bahaudin, A. Y., Mohammed Elias, E., & Mohd Nawi, M. 
N. (2015). Corporate Governance and Operations Performance: Inventory Study 
on Malaysian Listed Firms. International Journal of Supply Chain Management, 
4(2), 68-71. 
Nahar, S., Jubb, C., & Azim, M. I. (2016). Risk governance and performance: a 






Najid, N., & Abdul Rahman, R. (2011). Government ownership and performance of 
Malaysian government-linked companies. International Research Journal of 
Finance and Economics, 61,42-56. 
Nanka-Bruce, D. (2011). Corporate governance mechanisms and firm efficiency. 
International Journal of Business and Management, 6(5), 28-41. http://dx.doi: 
10.5539/iibm.v6n5p28. 
Narwal, K. P., & Jindal, S. (2015). The Impact of Corporate Governance on the 
Profitability: An Empirical Study of Indian Textile industry. International 
Journal of Research in Management, Science & Technology, 3(2), 81-85. 
National Bureau of Statistics (2013). Economic Outlook for the Nigerian Economy. 
retrieved on 04/04/2016 online from www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/.  
National Encyclopedia (2003). Retrieved on 04/04/2016 online from 
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/World-Leaders-2003/Nigeria-
POLITICAL-BACKGROUND.html#ixzz44rRDB4oz. 
National Pension Commission, PENCOM, (2016). “About PENCOM” retrieved 
23/04/2016 from http://www.pencom.gov.ng/about.php.  
Ndiwalana, G., Ssekakubo, J., & Lwanga, F. (2014). Corporate governance and the 
financial performance of savings, credit and corporative societies, International 







Neely, A., Gregory, M., & Platts, K. (1995). Performance measurement system design: 
a literature review and research agenda. International Journal of Operations and 
Production Management, 15 (4), 80-116. 
Ng, T. H., Chong, L. L., & Ismail, H. (2012). Is the risk management committee only a 
procedural compliance? An insight into managing risk taking among insurance 
companies in Malaysia. The Journal of Risk Finance, 14(1), 71-86. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/15265941311288112.  
Ngerebo-A, T. A., & Yellowe, S. (2012). The Effects of Corporate Governance on 
Patronage of Banking Services in Nigeria Australian Journal of Business and 
Management Research, 2(5), 30-36. 
Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation, NNPC (2012). Annual Statistical Bulletin. 
Retrieved 18/04/2016 from 
http://www.nnpcgroup.com/Portals/0/Monthly%20Performance/2012%20ASB
%201st%20edition.pdf.  
Nigerian Deposit Insurance Commission, NDIC, (2016). “About NDIC” retrieved 
23/04/2016 from http://ndic.gov.ng/about-ndic-3/ndic-history/.  
Nigerian Stock Exchange, NSE (2017). Market Indices. Retrieved July 14, 2017, from 
http://www.nse.com.ng/market-data/indices?  
Nuryana, S., & Islam, S. M. N. (2011). Corporate governance and performance: 







Nwonyuku, K. N. (2016). Corporate and Profitability of Listed Food and Beverages 
Firms in Nigeria.  Available at SSRN. 
Nzotta, S. M., & Okereke, E. J. (2009). Financial deepening and economic development 
of Nigeria: An Empirical Investigation. African Journal of Accounting, 
Economics, Finance and Banking Research, 5(5). 
O’Connel, V., & Cramer, N. (2010). The relationship between firm performance and 
board characteristics in Ireland. European Management Journal, 28(5), 387-
339. 
O’Sullivan, N. (2000). The impact of board composition and ownership on audit quality: 
evidence from large UK companies. British Accounting Review, 32, 397-414.  
Obradovich, J., & Gill, A. (2012). The impact of corporate governance and financial 
leverage on the value of American firms. International Research Journal of 
Finance and Economics, 91, 1-14. 
Odewale, R. W. (2016). Corporate governance characteristics, company performance 
and executive compensation: the case of Nigeria. Othman Yeop Abdullah 
Graduate School of Business, Universiti Utara Malaysia (Ph.D.). 
Ogege, S. & Boloupremo, T. (2014). Corporate Governance and Financial Performance 
of Banks: Evidence from Nigeria, Hyperion Economic Journal Year II, 2(2), 25-
36. 
Okonji, E. (2016, September 2). ‘Nigeria’s Business Environment Very Tough’. This 






Okponobi, O. (2011, January 26). ‘The Problem with our Appointments System in 
Nigeria’. Sahara Reporters. Retrieved from http://saharareporters.com. 
Olakanmi, O. (2008). Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) Cap. C20 LFN 2004 
and Investment and Securities Act 2007 (Rev. ed.) LawLords Publications, 
Abuja, Nigeria.  
Onakoya, A. B. O., Fasanya, I. O., & Ofoegbu, D. I. (2014). Corporate Governance as 
Correlate for Firm Performance: A Pooled OLS Investigation of Selected 
Nigerian Banks. The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, 13(1), 7-18. 
Onaolapo, A. A., & Kajola, S. O. (2010). Capital structure and firm performance: 
evidence from Nigeria. European Journal of Economics, Finance and 
Administrative Sciences, 25, 70-82. 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] (2015). 
G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, a report to G20 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 4th-5th September, Ankara, Turkey.  
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] (2004). “OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance”. Retrieved September 10, 2015 from: 
www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf. 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] (2009). Risk 
Management and Corporate Governance. Available at www.oecd.org.  
Ott, R. L., & Longnecker, M. T. (2010). An introduction to statistical methods and data 






Oyebode, A. (2009). The imperative of corporate governance in Nigeria. Chartered 
Institute of Bankers of Nigeria Journal, 2, 11-23.  
Pagach, D. P., & Warr, R. S. (2010). The effects of enterprise risk management on firm 
performance. Retrieved 15/08/2017 from 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1155218 
Pallant, J. (2005). SPSS survival manual: a step by step guide to data analysis using 
SPSS (3rd. Ed.), Australia: Allen & Unwin.  
Pan, L., Lin, C., & Chen, K. (2013). Corporate governance and firm performance: The 
Case of Chinese AD Rs. The International Journal of Finance, 25(1), 7580-
7605. 
Pantamee, A. A. (2014). The effect of corporate governance on corporate social 
responsibility disclosure in the Nigerian petroleum marketing industry. Othman 
Yeop Abdullah Graduate School of Business, Universiti Utara Malaysia (M.Sc. 
No. 815272). 
Parks, R. W. (1967). Efficient estimation of a system of regression equations when 
disturbances are both serially and contemporaneously correlated. Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 62(318), 500-509.  
Patel, S. A., & Dallas, G. S. (2002). Transparency and disclosure: Overview of 
methodology and study results-United States. 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=422800  
Pathan, S. (2009). Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking. Journal of Banking 






Patro, S., Lehn, K., & Zhao, M. (2003). Determinants of the Size and Structure of 
Corporate Boards: 1935-2000. Financial Management, 38, 2009, 1-57.  
Paul, G. D., Ebelechukwu, E. C., Yakubu, S. (2015). Impact of Corporate Governance 
on Financial Performance of Microfinance Banks in North Central Nigeria. 
International Journal of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education, 2(1). 153-
170. 
Pearce, H., & Zahra, S. A. (1992). Board Composition from Strategic Contingency 
Perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 29, 411-438. 
Peng, M. W., Li, Y., Xie, E., & Su, Z. (2010). CEO duality, organizational slack and 
firm performance in China. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27, 61 1424. 
Pesaran, M. H. (2004). General diagnostic tests for cross section dependence in panels. 
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1229; IZA Discussion Paper No. 1240.  
Peter, O. A., & David, A. (2014). Corporate Governance and Organizational 
Performance in the Nigerian Banking Industry, Journal of Emerging Trends in 
Economics and Management Sciences (JETEMS), 5(6), 525-531.  
Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The 
organization and its environment. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17, 218-
228.  
Pfeffer, J. (1983). Organizational demography. In L. L. Cummings, & B. M. Staw (Eds.) 






Pfeffer, J. (1987). A resource dependence perspective on inter-organizational relations. 
In M. S. Mizruchi, & M. Schwartz (Eds.), International relations: The structural 
analysis of business: 22-25. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Pierce, C. (2011). Corporate transparency and board governance. C-Governance 
Newsletter 1(2), 1-3. 
Pregibon, D. (1980). Goodness of link tests for generalized linear models. Applied 
Statistics, 29, 15-24.  
Provan, K. G. (1980). Recognizing, measuring, and interpreting the potential enacted 
power distinction in organizational research. Academy of Management Review, 
5, 549-560. 
Ramsey, J. B. (1969). Tests for specification errors in classical linear least-squares 
regression analysis. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B 
(Methodological), 31(2), 350-371. 
Randøy, T., & Goel, S. (2003). Ownership structure, founder leadership, and 
performance in Norwegian SMEs: Implications for financing entrepreneurial 
opportunities. Journal of business venturing, 18(5), 619-637. 
Reed, W. R., & Ye, H. (2011). Which panel data estimator should I use?. Applied 
Economics, 43(8), 985-1000. 
Reguera-Alvarado, N., & Bravo, F. (2017). The effect of independent directors’ 
characteristics on firm performance: tenure and multiple directorships. Research 






Richard, P., Devinney, T., Yip, G., & Johnson, G. (2009). Measurement Performance: 
Towards Methodological Best Practice. Journal of Management, 35, 718-804. 
Rodriguez-Fernandez, M., Fernandez-Alonso, S., & Rodriguez-Rodriguez, J. (2014). 
Board characteristics and firm performance in Spain. Corporate 
Governance, 14(4), 485-503. 
Rogers, M. (2008). Corporate Governance and Financial Performance of Selected 
Commercial Banks in UGANDA, CRR Conference, Queen’s university Belfast, 
7th to 9th September. Retrieved October 22, 2015 from: 
www.crrconference.org/previous_conferences/downloads/2006rogers.pdf.  
Ross, S. A. (1973). The economic theory of agency: The principal’s problem. The 
American Economic Review, 63(2), 134-139. 
Routray, S. K., & Bal, R. (2017). An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Multiple 
Directorship and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Duality on Firm's 
Performance. Siddhant-A Journal of Decision Making, 17(1), 88-97. 
Rowe, W., & Morrow, J. (1999). A Note on The Dimensionality of the Firm Financial 
Performance Construct Using Accounting, Market, and Subjective Measures. 
Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, 16, 58-70.  
Sachs, J. (1998). Symposium on Global Financial Markets: The Post-bubble Japanese 







Sahu, T. S., & Manna, A. (2013). Impact of board composition and board meeting on 
firms’ performance: A study of selected Indian companies. Vilakshan, XIMB 
Journal, 10(2), 99-1 12. 
Saibaba, M. D., & Ansari, V. A. (2011). Audit committees and corporate governance: a 
study of selected companies listed in the Indian bourses. The IUP Journal of 
Accounting Research and Audit Practices, 3, 1-10.  
Saibaba, M. D., & Ansari, V. A. (2013). Audit committees, board structures and firm 
performance: A panel Data Study of BSE 30 Companies. The IUP Journal of 
Accounting Research and Audit Practices, 2, 19-29.  
Said Mokhtar, E., & Mellett, H. (2013). Competition, corporate governance, ownership 
structure and risk reporting. Managerial Auditing Journal, 28(9), 838-865. 
Sanda, A. U., Garba, T., & Mikailu, A. S. (2011). Board independence and firm financial 
performance: evidence from Nigeria. African Economic Research Consortium, 
Nairobi, AERC Research Paper 213. 
Sanusi, L. S. (2010). The Nigerian Banking Industry: what went wrong and the way 
forward. Governor Central Bank of Nigeria (a lecture delivered at convocation 




Sarafidis, V., & Wansbeek, T. (2012). Cross-sectional dependence in panel data 






Schmidheiny, K., & Basel, U. (2013). Panel data: fixed and random effects. Short 
Guides to Microeconometrics, 2-7.  
Schwab, D. (1999). Research Methods for Organizational Studies. Mahwah, N.J: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.   
Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC], (2012). ‘SEC Nigeria tasks quoted firms 
on corporate governance’. Retrieved 20/09/2015 from 
www.sec.gov.ng/news/2012/02/29/sec-nigeria-tasks-quoted-firms-on-
corporate-governance.html. 
Shahwan, T. M. (2015). The effects of Corporate Governance on Financial Performance 
and Financial Distress: Evidence from Egypt, Corporate Governance, 15(5), 
641-662. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/CG-11-2014-0140. 
Sharif, S. P., & Lai, M. M. (2015). The effects of corporate disclosure practices on firm 
performance, risk and dividend policy. International Journal of Disclosure and 
Governance, 12(4), 311-326. 
Sheikh, N. A., & Wang, Z. (2012). Effects of corporate governance on capital structure: 
empirical evidence from Pakistan. Corporate Governance, 12(5), 629-641. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal 
of Political Economy, 94(3), 461-488. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of 






Simon, M. K., & Goes, J. (2013). Ex post facto research. Retrieved April, 26, 2016. 
From: http://www.dissertationrecipes.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Ex-
Post-Facto-research.pdf.  
Simsek, Z. (2007). CEO tenure and organizational performance: an intervening model. 
Strategic Management Journal, 28(6), 653-662. 
Singh, D. A., & Gaur, A. S. (2009). Business group affiliation, firm performance, and 
firm performance: Evidence from China and India. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 17(4), 411-425.  
Singh, H., & Harianto, F. (1989). Management-board relations, takeover risk, and the 
adoption of golden parachutes. Academy of Management Journal, 32(1), 7-24. 
Singh, M., & Davidson, W. N. (2003). Agency Costs, Ownership Structure and 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms. Journal of Banking and Finance, 27, 793-
816.  
Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations: 
Cannan, E. edition, ElecBook Classics.  
Society for Corporate Governance Nigeria [SCGN] (2011). Roundtable on Risk 
Management and Corporate Governance. c-Governance Newsletter, 1(2), 1-8.  
Sohail, S., Rasul, F., & Fatima, U. (2017). Is Internal and External mechanism of 
Governance Enriching the Performance of the Banking Sector of 
Pakistan? Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in 






Solomon, J. F., Solomon, A., Norton, S. D., & Joseph, N. L. (2000). A conceptual 
framework for corporate risk disclosure emerging from the agenda for corporate 
governance reform. The British Accounting Review, 32(4), 447-478. 
Spanos, L. J. (2005). Corporate governance in Greece: developments and policy 
implications. Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in 
society, 5(1), 15-30.  
Spence, A. M., & Zeckhauser, R. (1971). Insurance, information, and individual action. 
American Economic Review, 61, 380-387. 
Spencer, A. (1983). On the edge of the organization: The role of outside director. New 
York: Wiley. 
Stanwick, P. (2008). Corporate governance: Is it time for global standards? 
International Business and Economics Research Journal, 7(2), 57-64.  
Stemler, S. (2001). An overview of content analysis. Practical assessment, research & 
evaluation, 7(17), 137-146. 
Stinchcombe, A. L. (1965). Social structure and organizations. In J.G. March (Ed.), 
Handbook of organizations. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally,142–193. 
Stuart, T. E., & Yim, S. (2010). Board interlocks and the propensity to be targeted in 
private equity transactions. Journal of Financial Economics,97(1), 174-189. 
Subramaniam, N., McManus, L., & Zhang, J. (2009). Corporate governance, firm 
characteristics and risk management committee formation in Australian 






Sunday, I. (2015). Another look at Capital Structure and Corporate Performance in 
Emerging Markets: The Case of Nigeria. Asian Journal of Business 
Management, 7(1), 1-12. 
Sunday, K. O. (2008). Corporate governance and firm performance: The case of 
Nigerian listed firms. European Journal of Economics, Finance and 
Administrative Sciences, 14, 16-28. 
Sutton, C. N., & Jenkins, B. (2007). The role of the financial services sector in 
expanding economic opportunity. Corporate Social Responsibility Report 
Initiative, Report No.19, Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University. 
Switzer, L. N., & Tang, M. (2009). The impact of corporate governance on the 
performance of U.S. Small-Cap Firms. International Journal of' Business, 14(4), 
341-356. 
Syriopoulos, T., & Tsatsaronis, M. (2012). Corporate governance mechanisms and 
financial performance: CEO duality in shipping firms. Eurasian Business 
Review, 2(1), 1-30.  
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2007). Using Multivariate Statistics (5th. Ed.). USA: 
Pearson Education Inc.  
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2013). Using multivariate statistics (6th ed.). New 
Jersey: Person Education Inc.  
Tao, N. B., & Hutchinson, M. (2013). Corporate governance and risk management: The 






Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 9(1), 83-99. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2013.03.003.  
Teeratansirikool, L., Siengthai, S., Badir, Y., & Charoenngam, C. (2013). Competitive 
strategies and firm performance: the mediating role of performance 
measurement. International Journal of Productivity and Performance 
Management, 62(2), 168-184.  
The Commonwealth Yearbook (2015). Retrieved on 04/04/2016 online from 
http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/yb-pdfs/nigeria_country_profile.pdf 
Topal, Y., & Dogan, M. (2014). Impact of Board Size on Financial Performance: The 
Case of BIST Manufacturing Industry, International Journal of Business 
Management and Economic Research (IJBMER), 5(4), 74-79. 
Tosuni, G. (2013). The impact of corporate governance on the performance of financial 
institutions (Doctoral dissertation, Staffordshire University). 
Tsai, W. H., Hung, J. H., Kuo, Y. C., & Kuo, L. (2006). CEO tenure in Taiwanese family 
and nonfamily firms: An agency perspective. Family Business Review, 19(1), 
11-28. 
Tukey, J. W. (1949). One degree of freedom for non-additivity. Biometrics, 5(3), 232-
242. 
U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO (1996). Content Analysis: A Methodology for 







Uadiale, O. M. (2010). The Impact of Board Structure on Corporate Financial 
Performance in Nigeria. International Journal of Business Management, 5(10), 
155-166.  
Ujunwa, A. (2012). Board characteristics and the financial performance of Nigerian 
quoted firms. Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in 
society, 12(5), 656-674.  
Vafeas, N. (1999). Board meeting frequency and firm Performance, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 53, 113-142. 
Vance, S. C. (1978).  Assessing corporate performance by boardroom attributes. Journal 
of Business Research, 6, 203-220. 
Vance, S. C. (1983). Corporate leadership: Boards, directors, and strategy. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Velnampy, T., & Pratheepkanth, P. (2013). Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance: A Study of Selected Listed Companies in Sri Lanka, European 
Journal of Commerce and Management Research (EJCMR), 2(6), 123-127.  
Villiers, C. D., Naiker, V., & Staden, C. J. V. (2011). The effect of board characteristics 
on firm environmental performance. Journal of Management, 37, 1636-1663. 
Wang, M. C. (2017). The Relationship between Firm Characteristics and the Disclosure 






Wang. Y., & Oliver, J. (2009). Board composition and firm performance variance: 
Australian evidence. Accounting Research Journal, 22(2), 196-2 12. 
http://dx.doi: 10.1 10810309610910987510.  
Ward, J., & Mendoza, D. (1996). Work in the family business. Current Research 
Occupations and Professions, 9, 167-188. 
Watts, W.  (2016, April, 4). Oil ends at lowest level in a month as hope dims for 
production freeze. Market Watch. Retrieved April 6, 2016, from 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/oil-prices-under-pressure-as-hopes-dim-
for-production-cuts-2016-04-04.   
Weber, R. P. (1990). Basic content analysis (No. 49). USA: Sage University Press. 
Weber, S. (2010). bacon: An effective way to detect outliers in multivariate data using 
Stata (and Mata). Stata Journal, 10(3), 331. 
Wei, G. (2007). Ownership structure, corporate governance and company performance 
in China. Asia Pacific Business Review, 13(4), 5 19-545. 
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management 
Journal, 42, 171-180. 
West, S. G., Finch, J. F., & Curran, P. J. (1995). Structural equation models with 
nonnormal variables: Problems and remedies. In R. H. Hoyle (Ed.), Structural 







Whetten, D. A. (1987). Organizational growth and decline process. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 13, 335-358. 
White, H. (1980). A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a 
direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric 
Society, 817-838. 
Williamson, O. E. (1984). Corporate governance. Yale Law Review, 93, 1197-1219. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.23071796256.  
Wong, S. P. (2012). The impact of culture on risk management disclosures: an 
exploratory study of international banks. Southern Cross University, 
ePublications@SCU, Theses.  
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 
Cambridge: MIT Press.  
World Bank Country Report (2014). Retrieved on 04/04/2016 online from 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria.  
Wu, M. C., Lin, H. C., Lin, I. C., & Lai, C. F. (2009). The effects of corporate 
governance on firm performance. Changua: National Changua University of 
Education. 
Yasser, Q. R., Entebang, H., & Mansor, S. A. (2011). Corporate governance and firm 
performance in Pakistan: The case of Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). Journal 






Yasser, Q. R., Mamun, A. A., & Rodrigs, M. (2017). Impact of board structure on firm 
performance: evidence from an emerging economy. Journal of Asia Business 
Studies, 11(2), 210-228. 
Yatim, P. (2010). Board structures and the establishment of a risk management 
committee by Malaysian listed firms. Journal of Management and Governance, 
14(1), 17-36.  DOI: 10.1007/s10997-009-9098-6.  
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of 
directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185–211. 
Yilmaz, C., & Buyuklu, A. H. (2016). IMPACT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
ON FIRM PERFORMANCE: TURKEY CASE WITH A PANEL DATA 
ANALYSIS. Eurasian Journal of Economics and Finance, 4(1), 56-72. Doi: 
10.15604/ejef.2016.01.004.  
Zahra, A. S., & Pearce II, A. J. (1989). Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial 
Performance: A Review and Integrative Model, Journal of Management, 15(2), 
291-334.  
Zeitun, R., & Tian, G. G. (2007). Capital structure and corporate performance: evidence 
from Jordan. Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal, 1(4), 40-
61. 
Zhang, I. X. (2007). Economic consequences of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 










Listed Financial Service Companies in Nigeria as at December, 2016. 
S/n Company Name 
1 Abbey Mortgage Bank Plc 
2 Access Bank Plc. 
3 Africa Prudential Registrars Plc 
4 African Alliance Insurance Company Plc 
5 AIICO Insurance Plc. 
6 Aso Savings and Loans Plc 
7 Axamansard Insurance Plc 
8 Consolidated Hallmark Insurance Plc 
9 Continental Reinsurance Plc 
10 Cornerstone Insurance Company Plc. 
11 Custodian and Allied Plc 
12 Deap Capital Management & Trust Plc 
13 Diamond Bank Plc 
14 Ecobank Transnational Incorporated 
15 Equity Assurance Plc. 
16 Fbn Holdings Plc 
17 Fcmb Group Plc. 
18 Fidelity Bank Plc 
19 Fortis Microfinance Bank Plc 
20 Goldlink Insurance Plc 
21 Great Nigerian Insurance Plc 
22 Guaranty Trust Bank Plc. 
23 Guinea Insurance Plc. 
24 Infinity Trust Mortgage Bank Plc 
25 International Energy Insurance Company Plc 
26 Lasaco Assurance Plc. 
27 Law Union and Rock Ins. Plc. 
28 Linkage Assurance Plc 
29 Mutual Benefits Assurance Plc. 
30 N.E.M Insurance Co (Nig.) Plc. 
31 Niger Insurance Co. Plc. 
32 Nigeria Energy Sector Fund 
33 Npf Microfinance Bank Plc 
34 Omoluabi Savings and Loans Plc 






36 Regency Alliance Insurance Company Plc 
37 Resort Savings & Loans Plc 
38 Royal Exchange Plc. 
39 Sim Capital Alliance Value Fund    
40 Skye Bank Plc 
41 Sovereign Trust Insurance Plc 
42 Stanbic Ibtc Holdings Plc 
43 Standard Alliance Insurance Plc. 
44 Standard Trust Assurance Plc 
45 Sterling Bank Plc. 
46 Unic Insurance Plc. 
47 Union Bank Nig. Plc. 
48 Union Homes Savings and Loans Plc. 
49 United Bank for Africa Plc 
50 Unity Bank Plc 
51 Unity Kapital Assurance Plc 
52 Universal Insurance Company Plc 
53 Wapic Insurance Plc 
54 Wema Bank Plc. 
55 Zenith International Bank Plc 



















List of Sampled Firms in the Study (N=45) 
 Banks  Non-Banks 
S/N   S/N  S/N  
1 Access Bank  1 Abbey Mortgage Bank 16 Linkage Assurance Plc 
2 Diamond Bank Plc  2 African Alliance Ins. Plc 17 Mutual Benefits Assurance 
3 Ecobank Plc  3 Aiico Insurance Plc 18 N.E.M Insurance Co. Plc 
4 First Bank Plc  4 Axamansard Insurance  19 Niger Insurance Plc 
5 Fcmb Plc  5 Consolidated Hallmark  20 NPF Microfinance Bank Plc 
6 Fidelity Bank Plc  6 Continental Reinsurance  21 Prestige Assurance Co. Plc 
7 Guaranty Trust Bank Plc   7 Cornerstone Insurance 22 Regency Alliance Ins. Plc 
8 Skye Bank Plc  8 Custodian & Allied Plc 23 Resort Savings & Loans Plc 
9 Stanbic Ibtc Plc  9 Equity Assurance Plc 24 Royal Exchange Plc 
10 Sterling Bank Plc  10 Goldlink Insurance Plc 25 Sovereign Trust Insurance 
11 Union Bank Plc  11 Guinea Insurance Plc 26 Standard Alliance Ins. Plc 
12 UBA Plc  12 Infinity Trust Mortgage 27 Standard Trust Assurance 
13 Unity Bank Plc  13 International Energy Plc 28 Unity Kapital Assurance Plc 
14 Wema Bank Plc  14 Lasaco Assurance Plc 29 Universal Insurance Plc 
15 Zenith Bank Plc  15 Law Union & Rocks Ins. Plc 30 Wapic Insurance Plc 








This coding book is specifically designed for the collection of data via contents of 
audited accounts and reports of listed financial service firms for part of the research 
titled: Board Attributes, Risk Management, and Firm Performance: An Analysis of 
Listed Financial Service Firms in Nigeria. The research is being carried out by 
Mahmud Mohammed Kakanda, Tunku Puteri Intan Safinaz-School of Accounting 
(TISSA), Universiti Utara Malaysia. The data is related to the study objectives that 
aimed to: determine the extent risk management practice and disclosure; examine the 
relationship between risk management practice and disclosure and performance of listed 
financial service fmns in Nigeria. 
Instructions 
► All the coders MUST study and understand this coding book very well before 
coding of the annual reports selected for this study. 
► All coders MUST strictly follow the operationalized concepts and meanings 
contained in this book. 
► All coders are urged to always refer to this book for clarification and general 
guide. 
► After picking an annual report, the coder is expected to read through it 
meticulously to identify unit of the statement that answers the category then 
record it by ticking YES or NO in the coding sheet as applicable. 
► Please use one code sheet for each annual report. 
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Categories operationalization 
ID ( ·atq,:oril's <)pl·rationali1ation 
1 Coder ID Write your ID as applicable. 
(Names, but can be initialized) e.g. MKs 
2 Company ID Record the company ID as applicable. 
Find in the list of companies in subsequent pages. I f--
3 Annual report No. The annual report number is determined in order of 
analysis within the coding work sheet assigned to I 
each other. 
4 Date (in year). Record the date (in year) for each annual report being 
coded. 
RMDCl Governance structure related to risk Record as YES where an annual report shows that 
management. there is availability of a risk management committee, 
if otherwise NO. 
RMDC2 Risk management committee responsibility Record YES if there is availability of explanations 
and function. on responsibilities and functions of risk management 
committee, if otherwise NO. 
RMDC3 Description of risk management policies and Record YES if there is availability of explanations to 
objectives. risk management policies and objectives of the firms, 
otherwise NO. 
RMDC4 Audit committee responsibility and functions. Record YES where explanations are available on 
audit committee structure and their responsibil ities, 
and NO if otherwise. 
RMDCS Capital/Market risk disclosure. Record YES where information is available 
regarding Interest rate, Exchange rate, Commodity 
(stocks), Liquidity, and Credit, otherwise NO. 
RMDC6 Environmental risk disclosure. Record YES for availability of information on 
Health & Safety (Injury & illness, harm & 
accidents), erosion of brand name, and corporate 
social responsibil ity ( scholarship fo r students, 
building of schools, road , water boreholes etc.), 
otherwise NO. 
RMDC7 Operational risk and other risks disclosure. Record YES where information is available on 
customer satisfaction, product development, 
sourcing, product and service failure, stock 
obsolescence and shrinkage, otherwise NO. 
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Coding Sheet 
1 Coder ID 
2 Company 
3 Annual Report No. 
4 Date (in year) 
RMDCl Governance structure related to risk management YO NO 
RMDC2 Risk management committee responsibility and YO NO 
function 
RMDC3 Description of risk management policies and YO NO 
objectives 
RMDC4 Audit committee responsibility and functions YO NO 
RMDC5 Capital/Market risk disclosure YO N 
RMDC6 Environmental risk disclosure YO NO 
RMDC7 Operational risk and other risks disclosure YO N 
Note: Y=Yes and N=No, while Yes stands for the value of' l ' and No is 'O ' . 
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Appendix IV 
Frequency Tables for Risk Management Disclosure Categories (SPSS v.20 output) 
Governance Struc. Related to Risk Mgt 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Disclosure 225 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Risk Mgt C'mtee Responsibility & Function 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Disclosure 225 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Description of Risk Mgt Policies & Objs 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Disclosure 157 69.8 69.8 69.8 
Valid No Disclosure 68 30.2 30.2 100.0 
Total 225 100.0 100.0 
Audit C'mtee Responsibility & Function 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Disclosure 225 100.0 100.0 100.0 
408 
Capital/Market Risk Disclosure 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Disclosure 148 65.8 65.8 65.8 
Valid No Disclosure 77 34.2 34.2 100.0 
Total 225 100.0 100.0 
Environmental Risk Disclosure 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Disclosure 110 48.9 48.9 48.9 
Valid No Disclosure 115 51.1 51 .1 100.0 
Total 225 100.0 100.0 
Operational Risk & Other Risks Dislcosure 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Disclosure 104 46.2 46.2 46.2 
Valid No Disclosure 121 53.8 53.8 100.0 
Total 225 100.0 100.0 
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Risk Management Disclosure 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
7 36 16.0 16.0 16.0 
6 66 29.3 29.3 45.3 
5 74 32.9 32.9 78.2 
Valid 
4 29 12.9 12.9 91.1 
3 20 8.9 8.9 100.0 
Total 225 100.0 100.0 
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